An original action in this court for the writ of mandamus against the defendant to compel him to register a certain certificate of title in accordance with the provisions of section  122 of Act No. 496 of the Philippine  Commission.

The petition presented by the plaintiff is as follows:

"1. That plaintiff  is a citizen of the United States of America, of age, and a resident of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands;  that  defendant  is,  and at all times herein referred to has  been, an officer  of the Government of the Philippine  Islands, to wit, the acting register  of deeds of the subprovince of Benguet, and is a resident of the municipality of Baguio in said subprovince.

"II. That plaintiff,  in accordance with  the laws of the Philippine  Islands, has located  a mineral claim on  public and  unoccupied land  in the  barrio of Bua, municipality of Itogon, subprovince of Benguet, has complied with all the requirements of law  precedent to the issue of  a patent in favor of plaintiff, and that a patent for the said mineral claim has  been  issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands for said mineral claim in the name of  plaintiff and filed by the official who issued said  patent with defendant as register of deeds of the subdivision of Benguet; that the said mineral claim is known and recorded as the 'Ultimo Mineral Claim,' and is fully  and adequately described in the aforesaid patent.

"III.  That plaintiff has paid to defendant P6, Philippine currency, as fees for the issue of a certificate of title in favor of plaintiff for the aforesaid mineral claim in accordance with the aforesaid patent, and has demanded of defendant that the latter issue  such certificate; that defendant neglects and refuses to issue such certificate,  unless and until plaintiff shall pay to defendant  one-tenth of one per cent of the value of  plaintiff's aforesaid mineral claim for an assurance fund  and  shall file  with defendant  sworn declarations of three disinterested persons that the value fixed by plaintiff is fair; that plaintiff has refused to pay any sum whatever for an  assurance  fund and  has refused to file such sworn declarations or to fix a value, and upon  such refusal has again demanded of defendant that he issue  a certificate as aforesaid; that defendant thereupon refused and continues to refuse and neglect to issue to plaintiff  a certificate of title for the mineral claim  aforesaid.

"IV.  That plaintiff  has  no plain, speedy, and  adequate remedy in the ordinary courts  of law,  other than a  writ of  mandate to  be issued  to  defendant commanding him forthwith to enter a certificate of title in the name of plaintiff for the aforesaid  mineral claim and issue an owner's duplicate certificate therefor to plaintiff.

"Wherefore, plaintiff prays that judgment be entered granting a peremptory order against defendant, commanding him, immediately  after the  receipt of such order, to enter a certificate of title in accordance  with the provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496 in the name of plaintiff for the 'Ultimo Mineral Claim,' as described in the patent issued in plaintiff's name by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to issue an owner's duplicate thereof to, plaintiff; and plaintiff further prays  that he be given judgment against defendant for his costs herein."

To this  petition the defendant presented a demurrer, basing the same upon the following reasons:

"1. Because it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff has not done all that is required by the provisions of the Land Registration Act to entitle him to demand  the, registration of the patent and  the entry  of a certificate of title and the  issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate under section 122 of said Act.

"2. Because it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff has refused to pay the one-tenth of one per centum of the fair value of  the  land or any  sum whatever for the assurance fund, which  by section 99 of said Land Registration Act,  as  amended, is expressly made .payable to the register of  deeds upon  the original registration  of  any land under said Act.

"3.  Because it does not appear from  the complaint that the defendant has unlawfully neglected or refused to perform  any act which the law  specially  enjoins  as a duty resulting from his office as register of deeds, or that he has unlawfully excluded the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of any right to which he is entitled, and it does not appear that the duty is specially enjoined upon the register of deeds to register a patent  to public land and enter a certificate of  title thereto and  issue an owner's duplicate certificate without the payment to him of the one-tenth of one per centum of the assessed or fair value of the real estate at the time of such original registration."

The petitioner claims that he has complied with all the requirements of law precedent to the issuance of a patent in his favor and that a patent for a mineral claim has been issued by the  Government of the Philippine Islands to the plaintiff and has been filed by the official who issued said patent with the defendant as register of deeds of the subprovince of Benguet.  This  patent was filed with the register of deeds of the subprovince of Benguet for registration in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496.  It is alleged by the petitioner that the register of deeds  refused to register such  patent unless and until  he should pay the fee provided for in section 99 of Act No. 496. The question  presented  to  the  court by the demurrer is whether or not it  is the plain and specific  duty of the register of deeds  to  register  said  patent without demanding the fee provided for in section 99 of said Act No. 496. Section 37 of the Act of Congress of July 1,1902, provides how persons, associations, or corporations  may secure patents to mineral claims.

Section 122  of Act No. 496 (which Act  is known as the Act providing for  the registration of lands under the Torrens system) provides that "Wherever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to  the  Government  of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,  granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."

Section 73 of Act No. 926 provides that patents to public lands shall be issued "in the name of the United States and the  Philippine  Government under  the signature  of the Civil Governor; but such  patents  (patents to public lands) or certificates shall be effective only for the purposes defined in section 122 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), and the actual conveyance of  the land shall be effected only  as provided in said section."

That part of section 122  (Act No. 496)  to which said section 73 (Act No. 926) refers is as follows:

"The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or  bind the land, but shall  operate only as a contract between the  Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.  The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this Act (No. 496) registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies.  The fees  for registration shall be paid by the grantee.  After due registration and issue of the certificate and 'Owner's duplicate,' such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act."

The petitioner contends that the only fee for registration which he  is required to pay is the fee of $3 (P6) provided for in section 114 of Act No. 496.

The respondent contends that all patents and certificates granting  "public lands" issued by the Government of the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, in order to be registered in accordance with the provisions of section 122 (Act No. 496), the holder thereof must pay the fee provided for in section 99 of said Act.

Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission provides for a system of registration of land titles  under a system popularly known as the "Torrens system."  Said Act provides for the registration of titles to lands held by individuals, or, in other words, the registration of titles to lands which have already been granted by the State to private persons.   Section 19 provides who may make application for registration of title.   Section 21, as amended by Act No. 809, provides the form of application.  Sections 29 and 41 provide for the registration or recording of the decree of the court granting the registration of  the title under  said  Act.  Section 99 provides that in the original registration or  recording (meaning simply the first registration under the "Torrens system")  that there shall  be paid to the register of deeds one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed value of the  real estate, on the basis of  the last assessment  for  municipal taxation,  as an assurance  fund.   Act No. 700 of the Philippine Commission provides for the method of ascertaining the value  of the land, in case the same has not been theretofore assessed  for taxation.

Act No. 926 of the Philippine  Commission provides for the issuing of patents to public  lands in six different cases, as follows:

First.  Sections 1 to 9, for patents to  homesteads on the public domain.

Second. Sections 10 to 21, for sales  of portions of the public domain.

Third.  Sections 22 to 31, for leases  of portions of the public domain.

Fourth. Sections 32 to 35, for free  patents to individual settlers on portions of the public domain.

Fifth.   Sections  36 to 53, for the  reservation of town sites.

Sixth.  Sections  54  to 67, for  unperfected titles  and Spanish grants and concessions of the public domain.

In each of the above grants or patents issued in accordance  with the provisions  applicable thereto no  provision whatever  is made for the payment of a fee for the registration of the patent,  except under the patent granted for unperfected titles  and Spanish  grants and concessions of the public domain, where, in section 57 (Act No. 926), we find this provision:

"The fees provided to be paid for the registration of lands under the Land Registration Act (No. 496)  shall be collected from applicants under this chapter, except that upon the original registration of  the land claimed hereunder no fee shall be required for the assurance fund."

We believe that this exception is significant of the fact that it was the intention  of  the lawmaking body to require the payment of the fees  for the registration of patents to public lands issued under the provisions of said  Act No. 926.  This view is emphasized by the fact that section 122 (Act No. 496) expressly  provides that all patents to public lands  shall be brought forthwith under the provisions of the Act providing for the registration  of the land under the "Torrens system."  Had  it been the intention of the law- making body - as  the petitioner claims - not to require the payment of one-tenth of 1 per cent by the holder of a patent to public land for the registration of the same, then why did the Commission expressly relieve the holder of a patent to a portion of the public  domain (of unperfected titles and Spanish grants and concessions) from the payment of this fee, when at the same time they had brought all  patents to public lands under the provisions of Act No. 496?

