To our minds,  the able and  exhaustive opinion filed by the judge of the Court  of Land Registration, wherein this case  originated,  completely and satisfactorily disposes of all of appellants' assignments of error, and renders unnecessary any further discussion of the questions involved on this appeal.

That decision is as follows:

"The application  in this case  for  the registration  of  between 19  and 20 hectares  of  land  in the  United  States Naval Reservation  at  Olongapo is  opposed by the Commander of the Philippine Squadron of  the United  States Navy on behalf of  the  United States.   The question presented for decision is stated by the parties, respectively, in their briefs,  as follows:

"Applicants'  brief. - 'The application  and   opposition present to the court for its decision one single question. The undisputed and indisputable evidence demonstrates that the petitioners are the owners of the lands in question and as such are entitled to a decree of registration unless those lands have become forfeited by reason of the omission of the petitioners to  present this application within  the period of time prescribed by Act No. 627, United States Philippine Commission.   The present application was  filed after the expiration of the six months prescribed by said Act No. 627 and after the expiration of the further period to which the statutory term was extended by order of this honorable court   *  *   *  The facts therefore fairly and squarely present the question whether  the terms of Act No. 627 violate the prohibition against the taking of property without due process of law.'   (Pp. 131 and 132 of case.)

"Opponent's brief. - 'On the trial  of  the case the petitioners presented to the court a grant by the Government of Spain  to the ancestor of the petitioners.  On the part of the defense it was proven that on December 17, 1904, the then Civil Governor, in  accordance with the provisions  of Act No.  627  as amended by  Act No.  1138, notified the judge of  the  Court of Land  Registration  that  the  Commander in Chief of the United  States  Asiatic Fleet had certified to the said Civil Governor that the lands within the limits of which the tract in question is situated had been reserved by the President of the  United States  for  naval purposes and requesting that he forthwith bring  under the operation of the Land  Registration  Law  the  said  land. Upon receipt of such notification  the Land Court ordered that publication be made of the notices required by law, and notice was accordingly issued under the  seal of the Land Court directed to  the owners and occupants of the lands therein described and to all persons having and claiming to have an interest  therein, requiring them within, six calendar months from the date of such notice to present application to the said court to have said lands or interest therein  registered under the provisions  of the Land Registration Act, and notifying all such persons that unless such application was presented within the time prescribed that the said lands or interest therein  would be conclusively adjudged  to be public lands and all claims on the part of private individuals not so presented forever barred.   Such notice was dated July 8,  1905, and publication of the  same was duly made  as required by law.   Prior to the expiration of the six months' period fixed in  said notice and on the 27th day of December, 1905, the time for the presentation of claims was by the order of the judge of said court extended three months.   Said three months' extension expired on the 17th day  of April,  1906.  The petition in this case was not filed with the clerk of the Court of Land Registration until long after the 17th day of April, 1906, and long after the expiration of the period fixed by law as extended by the court.   This case raises the square issue of the legality or constitutionality of  section 4 of Act No. 627.  The petitioners claim that section 4 of Act No. 627 confiscates the property of the petitioners without the process of law, and  consequently is  null and void.'   (Pp. 146 to 148 of case.)

"In Twining vs. New Jersey (29 Supreme Court Reporter, 14, 20), Mr. Justice Moody says of 'due process of law:'

"'Few phrases of the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as this.  Doubtless the difficulties of ascertaining its connotation have been increased in American jurisprudence, where it has been embodied in constitution and put to new uses as a limit on legislative power.  This  court has always  declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred  that its  full meaning should be  gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise.   There are certain general principles, well settled, however, which narrow the  field  of discussion, and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles grow out of the  proposition universally accepted by  American courts  on the authority of Coke, that the words "due process of law" are equivalent in meaning to the words "law of the land," contained in  that chapter of  Magna  Charta which provides that "no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him,  nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."   (Den ex dem. Murray vs. Hoboken Land  & Improv. Co., 18 How.  272, 15 L. ed., 372;  Davidson vs. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97, 24 L. ed., 616; Jones vs. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329;  Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed., 500; McGhee, Due Process of Law, 16.)'

"In United States vs. Ling Su Fan  (10 Phil. Rep., 104, 111-112) the  following is given  as  the meaning of the phrase 'due  process of law:'

" ' "Due process of law" is process of proceedings according to the law  of the land.   "Due process of law" is not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply:

" 'First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government;

" 'Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation ;

" 'Third.  That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and

" 'Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.'

