Before this Court are consolidated petitions^[1] filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution^[2] dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order^[3] dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) (1), (2), and (6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,^[4] as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019^[5] (sixteen [16] counts).

Further assailed are: (1) by Cambe,^[6] the Ombudsman's Joint Order^[7] dated March 14, 2014, which denied Cambe's Supplemental Counter­-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend Proceedings;^[8] (2) by Sen. Revilla,^[9] the Ombudsman's Order^[10] dated May 15, 2014 which denied Sen. Revilla's Omnibus Motion^[11] to re-conduct the preliminary investigation, among others; and (3) by petitioners Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos), Rosario Salamida Nuñez (Nuñez), Lalaine Narag Paule (Paule), and Marilou Dialino Bare (Bare),^[12] the Resolutions dated November 13, 2014^[13] and May 13, 2015^[14] of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the finding of probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.

The Facts

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010,^[15] in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.^[16] The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder^[17] filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019^[18] filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly stated, petitioners were implicated for the following acts:

(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation^[19] in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects,^[20] and for receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";^[21]

(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF,^[22] and for personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;^[23]

(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;^[24]

(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN­-controlled NGOs^[25] through, among others, their designation as Presidents/Incorporators^[26] of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI)^[27] and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (GAMFI),^[28] respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's control;^[29] and

(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.^[30]

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case, Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.^[31] Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding IA tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the SARO,^[32] the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO.^[33] By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.^[34] Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff - including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the legislator;^[35] and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.^[36] Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.^[37] Thereafter, the DBM would release the NCA^[38] to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost.^[39] Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis.^[40] Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof.^[41] Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting.^[42] Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence.^[43] Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects.^[44] Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00^[45] to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00^[46]

In the Orders dated November 19, 2013^[47] and November 29, 2013,^[48] the Ombudsman directed petitioners, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to which petitioners complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.^[49]

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.^[50]

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.^[51]

For his part, De Asis filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, admitting that: (a) he was an employee of the JLN Corporation; (b) he did pick up checks for JLN-controlled NGOs; and (c) he was an incorporator in one of the JLN-controlled NGOs; but denying that he personally benefited from the supposed misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.^[52]

Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., in their separate Counter-Affidavits dated December 13, 2013, contended that: (a) there is no probable cause and factual or legal basis to indict them for the offenses charged; and (b) the criminal complaints did not specifically mention their names as among those who allegedly participated in the misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.^[53]

Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for the suspension of the preliminary investigation^[54] on the criminal complaints, which were, however, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order^[55] dated January 28, 2014, holding that no prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the preliminary investigation proceedings.^[56]

Cambe filed another motion^[57] to suspend proceedings of the preliminary investigation, claiming that the filing of the criminal complaints was premature since the Commission on Audit (COA) had yet to issue an Order of Execution in relation to the Notices of Disallowance^[58] (NDs) against Sen. Revilla's Office, docketed as Special Audits Office (SAO) ND Nos. NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09). The said motion was, again, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order^[59] dated March 14, 2014 (March 14, 2014 Joint Order). Thus, Cambe elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212014-15.

Meantime, Sen. Revilla filed a Motion to be Furnished Copies of Motions, Pleadings, and Other Submissions (Motion to be Furnished),^[60] praying that he be furnished with copies of all the counter-affidavits filed by the parties in this case, which was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order^[61] dated March 11, 2014. His motion for reconsideration^[62] thereof was likewise denied by the Ombudsman in an Order^[63] dated March 27, 2014.

Sen. Revilla likewise filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition (Of the Special Panel of Investigators),^[64] which was also denied by the Ombudsman in an Order^[65] dated March 7, 2014. His motion for reconsideration^[66] thereof was further denied in an Order^[67] dated May 9, 2014.

In a Joint Resolution^[68] dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder,^[69] and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section3 (e) of RA 3019.^[70]

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN­-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00, with at least P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla.^[71]

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00,^[72] way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.^[73]

In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in light of the following: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public officers, while private individuals Napoles and De Asis all conspired with these public officers; (b) said public officers exhibited manifest partiality to Napoles and her cohorts by favoring her controlled NGOs without the benefit of public bidding and without having been authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said public officers likewise exhibited their bad faith by unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects through the receipt of "commissions," "kickbacks," and the like; and (d) their collective acts caused undue injury to the government in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00.^[74]

Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration^[75] of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution. Specifically, Sen. Revilla, in his motion for reconsideration,^[76] pointed out that the Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which documents he prayed to be furnished with in his denied Motion to be Furnished, was a grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Pending resolution of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order^[77] dated May 7, 2014 granting Sen. Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, but only with respect to the counter-­affidavits of his six (6) co-respondents.^[78] He was also directed to file his comment thereon. Dissatisfied, Sen. Revilla then filed an Omnibus Motion^[79] dated May 13,2014 praying for the: (a) partial reconsideration of the May 7, 2014 Joint Order; (b) recall of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; and (c) re-conduct of the preliminary investigation and reconstitution of another special panel of investigators.^[80] The said Omnibus Motion having been denied by the Ombudsman in an Order^[81] dated May 15, 2014, Sen. Revilla elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212427-28.