It will be noted by comparing section 41 of Act  No. 496 with section 122 of the same Act, the former relating to the registration of titles to private lands and the latter to the registration of public lands, that  the  procedure, after the decree, in the first instance, is granted by the court, and the patent, in the  second,  by the Governor (see section 73, Act No. 926) is substantially the same.   It is as  follows. Section 41 provides "Immediately upon the entry  of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of  the court, to  the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called  the 'Registration Book,'  *  *  *.  The entry made by the  register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court.  *   *  *   The register of deeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words 'Owner's duplicate certificate,' and  deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney duly authorized."

Section 122 in part provides "It shall be the duty of the official (the  Governor-General)  issuing the instrument of alienation, grant,  or conveyance in behalf of the Government to  cause such instrument,  before  its delivery to the grantee,  to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon  a certificate  shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an 'Owner's duplicate certificate' issued to the grantee."

It will be  noted also that section 122 provides that this patent, "before  its delivery to the grantee," shall be  filed with the register  of deeds  *   *   *  "to be  there  registered like other deeds and conveyances."

What does the phrase "like other deeds and conveyances," when applied to these patents and the  registration of the same, mean? It  can only mean titles issued under  said Act No.  496.  It  can not be construed to apply  to titles given or executed between  private parties, for  the reason that registration  under the "Torrens system" makes no effort to change the method of transferring or registering titles granted by or to private persons, nor for the issuance of an "Owner's duplicate certificate."

It will be noted further that after the patent is filed with the register  of  deeds for the proper  province, that a  certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an "Owner's duplicate certificate" issued to the grantee. This provision of said section 122 shows clearly  that the phrase in said  section "to be there  registered like other deeds and conveyances" must necessarily refer to "other deeds and conveyances issued in accordance with  the  provisions of law granting 'Torrens titles.'"

All these Acts must be construed together.   If we were to construe section 41 alone (Act No. 496)  we might conclude that the register of property would be compelled to register a private title or a title to private lands granted under said Act without the collection of any  fee or fees whatever.  This section, read alone, seems to be mandatory in its terms.  It says nothing about the collection of fees; yet no  one contends  that the fees provided for in section 99 of said Act must not be paid before the owner  of the "original title" is entitled to the certificate.

Section  122 provides that the  register of deeds must collect  the  fees.  To  what does  the  word  "fees" apply? Section 57 of Act No. 926 says that the fees provided for the registration  of  lands, under the Land Registration Act, shall be collected from the applicants, except that no fee shall be required for an assurance fund.

Section 114 of Act No. 496 as amended by  section 7 of Act  No. 1648, as well as by section 11 of  Act No. 1699, provides what fees shall be collected  in the course  of the proceedings for the registration of titles under the "Torrens system" and the amount in each case.   This section  (114) with its amendments read alone might be construed to include or cover all fees.   It will be noted, however, that all these fees are for services actually rendered by the officers of the Court of Land Registration or by the register of deeds of the province, etc.,  while the fee under section 99  is not for services at all, but for the purpose of creating an "assurance fund."

The applicant admitted, by paying the fee for recording or registering his patent, that section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended, was applicable to  a  patent for public  lands. An examination of section 114, as amended, shows that the only fee or fees collectible are fees  for services  actually rendered by employees of the Government.

Section 6 of Act  No. 1699 provides  that all fees for the services of the clerk of the Court of Land Registration shall be deposited in the Insular  Treasury,  and all fees  payable for the  services of  the register  of  deeds, etc.,  shall be deposited in the provincial treasury, or in the case of the register of the city of Manila, then  they shall be deposited in the Insular Treasury.

These funds are not available  for the payment of any damages which may  result to  the real owner of  property by reason  of an illegal or  improper registration under the "Torrens system"  in  the  name  of  another, not  the real owner.   (See sees.  100, 101,102,  and 103, Act No.  496.)

The "assurance fund" is created for the purpose of paying any damages which may result from an improper or illegal registration.  All the people of the Philippine Archipelago may be taxed for the purpose of paying  these damages if the "assurance fund" is  not sufficient,   (Sec. 103, Act No.  496.)   A large portion  of the lands of the Archipelago still belong to  the public domain.  All original patents granted thereto are given the advantage  and protection of the provisions of Act No. 496. Why should the future holders of these original patents be entitled to the protection  of  this law without sharing its burdens?  We believe  that when the legislative department of the Government provided that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands,  *  *   *   are  alienated, granted, or  conveyed to persons or to public or to private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under  the operation of this  Act  (No. 496) and  shall become registered lands," thereby giving the holder of  these  original patents the benefit of said Act (No. 496), it intended also to impose upon such grantees the burdens of said Act.  But in  reply to this consideration we are met with the question,  Why should the  Government require a  fund to insure against its own  acts, thereby implying that  there  is no possibility of mistakes occurring in the  granting of these patents and that  there  is no possibility of the occurrence of damages? The, literally,  hundreds of  cases which have  been  brought in the courts of the United States to set aside original patents granted by the Government  which have been secured by fraud, mistake, etc., are a complete answer to this  contention.

We are of the opinion and so hold that when the legislative department of the Government provided  in  section 99 of Act No. 496 that "Upon the original registration of land  under this Act," etc.,  "there  shall be  paid  to the register of deeds one-tenth of one per cent of the assessed value of the real estate," etc.; and when it provided that "Whenever  public lands," etc., "are  alienated, granted, or conveyed," etc.,  "the same shall be brought forthwith under the provisions of this Act" (sec. 122, Act No. 496), that it intended to bring all future titles  granted  to public lands immediately under the  "Torrens system"  and  that such holders, in  order to secure the registration of such titles, should make a contribution to the "assurance fund."

It not being the clear and  specific legal duty,  therefore, of the defendant to register the patent in question without requiring the payment of the fee  provided for  in  section 99 of Act No. 496, the demurrer is hereby sustained with costs, and the  petitioner  is hereby  given  ten days from receipt  of notice of this decision in which to amend his petition, if  he so desires.   If the petition  is not amended within ten days, then let a judgment be entered with costs denying the issuance of the writ  of mandamus prayed for  in said petition.  So ordered.

Arellano,  C. J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

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DISSENTING



MORELAND, J.,

In this dissenting opinion I shall discuss  the case at bar in two aspects.   In the first place, upon the plain provisions of the  laws invoked in support of the majority opinion, the plaintiff is  entitled to the writ prayed for.   In the second place, if  those laws mean what the majority of the court claim they do, then they are utterly and irremediably in violation of the express provisions  of the  Philippine Bill, and, therefore, null and void.

First, as to the plain provisions of the  laws:

After full compliance on his  part with the provisions of the mining laws, there was issued to plaintiff a  patent for the "Ultimo" mineral claim,  in the subprovince  of Benguet.  This patent, instead of being delivered personally to the plaintiff, .was,  in accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496, sent to defendant as register of deeds of the province where the patented land is situated.   That section is as follows:

"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the  Government  of the  United  States or to  the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed  to persons or to public or private corporations, the  same shall be brought forthwith under the  operation of this Act and shall become registered lands.  It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument, before  its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like  other deeds  and conveyances,  whereupon  a certificate  shall be entered as in other cases of registered land,  and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the grantee.   The deed, grant,  or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a  conveyance or bind  the  land, but shall operate only as a contract  between  the  Government and the  grantee and as evidence  of authority to  the clerk or  register  of deeds  to  make registration.   The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be  made in  the office of  the  register of deeds for  the province where the land lies.  The fees  for  registration shall be  paid by the grantee.  After due  registration  and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this  Act."

Plaintiff paid  to  defendant P6 to  cover the  fees  for registration, raising no question as to whether any fees may lawfully  be required of him, nor as to the amount thereof, and desiring only to cover the full amount that defendant may lawfully be entitled to charge for entering a certificate of title and  issuing  a  duplicate  thereof to the  plaintiff. Defendant now requires of plaintiff a further payment of one-tenth of 1 per cent of the value of the patented land for  an assurance fund, and requires plaintiff to file the affidavits of three disinterested persons for the purpose of showing that the value fixed by plaintiff is just.  Defendant doubtless relies for such  requirement upon section 99 of Act No. 496, which, as amended by Act No. 700, reads as follows:

"Upon the original registration  of land under this Act, and also upon the entry of a certificate showing title as registered owners in heirs or devisees, there shall be paid to the register of deeds one-tenth of one per centum of the assessed value of the real estate on  the basis of the last assessment for municipal taxation, as an assurance fund.

"In case land is subdivided subsequent to the last assessment and registration proceedings are had as  to a portion only of such land, the value of such portion, for  the purposes of this section  and for the payment required by paragraph four of section one hundred and fourteen, shall be fixed by agreement between the applicant and the tax collector of the city or province where the land  is situated and shall be proportioned to the value such  land bears to the whole tract assessed.  In case of disagreement between the tax collector and the applicant as to the  value of the land, the question shall be submitted to the court for decision.

