Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari^[1] are the Decision^[2] dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution^[3] dated January 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106186, which affirmed the Decision^[4] dated April 22, 2008 and the Resolution^[5] dated August 26, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW M-06-03-01004-00 / NLRC NCR CA No. 052872-07, dismissing petitioner Tomas P. Atienza's (petitioner) complaint for disability benefits.

The Facts

Petitioner was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. (Orophil) on behalf of its principal, respondent Hakuho Kisen Co., Ltd. (Hakuho), and was assigned at the M/V Cape Apricot.^[6] In the course of his employment contract, petitioner complained of severe headaches, nausea, and double vision which the foreign port doctors diagnosed to be right cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome (THS).^[7] As a result, petitioner was repatriated on February 4, 2005 and referred to a company-designated physician, Doctor Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), who confirmed the findings and advised him to continue the medication prescribed by the foreign doctors.^[8] On June 28, 2005, Dr. Cruz issued a certification^[9] declaring petitioner fit to resume work.^[10] Dissatisfied, petitioner consulted an independent physician, Dr. Paul Matthew D. Pasco (Dr. Pasco), who, on the other hand, assessed his illness as a Grade IV disability and declared him unfit for sea duty.^[11] Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint^[12] against Orophil, Engineer Tomas N. Orola, and Hakuho (respondents) before the NLRC for payment of disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees, docketed as NLRC NCR OFW M-06-03-01004-00.

For their part, respondents opposed the claim for disability benefits, asserting that petitioner was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician and that his illness is not work-related, adding too that he maliciously concealed the fact that he had previously suffered from THS that effectively barred him from claiming disability benefits under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).^[13] They likewise contended that petitioner had been paid his sickness allowance, while the claims for damages and benefits are without basis.^[14]

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

In a Decision^[15] dated April 30, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ordered respondents to pay petitioner the amount equivalent to US$34,330.00 for his Grade IV disability and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees, while the rest of the claims were denied for lack of basis.^[16] The LA found petitioner's illness to be work-related and that he cannot be faulted for not declaring his previous treatment for the same illness given that it had occurred way back in 1996 and has not recurred despite several contracts.^[17] The LA did not give merit to the company-designated physician's finding of fitness to work, noting that petitioner was subsequently declared unfit for sea duty in a medical certificate dated March 14, 2006.^[18] Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the case to the NLRC.^[19]

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision^[20] dated April 22, 2008, the NLRC set aside the LA's Decision and dismissed the complaint for petitioner's failure to establish that his illness is work-related.^[21] In so ruling, it did not give credence to the certificate issued by Dr. Pasco as the finding of petitioner's unfitness to resume work was not supported by any explanation.^[22]

His motion for reconsideration^[23] having been denied by the NLRC in a Resolution^[24] dated August 26, 2008, petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106186.^[25]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision^[26] dated September 30, 2009, the CA affirmed the NLRC, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the latter's part in dismissing petitioner's complaint for disability benefits, allowances, and damages. It held that petitioner failed to prove that his illness was caused or aggravated by his employment conditions.^[27] Further, the CA pointed out that petitioner was also declared fit to work by the company-designated physician and that while his independent physician found otherwise, the said assessment was made after the lapse of a considerable period of time.^[28]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution^[29] dated January 22, 2010; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits pursuant to the 2000 POEA-SEC.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has merit.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevance evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.^[30] Likewise, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.^[31]

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner's certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied" is deemed to be a "work-related illness."^[32] On the other hand, Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC declares that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." The legal presumption of work-relatedness was borne out from the fact that the said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits.^[33] Given the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. "The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail."^[34]

Thus, in Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, Inc.^[35] and David v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc.,^[36] the Court held that the legal presumption of work-relatedness of a non-listed illness should be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined, is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."^[37]

Nonetheless, the presumption provided under Section 20 (B) (4) is only limited to the "work-relatedness" of an illness. It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of compensability. The former concept merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer's illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one's work, whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. This can be gathered from Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC which already qualifies the listed disease as an "occupational disease" (in other words, a "work-related disease"), but nevertheless, mentions certain conditions for said disease to be compensable:

SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As differentiated from the matter of work-relatedness, no legal presumption of compensability is accorded in favor of the seafarer. As such, he bears the burden of proving that these conditions are met.

