This is an appeal from a decision of  the Court of  First Instance of the  city of Manila affirming the decision of the Collector of Customs  in the protest case Entry E, 3646, and filed by the appellant herein in behalf of their  clients, Moll,  Kunzli &  Co., the case number being C. A. 61.  Inasmuch as the question involved in  case C. A. 49, entitled Moll, Kunzli & Co. vs.  The Collector of Customs, is the same. it has been stipulated that the appeal in that case  be discontinued awaiting the decision of this case,  and it has also been stipulated that the evidence in that case,  as  well as in  this case,  should be made a part of the bill  of exceptions here.

The protest in this  case was against the inclusion in the dutiable  value of certain goods, dutiable ad valorem, of a 4 per cent commission on an invoice of said goods made by Cuno  Hering, of Hamburg,  Germany, to  Messrs.  Moll, Kunzli & Co.  The form of invoice employed was the  regular consular invoice prescribed for goods purchased by the importer, in which the said Cuno Hering described himself as seller.  The  protest  was  overruled  and denied  by the Acting Insular Collector of Customs.

The appellants say in their brief filed in this court:

"It will  thus  be seen  that the  question in this  case is simply one of whether  Cuno Hering was  a seller to or purchasing agent for Moll, Kunzli & Co.  If he was a seller, the items charged as a commission were properly included as a dutiable item in the valuation of the goods.  If he  was an  agent of the purchaser,  Moll,  Kunzli & Co., the items charged as commission were not properly so included."

The court below found that Cuno Hering was the seller and not the agent of Moll, Kunzli & Co., and held, accordingly, that the commission,  or  whatever it may be called, of the seller,  being  an  integral part of the value of  the goods from the standpoint of Moll, Kunzli & Co., was therefore dutiable.

On the shipment of the goods from Weimar, Cuno Hering made the following declaration on the invoice accompanying the shipment.

"I,  the undersigned, do solemnly and truly declare that I am  the seller  of the merchandise in the within invoice mentioned  and described; that  the said invoice  is  in all respects correct and true, and was made at Weimar, whence said merchandise is to be exported to  the United States of America; that said invoice contains a true and full statement  of  the time  when, the place where, and the persons from  whom the same was  purchased, and the actual cost thereof, the price actually paid or to be paid therefor, and all  charges thereon; that no discount, bounties, or  drawbacks are contained in said  invoice but such as have been actually allowed thereon; that  no different  invoice of  the merchandise mentioned in said  invoice has been or will be furnished to anyone,  and that the currency in which said invoice is made out is that which  is actually paid  or is to be paid for said merchandise.  I further declare that it is intended  to make entry of said merchandise at the port of Manila.

"Dated at Weimar,  Germany, this 24th day of December, 1906.

     (Signed)   "CUNO HERING."

On the arrival of the goods here, Moll, Kunzli & Co. made the following sworn declaration on the entry and appraiser's return:

"Tomas  Molina,  being  duly sworn, says that he is an agent of the firm (or corporation)  of  M. M. & Co., agents of Moll, Kunzli & Co., the identical person (persons) mentioned in the within entry, and that the said entry contains the true numbers, weights, and quantities, according to the tariff,  and a just and true  account, classification, and description of all the goods, wares, and merchandise contained in the parcels  described  in the said  entry,  as  he verily believes; that according to  the  best of his knowledge and belief there is no invoice or bill of lading other than those now produced by  him and that they  are in the state in which he actually received them, and that nothing has been by him or to his knowledge concealed or suppressed whereby the  Government may  be  defrauded of the  duty lawfully due  on said goods, wares, and merchandise.   And this deponent further says that  the invoices  and entry which he now presents contain, as to such goods,  wares,  and merhandise as are  dutiable according to  the value thereof, a just and faithful  account of the  actual cost and  actual market value thereof in the usual  wholesale  quantity, including the cost of all packing, packages, and receptacles thereof, and all other costs incident  to  placing  the  said goods, wares, and merchandise  in condition  ready packed for shipment to the Philippine Islands."

On the  question of the good  faith of the appellants in making the protest, the following letter from the American consul at Hamburg was admitted in evidence without objection:

"HAMBURG,  January 16,1908.

"To  the Collector of Customs, Manila, P. I.

"SIR: I received your letter of the 11th  ult. inclosing two invoices of Mr.  Cuno Hering, both of which I herewith return.

"I regret that it escaped our notice  that the commission of 4 1/2 per cent  was not stated on the invoice, as this  office was extremely  busy at the time.

"Of late we  have  had numerous conversations with Mr. Hering regarding other consular invoices, and on the  same subject, and he has been informed that every item, including commission, must be stated in the consular invoice and that his invoices will be refused  if any such statements are wanting.

"I would add that Mr. Hering is absolutely innocent in the matter, always wishing to do what  is correct, but that Messrs. Moll, Kunzli & Co., in  Manila, are constantly instructing Mr. Hering to make out his invoices other than in the manner prescribed by our regulations, and has caused this office  much  unnecessary  annoyance  and work.   For instance, in this case,  he  was  instructed by the Manila firm to leave out his commission, notwithstanding that we have always demanded that the same must be stated in the invoice.

