The plaintiff, a married woman, brought this action in her own name, without  joining her husband, to recover the possession of a steamboat, alleged to be her exclusive property, and for damages  for the wrongful  detention of the same. The fact of plaintiff's coverture does not appear on the face of the complaint but it was raised by answer, and one of the special  defenses in  the answer was that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, this  special  defense being based on  the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant company, dismissing the complaint, with costs, on  the ground that the plaintiff did not have the legal capacity to bring this action without joining her husband. The plaintiff appealed and during the pendency  of the appeal this  court, upon motion, allowed the plaintiff to  amend her complaint by striking out  that  part which refers to  damages for  the alleged  illegal  detention of the steamer, leaving as  the subject  matter of the action the steamer only,;   Before  the amendment was made plaintiff's husband ffiad  an interest or  right  in the income from this  steamer.   (Quison vs. Salud, 12 Phil. Rep., 109; arts. 1385/1401, Civil Code.)

Passing the question whether, fonder ordinary circumstances, the husband has such  right or interest in his wife's paraphernal property, aside from  the products, so as to make him a necessary party,  we will proceed to determine whether or not the  defendant company can raise the question of  plaintiff's  exclusive  ownership,   between herself  and husband, of the  steamer in question.

It appears from Exhibit A, the only evidence before us, and which is a public notarial document,  duly executed on the 2d of July, 1907, that Manuel Veloso, m his own name and as  the legal representative,  by  the proper power of attorney,  of his wife Casiana Bismorte, and William Urquahart, the duly authorized agent and liquidator of Aldecoa &  Co., executed  this Exhibit  "A," which appears to have for  its  object at  least a  partial settlement of Veloso's indebtedness to Aldecoa &  Co.; that  Veloso, as the legal representative of his wife, sold to the defendant company on the 19th of August, 1905, with the right to repurchase within  ten  years, various parcels of real  estate for the sum of P6,478, said amount to be applied on Veloso's debt to defendant company; that on the same  date  and under the same conditions/Veloso,  in his own name, sold to the defendant company for the sum of P13,583, to  be applied on  his  debt, a number of parcels of real  property; that in that same document, dated the 19th of August, 1905, Veloso promised to pay P2,000 a month on his indebtedness, guaranteeing this payment by, as he said, all of his property, credits, and interest which constituted his business in Leyte; that in a notarial document duly executed on  the 3d of August, 1904, Veloso acknowledged himself to be indebted to Aldecoa & Co. in certain other specified sums, guaranteeing the payment of tnese amounts with the steamer San Rafael, the said boat being his own property; that a final liquidation of all  the accounts  was made, resulting  in Veloso  owing Aldecoa &  Co. the  sum of  P129,749.65;  that  after this liquidation,  and by  virtue of this document,  Exhibit  A, Veloso, for  himself and as the legal representative  of his wife,  by and with the consent of the legal representative of the  defendant company, modified the former sales of the real property, with the  right to repurchase, and converted the same into an  absolute  sale in favor of the defendant company, together with other specified property belonging to him, in payment  of his indebtedness.  Paragraphs  (e) and (f) of this document, Exhibit A, are as follows:

"(e)  There should be  excluded from the foregoing assignment, cession, and transfer, the steamer San Rafael,  which will hereafter be the exclusive property of my wife, Casiana Bismorte, in consideration of the property by her  transferred and  assigned in  payment  of part of the aforesaid indebtedness.

"(f)  It is further stipulated  and agreed that  Casiana Bismorte shall execute, within the maximum period of two months, a notarial instrument, ratifying the present one, otherwise Aldecoa  & Co. can either insist upon the validity of this instrument or  have  the  same  rescinded, leaving everything in the same  condition  in which it was  prior to the execution of the present agreement, demanding payment of all the amounts due them from the said Manuel Veloso, and such interest as may have accrued thereon."