Thus, in Tagle v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc.,^[38] the Court ruled that while work-relatedness is indeed presumed, "the legal presumption in Section 20 (B) (4) of the [2000] POEA-SEC should be read together with the requirements specified by Section 32-A of the same contract.”^[39]

Similarly, in Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.,^[40] it was explicated that the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim, and that while the law disputably presumes an illness not found in Section 32-A to be also work-related, the seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish its compensability. The proof of work conditions referred thereto effectively equates with the conditions for compensability imposed under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena^[42] it was likewise elucidated that there is a need to satisfactorily show the four (4) conditions under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC in order for the disputably presumed disease resulting in disability to be compensable.^[43]

To note, while Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC refers to conditions for compensability of an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death, it should be pointed out that the conditions stated therein should also apply to non-listed illnesses given that: (a) the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) accorded to the latter is limited only to "work-relatedness"; and (b) for its compensability, a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated must be shown.^[44]

The absurdity of not requiring the seafarer to prove compliance with compensability for non-listed illnesses, when proof of compliance is required for listed illnesses, was pointed out by the Court in Casomo v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc.,^[45] to wit:

A quick perusal of Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC], in particular the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases including Occupational Diseases or Illnesses Contracted, and the List of Occupational Diseases, easily reveals the serious and grave nature of the injuries, diseases and/or illnesses contemplated therein, which are clearly specified and identified.

We are hard pressed to adhere to Casomo's position as it would result in a preposterous situation where a seafarer, claiming an illness not listed under Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC] which is then disputably presumed as work-related and is ostensibly not of a serious or grave nature, need not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 32-A of the [2000 POEA-SEC]. In stark contrast, a seafarer suffering from an occupational disease would still have to satisfy four (4) conditions before his or her disease may be compensable.

x x x x

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuntapay [576 Phil. 482, 492 (2008)] iterates that the burden of proving the causal link between a claimant's work and the ailment suffered rests on a claimant's shoulder:

The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease.^[46] (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, it is apparent that for both listed occupational disease and a non-listed illness and their resulting injury to be compensable, the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence compliance with the conditions for compensability.

At this juncture, it is significant to point out that the delineation between work-relatedness and compensability in relation to the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) has been often overlooked in our jurisprudence. This gave rise to the confusion that despite the presumption of work-relatedness already accorded by law, certain cases confound that the seafarer still has the burden of proof to show that his illness, as well as the resulting disability is work-related.

Among these cases is Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc.,^[47] wherein this Court failed to discern that the presumption of work-relatedness did not extend or equate to presumption of compensability, and concomitantly, that the burden of proof required from the seafarer was to establish its compensability not the work-relatedness of the illness:

At any rate, granting that the provision of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to the respondent company.^[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Later, in Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel,^[49] Section 20 (B) (4) (which pertains to a presumption of work-relatedness) was mischaracterized as a presumption of compensability which stands absent contrary proof:

Anent the issue as to who has the burden to prove entitlement to disability benefits, the petitioners argue that the burden is placed upon Laurel to prove his claim that his illness was work-related and compensable. Their posture does not persuade the Court.

True, hyperthyroidism is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Nonetheless, Section 20(B), paragraph (4) of the said POEA-SEC states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this contract are disputably presumed work-related." The said provision explicitly establishes a presumption of compensability although disputable by substantial evidence. The presumption operates in favor of Laurel as the burden rests upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the seafarer's employer/s, this disputable presumption stands.^[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in DOHLE-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan,^[51] a "presumption of compensability" was declared for illnesses not listed as an occupational disease:

More importantly, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.^[52] (Emphasis supplied)

To address this apparent confusion, the Court thus clarifies that there lies a technical demarcation between work-relatedness and compensability relative to how these concepts operate in the realm of disability compensation. As discussed, work-relatedness of an illness is presumed; hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial burden of proving the same. Rather, it is the employer who bears the burden of disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully proves that the illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside of his work (meaning, the illness is pre-existing), or that although the illness is pre-existing, none of the conditions of his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating such illness, then there is no need to go into the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the name itself implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer's illness has a possible connection to one's work, and thus, allows the seafarer to claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the same is not listed as an occupational disease.