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order^[82] (June 4, 2014 Joint Order) denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and, thereby, affirming the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution with minor modifications to correct clerical errors.^[83] These Ombudsman's issuances led to the filing of certiorari petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212694-95, G.R. Nos. 212794-95, G.R. Nos. 213477-78, G.R. Nos. 213532-33, and G.R. Nos. 213536-37.

Consequently, on June 6 and 9, 2014, Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, charging: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240;^[84] and (b) all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267 to 0282.^[85]

To forestall the service of the warrant of arrest against him, Sen. Revilla filed on June 13, 2014, a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment and/or Suspension of Proceedings.^[86] Likewise, Relampagos, et al. moved that the Sandiganbayan declare lack of probable cause against them and suspend proceedings.^[87]

On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners and their co-accused and, thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against them.^[88]

Thereafter, Relampagos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution Dated 19 June 2014 with Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and to Defer Arraignment.^[89]

In a Resolution^[90] dated August 28, 2014, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion, and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282 in so far as Relampagos, et al. were concerned for the reason that the SAROs pertinent to these criminal cases were not issued or signed by Relampagos, et al., but by then DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya. However, the Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to present additional evidence to establish the existence of probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.

The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282 against Relampagos, et al. was appealed^[91] by the prosecution, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution^[92] dated November 13, 2014. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of probable cause against Relampagos, et al. in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280 on the ground that the defenses they raised were evidentiary in character.^[93] In particular, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue of whether the IA's endorsement was indispensable before the SARO can be issued is a matter of evidence to be threshed out during trial.^[94]

Hence, Relampagos, et al. filed a motion for partial reconsideration^[95] citing DBM Circular Letter No. 2015-1, s. of 2015,^[96] which supposedly clarified that the IAs' endorsements are no longer required before the issuance of the corresponding SARO. The said motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution^[97] dated May 13, 2015, pointing out that said DBM Circular was issued only after the Ombudsman's issuance of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution.^[98] Thus, Relampagos, et al. elevated the issue before the Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 218744-59.

The Issue Before This Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

All petitions are bereft of merit.

I. Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings.

At the outset, the Court traverses the procedural issue raised by Cambe in his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15. In particular, Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him. This relates to the twelve (12) NDs received by the Office of Sen. Revilla on January 14, 2014 and February 4, 2014 pertaining to expenditures charged against his PDAF during the period 2007 to 2009, docketed as SAO ND Nos. TRC-2013-016-PDAF(07-09) to 019-PDAF(07-09)^[99] and NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09),^[100] respectively, which Cambe claims should first attain finality; otherwise, the filing of the criminal complaints would be premature pursuant to the COA's 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.^[101]

The Court disagrees.

The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,^[102] this Court explained that:

[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

x x x x

It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.^[103]

In Reyna v. COA (Reyna),^[104] this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA."^[105]

Cambe's reliance on Section 6, Rule XIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA is misplaced. As worded, the provision only accounts for the possibility of the filing of criminal charges upon referral of the audit findings to the Ombudsman:

Section 6. Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his Director all instances of failure or refusal to comply with the decisions or orders of the Commission contemplated in the preceding sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report is supported by the sworn statement of the Auditor concerned, identifying among others, the persons liable and describing the participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the Legal Services Sector who shall refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman or other appropriate office for the possible filing of appropriate administrative or criminal action.

Nowhere does the provision state any delimitation or precondition to the filing of such criminal charges. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, "an audit disallowance may not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna] that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint."^[106]

In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe's motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe's petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause against all petitioners.

II. Parameters of Review.

Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.^[107]

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.^[108]

Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief."^[109] "[T]hus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice."^[110]

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty."^[111] In this case, the petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2^[112] of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)^[113] thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).^[114] On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)^[115] of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.^[116] In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence of these elements is required.

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it."^[117] It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence."^[118] Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."^[119] Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings."^[120] In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,"^[121] and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.^[122]

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

III. Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla.

First, in G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged, Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alios acta rule.