"It is not pretended in the present case that Act No. 627, extended to  naval reservations by Act No.  1138, has not been enforced in the Olongapo Reservation according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed by that  Act, nor that the provisions of the Act are not applicable alike to all persons  owning or claiming lands within the reservation.   In fact the regular methods of procedure prescribed by Act No.  627 have been complied with, and that Act is expressly applicable to all such persons.  The third and fourth requirements of the last above-quoted definition  of 'due process of law' have, therefore, undoubtedly been complied with, and  it  only remains to  be  determined whether or not the law in question fulfills the  first and second requirements of said definition.  The undersigned  is of the opinion that it does in view of the decisions of the  Supreme Courts of the  United States and  the Philippine Islands hereinafter cited.

"First. Act No.  627 of the  Philippine Commission is in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the  Government.

"Alfonso  vs.  Commanding General, 6 Phil.  Rep.,  600, 609. - 'The powers of the  (Insular) Government and of the Commission embrace all the public lands in the Philippine Islands, so that by means of laws and orders there may be carried out the intention of Congress that from the public lands which are to constitute  reservations, military or otherwise, as well as from the rest which are to be at the free disposition and administration of the Insular Government, there may be segregated those parts  of the public lands to which there is proven either a right of possession or an application for  title prior  to  the  change of sovereignty.'

"Botiller vs. Dominguez, 130 U. S., 238, 250. - An Act of Congress of March 3,  1851, provided that each and every person claiming lands  in California by virtue of any right or title  derived from the Spanish or Mexican Government should present  his claim to a commission created  by said Act, and that 'all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented  to the said commissioners within two years after the date of this  Act, shall be determined, held, and considered as part  of the public domain of  the United States.'  The Act also  provided for appeals by the claimant and by  the Government from the decisions of the commission, first to the  district court and thence to the Supreme Court.  Held, that no  title to land in California dependent upon  Spanish or Mexican grants can be of any validity, which was not submitted  to, and confirmed by, the commission provided for that purpose under the Act of March 3, 1851; or, if  rejected by that commission, confirmed by the district court or by the  Supreme Court of the United States.  In its opinion in this case the court says:

" 'Nor can it be  said that there  is anything unjust or oppressive in requiring the owner of a valid claim, in that vast wilderness of lands unclaimed, and  unjustly claimed, to present his demand to a tribunal possessing all  the elements of judicial functions, with a guaranty  of  judicial proceedings, bo that his title could be established if it was found to be valid, or rejected if it was invalid.

" 'We are unable to see any injustice, any want of constitutional power, or any violation of the treaty, in the means by which the United States undertook to separate the lands in which it held the proprietary interest from those which belonged, either equitably or by a strict legal title, to private persons.  Every person owning land or  other  property is at all times liable to be called into a court of justice  to contest his  title to it.  This may be done by another individual, or by the government  under which he lives.  It is a necessary part of a free government, in which all are equally subject to the laws, that whoever asserts rights  or exercises powers  over property  may be  called before the proper tribunals to sustain them.

" 'No  doubt could exist, and none whatever would  have been suggested, if this statute, instead of requiring the individual claimants to take notice that they were called upon to establish their title and come forward  and do so,  had provided that the United States should sue everybody who was found in possession of any land in  California at the time the treaty was made, and thus compel him to produce his title, if  he had any.  Such suits would have been sustained without hesitation, as being legal, constitutional  and according to right.  What difference can it make, then, that the party who is supposed to possess all the evidences which exist to  support his claim  is called upon  to come before a similar tribunal and establish  it  by a judicial  proceeding? It is beyond question that  the  latter mode is the more appropriate one to carry out the object intended, and better calculated to save time and expense, both to the Government and to the  party, and to  arrive  at  safe and  satisfactory conclusions.'

"Ainsa vs. New Mexico and Arizona Railroad, 175 V. S., 76, 84. - 'This court held (in Botiller vs. Dominguez)  that this provision (of the Act of March 3, 1851) included perfect as well as inchoate titles, and  that consequently no suit could be  maintained in a  court of the State of California on any Spanish title whatsoever, if it had not been presented to the commissioners in accordance with the Act of Congress.'

"Thompson vs. Los Angeles, 180  U. S., 72, 77. - In this case the Supreme Court says, speaking of the Act of March 3, 1851:  'Every question  which  could  arise on  the title claimed could  come to  and receive judgment from this court.   The scheme of adjudication was made complete and all the purposes of an Act to give repose to titles were accomplished.  And it was certainly the purpose  of the Act of 1851 to give repose  to  titles.   It was enacted not only to fulfill our treaty obligations to individuals, but to settle and define what portion of the acquired territory was public domain.   It not only permitted but required all claims to be presented to the board, and barred all  from future assertion  which were not presented within two years after the date of the Act.  (Sec.  13.)  The jurisdiction of the board was  necessarily  commensurate with  the purpose  of its creation,  and  it  was a jurisdiction  to  decide  rightly  or wrongly.  If wrongly a corrective was afforded, as we have said, by an appeal by the claimant or by the United States to the district court.'