"Where land sought to be registered has not been assessed for taxation, its value, for the purposes of this Act shall be its market value, and the applicant shall file with his application  the  sworn declaration  of three  disinterested persons that the value fixed by him is to their knowledge a fair valuation.

"The court is authorized  to increase  the  valuation  as fixed  under the two preceding paragraphs should it appear upon  the hearing that the value stated in the application is too small."

The issue is therefore this: Defendant contends that his registration of the patent, entering of the  certificate, and issue  of  the duplicate, under section  122, constitutes "the original registration of land under this Act," as the phrase is used in section  99;  while plaintiff maintains that "the original registration of land under this Act" does not embrace the proceedings of a register of deeds under section 122.

It is apparent that sections 99 to 107 of the Land Registration Act provide in effect an insurance of titles, and that the payment of one-tenth of 1 per cent upon original registration is practically a premium for such insurance.

Act No. 496 provides  two ways in  which land may be brought under the Torrens system.   The  first way is  by judicial proceedings in the Court of Land Registration, terminating in the decree of that court.   The second way is by proceedings purely administrative taken upon the alienation of public lands.  The first method is provided for in sections 19 to 49; the second by section 122.  I submit that only the first method, that is, registration upon a judicial decree, is meant by the phrase "original registration," as employed in section 99.

If it  should  appear that the phrase "original  registration" is used with a particular meaning in previous sections of Act  No. 496, then it may fairly be assumed that it is used with  the  same meaning in  section 99.  Sections  19 to 49 of the Act, covering judicial proceedings in the Court of Land  Registration,  are  grouped  under the  general heading "ORIGINAL REGISTRATION."  Again examining section 99, as amended  by Act No. 700, we find  that the three paragraphs  added  by Act No. 700  indicate clearly that "original registration," as used in that section, refers only to  registration upon judicial decree, and that the insurance premium is to be paid only for a judicial proceeding.   Where, for  instance, registered land has not  been assessed for taxation,  its market  value must be stated by the applicant in his application,  and this  must be accompanied by three disinterested affidavits confirming the value fixed by the applicant.  And so, where land has been subdivided since the last assessment,  the tax collector and the applicant shall agree upon the assessment value of the parcel sought  to  be registered.  Upon reference to the sections under the  head of original registration, we find that "applicant" is the term used for the petitioner in the Court of Land Registration,  and  "application"  is the technical name for his petition.   The form of application contained in section  21, in its second  clause, provides for fixing  the value.  All this is entirely inapplicable to the registration upon the alienation of public lands.  "Applicant" and "application"  unquestionably  refer to the party  and  to  his pleading in the Court of Land  Registration; and although public lands,  previous to  the issue of patent, are  not  assessed for  taxation, there is no  provision under the mining laws  whereby the locator of a mineral claim is required at any stage of the proceedings to fix the value of his claim. Defendant requires plaintiff  to file the affidavits of three disinterested  persons that the  value  fixed  by plaintiff is fair.  This requirement is evidently based upon section 99 as amended, and its inapplicability is evident from the fact that plaintiff has never fixed any value, as that was  wholly unnecessary in the proceeding he took.

Again, section 99, as  amended, provides that  in case of a subdivision after the last assessment, if there is disagreement between the tax collector and the applicant the question shall be submitted to  the court for decision; and that if the value fixed by the applicant should appear, upon  the hearing, too small, the  court is authorized  to increase it. This  indicates beyond  question that   section  99 has  reference only to "original registration," that is  to  say, to registration upon a decree of  court.   In  the proceedings by this  plaintiff for a title to his mineral claim, no court has intervened.

An examination  of section  122 of the Land Registration Act  confirms the  interpretation  which I have given to section  99.  It is there provided that upon the filing with the register of a patent  for public land, it shall  be "registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon  a  certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land." There is no provision in the Land Registration Act for a payment to the insurance fund  upon the registration of deeds and conveyances.   Such payment is made only upon "original registration"  (with the single  exception  of  the registration of  inheritances  and  devises).  Registration upon a judicial decree, under sections 19  to 49, is a ratification of an existing title; while a registration under section 122,  as  in  the case of "other deeds  and  conveyances," is the certification  of a  new  title to the grantee.  Registration,  under section 122, is therefore analogous to the entry of a  certificate under  section 57, rather than to the  entry of an original certificate under sections  41  and 42.

Again, section 122 provides: "The fees for registration shall  be paid by the grantee."  It is clear that the insurance premium provided for in section 99 is not a fee in any real sense,  and it would seem  to be  equally clear that if the legislature had intended to require a patentee of public lands to pay the insurance premium, section 122 would have so stated.

That the Philippine Commission understood the phrase "original registration  under this  Act" meant only registration upon a decree  of the Land Court,  as distinguished from  registration upon  the issue  of  a patent, is  also apparent  from an  examination of  Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, enacted in  pursuance  of  the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.  The  Public Land Act provides for the alienation of the public domain in six several ways: homesteads on the  public domain;  sales of portions of the public  domain;  leases of portions of the public domain; free patents to native settlers; town sites; and unperfected titles and Spanish grants and concessions. It provides that unperfected titles and Spanish grants shall be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration  leading to a decree  and the issue of  a certificate thereon  (sec. 63  of Act  No. 926).  All the other methods of alienation  are administrative  proceedings under the direction of the  Bureau  of Lands, and lead to the  issue of patents which are  to  be converted into  certificates of title in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496  (see  sec. 73  of  Act No.  926).   There can be no reason why an insurance  premium should be collected from native settlers entitled to  free patents, and none from applicants for the perfection of incomplete Spanish' grants; and yet we  find that  by the last sentence of section 57 of Act No. 926 the latter class are specifically exempted from the  payment of this  insurance premium.  It must,  therefore, have been the understanding of the Commission that specific exemption was  unnecessary in the case of persons obtaining patents  through  the Bureau  of Lands, for the reason that the issue of certificates upon such patents  is not  included in "original registration,"  as used in section 99 of Act No. 496,  and  that such exemption was necessary in cases where the certificates were issued upon a decree of the Court of Land Registration.

I have thus stated affirmatively the argument in a general way deducible  in favor of  plaintiff's case from the  plain provisions of  the   laws  invoked to sustain  the majority opinion in this  case,  I  now propose, in an amplification of those arguments, to examine the positions successively taken by the court in its opinion as it advanced the final conclusion.

It must be borne always in  mind that the court in its opinion is continually comparing two proceedings,  one a purely administrative proceeding for a patent  to public lands, that is,  a proceeding to obtain title, and  the other a  purely judicial  proceeding  to register  a title already acquired; and by such comparison drawing the conclusions upon which its judgment is based.   The court quotes as the basis of and reason for its  decision no law but the Public Land Law (No. 926)  and the Torrens Law (No. 496), the one providing for the administrative proceeding for a title and  the other the judicial  proceeding  upon a title already acquired.  The decision  admits, in effect, that the provisions of the Public Land  Law (No. 926), the law which provides how and under what conditions a patent to  public lands may be obtained,  do not expressly require an insurance premium to be paid as a part of such  proceeding, in other words, that the payment of an insurance premium or assessment is not, under said  law, a  part  of the proceeding,  a condition precedent to obtain title.  This admission is unquestionably in accordance with the fact.  Nowhere in said law is there  the slightest mention of the insurance premium or assurance fund.   The opinion also admits,  in the same way, that the provisions of the Torrens Law (Act No. 496), which  require the payment of  an  insurance  premium  or assessment as a condition precedent to the registration of title, do not expressly require the payment of such premium or assessment in proceedings under the Public Land Law. This admission is also unquestionably in accordance  with the fact; for nowhere in Act No.  496, the Torrens Law, is  there any express provision requiring such payment to be made.  Summarizing  these admissions of the court, it is  unquestioned  that there is no law  anywhere expressly requiring the payment of an insurance assessment in proceedings to obtain a  patent to public lands.   This is necessarily so.  If it were not, there  would have been no cause of this character here and these opinions would  not  have been written.  The provision requiring payment would have been expressed and no question  concerning the necessity of its payment  could have arisen.

As a result of this, the  necessity  for such payment must be interpreted, construed, spelled, implied out of the law, or the payment can not  be required.  That  is what the court has done.  It has compared and analyzed and inferred and deduced in order to require the payment.

