This is a motion to dismiss an appeal taken from an order of the Court of Land Registration, vacating a part of  a prior order wherein that court declared certain lands to be public lands by virtue of proceedings had under the provisions of Act No.  627 and its amendments.

The motion to vacate in the court below was made in  the original proceedings wherein the vacated order was entered, and the vacating order merely vacated a part of the former order, without making any further disposition of the case. The precise question submitted to this court for decision is whether  the vacating order thus entered was a final order subject to appeal, or  whether it was a mere  interlocutory order, and as  such not subject to appeal.  We are  not called upon, at this time, to consider the legality or validity of that order, or to determine whether it was or was  not properly  entered under all the circumstances of the case.

In the  case of Go-Quico vs. The Municipal Board of Manila (1 Phil. Rep.,  502), one of the  early cases decided by this court,  we sustained a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that  the order from which the appeal had been taken  was not a final one,  and after discussing the  not altogether uniform rulings of the American cases, we said (p. 508):

"In considering the American authorities it must be borne in mind  that probably no one of the statutes therein construed contained such strong provisions against appeals from interlocutory resolutions as are found in our article 123. The evils resulting from such appeals under the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil were  well  known.  It was to cure such evils that this article was adopted.  It expressly prohibits appeals not  only from interlocutory orders, but also from interlocutory judgments.  This  prohibition is reiterated in article 143, which says: 'Upon the rendition of final judgment disposing of the action either party shall have the right to perfect a bill of  exceptions.'"

Since that time  this court has strictly and  uniformly adhered to the doctrine enunciated in the case  just cited, and indeed an examination of the decisions will disclose that we have steadfastly denied the right of appeal from rulings, orders, and judgments of the lower court until final judgment has been rendered  for one  party or the other, and have construed the term  final judgment in this connection in its strictest sense, as a  j udgment completely disposing of, and finally determining the action or proceeding  wherein it was entered.

It seems  quite clear that the vacating  order in the case at bar did not make a final  disposition of the proceedings wherein it was entered.   Those proceedings were originally had in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627 and its  amendments,  for the purpose of securing  a judicial declaration  that certain lands  are public lands,  and  when the original order, which  if not appealed  or vacated would have  finally disposed  of  those proceedings,  was in part vacated in a motion made in those very  proceedings, they were left, pro tanto, in  precisely the  condition in which they were before that part of the vacated order was entered. There was thereafter no final judgment, order, or decree of the court in existence which disposed of or terminated that part of the original proceedings affected by  the vacated order, and accordingly it was the duty of the court, upon motion or otherwise,  to go forward with the proceedings until it had entered a "proper judgment, order, or decree, making a final disposition thereof.   It is  not  necessary  for us to consider whether, under the circumstances, further proceedings in  the nature of a new trial  were necessary before a final judgment, order, or decree could or should have been entered; it is sufficient for our purposes to say that until the court  below  had  made some final disposition of the matters  left undecided as a result  of the  entry of the vacating order, the action  of the court below could not be brought here for review upon appeal.

Black in his work on Judgments, volume 1, paragraph 34, points out that a distinction  is to be  made between an independent action brought (under particular statutes authorizing such actions) for the purpose of vacating a former judgment between the same  parties and procuring a  new trial of the action and a case wherein  the application comes in the form of a motion made in the  same cause.  In the former class of cases it has  frequently been held that a judgment granting the relief asked for is final and appealable, because "the issues in  the independent suit having been determined and the relief accorded, the decision puts an end to that controversy."   (McCall vs. Hitchcock, 7 Bush, 615; Belt vs. Davis, 1 Cal., 134; State vs. Allen, 92 Mo., 20,  4 S. W. Rep., 414) ;  and similar reasoning seems to have led to a like conclusion where the method of seeking relief was by the ancient writ of audita querela, which was a regular suit with  its usual incidents, pleadings, issues of law and fact, trial,  judgment, and error.   (Fitch vs. Scovel, 1 Root, 56; White vs. Clapp,  8 Allen, 283; Gordonier vs. Billings, 77 Pa. St.,  498.)

But in  those cases  where  the application  comes in the form of a motion made in the same cause, an order vacating the judgment is not a final appealable judgment, since, as we have seen, the effect is to leave the cause open for further proceedings before the final judgment or decree can be entered.   (McCulloch vs. Dodge, 8  Kan., 476; Higgins vs. Brown, 5 Colo., 345; Brown vs. Edgerton, 14 Neb., 453, 16 N. W. Rep., 474.)

Counsel  for appellant cites in support of his contention the cases cited in Freeman on Judgments, volume 1, paragraph 18;  but these cases as well as the text  in support of which they are cited will be found to deal with vacating judgments rendered  in separate  actions brought to  vacate a judgment in a former action or proceeding; and Freeman in paragraph 32 (c)  of the same work cites many cases in support of his text which there sustain the general doctrine as laid down herein.

After  ten days let judgment be entered dismissing this appeal with costs  against the appellant, and  twenty days thereafter let the record be returned to the court below.   It is so ordered.

Arellano, C. J.,  Torres,  Mapa, Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ.,  concur.