"Barker vs.  Harvey, 181 U. S., 481,  487-490. - In this case the Act of March 3, 1851, is again considered and the above-cited cases of Botiller vs. Dominguez and Thompson vs. Los Angeles are quoted  at length and followed, the court holding that the United States had the right  to require reasonable means for determining the validity of all titles within the territory ceded to it by Mexico, to  require all persons having claims to lands to present them for recognition, and  to  decree that all claims which  were not thus presented  should be considered abandoned.

"See also Jackson vs. Lamphire (28 U. S., 280) and the provisions of  law therein  cited and sustained relating to the settlement of claims under patents for lands granted by the State  of New York.

"Second. Act No.  627 of the Philippine  Commission is reasonable in its operation.

"Terry vs. Anderson, 95 U. S., 628, 632-684. - 'This court has often decided that statutes  of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action  before the bar takes effect.   (Hawkins vs. Barney, 5 Pet., 451; Jackson vs. Lamphire,  3 id.,  280; Sohn vs. Waterson,  17  Wall., 596; Christmas vs. Russell, 5  id.,  290;  Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat., 122.)   It is  difficult  to see why, if the legislature  may prescribe a limitation where none existed before, it may not change one which has already been established.  The parties to a contract have no more a vested interest  in a particular limitation which has been  fixed, than they have in an unrestricted right to sue.   They have no more a vested interest in the time  for  the commencement of an action than they have in the form of the action to be commenced; and as to the forms of action or modes of remedy,  it is well settled that the legislature may change them at its discretion, provided adequate  means of enforcing the right remain.   *

" 'In all such cases, the question is one of  reasonableness, and we have, therefore, only to consider whether the time allowed in the statute  is,  under all the  circumstances, reasonable.  Of that the legislature is primarily the judge; and we can not overrule  the decision of  that  department of the government, unless a palpable error has been committed.   In judging of that, we must place ourselves in the position  of the legislators, and must measure the time of limitation in the midst of the circumstances  which surrounded  them,  as nearly  as  possible; for what is  reasonable in a particular case depends upon its particular facts.

" 'Here, nine months and seventeen days were given to sue upon a  cause of action which had already been running nearly four years or more.  *  *   *   The circumstances under which the  statute  was  passed seem to  justify the action of the legislature.   The time, though  short, was sufficient to enable creditors  to elect whether to enforce their claims or abandon them.'

"Koshkonong vs. Burton, 104  U. S., 668, 675. -  In this caste the above decision in Terry vs. Anderson is cited, and the principle therein laid down reiterated.

"Huling vs. Kaw Valley  Railway, 180 U. S., 559, 568, 564. - Held, That in proceedings commenced under a State statute for condemnation of land for a railroad, a published notice in compliance with the  terms of the statute,  specifying the section, township and range, county and State, in which it  is proposed  to  locate the  railroad, is sufficient notice to  a nonresident owner of  land therein, and such publication  is 'due process of law,'  as applied to such a case.  In  the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Miller says: 'Of course,  the statute goes  upon the presumption that, since all the parties can not be served personally with such notice, the publication, which  is designed to  meet the eyes of everybody,  is to stand for such notice.   The publication itself is sufficient if it had been in the form of a personal service  upon the  party  himself  within  the  county.  Nor have  we any doubt that this  form of warning owners of property to appear and  defend their interest,  where it is subject  to demands for  public  use when  authorized  by statute, is sufficient to  subject the property to the action of the tribunals appointed by proper authority to determine those matters.

"'The owner of real estate, who is a nonresident of the State within which the property lies, can not evade the duties and obligations which the law imposes upon him in regard to such property, by  his absence from the State. Because he can not be reached  by  some process of the courts of the State, which, of course, have no efficacy beyond their  own borders, he can not therefore  hold his property exempt  from the liabilities, duties, and obligations which the State has a right to impose upon such property; and in such cases some substituted form of notice has always been held to  be a sufficient warning to the owner, of the proceedings which are being taken under the authority of the State to subject his property to those demands and obligations.  Otherwise the burdens of taxation, and the liability of such property to be taken under the power of eminent domain, would be useless in regard to a very large amount of property in every State of the Union.