It is a universal maxim of statutory construction  that where the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the  construction most in  accordance  with reason  and justice should be adopted; for it  will  not  be  presumed  that the legislature contemplated unreason or injustice.  The construction given by the court to the statutes  involved in the case at bar is, in  my humble judgment,  unjust and unreasonable.   I  have so much confidence in the judgment  of my associates and so little in my own that only  the sternest necessity,  as  I regard it, induces me to dissent from the  decision of the court in this  case.  If the decision did not  involve,  in my humble judgment, a  misapprehension of the  nature and purposes  of the Torrens  Law,  and an  opposition to the policy of  the  Government in relation to the  public lands, I would not permit myself to dissent.

The sole question is whether an individual who has purchased  from the Government  a  portion  of its  public land and paid  to the  Government the value thereof  as fixed by law, shall then be required, before he can register the deed which the Government has given  him, to pay to the Government a further  sum  to  insure  the very title which the Government has just  given him.  In other words, must a vendee for full value himself protect the title  of the vendor? That is  to  say,  must  the  vendee, in  the  absence of his agreement to  do  so, warrant the title of  the vendor?  The decision  of  the  court in  this  case says "yes."  For this reversal of  every principle of law and justice  relating to real estate  uninterruptedly applied in  every part  of the civilized world  from  Justinian  to Blackstone and  from Blackstone to Washburn,  some  solid  reason ought  to  be given.  Such  reason can not justly be construed by tortuous process  out of a doubtful situation.  It should not be necessary to spend pages in confrontation of  laws, in comparison of phraseology, in interpretation and substitution of words and  sentences, in  close  and intricate analysis, in strained construction and uncertain interpretation, in order to find such reason.  It should, in fairness and in justice, be so clear  and  plain as  to leave  absolutely no room for doubt.  It is an  invariable rule  of statutory construction and interpretation, as I have said before, that a statute will never be construed so  as to work injustice. To produce such a result the terms of the law must be  so plain as to require no construction.

The plaintiff  in  this case bought mining  lands of the Government.  He paid the full  purchase price therefor. The  Government granted him  a  patent.  When  it  was sought to record this  patent  in  the office of the register that functionary  refused to register it, unless the plaintiff should pay to the Government a certain sum to warrant the validity of that title.

It may be said, as the opinion indicates,  that the payment to the assurance fund is not to protect the patentee, but the person who may be injured by the bringing of the patentee's title under the Torrens Law; that it is  not the benefit to the  patentee but to the person injured by the operation of the law which is the basis of the requirement to pay.  But the instant reply is that if the person  who pays  gets no benefit, why should he  pay?  It is  unjust, unfair, if not absolutely unconstitutional, to require one to part with his property without consideration.  No law may compel one  to  pay  money solely  to  benefit  some one else. He must be  the one benefited  if  he  pays.  The only legal basis upon which the Torrens Law  can stand is that the one who pays  is the one who benefits.   If, on the other hand, it be held that the  patentee is benefited by the payment in that his  title  is thereafter  absolutely guaranteed, that the land itself can never be taken  away from him by reason of defects in the Government's title, the reply comes that the patentee, having paid the full consideration required by  the  Government,  and having obtained title from  the Government, his  title is already  guaranteed.  Can a title be better guaranteed than by having the  Government itself back of it?   What more can the Torrens Law offer  by way of a warranty than the power and resources of the Government itself?  Nothing  whatever. The  Government may repeal the Torrens Law utterly  and apply the assurance fund  to  other  purposes, but  it  can not, except  by  the odious and  infamous process  of repudiation, escape its contract  with a patentee to protect his  title.  When  the patentee paid  P25 per  hectare,  the full purchase price of the public land bought as fixed  by law, he then and there paid the full consideration for a warranty of title.   It could not have been intended that he pay a whole purchase price and  get  half a title.   It could not have been presumed that he should pay a sound price  and get an unsound title. The Government  which rigidly enforces  the maxim that a sound price  imports a  sound article  among its  citizens can not in decency refuse to apply  that doctrine to itself. This  being so, what is there of equity, fairness, or justice in the requirement that the patentee in this case shall again pay for the protection of his  title?  Why should he pay twice for the same thing?

But it  may be said that the Government's warranty of title  on the  sale is merely  a covenant running with  the land  and  does not insure  to the patentee the land itself; that  section  122, by  bringing the title under the  Torrens Law,  insures that the patentee shall retain the land itself whatever  the defect  in  the Government's title may have been; and that the patentee, being thus assured of something more  than he would get  under a covenant of warranty, should pay for it.  In reply it  may be noted, in the first place, that the fact that the land itself is assured to  the patentee  constitutes  in  the  law no  greater consideration than  the  covenant of warranty.  In the eyes of  the  law the one is as valuable as  the other.  Moreover, if should be observed  that inasmuch  as  section 122  provides  that the issuance and delivery  of the patent  do not  actually transfer the  title but operate merely as a contract  between the Government  and the patentee, and that the operative act to transfer  the title  is the registration,  it is evident that the assurance assessment is paid while the title is  yet in the Government.  Why,  then, is the Government  not justly the one to pay this assessment, if anyone is to pay it?  If anyone is being injured, he  is that one, and he is injured by reason of the Government selling lands which do not belong to  it.   The patentee pays and gets for such payment  absolutely  nothing in the  eye of  the law that he did not already have.

It should be noted, also,  that the payment  to  the  assurance fund, under the Torrens Law itself, is purely voluntary.  One is not obliged to apply for the registration of his title under that law.  It is wholly optional   One may leave his title as it was before the passage of that law.   The Legislature, in enacting that law, was very careful not to make registration compulsory.   One may assume the risk himself.  It was very careful also to provide that no title should suffer by reason of a failure to register.  Under the holding of the court in this case,  however, no choice is left to a patentee..  He must come  under that  law willy nilly.  He must pay whether he will  or not.  It  is of no significance that he is satisified with the title the Government gives him and  wishes no further guaranty than the Government itself. It is of no consequence that he is willing to assume  the risk himself.  He must take what the law offers whether he will or not, and whether it really  benefits him or not; and  he must pay for it, too.  I maintain that such a construction is unfair and unjust.   There is no reason whatever why one  who comes under the Torrens Law by virtue of having purchased land  from the Government should be obliged to pay, while all  other  owners or purchasers of real estate may pay or not as  they please. One who purchases public  lands is  assisting in carrying out a  great Government program, that of  the  development of the  resources of the Islands.   It is the manifest purpose of  the Insular Government to exploit  the great mineral wealth of this  country; to induce as  many  deserving persons as possible to take up homesteads; to develop the wealth of  the forests;  in short, to make  earth, field, and forest yield up their riches.  To  fasten upon every  person who desires to enter with heart and hand into this scheme of the Government an obligatory  payment as a  condition precedent to such cooperation is, to the extent of that obligation, to present an obstruction and a hindrance in the way of  the Government's  policy.

Moreover, the Torrens Law, by  its  very terms, applies only  to titles already acquired.  It does not apply to  the process of acquiring title.   It  simply  registers a title  already vested.   It does not pretend in any way to make compliance with any of its  provisions a condition precedent to the vesting of a title.   It begins to operate only after  the title  is vested. Section 19 of that law provides,  in part: "Application  for  registration  of title  may be made by the following persons, namely:

"First. The person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate  in fee simple."

By section 21 the application must contain the statement that  the applicant  is "the  owner in fee simple  (or by possessory information)" of  the land the title to which is to be registered.  That is to say, that before one is allowed even  to  initiate the proceedings  by which the title is  registered,  he  must be the owner  of the premises  or have such  interest therein  as the law  requires.  The  purpose of the law is to insure or assure a title already vested.   It was never intended to be a means of obtaining  title or to be a step in  or a part  of the proceedings by which that title was obtained.   This being so, section 122, Act No. 496, has no such significance or meaning as is given to it by the opinion of the court in this case.  That section provides:

"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine  Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or  to public or private corporations, the same shall  be brought  forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become  registered lands.  It  shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such  instrument, before its delivery  to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon  a certificate  shall be entered as in other cases  of registered land, and  an owner's duplicate certificate issued to  the  grantee.  The deed,  grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance to bind  the land,  but shall  operate only as a contract between the  Government and the  grantee and as evidence of the authority to  the clerk  or  register of deeds to  make the registration.  The act of registration shall be the operative act  to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies.  The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee.  After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act."

