In  a civil action instituted  in  the court of the justice of the peace of Gapan, Province  of Nueva Ecija, between Luis  Borja as plaintiff  and  Alejandro Policarpio as defendant,  judgment  was rendered in favor of the former, of  which  the  latter  was notified on July  24,  1908.  On the afternoon of Saturday, the 8th of the following month of August, the last day of  the fifteen specified  by law as the period for the filing  of an appeal,  the said Alejandro Policarpio met the justice of the  peace  in a private house, for the purpose,  according to  his own statement, of appealing,  and the justice  told  him to return  the  following Monday.   Apparently the said justice believed in good faith that this  day was within the term prescribed  by law for an  appeal.  Policarpio  did not return on  the  following Monday,  and on the petition of Luis Borja  the  execution of the judgment was ordered on  the following Tuesday.

In  view of  these facts,  the aforesaid  Alejandro  Policarpio filed suit in the Court of First Instance, praying for the annulment  of the said judgment of the justice  of the peace on the ground that, owing to the latter's error in computing the days  comprised within the legal term for an appeal, he was  prevented from filing in due time his appeal against the judgment aforesaid.

The case  having come to trial, after the evidence had been adduced by both parties, the court rendered judgment annulling that of the justice of  the peace, by virtue  of the provisions of section  148  of the Code of Procedure in Civil  Actions, concluding that the facts alleged  in the complaint had been proved.  "It is  a fact," the judgment states, "that the plaintiff was  prevented from filing his appeal within the term fixed by law, either through error on his part or through error of the justice of the peace."

The important question  to be decided in this  case  is what  the present plaintiff did on the 8th day of  August with respect to his appeal against the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace  whether  he did or did not file the said appeal in due  form,  for not having so done, not having  actually filed an appeal on that day,  no importance could attach to the fact that the justice  of the peace told him to return on another day.  On  such  a supposition,  it could not  be said that he was prevented from appealing within the legal term for  a cause or reason not imputable to himself.

The plaintiff  says, in  testifying  with regard to what occurred on  the said 8th of August, that he met the  justice of the peace and told him  that he  ivould file  his  appeal; that  he carried  with  him his written appeal and  showed it  to  the justice, who  did  not  receive it,  telling  him  to return on Monday;  and that he took no sureties with him, but that  he did carry money, although he made no  intimation of his wish to deliver  the money to him, in view  of the fact that the latter told him to return on Monday.  On the other hand, the justice  of  the  peace testified  in his behalf that the plaintiff did not present to him, nor did he carry on  that occasion any document whatever; that neither did he  present  to him any  bond, and that he  merely said to him that he wished to appeal, wherefore the justice told him to return  on Monday.  On this  witness being asked why he did not admit the appeal as  it was  the fifteenth day, he answered literally as follows: "It was because he brought nothing with him on that occasion."

Section  16  of Act No.  1627,  amendatory of section  76 of Act No. 190,  provides as follows:

"An  appeal in civil causes  shall be perfected by filing with the justice  of the peace, within fifteen  days after the entry  of the  judgment complained of, a notice that the party intends to appeal, and by depositing with such justice the appellate  court docket fee  of sixteen  pesos, and by filing with him a bond in  the sum of fifty pesos, executed to the adverse party by the appellant and by at  least one sufficient  surety, conditioned that the appellant  will pay all costs  which  the Court of First Instance may award against him.  In lieu of such a  bond, the  appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper  official that the appellant has deposited twenty-five pesos with  the municipal  treasurer (in Manila with  the Collector of Internal  Revenue)  and  that said  sum  is  available for the satisfaction of any judgment for costs that may be rendered against appellant by the appellate court in said cause."

Even admitting as true the whole testimony of the plaintiff, the conclusion is  that all  he did  on  that occasion amounted  to no  more  than a  mere intention to appeal, which was not carried  out, or at least was not effected in the manner required by law.  Neither did he  deposit the P16 for the court fee, nor execute the bond required by law, nor even  make any offer of the one or  the other, nor did he make the slightest  intimation  that he was willing at  that moment to comply with the  said  requirements, which was the least that  he could have  done in  order to file his appeal in due form.  Far  from doing this, he himself asserted that he took no  sureties with  him and did not tell the justice of  the peace that he carried money. And he also testified that what he said to the latter was only that he  would file an appeal.   But  the appeal was not filed.   He did not comply with, nor  did he do  anything to comply with any of the essential  formalities prescribed by law for the perfecting of an  appeal.  As the justice of the peace states, when he  saw that the plaintiff brought nothing,  that is, neither money for a deposit nor a bond, he told him to return on Monday.  Consequently, the fact of  saying that he was  to return  on another day was not the reason why the appeal  was  not filed within the term  specified by law; it was said because the plaintiff did not then formally file  the appeal.  We find, therefore, that it has not been  shown  that the  latter was prevented through error or  other  cause not  imputable to himself from filing the appeal in due time.

The judgment appealed from is reversed  and the petition contained in the complaint is denied, without special finding as to costs of  this instance.

Arellano,  C. J., Torres, Johnson,  and  Moreland,  JJ., concur.
Carson, J., dissents.