" 'It is, therefore, the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition; and  if he fails to do  this, and fails to get notice by  the ordinary publications which  have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences.   Such publication is  "due process  of law" as applied to this class of cases.  (Harvey vs. Tyler, 2 Wall., 328; Secombe vs. Railroad Co., 23 Wall., 108; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714,  722, 743, 744; Hagar vs. Reclamation District,  111 U. S., 701; McMillen vs. Anderson, 95 U. S., 37; Davidson vs.  New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97, 105; Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98  U. S., 403, 406.)'

"Wheeler vs. Jackson,  137  U. S., 245, 255. - The fifteenth section of the Act of the legislature of New York, approved June 6, 1885, provides that no action or special  proceedings shall thereafter be maintained against the city of Brooklyn, or the registrar of arrears of that city, to compel the execution or delivery of a lease  upon any sale for taxes, assessments, or water  rates, made more than eight  years prior to the above  date,  unless commenced within  six months after that date, and notice thereof filed in the office of the registrar of arrears; also, that officer shall, upon the expiration of such six months, cancel in his office all sales made more than eight years  before the passage of the Act, upon which no lease had been given, and no action  commenced and notice thereof filed, within the period limited as aforesaid, and that thereupon the lien of all such certificates of purchase should cease and determine.  Held, That this section  is not repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States forbidding a State to pass any law  impairing the obligation of contracts, or to the clause declaring that  no State  shall deprive any person of property without  due process of law; citing Terry vs. Anderson (supra); Koshkonong vs. Burton  (supra);  Mitchell vs. Clark  (110  U. S., 633, 643) ; and McMahey  vs. Virginia (In re Brown)  (135 U. S., 662, 701, 705-707).

"Bollard vs. Hunter, 204 U. S.,  241, 262. - A State may make reasonable discriminations  in regard to service of process for enforcement of liens for taxes and assessments on real  estate  between resident and nonresident owners, providing for personal service on the former and  constructive service  by publication on the  latter.  Land stands accountable to the demands of the State,  and owners are charged with knowledge of laws affecting it, and the manner in which those  demands may be  enforced.  The court says in its opinion: 'A law must be  framed and judged of in consideration of the practical affairs of man.   The law can not give  personal notice of its provisions or proceedings to everyone. It charges everyone with knowledge of its provisions;  of its  proceeding it  must,  at  times, adopt some form  of  indirect  notice,  and indirect notice is usually efficient notice when the proceedings affect real estate.  Of what concerns or may concern their real estate men usually keep informed and on  that probability the law may frame its proceedings; indeed, must frame them, and assume the care of property to be universal, if it would give  efficiency to many  of its  exercises.  This was pointed out in Huling vs. Kaw  Valley Railway and Improvement Company  (130 U. S., 559), where it was declared to be  the "duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident,  to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when  his property is called into requisition; and if he  fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have been usually required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences."  It makes no  difference, therefore, that plaintiffs in error did not have  personal notice of the suit to collect the taxes on their lands or that taxes had been levied, or knowledge of the law  under  which the taxes Had been levied.'

"While  the  decisions above cited  as  bearing upon  the reasonableness of Act No. 627 in its operation do not relate to statutes  identical  in their object with said Act,  the statutes which they do discuss, relating to  shortening periods of limitation, expropriating lands for public purposes, and enforcing  liens for  taxes, may be said to be  analogous in their nature to Act No. 627, and are obviously similar in their effect,  providing, as they do,  for the  loss of title to real estate upon the owner's failure  to  take the steps required of him  by such statutes.  In the  light of those  decisions it can not be successfully maintained that Act No. 627  is unreasonable in its operations  unreasonable in  the manner in which the  notices are to be given to interested parties and in  the time given such parties within which to act.   The notice is required to appear in newspapers published in both  Spanish and English, to be posted conspicuously at each angle  of the land reserved, and  to be served on each person living upon or in visible  possession of any part of said  land  (Act No. 627, sec. 3), and claims may be presented  to the  Court of Land Registration within  six months from the  date of the notice, which  period may be extended to nine months (Act No. 627, sec.  4).  As stated in the briefs  of the respective parties, said extension to nine months was  actually  made with  respect to the  Olongapo reservation.  It is not clear in the present case whether the applicants  or their authorized agent received  actual notice in time  to  present their claim  within the period of nine months  or not  (see pp. 110 to 118 and 125 to 129 of the case), but their contention is that the lands they claim have been unoccupied for many years, and that they did not receive actual  notice until  after said period had expired. In other words, they explain the nonreceipt of actual notice, and seek to excuse themselves for not having presented their claim sooner, by affirming that they had in effect abandoned the land, except for the payment of taxes, for a long period of time.  It is  evident from reservation file No. 1, relating to the Olongapo reservation, which  file is before the court in this case (see p. 124 of  the case), that if  the applicants had  maintained a representative on the land they would have  received  actual notice  of the reservation  early  in August, 1905, at the latest, as did their witness and cousin, Damaso Esteban, and 195 others (see pp. 18 to 24 of said reservation file No. 1).  As  indicated in the above decisions, owners  of property can  not evade  the duties and obligations which the  law imposes upon them in regard thereto  by absenting themselves,  and withdrawing their agents from the jurisdiction in which the property is located.