It provides, as is seen, that "whenever  public lands *   *   *  are conveyed  *  *  *  the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall oecome registered  lands,"  This  unquestionably  means  that the instant the sale is completed that instant they become registered lands; that  when one proceeding, namely,  the administrative proceeding for a  patent under Act No. 926, is  completed,  its results shall be the same, so far as the unimpeachability of the title is concerned, as are the results which  follow the judicial proceeding under Act. No. 496. But it emphatically does not say that  any proceeding or any payment  which is a condition precedent to that registration under the Torrens Law shall also be indispensable to the proceeding under the Public  Land Law.   When a proceeding under the Public Land Law is complete that is an end of it.   It can not, without express provision of law, be opened in order to put in  another condition to the completion of the  proceeding.   The evident intention  of that section, as it is also of the Public Land Law, Act No. 926, is to keep the  two proceedings wholly separate and  distinct while  they are in progress.   Each one shall proceed according to its  own law,  taking  its own forms,  pursuing  its own methods,  involving its own costs  and  expenses  and providing  for its own fees and disbursements.  The  two proceedings, as such, never touch,  never come in contact. They are never involved with each other until both are fully terminated.   Even  then  they do not touch.   They simply have the same result by express provision of law; and that provision  of law does absolutely nothing else than to affect results.  It does not affect or touch proceedings to obtain results. That this is the intention of section 122 is apparent from the provisions of the Public Land Law, Act No, 926. Under that law public lands may be patented for any one of six different purposes.  There is a separate and distinct proceeding required in each case.  Each proceeding is complete in itself.   The law states specifically and in detail what the applicant must do and what he must pay to obtain a patent. It also states that when he has done those things his patent shall be issued  to him.   He has done  everything that the law requires.   He has  paid his full  consideration.  The proceeding is then complete  in all of its essential features. Nothing remains to be done but to record the patent.  This is purely a clerical matter in no sense affecting the essentials of the proceeding.  But  even  this the patentee is not  required to do.  Section 122 expressly provides that the official shall cause the  patent to be registered.  It says: "It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation  *   *  *  to cause such instrument, before its delivery to the grantee,  to  be filed with  the register of deeds for the province where the land lies  and to be there registered like  other deeds and conveyances   *  *   *."

The quotation clearly concedes  that the patentee has done all  that the law requires him to do in order to bfhd the Government legally and morally  to  give  him a title.  The remainder, whatever it is, must be done by the Government itself.  That title,  having the Government  back of it, is as good as it can be.   Nothing can be added to it; nothing can be taken away from it.  He stands upon the proceedings he has taken, upon consideration he has paid, and justly demands his title.

But, says the  opinion of the court, and this is the central point of the decision, section 122 provides that "the fees for registration shall  be  paid by the grantee;" and  then asks, in substance, "does this not mean that he shall pay the insurance fund assessment, and if not, why not?"  The answer is  "no;" and  the  reason  is that the  plain and unmistakable language of the section  shows clearly that  no such thing was  intended  or thought of.  The section says that he shall  pay the "fees  for  registration" not an assurance fund fee or assessment.  The phrase "fees for registration" means what it says.  It is an  expression well known to the law.  It has a known and definite signification. It is a fee for registration, not for insurance.  It is something paid to a Government official for services performed by that official for the benefit of the payer  and not a thing paid to  the  Government in trust for someone  that the Government  has unjustly deprived of his  property.   It is a payment for valuable services rendered to the payee and not to purchase immunity for the Government or  some one else  for its  or his unjust and spoliative  acts committed against another.   To hold that the expression  "fees for registration" includes  an assessment for an insurance is fo violate language and rob it of its significance.

Moreover,  if anything more were needed to demonstrate the error involved in the construction given to said phrase by the court, it will be found in  section 114 of the same Act. Act  No. 496 is divided into headings, such as "Assurance Fund," "Powers of Attorney," "Lost Duplicate Certificates," "Adverse Claims,"  "Surrender of Duplicate Certificates," etc.  One of the divisions is headed in capital letters, "FEES FOR REGISTRATION."  Under this heading comes every charge which may be made, as a fee, from the beginning of the proceeding to its close.   That section reads:

"FEES FOR REGISTRATION.

"SEC. 114.  Fees payable under this Act shall be as follows:

"For  every application to bring  land under  this  Act, including indexing and  recording the same, and transmitting to the clerk, when filed with the register of deeds, three dollars.

"For every plan filed, seventy-five cents.

"For indexing any instrument recorded while application for registration is pending, twenty-five cents.

"For  examining title, five dollars and one-tenth  of one per centum  of the value of the land, as fixed by the last preceding valuation for the purposes of taxation.

"For each notice by mail, twenty-five cents and the actual cost of printing.

"For all services by a sheriff or other officer under this Act, the same fees as are now provided by law for like services.

"For each  notice by publication, twenty-five cents and the actual cost of publication.

"For entry of order dismissing application, or decree of registration, and  sending memorandum to register of deeds, one dollar.

"For copy of decree of registration,  one dollar.

"For entry  of original certificate of title  and issuing one duplicate certificate, three dollars.

"For making  and  entering a  new certificate  of  title, including issue of one duplicate certificate, one dollar.

"For each duplicate certificate, after the first, fifty cents.

"For the registration of every instrument, whether single or in duplicate or triplicate,  including entering, indexing, and filing the  same, and attesting registration thereof, and also  making  and attesting copy of memorandum on one instrument or on a duplicate certificate when required, one dollar and fifty cents.

"For making and attesting copy of memorandum1 on each additional instrument or  duplicate  certificate if required, fifty cents.

"For filing and registering an adverse claim, three dollars.

"For entering statement of change  of residence or  post-office  address, including indorsing and attesting the  same on a duplicate certificate, twenty-five cents.

"For entering any  note in the entry book or in the registration book, twenty-five cents.

"For the registration of a suggestion of  death or notice of bankruptcy, insolvency, or analogous proceeding, twenty- five cents.

"For the registration of a discharge or release of mortgage or other instrument creating an incumbrance,  fifty cents.

"For the registration of any levy, or of any discharge or dissolution of  any attachment or levy, or of any certificate of or receipt for the payment of taxes, or notice of any pending action, or of a judgment or decree, fifty cents.

"For indorsing on any mortgage, lease, or other instrument a memorandum of partition, one dollar.

"For every  petition  filed  under this  Act after original registration, one  dollar.

"For a certified copy of any decree of registered instrument, the same fees as are  provided  by the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and  Special Proceedings for clerks of Courts of First Instance for like services.

"In all cases not  expressly provided for by the law the fees of all  public officers  for  any official duty  or service under this Act shall be at the same rate as those prescribed herein for  like services: Provided, however, That if the value of the land sought to be registered does not exceed one hundred dollars  the fees payable for  the application to bring land under this Act and for indexing and recording instruments while application  for  registration  is pending, for examining title, for notices by mail or by publication, for services by sheriff  or other officer, for entry of order dismissing application  or  decree  of  registration,  and for entry of original certificate of title and issuing one duplicate shall be ten dollars."

Certainly the necessity  of a payment to the insurance fund is not found here.

The Public Land  Law  requires the payment of no fees whatever except in cases of "unperfected titles and Spanish grants and concessions," and to establish the titles in those it is required by the law that the full and complete proceeding  under the Torrens Law must be taken.  In  those cases the same payments are made as in the regular proceeding, except that to the assurance fund.  In this law, then, there is no provision for  fees which can possibly be construed to  include a payment to the assurance fund.

Moreover, section 122  provides, as we have  seen, that the patent shall be  "registered like other deeds and conveyances."  These  words, "deeds  and conveyances," certainly can not mean the certified copy of the court's final decree in the judicial proceeding under Act No. 496, which is the instrument transmitted by the clerk of the court to the  register  of  deeds in  the  province  where the  land lies, to be there registered as the final act of the proceeding; for the reason that neither such certified copy of the final decree nor the final decree itself is a  "deed" or "conveyance."  As I  have said before,  it transfers no title whatever; it conveys nothing.  The person  instituting the proceedings  had  title before  he began.  He was the  owner before he made the application.   He must be such under the law.  The words  "deed," "conveyance" mean unquestionably an instrument which transfers a title to or interest in real property from one person to  another.  Inasmuch as the registration of title under the Torrens Law transfers absolutely nothing, such registration can not possibly mean "deeds and conveyances" as those words are used in section 122.   This is a complete reply to  that portion  of the opinion which, after quoting  from section 122 the  words "to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances," says: "What  does this phrase 'like other deeds and  conveyances,' when  applied to these  patents  and the registration of the  same, mean ?  It can only mean titles  issued under said Act  No.  496."  The fundamental error embedded  in this  quotation,  and  it runs  all  through  the decision, is that the Torrens Law grants or "issues titles." The  law does  nothing of the  kind.  It guarantees a  title already "issued" or vested.   As  I have said repeatedly, the very first  condition precedent to the institution  of the proceeding under that law is that the applicant must  be the owner;  and that law  specifically provides that if, during the proceedings, it appears that he is  not the owner the proceedings must be dismissed.   The law  simply confirms irrevocably  a  right  already vested. The  state,  and it  is the state acting through the law, can grant no rights which it does not have, can issue or grant no title which it  does not possess.  Its very purpose in promulgating the Torrens Law was to confirm a title which a court should find, after a judicial trial in an  ordinary action, to  have been legally vested in the applicant at the time the action was  instituted.   It confirms,  not grants.  It guarantees, not transfers.   Section 38  provides:

"If the court  after hearing finds that the applicant has title as stated in his application, and  proper for registration,  a decree  of confirmation and registration  shall  be entered  *  *   *."