The petition holds no water.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla^[123] himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN­-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents - even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla - directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica),^[124] this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post­-enactment phases of project implementation."^[125] "At its core, legislators ­ may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus - have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations."^[126] It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be among those organized and controlled by Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically set by Napoles for the x x x purpose [of having the PDAF funds released]."^[127] Napoles's staff would then "prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the legislator and reflecting the preferred NGO to implement the undertaking."^[128] These documents "are transmitted to the IA which, in turn, handles the preparation of the MOA relating to the project, to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA[,] and the NGO concerned." "The projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. [However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place."^[129] As such, there was a defiance of Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that:

4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for projects to be specifically contracted out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO through competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53[(j)] of the [IRR-A]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine."^[130] Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores)^[131] and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui)^[132] cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses.^[133] In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,^[134] this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that "[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results."^[135] Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui's findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands."^[136] Verily, the Ombudsman's own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect. "[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence,"^[137] as in this case.

The Ombudsman's finding on the absence of forgery furthr gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011 Letter^[138] signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The letter evinces on its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe's signatures appearing on the PDAF documents:

After going through these documents and initial examination, it appears that the signatures and/or initials on these documents are my signatures or that of my authorized representative.^[139]

The Ombudsman further noted that the Confirmation Letter appeared to have originated from Sen. Revilla's Office because it was issued Bar code/Reference No. 0-2011-13079.^[140]

At this juncture, it deserves mentioning that while Luy indeed admitted that there were times that the whistleblowers would forge the signatures of the legislators in the PDAF documents, he, however, explicitly qualified that such forgeries were made "[w]ith the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap":

Sen. Escudero: Ang tanong ko, finorge or may finorge na ba kayong pirma ng senador o congressman dahil pinepeke nga 'yong beneficiary, 'di ba, galing sa listahan ng kung sino. x x x.

Mr. Luy: With the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap, mav pagkakataon po na fino-forge po.

Sen. Escudero: May pagkakataong fino-forge [ninyo] ang pirma ng mambabatas?

Mr. Luy: Opo.^[141]

Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not pass through the legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman - are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated^[142] to have dealt with Napols in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by N&poles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.^[143]

Among others, it is interesting to note that, as per Luy's testimony, Sen. Revilla was given his own codename, same as the other involved legislators with whom Napoles transacted with:

58.	T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?
	S: Ang pangalan pong taong [tumanggap] ng pera ang nilalagay ko sa voucher pero minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko.
59.	T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"?
	S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi daw po ay sa gobyerno kami nagta-transact.
60.	T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames" ng mga ka-transact ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang [Chief of Staff]?
	S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kay Senator Jinggoy Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla, "GUERERA" kay Congressman Rizalina Seachon-Lanete, "BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA, "BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA, "SUHA" kay Congressman ARTHUR PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kay Congressman EDGAR VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking naalala.[144]

As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the PDAF shares were disbursed x x x were identified by the use of 'codenames.' These 'codenames,' which were obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved in the scheme, were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation,"^[145] such as the whistleblowers. The level of detail of the whistleblowers' narration of facts would surely impress upon a reasonable and prudent mind that their statements were not merely contrived. In addition, the fact that they had no apparent motive as to why Sen. Revilla, among all others, would be drawn by the whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case of plundet should likewise be taken into account. Further, in Reyes, this Court observed that:

[W]histleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.) [590 Phil. 8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave recognition and appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that corruption is often done in secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to pin down the crooked public officers.^[146]

Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter alios acta rule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman,^[147] this Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter:

Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case.^[148] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis^[149] mandates a similar application of the foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."^[150] Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co­accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records disclose that the kickbacks amountpd to "at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010."^[151]

Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of his involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident that they had personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly, they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla's Office, which lasted for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.

In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."^[152] The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his PDAF funds.

The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's co­respondents which constitute direct evidence that provide an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time from the perspective of certain IA officials.

Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, echoed the Ombudsman's finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was] responsible for 'identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs' which was manifested in the letters of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"^[153]

For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan) narrated that he met Janet Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007. According to him, Napoles introduced herself as "the representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects"; at the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate President [Enrile], [Sen. Revilla], [and] [Sen. Estrada.]" Cunanan further averred that he "often ended up taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff members," all in connection with PDAF projects. In addition, Cunanan even conveyed that Luy would occasionally go to his office to pressure him to expedite the release of the PDAF funds by calling the offices of the legislators concerned.^[154]

Cunanan's statements were furthr corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco B. Figura (Figura), wno averred that legislators would "highly recommend" NGOs/foundations as conduit implementors and that if TRC disagreed with their recommendations, said legislators wquld feel insulted and take away their PDAF from TRC, resulting in the latter losing the chance to earn service fees.^[155] According to Figura, this set up rendered TRC officials powerless to disregard the wishes of Sen. Revilla especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.^[156]

At this juncture, this Court would like to dispel the notion. that due process rights were violated when Sen. Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28. This matter was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said:

Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his [co-respondents]. The right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties. or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents.^[157]

In any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen. Revilla's requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the opportunity to comment thereto.^[158] Thus, there is more reason to decline his flawed claims of denial of due process. Case law statethat the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard,^[159] which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.