The established work-relatedness of an illness does not, however, mean that the resulting disability is automatically compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer, while not needing to prove the work-relatedness of his illness, bears the burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his claim.

Notably, it must be pointed out that the seafarer will, in all instances, have to prove compliance with the conditions for compensability, whether or not the work-relatedness of his illness is disputed by the employer:

On the one hand, when an employer attempts to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness (i.e., by either claiming that the illness is pre-existing or, even if pre-existing, that the risk of contracting or aggravating the same has nothing do with his work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer to prove otherwise (i.e., that the illness was not pre-existing, or even if pre-existing, that his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating the illness.) In so doing, the seafarer effectively discharges his own burden of proving compliance with the first three conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that (1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; and (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. Thus, when the presumption of work-relatedness is contested by the employer, the factors which the seafarer needs to prove to rebut the employer's contestation would necessarily overlap with some of the conditions which the seafarer needs to prove to establish the compensability of his illness and the resulting disability. In this regard, the seafarer, therefore, addresses the refutation of the employer against the work-relatedness of his illness and, at the same time, discharges his burden of proving compliance with certain conditions of compensability.

On the other hand, when an employer does not attempt to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability, which does not only include the three (3) conditions above-mentioned, but also, the distinct fourth condition, i.e., that there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts to the employer to now disprove the veracity of the information presented by the seafarer. The employer may also raise any other affirmative defense which may preclude compensation, such as concealment under Section 20 (E)^[53] of the 2000 POEA-SEC or failure to comply with the third-doctor referral provision under Section 20 (B) (3)^[54] of the same Contract.

Subsequently, if the work-relatedness of the seafarer's illness is not successfully disputed by the employer, and the seafarer is then able to establish compliance with the conditions of compensability, the matter now shifts to a determination of the nature (i.e., permanent and total or temporary and total) and in turn, the amount of disability benefits to be paid to the seafarer.

In this case, petitioner claims entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits. Under Article 198 (c) (1)^[55] of the Labor Code, as amended, in relation to Rule VII, Section 2 (b) and Rule X, Section 2 (a) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation^[56] (AREC), the following disabilities shall be deemed as total and permanent:

Art. 198. Permanent Total Disability. - x x x.

x x x x

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules[.]

Rule VII
Benefits

Sec. 2. Disability - x x x.

x x x x

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

Rule X
Temporary Total Disability

x x x x

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. (Emphases supplied)

Based on the foregoing provisions, the seafarer is declared to be on temporary total disability during the 120-day period within which he is unable to work. However, a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, is considered as a total and permanent disability.^[57] This exception pertains to a situation when the sickness "still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240 days" in which case, the temporary total disability period is extended up to a maximum of 240 days.^[58]

It should be pointed out that these provisions are to be read hand in hand with the 2000 POEA-SEC, whose Section 20 (3) reads:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.^[59]

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara).^[60] the Court explained how the provisions of the Labor Code/AREC and the 2000 POEA-SEC harmoniously operate:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.^[61]

Note, however, that prior to the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, the rule which was followed was the doctrine laid down in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad (Crystal Shipping).^[62] Essentially, Crystal Shipping holds that "[p]ermanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body,"^[63] and "[w]hat is important is that [the seafarer] was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability."^[64]

The apparent conflict between Crystal Shipping (120-day rule) and Vergara (120/240-day rule) was later clarified in the case of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel),^[65] wherein the Court held that if the seafarer's complaint was filed prior to the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, the Crystal Shipping doctrine should be applied, viz.:

This Court's pronouncements in Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping such that a seafarer is immediately catapulted into filing a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits after the expiration of 120 days from the time he signed-off from the vessel to which he was assigned. Particularly, a seafarer's inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to determine fitness or unfitness to work despite the lapse of 120 days will not automatically bring about a shift in the seafarer's state from total and temporary to total and permanent, considering that the condition of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.

Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.^[66]

In the case at bar, petitioner was found by both the company-designated and independent physicians to have THS during the term of his employment contract that caused his eventual repatriation on February 4, 2005. THS is a rare neurologic disorder characterized by severe headache and pain often preceding weakness and painful paralysis of certain eye muscles. Its exact cause was unknown but the disease was thought to be associated with inflammation of the area behind the eyes.^[67] A possible risk factor for THS is a recent viral infection.^[68]

Records show that petitioner, as an Able Seaman, was called to keep watch at sea during navigation, and to observe and record weather and sea conditions, among others^[69]. It was also not disputed that in the performance of his duties, petitioner was constantly exposed to cold, heat, and other elements of nature.^[70] It was likewise in the exercise of his functions that he experienced major symptoms of THS, namely, severe headache, nausea, and double vision.^[71] Clearly, while the exact cause of THS is unknown, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner's illness was most probably aggravated due to the peculiar nature of his work that required him to be on-call twenty-four (24) hours a day to observe and keep track of weather conditions and keep watch at sea during navigation. These activities necessarily entail the use of eye muscles that can cause an eye strain as in fact, he experienced headache, nausea, and double vision that worsened when he looked at his right side. Considering further his constant exposure to different temperature and unpredictable weather conditions that accompanied his work on board an ocean-going vessel, the likelihood to suffer a viral infection - a possible risk factor - is not far from impossible, more so when no less than petitioner's independent physician, Dr. Pasco, diagnosed him to be suffering from cavernous sinus inflammation.^[72]

Accordingly, it is apparent that while petitioner's illness appears to have been pre-existing, his work exposed him to the risk of aggravating the same. Further, it is also shown that the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. As the LA aptly observed:

Respondents further argued that [petitioner] failed to disclose that he suffered from frequent headaches, stiffness, and eye trouble before he boarded the vessel.

[Petitioner] cannot be faulted in answering so when called to answer whether he suffered those conditions because it is possible that indeed he did not suffer from said conditions before boarding the [vessel, because] the history of his illness was way back in 1996 and has not recurred despite his several contracts with the respondents. It is only during his last contract that he experienced the said illness and it is unavoidable that his illness called "Right cavernous Sinus Inflammation" was aggravated by his working conditions on board including the lifestyle on board the vessel.^[73] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. These findings square with the conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, and hence, all appear to attend to this case. By and large, the tasks performed by petitioner and his constant exposure to the varying elements of nature have contributed to the development or aggravation of his illness while on board the M/V Cape Apricot and therefore, rendered his illness and resulting disability compensable. In Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation,^[74] it was held that the pre-existing nature of the seafarer's illness does not bar compensation if the same was aggravated due to his working conditions:

Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer's] employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease.^[75] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

At any rate, records show that it was only on June 28, 2005^[76] that the company-designated physician issued a Medical Certificate declaring petitioner fit to work, which was 144 days after petitioner's repatriation on February 4, 2005. Considering that petitioner's complaint was filed on March 29, 2006, during which time the 120-day rule pronounced in Crystal Shipping was the prevailing doctrine, the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment within the 120-day period gave rise to a conclusive presumption that petitioner's disability is total and permanent.

In this case, the NLRC failed to account for the foregoing rules on seafarers' compensation and instead, cavalierly dismissed petitioner's claim on the supposition that petitioner failed to show a reasonable connection between his illness and his work as an Able Seaman, even if the records show otherwise. More significantly, the NLRC did not account for the employer's failure to comply with the 120 day-rule, by virtue of which the law conclusively presumes the seafarer's disability to be total and permanent. Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds that the NLRC's ruling is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and hence, should have been corrected by the CA through certiorari. Accordingly, the CA's ruling must be reversed and set aside.

In fine, petitioner should be paid by respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. (his employer) the maximum disability amount of US$60,000.00 under the 2000 POEA-SEC, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, as prayed for in his Position Paper^[77] and pursuant to existing jurisprudence:

Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was made beyond the 120-day period prescribed in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare that respondent suffered permanent total disability. This condition entities him to the maximum disability benefit of USD 60,000 under the POEA-SEC.^[78] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court likewise grants petitioner attorney's fees of US$6,000.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, since he was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. Case law states that "[w]here an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to [ten percent] (10%) of the award."^[79]

On the other hand, as the LA ruled, all other claims in petitioner's Position Paper are dismissed for lack of merit.^[80]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated January 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106186 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED ordering respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. to pay petitioner Tomas P. Atienza the aggregate amount of US$66,000.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. On the other hand, all other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), see dissenting opinion.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 13-45.