"In addition to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court previously cited  bearing  upon the  reasonableness of the length of time given by Act No. 627  to present claims, there are numerous similar decisions by the Federal courts and  the courts of the  different  States.   For instance, the following periods have been held reasonable for the enforcement of existing causes of action before  the bar of a new statute of limitations should become complete:

"One  year.   (McMillian vs.  Werner, 35 Tex., 419;  Cameron vs. Louisville, 0. & T. R. Co.,  69  Miss., 78, 10 So., 554; Adamson  vs. Davis, 47 Mo., 268; Krone vs. Krone, 37 Mich., 308; People ex rel. Parsons vs. Circuit Judge,  37 Mich., 287; Burwell vs.  Tullis, 12 Minn., 572,  Gil.,  486; Duncan vs. Cobb., 32 Minn.,  460,  21  N.  W., 714;  Lockart vs. Yeiser,. 2 Bush, 231; Vandiver vs.  Hodge, 4 Bush,  538; Stern vs. Bates, 9 N. M., 286, 50 Pac, 325; Call vs. Haggex, 8 Mass., 423; Wooster  vs. Bateman, 126  Iowa, 552, 102 N. W.,  521; Hill vs. Gregory, 64  Ark.,  317,  42 S. W.,  408; Michel vs.  Tenney, 6 La.  Ann.,  89; Wrightman vs. Boone County, 82 Fed., 413.)

"Eighteen months.   (Hodger vs. Rennaker, 3 Met. (Ky.), 255.)

"Thirteen months.   (Merchants' Nat.  Bank vs. Braithwaite, 7 N. D., 358, 66 Am. St. Rep., 653, 75 N.  W.,  244; State use off Isaac vs. Jones, 21 Md., 432.)

"Ten  months.   (Osborne vs.  Lindstrom, 9 N. D., 1,  46 L. R. A., 715,  81 Am. St.  Rep.,  516, 81 N. W., 72.)

"Nine months.  (Eaton vs. Manitowoc County, 40 Wis. 668.)

"Eight months.   (Duncan  vs. Cobb,  32 Miss., 460, 21 N. W., 714.)

"Seven months.   (Power vs. Kitching, 10 N. D., 254, 88 Am. St. Rep., 691, 86 Pac, 737.)

"Six  months.   (Tipton vs. Smythe; People vs. Turner, 117 N. Y., 227, 15 Am. St.  Rep., 498, 32 N. E.,  1022, 145 N. Y., 451, 40  N. E., 400, affirmed in 168 U. S., 90,  42 L. ed., 392, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 38; Saranac Land & Timber Co. vs. Roberts,  83 Fed., 436, affirmed in 177 U. S., 318,  44 L. ed., 786, 20  Sup.  Ct. Rep.,  642; Von Baumbach vs.  Bade, 9 Wis., 559, 76  Am. Dec, 283; Myers vs. Wheelock, 60 Kan., 747, 57 Pac, 956; Russell vs. A. C. Akely Lumber Co., 45 Minn., 376, 48 N. W., 3; Dabbs vs. Rothe, 25 Tex. Civ.  App., 201, 60 S. W., 811; Smith vs. Morrison, 22 Pick., 430.)

"Five  months.  (Bigelow vs. Bemis, 2 Allen, 496.)

"Four  and  one-half months.   (Stine vs. Bennett, 13 Minn., 153, Gil., 138; Horbach vs. Miller, 4 Nebr., 31.)

"Three months.  (Demoss vs. Newton, 31 Ind., 219.)

"Wherefore,  in accordance with the provisions  of sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 627, the claim of the applicants is held to be barred, the application  is dismissed, and the lands embraced therein are adjudged to be public lands."

Twenty days hereafter let judgment be entered affirming the decision  of the court below with costs against the appellants.  So ordered,

Arellano, C. J,, Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.