Therefore, when section 122  used the words "to be there registered  like other deeds and  conveyances" it  did not, by said words, in any sense refer to the final decree, or a certified copy thereof, as  defined in the  Torrens Law.   It simply meant that the patent inasmuch as  it is a deed  or conveyance, should be registered or recorded in the same manner  as  any other deed  or conveyance.  That patent granted and  transferred a title,  an ownership, in exactly the same manner as would a deed of  conveyance between John  Doe and Richard Roe.   Why, then, should it be  recorded differently or under a different law?

All this goes to show simply that the Torrens Law has absolutely nothing to do with the proceedings for a patent under the Public Land Law.   Section  122  simply provides what  shall be the effect, the result, after  the  proceedings are terminated.

Entering upon the second phase of the  question,  I am of the opinion that section 122 of Act  No. 496, if it means what  the majority of the  court  conclude  it means,  is  in violation of the  Act of July  1, 1902.

It must be remembered, first of all, that the land involved in this action is mineral land.

It must be borne in mind also that the only law in force in the Philippine Islands which has to do with the sale  of mineral lands is the Act of July 1, 1902.

It is  of the very  greatest  importance also to note that the Public Land Law is wholly inapplicable by  express provision to the sale of mineral lands.

This  inapplicability was lost  sight  of  by the court in its decision.  The opinion attempts to show that the Public Land Law is applicable to the case at bar, and for that purpose refers to said law as follows:

"First. Sections  1 to 9,  for patents to homesteads  on the public domain."

Section 1,  referred  to, provides (the italics are mine):

"Section l.  Any citizen of the  Philippine Islands,  or of the United States, or of any insular possession thereof, *   *   *  may,  as hereinafter  provided, enter a homestead of not  exceeding sixteen hectares of unoccupied, unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public  land in the Philippine Islands   *   *  *."

Section 2, referred to,  provides for the form and contents of the application for  homestead, and says that  one of the necessary allegations in  the application shall be, "that the land applied  for is nonmineral,  does not  contain valuable deposits of coal or salts, is more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes and  is not  occupied by  any other person."

The opinion  further says: 

"Second. Sections 10 to 21, for sales of portions of the public domain."

Section 10, referred to,  provides:

"SEC.  10. Any citizen of the  Philippine Islands,  or  of the United States, or of any insular possession  thereof, or any corporation or  like association of persons organized under the laws of the  Philippine Islands, or of the United States,  or of any  State, Territory,  or insular  possession thereof, and  authorized to transact  business in the Philippine Islands, may  purchase  any  tract of unoccupied, unappropriated, and unreserved nonmineral agricultural land in the Philippine  Islands  *   *   *."

Section 12  contains  the requirement that the application must  show affirmatively that  the land applied for is  nonmineral.

The opinion further says:

"Third.  Sections 22 to 31, for leases of a portion of the public domain."

Section  22, referred to, provides:

"Any citizen of the United States,  *   *   *  may lease any tract  of  unoccupied, unreserved, nonmineral agricultural public lands   *  *  *."

Section  24  requires  that  the application for the  lease must contain  the statement that the land is  "nonmineral in character."

The opinion further  says:

"Fourth. Sections 32 to 35, for free patents to individual settlers on portions of the public domain."

These sections constitute Chapter IV of the Public Land Law.  Said chapter  is  headed: "Free Patents  to  Native Settlers."  Section 32  provides:

"Any native of the Philippine Islands now  an occupant and cultivator of unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public land,  as defined by the  Act of Congress of  July first, nineteen hundred and two,  who  has continuously occupied and cultivated such land  *  * .  *   since August first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; or who, prior to August first,  eighteen hundred and  ninety-eight, continuously occupied and cultivated  such  land for  three years immediately prior  to said date, and who has  been  continuously since July fourth, nineteen hundred and two,  until the date of the taking  effect of this Act, an occupant and cultivator of such land, shall be entitled  to  have a  patent issued  *   *  *."

Section 33  requires  that  the petition  presented under this chapter shall show that the applicant is a native  of the Philippine Islands.

The opinion further says:

"Sixth.  Sections  54  to 67, for  unperfected titles  and Spanish grants and concessions of  the public domain."

These sections compose Chapter VI of said Public Land Law.  It is headed: "Unperfected titles and Spanish Grants and Concessions."

Section 54 provides:

"The following-described persons or their  legal successors in  right,  occupying  public lands in the  Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to  the  Court of Land  Registration of the Philippine Islands  for confirmation of their  claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,  to wit:

"1. All persons who prior to the  transfer of sovereignty from Spain to  the  United  States had fulfilled all  the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal  decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of  public  lands, including the payment  of the purchase  price, but  who failed to  secure formal  conveyance of title;

"2. All persons who prior to the  transfer of sovereignty from Spain to  the United States, having  applied for the purchase  of  public lands  and  having secured  a survey, auction,  and  an award,  or a  right to an  award, of such lands,  did not  receive title therefor  through no default upon their part;

"3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to  the United States, having  applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence  upon  their part, comply with the conditions of  full  or any  payment  therefor,  but who after such survey and award shall have occupied the land  adversely,  except as prevented  by war or force majeure,  until the taking effect  of this  Act;

"4. All persons who  were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment  or composition of title to lands against the Government under the  Spanish  laws and royal decrees in force  prior to the royal decree of February  thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed to receive title therefor through  no default upon their  part;

"5. All persons who were entitled  to a  gratuitous title to public lands by 'possessory proceedings' under the provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who,  having complied with all  the conditions therein required,  failed  to receive title therefor through no default upon their part; and

"6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,  exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation  of agricultural public lands, as defined by  said Act of Congress  of  July first, nineteen  hundred and two, under  a bona  fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when  prevented by war or force majeure,  shall be conclusively  presumed  to have performed all the  conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to  a certificate  of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

"All  applicants for lands under  paragraphs one, two, three, four, and five  of this section must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and  the necessary  conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.

"SEC. 55. All persons claiming title to Government lands not coming within  the  classes specified  in the preceding sections are excluded from the benefits of this chapter.

"SEC. 56. Any person  or persons, or their legal representatives  or successors  in right,  claiming any lands or interest in lands in the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of this chapter, and who now desire or claim the right to have such title perfected,  must in every case present an application in writing to the Court of Land Registration praying that  the validity of the alleged  title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title issue to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act for the lands claimed.

"SEC.  57. Such claims and  applications shall conform as  nearly  as  may  be in their material allegations to the requirements  of  an application for registration under the provisions of sections twenty-one and subsequent sections of the Land Registration Act, and shall be accompanied by a plan of the  land and all documents evidencing a right on the part of the  applicant to the lands claimed.   The applications shall also set forth fully the nature of the claim to the  land,  and when  based upon proceedings  initiated under Spanish laws  shall particularly state  the date  and form of the grant,  concession, warrant, or order of survey under which the claim is made; by whom such grant, concession,  warrant, or order of survey was made; the extent of the compliance with the conditions required by the Spanish laws  and royal decrees  for the  acquisition of legal  title, and  if not fully  complied with the reason for such  noncompliance, together with a statement  of the length of time such land or any  portion thereof has been actually occupied by the claimant  and his  predecessors in interest; the use made of the land, and the nature of the inclosure, if any. The fees provided to be  paid for the registration of lands under the  Land  Registration Act shall be collected from applicants under  this chapter, except that upon the Original registration of land claimed hereunder no fee shall be required for the assurance fund."

"SEC. 63. All proceedings under this chapter involving title to, or interest in, land shall be  conducted  and  considered as an application for registration of such land, and the final decree of the court shall  in every case be the basis for the original certificate of title in  favor of the person entitled to  the property under the procedure prescribed in section forty-one  of the Land Registration Act."