The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report)^[160] also buttress the finding of probable cause against Sen.Revilla. This report presents'in detail the various irregularities in the disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years 2007 to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, directly releasing the funds to the NGOs after deducting a "management fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring legislator, including Sen. Revilla; (b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of government projects, provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected without any public bidding and complying with COA Circular No. 2607-001 and GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; and (c) the suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs denied ever dealing with the latter. Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were "ghost" or inexistent.^[161]

The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by the Field Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood projects. In the course of investigation, it was revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received livelihood assistance kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving the same and worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the signatures on the certificates of acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in fact, the supposed beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the place where they were named as such; had jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The foregoing led the FIO to similarly conclude that the purported livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting to P517,000,000.00 were never used for the same.^[162]

Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of Office which unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly observed, "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles's] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be 'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."^[163] Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder.

Besides, case law holds^[164] that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his co­petitioners^[165]), any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.

In fine, Sen. Revilla's petitions in G.R. Nos. 212427-28 and G.R. Nos. 212694-95 are dismissed for lack of merit.

IV. Probable Cause Against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him, as well as its failure to furnish him copies of his co­respondents' counter-affidavits.

The above-discussed pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable cause against Cambe. There is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs.^[166]

Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would go to Napoles's office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla's "commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the PDAF scam. The cash would come either from Luy's vault or from Napoles herself.^[167] In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cam be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this Court holds that Cambe should likewise stand trial for the crimes charged, and his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 be dismissed.

V. Probable Cause Against Napoles.

In G.R. Nos. 213536-37, Janet Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.

Napoles's arguments are untenable.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman, Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and "offer to 'acquire' his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange for a 'commission' or kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF."^[168] Once Napoles was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla's PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen. Revilla's Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen. Revilla's behalf. Once the SARO and/or the NCA regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the promised "kickbacks" to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which turned out to be "ghost" or "inexistent;" thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.^[169]

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government.

That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.^[170] In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

Thus, Napoles's petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 is dismissed.

VI. Probable Cause Against De Asis.

In G.R. Nos. 213477-78, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion in finding probable cause against him for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, contending, inter alia, that the performance of his functions as driver and messenger of Napoles hardly constitutes overt acts of the aforesaid crimes or a willful participation thereof. In this regard, he asserts that as a mere high school graduate and former security guard, it is highly unimaginable for him to conspire with his employer and other high-ranking government officials to commit the aforesaid crimes.

The petition has no merit.

Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator^[171] of KPMFI which was one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF allocations.^[172] Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly n,amed De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker.^[173] Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others, rec ived the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's house.^[174] Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.

To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his perceived want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the crimes charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.^[175]

In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict De Asis for the crimes charged. Consequently, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-78 is dismissed.

VII. Probable Cause Against Lim.

In G.R. Nos. 213532-33, Lim argues that the Ombudsman. gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against him for Plunder. According to him, the criminal complaints do not allege a specific action he committed that would demonstrate his involvement for the crime charged.

Lim's contention is without merit.

As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles - which includes Lim - would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla.^[176] The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to his involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not deliver the same as he claims,^[177] the act of preparation is still connected to the common objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause against him for thb crime charged. Hence, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 is likewise dismissed.

VIII. Probable Cause Against Relampagos, et al.

Meanwhile, in G.R. Nos. 218744-59, DBM employees Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated November 13, 2014^[178] and May 13, 2015^[179] which judicially found probable cause against them for eight (8) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, thereby affirming the Ombudsman's earlier finding of probable cause against them (at least for the said eight [8] counts that were affirmed). In particular, they argue that: (a) they cannot be faulted for issuing the SAROs without prior IA endorsement as it was authorized under the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) for the years 2007 to 2009; and (b) there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the DBM itself prescribes shorter periods in the processing of the same.^[180]

Relampagos, et al.'s arguments fail to persuade.