The defendant  now insists that it has not been shown that the property  transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant in payment of a part of her husband's indebtedness was acquired by her separate funds, nor even that it belonged to her.  The defendant is estopped from now raising this question, as it dealt with the  plaintiff's husband on the theory that the plaintiff was the owner of these lands.   The parties  to  this contract  treated this fact as specifically settled.  That  the plaintiff was the owner of  this  real property forms a part of the  very  basis  of the  contract itself; in fact it is the basis or  foundation of this contract as far  as the plaintiff is  concerned.   That she was the exclusive owner of the lands can not now be questioned by the defendant.  It is estopped  by the  contract itself.  It accepted the lands as the  property of the plaintiff, and it would now be  against the plainest principles of justice to allow it  to deny that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of those lands.

According to the contract, Exhibit A, plaintiff's husband obligated himself  to do certain things.  He also, on behalf of his wife, obligated her to perform  certain acts.   The defendant accepted these obligations with the corresponding reciprocation.   The obligations on the part of the plaintiff and her husband  were distinct and separate.  She had nothing  to do with the fulfillment of this contract, except to consent to the  conversion of the provisional sale of her lands to an absolute sale in favor of the defendant and to ratify this  sale within the period of  two months.   She consented to the  converting of the  provisional sale  into an absolute one, but the record does not show whether or not she  executed  a document ratifying this absolute  sale, as provided in paragraph (f), supra.  But  this  is  immaterial, as the fact  that she brought this action, seeking the fulfillment  of  the contract,  is conclusive proof of her ratification, and if she never executed a document ratifying the same her conduct is a sufficient ratification.  She therefore complied en toto with her part of this obligation.   She can  not be held responsible if  her husband  has  failed to comply with his part of the contract, as no stipulation to this effect  was made.  The  defendant did  not  demand, neither does it appear in the  contract, that the fulfillment of same  between it and the plaintiff would  be dependent upon the  husband's compliance with  his obligations.   We can  not determine whether her  husband has,  in fact,  complied with his part of the contract or not, but this is immaterial in this case.

It having been settled that the lands  (which were  mentioned in  the contract as belonging to the plaintiff)  were the  plaintiff's exclusive  property,  and these  lands  having been exchanged, according to  the contract, for the steamer in question, ther said steamer,  under article 1396  of the Civil Code, became the paraphernal or  exclusive  property of the plaintiff.  The defendant specifically agreed in the contract that the steamer should become  the exclusive property of the plaintiff,  the consideration being the plaintiff's lands.  Under the plain terms of this contract any defense which the defendant might set up against the  plaintiff's husband  for his failure to comply with  his part  of the contract can not be interposed against the plaintiff, as she has fulfilled her obligations.   The defendant received from the plaintiff what it  then considered a valuable consideration when  the  contract was  executed,  in so far  as the contract  affected the plaintiff.  As to whether or  not it has any meritorious  defenses  which are not  stated in the contract against the plaintiff must be left for  future determination.   It was specifically agreed in the  contract,  as we  have said, that  the plaintiff  should be the exclusive owner of the steamer  San Rafael.   In the  face  of  this express agreement, the defendant seeks to avoid complying with its part of  this obligation, in so far as the plaintiff is concerned, by now claiming  that  the plaintiff's  husband has an interest  in this  steamer.   We think that this  is a clear case of estoppel by contract.   As the defendant had agreed  that the plaintiff  should  be the exclusive owner of the  boat it should not now be  permitted  to  say that her  husband has an interest in it.The estoppel of the defendant was  fixed  hy the  execution  of the  contract. Nothing1 further need be shown where the fact in  question, as in this case, has been clearly agreed upon.  This position was taken by the defendant  when it executed the contract in question. The plaintiff acted upon  this theory.  The defendant can not now change its position to the prejudice of the plaintiff.   The defendant can  not now deny this fact in regard to its position, it having acted with full knowledge of its rights and all the material facts.