From these provisions it is perfectly plain that  Act No. 926 has absolutely nothing to do with  the sale of mineral lands.   It is equally plain from the provisions of that Act that section 122 of Act No. 496 has absolutely nothing to do with the sale of mineral  lands,  inasmuch as the "public lands" referred to in section 122 are the same kind of public lands described in Act No. 926.  Section 73 provides:

"All patents or certificates for lands disposed  of under this law shall be prepared in the Bureau of Public Lands and shall issue in the name of the  United States and the Philippine Government  under the signature of  the Civil Governor; but such patents or certificates shall be effective only for the purposes defined  in section one  hundred and twenty-two of  the Land Registration Act and the actual conveyance of the land shall be effected only as provided in said section."

Nothing could be clearer than that  section  122 in its reference to public lands means the same kind  of public lands described in Act No. 926.  Section 122 touches public lands only  through paragraph 73.   It  ought to be  self-evident that it  refers only to such lands as the Insular Government has power and jurisdiction to convey.

Moreover, from the provisions of the Act of July 1, 1902, it is beyond question not only that section 122 has absolutely no  relation  to mineral lands but also that it can have no such relation.  To demonstrate this it is necessary to quote those provisions of said Act touching this matter:

"SEC. 12. That all  the property and  rights which  may have been acquired in the Philippine  Islands by the  United States under the  treaty of peace with  Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen  hundred and ninety-eight,  except such land or other property as shall be designated  by the President of the United  States for military and other reservations  of the  Government of the United  States, are hereby placed under the  control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this Act.

"SEC. 13.  That the Government of the  Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as  herein provided,  shall  classify according to  its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease,  sale,  or other disposition of the  public lands other than timber or mineral  lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the  force of law until  they have received the approval of the  President, and when approved  by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof, and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided,  That  a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

"SEC.  14. That the Government of the Philippine  Islands is hereby  authorized and  empowered to enact  rules  and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in  said Islands, who, prior to  the transfer of sovereignty  from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled  all or some of the conditions required by  the Spanish  laws and royal  decrees  of the Kingdom of Spain for the  acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the  Philippine Commission is authorized  to  issue  patents, without  compensation,  to any native of said'Islands, conveying  title to any  tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in  extent, which were public lands and  had been  actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine  Islands is hereby authorized  and empowered,  on such terms  as it may  prescribe, by  general legislation,  to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of  said Islands such  parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares  to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of  not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether  the purchase price be paid at once or  in  partial payments, shall be conditioned  upon actual  and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation  of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers  of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents."

The preceding sections are those under which the  Government of the  Philippine Islands found authority to  pass Act No. 926.  They have nothing to do with mineral lands.

"SEC. 20. That in all cases public lands in the Philippine Islands valuable for  minerals shall  be reserved from  sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law.

"SEC.  21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in  the  Philippine  Islands, both surveyed and  unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase,  *  *  *  by citizens of the United  States, or of said Islands: Provided,  That when on any lands in  said  Islands  entered  and occupied as agricultural  lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the  working of such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation  who or which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits  are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims."

"SEC. 36. That the United States  Philippine Commission or its, successors may make  regulations, not in conflict  with the provisions of this Act, governing the location, manner of recording, and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim, subject to  the following requirements.:

"On each claim  located after  the passage of this  Act, and until a patent  has been issued therefor, not less than one hundred dollars'  worth  of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year: Provided, That upon a failure  to  comply with  these  conditions the  claim  or mine upon which such  failure occurred shall be open to relocation  in the same manner  as if no location,of the same had ever been made, provided that  the original locators, their heirs, assigns, or  legal representatives have not resumed work upon the claim after failure and before  such location.   Upon the failure  of  any one of several  coowners to contribute his proportion of the expenditures required thereby, the coowners who  have  performed the  labor  or made the improvements may, at the expiration of  the year, give such delinquent coowner personal notice in writing, or notice by publication in the newspaper published nearest the claim,  and in two newspapers published at Manila, one in the  English language and  the other  in the Spanish language, to be designated by  the Chief of  the Philippine Insular Bureau of Public Lands, for at  least once a week for ninety  days, and, if at  the expiration of ninety days after such  notice in writing or by publication such delinquent shall fail or refuse to contribute his  proportion  of the expenditure required by this section  his interest in the claim shall become the property of his coowners who have made the required expenditures.  The period within which the work required to be done  annually  on all unpatented mineral claims shall commence  on the first day of January succeeding the date of location  of such claim.

"SEC. 37. That a patent for any land claimed and located for valuable mineral deposits may be obtained in the following  manner: Any person,  association, or  corporation authorized  to locate a claim under this Act, having claimed and located a  piece of land for such purposes,  who has or have complied with the  terms of this Act, may file in the office of  the provincial secretary, or such other officer as by the Government  of said  Islands may be described as mining recorder of the province wherein the land claimed is located,  an application for a patent, under oath,  showing such compliance, together with  a plat and field notes of the claim or claims in common, made by or under the direction of the Chief of the Philippine Insular  Bureau of Public Lands, showing accurately  the boundaries of the  claim, which shall be distinctly marked by monuments  on the ground, and shall post a copy of such plat, together with a notice of such application for  a patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in  such  plat previous to the filing of the application for  a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has been duly posted, and shall file a copy of the notice in such office, and shall thereupon be entitled to a patent for the land, in the manner following: The provincial secretary, or such other officer as by the Philippine Government may be described as mining recorder, upon the filing of such application, plat, field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such an  application has been made, once a week for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him designated as nearest to such claim and in two newspapers published at Manila,  one in the English  language  and one  in the Spanish language, to be designated by the Chief of the Philippine Insular  Bureau of Public. Lands; and he shall also post such  notice in his office  for the same period.  The claimant at the time  of  filing  his application, or at any time thereafter within the sixty days of publication, shall file with the provincial secretary or such other officer  as by the Philippine Government may be described as mining recorder a  certificate of the Chief of the Philippine Insular Bureau of Public Lands that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended or improvements made  upon the claim by himself or grantors; that the plat is correct, with such further description by such  reference to natural objects or permanent monuments  as shall identify the claim, and furnish an accurate description to be incorporated  in the patent.   At the expiration of the sixty days of publication the claimant shall file his  affidavit,  showing that the plat and notice have been posted  in  a conspicuous place  on the claim during such period of publication.   If no adverse claim shall  have been filed with the  provincial secretary or such other officer as by the Government of said Islands may be described  as mining  recorder  at the expiration  of the sixty days of publication, it shall be assumed that the applicant is entitled to a patent  upon the payment to the provincial treasurer or the collector of internal revenue of five dollars per acre and that no adverse claim exists, and thereafter no objection from  third parties to the issuance of a patent shall  be heard,  except it be  shown  that the applicant has failed to comply with the terms of this  Act: Provided,  That where the claimant for  a patent  is not a resident of or within the province wherein the land containing the vein,  ledge, or deposit sought to be patented is located, the application for patent and the affidavits required to be made in this section by  the claimant for such patent may be made by his,  her, or its authorized agent where said agent is conversant  with the facts  sought  to be established by said affidavits,"

"SEC. 49,  That as a condition of sale the Government of the  Philippine Islands may provide rules for working, policing, and  sanitation of  mines, and  rules concerning easements, drainage, water rights, right  of  way,  right of Government survey and  inspection, and other necessary means  to their complete development not inconsistent  with the provisions of this Act, and those conditions  shall be fully expressed in the patent.  The Philippine Commission or its successors are hereby further empowered to fix the bonds of deputy mineral  surveyors."

"SEC. 51.  That all patents  granted shall  be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or  rights to ditches and reservoirs used in  connection with such water rights as may have been acquired  under or  recognized by  the preceding section.

"SEC. 52.  That the Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized ,to establish  land  districts  and provide  for the appointment  of the necessary officers wherever  they may deem the same necessary for  the public convenience, and to  further provide that in districts where land offices are established proceedings required by this Act to be had before  provincial officers  shall be h,ad  before  the  proper officers of such land offices."

"SEC, 57. That in case of conflicting claims upon coal lands where the improvements shall be commenced after the date of the passage of this Act, priority of possession and improvement, followed by proper filing and continued good faith,  shall determine  the preference right  to purchase. And also where improvements have already been made prior to the  passage of this Act, division  of the  land claimed may be made  by legal subdivisions, which shall conform as nearly as practicable with the subdivisions of land provided for in this Act,  to include as near as may  be the valuable  improvements  of  the  respective   parties.  The Government of the Philippine Islands is  authorized to issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying  into effect the provisions of this and preceding sections  relating  to mineral lands."