"In future Mr. Hering's invoices shall be carefully  scrutinized, so that such  oversight may not occur again.   I am, sir,

"Very respectfully yours,

        "______________________

            "Consul-General"

We do not believe  that it ought to be laid  down as a general rule that an  importer may not have the right to correct a mistake made in a sworn statement to the customs officials concerning the relations which he  sustains to  the person from whom he receives the goods.   We do not believe that such a statement is conclusive against him.   We  are convinced that does not work an estoppel in pais.  Whether or not a correction will be permitted in a given case must depend upon  the facts of that case.   Whether or not  one is estopped from asserting something contrary to what he has theretdfore  stated or asserted depends on  conditions. The  doctrine  of estoppel can be  stated only in the most general terms.   This is its particular characteristic.  It is impossible to lay down a rule to cover all cases.

To arrive at a conclusion in this case it is necessary to consider only the facts of this case.  Whether or not a correction will be permitted depends, among other things, upon (1)  the  good faith of the party seeking the change, that is, whether it is a real mistake or a simulated one; upon (2) the promptitude  with  which the request  for correction is presented; and (3) upon whether or  not injury will result to anyone if the change is permitted.

The fact that the relations between  the appellants and Cuno Hering are stated under oath  by appellants is not of itself conclusive against them.  One may make an honest mistake  under oath as well as  in an unsworn  statement. Neither is it conclusive that the appellants and Cuno Hering agreed in their description of the relations between them. Men may,  and frequently do, mistake  the relation which they bear  to each  other.  These  are simply facts which must be considered  and weighed  in  determining  whether as a matter of justice and equity, upon  the whole case, the correction ought to be permitted.

For these reasons the authorities cited by the contending counsel, while significant and helpful, can not have weight here.  The facts in  those cases are not the  same or substantially the same as in the case at bar.

The Government has no ready means of knowing the real relations between the shipper and the importer except by the  testimony of these persons themselves.  They themselves are the only ones who  know the facts from which those relations spring.  The evidence of that relationship they alone possess.   The Government  is, in a way, at their mercy in this regard.  Therefore, when they solemnly and formally state under oath what these relations are, a presumption of more than usual strength and tenacity arises. that they are stating the truth and the fact, especially when in such statement they speak  against their  own interests. If, later,  they return to vary that statement, thereby regaining what their previous statement lost them, their evidence of mistake will be scanned with  the very closest scrutiny. If in it there appears any flaw or  weakness, or if, in the whole case as presented, there appears any reason to doubt the good faith which they ought to exercise in dealing with the Government, the right to change will be denied them.

Greenleaf says in his Treatise on  Evidence, paragraph 210:

"PAR.  210.  In some other cases,  connected with the administration of public justice and of government, the admission is held conclusive, on grounds of public policy.  Thus, in an action on the statute against bribery,  it was held that a man who had given money to another for his vote should not be admitted to say that such other person had no right to vote.  So, one who has officiously intermeddled with the goods of another, recently deceased, is, in favor of creditors, estopped to deny that he is executor.   Thus, also, where a shipowner, whose ship had been seized as forfeited for breach of the revenue laws, applied to the Secretary of the Treasury for a remission  of forfeiture, on the ground that it was incurred by the master ignorantly, and without fraud, and, upon  making  oath to the application,  in the  usual course, the ship was given up, he was not permitted afterwards to gainsay it and prove the misconduct of the master, in an action by the latter  against the owner for his wages, on the same  voyage, even by showing that the fraud had subsequently  come to his  knowledge.   The mere fact that an admission  was made under oath  does  not seem alone to render it conclusive against the party, but it adds vastly to the weight of the  testimony,  throwing upon him.the burden of showing that it was a case of clear and innocent mistake.   Thus,  in a  prosecution under  the  game  laws, proof of  the defendant's oath, taken under the Income Act, that the yearly value of his estates was less than £100, was held not  quite conclusive against  him, though very strong evidence  of the fact.   And even  the defendant's belief of a fact, sworn to in an answer in chancery, is admissible at law, as evidence against him of the fact,  though not conclusive."

We do not feel like disturbing the conclusion of the Collector of  Customs in this  particular case.  He dealt with the parties at first hand, was thoroughly  acquainted with the system in operation, was deeply schooled in the methods and arts of those who seek to impose upon the Government in the matter of customs duties.  He listened to the protest, observed the conduct of the parties, and weighed the evidence presented.   He drew his conclusions from the whole case; and, while the declarations under oath  of the  appelants and Hering are not conclusive against them, still we are  satisfied from the whole case that the  Collector of Customs in  concluding that they have failed to meet and overcome satisfactorily the burden of  proof  which those declarations laid upon them was fully justified.

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against  the appellants.   So ordered.

Arellano, C, J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.