"A party can  not either in the course of litigation or in dealings in  pais occupy inconsistent positions.   Upon that rule election is  founded;  'a  man shall not be  allowed,' in the language of the Scotch law, 'to approbate and reprobate.'   And where a man has an  election between several inconsistent courses of  action,  he will be confined to that which he  first adopts; the election,  if  made with knowledge of the facts, is in itself binding; it can not be withdrawn without due consent; it  can not be withdrawn though  it has  not been  acted upon  by another  b;y any change of position."  (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 673.)

In the case of Daniels vs.  Tearney (102 U. S., 415), the suit was brought by Tearney and  Wilson, executors  of Collin  C. Porter.  The complaint set forth that  the  defendants  on  the  1st day of  June, 1861,  made their joint and  several bond whereby they bound themselves to pay to the plaintiff a certain specified sum of money when requested, and that there was a condition affixed  to the bond which was "That, whereas on the 25th day of March, 1861, a writ fieri facias was issued from the clerk's office in the name of Porter against one  Daniels for  a certain sum of money,  with interest from the 2d day of January,  1860, and  costs; if, therefore, the said Daniels should  pay  the debt,  interest, and costs, when the operation  of the ordinance before mentioned  should cease, then the obligation to be void, otherwise to be in full force."  In April, 1861, a convention of the State of Virginia passed an ordinance of secession, and on the 30th of that month a law entitled "An ordinance to provide against the sacrifice of property and to suspend proceedings in certain cases."  It was under this law or ordinance that the bond sued upon was  given. When this suit was brought the defendants pleaded, among other things, the unconstitutionality  of that statute and ordinance.  This law  was held by  the  Supreme  Court of the United States to be directly repugnant to the constitutional provisions which forbid the impairment of  contracts by State laws.   It also held that the bond sued upon, as a statutory  instrument, was likewise void, but held that the defendants  were  estopped  from raising the question of the validity of the statute and bond, the court saying:

"The principle of estoppel  thus applied has its foundation in a wise and salutary policy.  It is  a means of repose. It promotes fair dealing.  It can not be made an instrument of wrong or oppression,  and it often gives triumph to right and justice,  where nothing else known to our  jurisprudence  can, by  its  operation, secure  those ends.   Like the statute of limitations,  it is a conservator, and without it society could not well go on."

The court in quoting  from  the  case of Ferguson vs. Landram  (5 Bush  (Ky.), 230), cited in the above case, said:

"Upon what principle of exalted  equity shall a man be permitted  to receive a valuable consideration through  a statute, procured by his own consent or  subsequently sanctioned by him, or from which he derived an interest and consideration, and then keep the  consideration,  and repudiate the statute?"

In applying this principle to the  case at bar we might likewise ask  upon what principle of exalted equity shall a  man be permitted to  receive a  valuable  consideration, through a contract, procured by his  own consent, with full knowledge of all of his rights  and of all the material facts, and then  keep  the consideration (the land in this case) and repudiate the contract?  Parties are precluded  from contradicting their solemn admissions or statements deliberately made in their contracts under these circumstances. The defendant company in  this contract specifically agreed that the steamer should be the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It was upon  this  agreement that  the  plaintiff parted with her lands.   It would not  now be just to permit it to retain the lands and question her exclusive ownership, between herself and her husband, of this boat.

"It is a principle of law of universal application (and as just as it is  general) that  admissions, whether of. law or of fact, which have been acted upon by others are conclusive  against the party making them, in all cases between him and the  person whose conduct he has thus influenced; and the principle is founded upon grounds of public policy, that a  man shall not be permitted  to repudiate his own representations."   (Toppan vs. Cleveland, C.  & C. K. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 14,099.)

Under all of the facts  before us we are irresistibly led to the  conclusion  that  the defendant  company is estopped from raising this question.

The  judgment is, therefore,  reversed, and the record will be  returned to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this  decision, without special ruling as to costs.  So ordered.

Arellano,  C.  J.,  Torres,   Johnson, and  Moreland,  JJ., concur.