"SEC,  59. That no Act  granting lands to provinces, districts, or municipalities to aid in the construction of roads, or for other public purposes, shall  be so construed as  to embrace mineral lands, which, in all cases,  are reserved exclusively, unless otherwise specially provided  in the Act or Acts making the grant.

"SEC.  60. That nothing in this Act shall  be construed to affect the  rights  of any person, partnership, or  corporation having a valid, perfected mining concession granted prior to April  eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, but all such concessions shall be conducted under the provisions of the law in force at the  time they were granted, subject  at all  times to cancellation by reason of illegality in the  procedure by which  they were  obtained, or for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed as requisite to their retention in the  laws  under  which  they were granted: Provided, That the owner or owners  of every such concession  shall cause the corners made by its  boundaries to be distinctly marked with permanent monuments  within six months after this Act has been promulgated in the Philippine Islands,  and that any concessions  the  boundaries of which are not so marked within this period shall  be free and open  to explorations  and purchase  under  the provisions of this Act.

"SEC.  61. That  mining  rights  on public lands in  the, Philippine Islands shall, after the passage  of this Act, be acquired only in accordance with its provisions."

These  are the only provisions of the Act of July 1, 1902, which  touch the question  of  mineral lands.  From  these provisions we see:

1. That there is provided a complete proceeding for the sale of mineral  lands.  Nothing whatever essential to the proceeding is omitted  or left to be done by others.  The proceeding provided for is absolutely  complete from  the "staking" of the claim to the issuance of the patent.
   
   
2. That the Government of  the Philippine  Islands is prohibited in  express terms from intervening in  any way in the proceeding except in a manner wholly  clerical  or mechanical.   Every line  of the law leads inevitably to this conclusion.  Section 36 provides that the Philippine Commission "may make such regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, governing the  location, manner of recording,  and  amount of  work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim, subject to the following requirements:"   The following section then  provides  fully  the amount of work required, when it shall be performed, and what shall be the result in case it  is not  performed  as required. Section 37 provides expressly how a  patent for mineral  lands shall  be obtained.  It  sets out the "requirements  fully and  in detail and provides that after complying with the conditions in that section expressed, the applicant "shall  thereupon be entitled to a patent for the land, in the manner  following:" The section  then  provides  that  the applicant shall  file certain notes,  notices,  affidavits, and certificates;  that a certain  notice shall be published and posted for sixty days; that after  such time "it shall  be assumed that the applicant is  entitled to a patent upon the payment to  the provincial treasurer or the  collector of internal revenue of five dollars per acre and that no adverse claim exists, and therefore no objection from third parties to the  issuance of a patent shall  be heard, except it be shown  that  the applicant has failed to  comply with the terms of  this Act."
   
   
3. That the applicant and the Government of the United  States  (not  the Philippine  Government),  by  these provisions, enter into a special relation, the one making an offer to sell  lands and the other accepting  the offer and performing the conditions named therein; that the terms of that offer are set forth fully in those provisions; that it clearly  and explicitly appears therefrom what the applicant must do, and all he must do, to obtain his patent; that it is plainly set forth what  shall be the result of a performance  of the conditions.  Now, while I have no doubt that the Philippine Government  has full  power, as  stated in section 57, to make "rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this and the preceding sections relating to mineral lands," it must carry those provisions into effect,onerous to the applicant.  The terms of the offer are fixed by  the  United States.  None may  take  away  or add to them.  It  is  undoubtedly proper for the Philippine Government to require the patent to be recorded in a particular place and to say  who shall  pay the recording fee.  But it has  no right to say that the patentee shall do other things  and pay other moneys as a condition precedent to obtain title, when the Government of the United States has stated specifically  that he shall  be entitled to a patent, a title, when he  has done the things and paid the moneys specified in  that Act  In other words,  the Government of the United States, through the statute, says to the applicant: "You do the things  which we specify herein and I will give you a  perfect title to certain mineral lands." The applicant  meets fully  the  conditions named  in the offer of the Government.  Whereupon the Government, on its part, issues the title.  But at this point the Philippine Government, by section  122 of Act No. 496,  steps in and says: "That title that you  have  just  received  from the United States is not a title or patent at  all.  It is not what the Government of the United States represented it to be. It does  not have at all the  effect which the United States said that it should.  It 'shall not  take  effect as a  conveyance to bind the land,  but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee; the act of registration  shall  be  the  operative act  to  convey the lands.' Before you can have a  title, a patent,  you must pay the Insular  Government an  assessment for assurance, a  sum of money to guarantee the  title which  the Government of the United States already  guarantees.  The Government of the United States was  mistaken when it  said that all you had to do to obtain  a perfect title was to perform the conditions specified in the  Act of  July  1, 1902.  We have one other condition to add, one that the  Government of the United  States neglected  to  impose, and if you don't meet this condition also, we shall declare the proceedings had between you and the Government of  the United States, in effect,  nugatory."

not change them, nor  insert new  provisions, nor  add new, other or different provisions  or conditions
It needs no argument to demonstrate  that  the  Insular Government  has  no power to alter in  a material way  a statute of the United States (U. S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7) or to add anything whatever to those conditions laid down by a statute of the United States  as being by the terms of said  statute the only  conditions required  to be met in order to  obtain  a title  to  public  lands.  If the  Insular Government  may  add one  material condition,  it may add others,  and thus change entirely the relation established between  the Government of the  United States  and the applicant.  The right to  alter is the right to  abrogate.  If section 122 is operative as to mineral lands in the manner claimed  by the  court, then the Insular Government has changed so essentially the proceedings for  a patent to mineral lands, provided in the Philippine Bill, as to destroy the vested rights of one  who has done  his work  and paid his money in reliance upon a promise of the United States Government.

Moreover, the Act of July 1, 1902, provides that third parties who  prior to the sale had an interest in the mineral lands  sold and  who  were threatened with an unjust  and illegal deprivation of such interest  by reason  of the applicant's failure to comply with the terms of the Act, may come  in even after  the  issuance of the patent  and set aside the proceedings, recovering the land itself in a proper case.  Section 122, however, by bringing the title to  mineral lands under the Torrens  Law,  effectually and  irrevocably cuts off the rights of third parties thus guaranteed by the Philippine Bill.  Under the conception of the court after registration under section  122 the title to the lands becomes absolutely secure not  only against  all  persons who had rights  in the land before  registration,  but also against the  Government  of the United States  itself. So that, after the lapse  of one year, no matter how  flagrant and  vicious  may  have been  the  fraud practiced  upon the Government of the United States or upon any other interested  party by the patentee in obtaining his patent, the  Government  of  the  United  States,  as  well as  the party, is, by section  122,  absolutely prohibited from disturbing  him  in  the  enjoyment of  his  tainted title.  If the Insular Government can  not protect him as fully as it does all others who bring their lands under the Torrens Law, it has  no  right  to take the money.  It protects all others from  their vendors as well as other persons.  It should protect the applicant in the same way.

4.  That the officers of the Insular Government who participate in the proceedings for the sale  of mineral lands do so  as agents of the Government of the United States rather than  of  the Insular Government.

It is a question of extreme doubt whether a  person injured by the sale by the United States Government of a mineral claim to  an applicant would have the  right to resort  to the assurance fund.  Section 101 of Act No,  496, as  amended by section 12 of Act No.  1699, would need to be  strained to the breaking point in order to include within its terms such  person.

It  is also a matter of some  doubt  whether  the purely administrative  proceeding1 followed in  cases of  sales  of mineral lands affords that due  process of  law  to those persons who have an interest in the lands conveyed which is required before one may be deprived  of  his property  to the extent  provided in the Torrens Law. It is certainly widely  different from the proceedings  followed  under said Act No. 496.

In  view of all this I  am confident  that the  Philippine Government never  intended that section 122 of  Act No. 496 should be given the meaning  accorded it by the decision of  this  court.

Giving section  122 all the signification which it was intended to have, it simply requires that a patent t5 mineral lands shall be  registered "like  other   deeds and  conveyances."   The provisions  of the law are  express and mandatory,  leaving no  discretion whatever in the register of deeds.  This is apparent and clear on  reading the section. (Marbury vs. Madison, 1  Cranch., 172.)  While the section provides that the official shall cause the patent to be registered, I am  of the opinion that the patentee has a sufficient interest to compel  the registration.

The mandamus should be issued.