Appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of "faithlessness in the custody of documents,"  as defined and penalized in subsection 1 of article 360 of the Penal Code.

The evidence discloses that while  acting as assistant postmaster of  the  municipality  of Mabalacat,  Pampanga,  the defendant extracted P24 from a registered letter  which had been handed him for registry; that he entered the letter in the registry  receipt book of the post-office, but failed and    neglected to forward it  to its destination; that some days after the letter had been received for registry he took it to the  sender, confessed that he  had extracted the money, returned a part thereof,  and  promised payment  of the remainder, and begged the sender of the letter to forgive the wrong he had done him and to conceal his misconduct.

Counsel  for appellant contends that these facts  do not justify the conviction of the defendant under the provisions of subsection  1 of  article  860,  because as counsel alleges, the record fails to disclose affirmatively that the defendant was a "public official" at  the time  the alleged crime was committed; and because further, as he insists,  even if it be admitted that he was a public official and that  he did unlawfully appropriate the money contents of the letter, "grave injury to a third person or  to the public interests did not result from the act," so  that the less harsh penalty prescribed in  subsection 2  of  article 360 should have been imposed.

Article 360  is as  follows:

"The public official who  shall steal,  destroy, or hide any documents or  papers intrusted to him by virtue of his office shall be punished  

"1. With the penalties of provision mayor and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas, provided that a  grave injury to a third person or the public interests has resulted from his action.

"2. With those of prision correccional in its minimum and medium  degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas if the injury to  the third  person  or to the  public  interests were not grave.

"In either case there shall, furthermore, be imposed the penalty of temporary  special  disqualification in its  maximum degree to perpetual special disqualification."

Notwithstanding the denial of the defendant that he had ever been  appointed assistant  postmaster,  we think  the evidence  strongly tends to establish that fact; but however this may be, the defendant's own admissions  leave no room for doubt that at the  time when he received the letter in question  for  registry, he was acting for,  and instead of, the postmaster, by  commission  of and direction of the postmaster, and the postmaster being undoubtedly a "public official,"  defendant was criminally liable for any infidelity in  the custody of the documents and papers thus intrusted to him, as though he himself were a public official, by virtue of the general provisions of the second paragraph of article 362 of the code, which are as follows:

"The penalties prescribed in the three preceding articles are also  applicable to  ecclesiastics and to individuals intrusted temporarily  with the transmission or custody of documents or  papers,  by commission of the Government or of officials to whom  they may  have been intrusted by virtue of their office."

The question whether  or not the acts complained of resulted in a "grave injury"  to the public interests presents more difficulty.

Viada suggests  that for the purpose of determining the character of damages referred to  in these articles we should look to the eighth chapter of Title XII of the code, which, treating of damages to property  of another unlawfully and criminally caused (in cases wherein the code imposes no specific penalty  in other provisions thereof),  prescribes a greater or lesser penalty as  the  amount is  greater  or  less than 6,250 pesetas. But, while this chapter might, perhaps, be  safely  followed in cases  where the amount of damage is capable of monetary valuation, it furnishes no satisfactory guide in cases of damages where  the injury is not subject of monetary valuation, since it expressly provides a single penalty, with  wide discretionary  limits,  in all cases of the destruction of documents  and papers whose  value is  not subject of monetary valuation.

It would be impossible to give a precise monetary value to the injury done to  the public service by the theft of the contents of registered mail by an employee charged with its transmission.   Certain it is that in addition to the actual injury done to the owner of  the contents of such mail, the doubt and uncertainty as to the safety of registered packages resulting from thefts of their contents,  does  amount to a very real and positive injury to the postal service and hence to the "public interests."  In the case of  The United States vs. Marino  (10 Phil. Rep., 652) wherein  the defendant was charged with a  crime similar  to that committed by the defendant in this case,  and it was shown that defendant had been guilty of several separate thefts from registered mail intrusted to him, we held as follows, stating  the doctrine as laid down in the syllabus of that case:

"For the  proper qualification of the gravity of the injury caused  to third parties  or to the  public interests  in consequence  of the above-mentioned crime of infidelity in the custody and dispatch of mails intrusted to the administration of posts, it does not suffice to take into account the extent of the injury or damage inflicted respectively on each of the parties interested in the ordinary or registered letters stolen, hidden, or destroyed by the unfaithful functionary, but  it must be further considered that the unlawful conduct of the officer affects the public interests, inasmuch as the loss of packages, and the disappearance of letters, generally cause uneasiness and a certain alarm among the interested parties, some of whom, in the case at bar, filed their complaints with the Director of Posts.  Such deeds committed in a post-office tend to alienate the confidence of the public in a Government service  of the greatest necessity in social life, thus causing a grave injury of far-reaching effects to the public interests. Therefore, the penalty that should be  applied is the more severe one prescribed in  No. 1 of article 360 of the Penal Code, according to  the  jurisprudence established  by  the supreme court of  Spain in its decisions  of  the  2d of December, 1895, and the 7th of January, 1904,  rendered on appeals in cassation,  when applying  the  provisions of the corresponding article of  the Spanish  Code, analogous  to that in force in these Islands."

After a full consideration and review of the reasons upon which  our decision in that case was based we  adhere to the conclusions announced  therein,  and we are further of opinion,  and so  hold, that  the injury done to the "public interests" by each and every separate theft of the contents of registered mail by post-office  officials into whose  hands it is intrusted for delivery is a "grave"  injury thereto, and subjects  the offender to the penalties prescribed in subsection  1 of article 360 of the Penal  Code.

The  judgment  of conviction and the sentence imposed by the  trial court should be  affirmed, with the costs of this instance  against the appellant.  So  ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Moreland,  and Trent,  JJ.,  concur.