^[2] Id. at 61-74. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring.

^[3] Id. at 76-77.

^[4] Id. at 153-157. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, with Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go, concurring.

^[5] Id. at 159-160.

^[6] See Contract of Employment dated April 6, 2004; id. at 97.

^[7] See Medical Report dated February 4, 2005; id. at 99 and 139-140.

^[8] See id. at 62-63.

^[9] Id. at 135.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id. at 101.

^[12] Id. at 102.

^[13] Id. at 63.

^[14] See id. at 148.

^[15] Id. at 143-152.

^[16] Id. at 152.

^[17] Id. at 150.

^[18] Id. at 151.

^[19] See id. at 26-27.

^[20] Id. at 153-157.

^[21] Id. at 155.

^[22] Id. at 156.

^[23] See id. at 27.

^[24] Id. at 159-160.

^[25] Id. at 27.

^[26] Id. at 61-74.

^[27] See id. at 70-71.

^[28] Id. at 71-72.

^[29] Id. at 76-77.

^[30] Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Hipe, Jr., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014, 740 SCRA 330, 340.

^[31] Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 558 (2013).

^[32] See Item 12, Definition of Terms, 2000 POEA-SEC.

^[33] See Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, 743 Phil. 371, 387-388 (2014).

^[34] Bautista v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206032, August 19, 2015, 767 SCRA 657, 669-670.

^[35] G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014,740 SCRA 122, 133.

^[36] 695 Phil. 906, 921 (2012).

^[37] See Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

^[38] 738 Phil. 871 (2014).

^[39] Id. at 888, citing Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater, 628 Phil. 81, 96 (2010); emphasis and underscoring supplied

^[40] G.R. No. 213679, November 25, 2015, 775 SCRA 586.

^[41] Id. at 597.

^[42] Supra note 33.

^[43] See id. at 391-392.

^[44] See Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016, 784 SCRA 292 308-311.

^[45] 692 Phil. 326 (2012).

^[46] Id. at 339-350, citations omitted.

^[47] 676 Phil. 313 (2011).

^[48] Id. at 327.

^[49] 707 Phil. 210 (2013).

^[50] Id. at 227-228.

^[51] G.R. No. 199568, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 209.

^[52] Id. at 226.

[53] E.

A seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid ground for termination of employment and imposition of the appropriate administrative and legal sanctions.

[54] B.	Compensation and Benefits for Injury and Illness The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: x x x x x
	3.	Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor' s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

^[55] Formerly Article 192. See Department Advisory No. 01, Series of 2015, entitled "Renumbering of the Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended" dated July 21, 2015.

^[56] (June 1, 1987).

^[57] See Article 198 (c) (1) of the LABOR CODE, and Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the AREC.

^[58] See Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 588 Phil. 895, 911-912 (2008).

^[59] See id. at 912.

^[60] Id.

^[61] Id.

^[62] 510 Phil. 332 (2005).

^[63] Id. at 340; emphasis supplied.

^[64] Id. at 341.

^[65] 702 Phil. 717 (2013).

^[66] Id. at 738.

^[67] Rollo, p. 136.

^[68] < http://eyewiki.aao.org/Tolosa-Hunt_syndrome > (last visited August 25, 2017).

^[69] Rollo, p. 81.

^[70] Id.

^[71] Id. at 82.

^[72] Id. at 101.

^[73] Id. at 150.

^[74] 745 Phil. 252 (2014).

^[75] Id. at 264-265, citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, 366 Phil. 646, 654-655 (1999).

^[76] Rollo, p. 135.

^[77] See id. at 91.

^[78] C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Obligado, 770 Phil. 240, 249 (2015), citing Section 32 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

^[79] United Phils. Lines, Inc. v. Sibug, G.R. No. 201072, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 546, 556, citing Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc., v. Balasta, 728 Phil. 297, 314 (2014).

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