As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working - a finding that they themselves did not dispute.^[181] More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles's "contact persons" in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs.^[182] Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos et al.'s manifest partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

As to their contentions that there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the GAAs for the years 2007 to 2009 authorized such issuances even without prior IA endorsement and that the DBM itself prescribes a shorter processing time for the same, suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated in a full-blown trial. The timing of the SARO releases by these DBM officials, as well as any deviations from legal procedure are but part of a multitude of factors to be threshed out during trial in order to determine their exact culpability. Verily, the confines of a preliminary investigation do not yet allow a full exposition of the parties' claims. Relampagos, et al.'s petition in G.R. Nos. 218744-59 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."^[183] In the review of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, we are guided by this Court's pronouncement in Vergara v. Ombudsman,^[184] where it was ruled that:

[C]ourts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.^[185]

Meanwhile, with respect to the Sandiganbayan's judicial determination of probable cause, this Court, in Delos-Santos Dio v. Court of Appeals,^[186] enlightens that:

[A] judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it call)lot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.^[187]

In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that "[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] athe very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved."^[188] Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of erit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please Dissenting Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part prior OSG action.
Caguioa, J., On leave but left my vote.

---

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on December 6, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on January 6, 2017 at 2:20 p.m.

	Very truly yours,
	(SGD)
	FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
	Clerk of Court

---

^[1] Pertains to the following petitions: (a) petition in G.R. Nos. 212694-95 filed by Revilla; (b) petition in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 filed by Cambe; (c) petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-78 filed by De Asis; (d) petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 filed by Ronald John Lim; (e) petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 filed by Napoles.

^[2] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 84-223.

^[3] Id. at 224-278.

^[4] Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER," approved on July 12, 1991, as amended by, among others, Section 12 of RA 7659, entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December 13, 1993.

^[5] Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," approved on August 17, 1960.

^[6] Pertains to the petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15.

^[7] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212014-15), Vol. I, pp. 32-36.

^[8] See Supplemental Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated March 12, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VIII, pp. 4486-4494.

^[9] Pertains to the petition in G.R. Nos. 212427-28.

^[10] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 42-44.

^[11] Id. at 45-60

^[12] Pertains to the petition in G.R. Nos. 218744-59.

^[13] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 49-54.

^[14] Id. at 55-59.

^[15] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 89.

^[16] Id. at 97.

^[17] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 201-220.

^[18] Id. at 222-371.

^[19] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 96-97.

^[20] See id. at 113 and 115.

^[21] Id. at 117, 186 and 188-189. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 352 and 356.

^[22] Id. at 177 and 188-189.

^[23] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 352 and 356-357.

^[24] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 93-96 and 148-152. See also Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, et al., March 15, 2016.

^[25] See id. at 188-189 and 192.

^[26] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VII, pp. 4191 and 4167.

^[27] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 2I2427-28), Vol. I, p. 202.

^[28] See id.

^[29] See id. at 213-214.

^[30] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 191.

^[31] Id. at 148.

^[32] See id. at 94.

^[33] "A SARO x x x is "[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority." (Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 577-578 [2013])

^[34] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 148-149. See also id. at 95.

^[35] Id. at 150.

^[36] Id. at 149-150 and 188.

^[37] Id. at 150.

^[38] Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). Cash authority issued by the DBM to central, regional and provincial offices and operating units through the authorized government servicing banks of the MDS,* to cover the cash requirements of the agencies.

*MDS stands for Modified Disbursement Scheme. It is a procedure whereby disbursements by NG agencies chargeable against the account of the Treasurer of the Philippines are effected through GSBs.**

** GSB stands for Government Servicing Banks. (Belgica v. Ochoa, supra note 33, at 578.)

^[39] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95) pp. 96 and 151.

^[40] Id. at 151.

^[41] Id.

^[42] See id.

^[43] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 214 and 354.

^[44] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 151-152.

^[45] See id. at 167.

^[46] See id. at 187.

^[47] Not attached to the rollos.

^[48] Not attached to the rollos.

^[49] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 119.

^[50] Id. at 120.

^[51] Id. at 120-121.

^[52] Id. at 138.

^[53] Id. at 137-138.

^[54] See Sen. Revilla's Motions to Suspend Preliminary Investigation both dated January 15, 2014 (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212694-95], Vol. II, pp. 595-612 and 614-631); and Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings Based on Prejudicial Question with Counter-Affidavit (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. VIII, pp. 4338-4362), respectively.

^[55] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. II, pp. 748-760.

^[56] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 121.

^[57] See Supplemental Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated March 12, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VIII, pp. 4486-4494.

^[58] Id. at 4495-4543.

^[59] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212014-15), Vol. I, pp. 32-36.

^[60] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. II, pp. 687-691.

^[61] Id. at 693-694.

^[62] Id. at 695-699.

^[63] Id. at 701-703.

^[64] Id. at 786-799.

^[65] Id. at 801-808.

^[66] Id. at 809-818.

^[67] Id. at 820-823.

^[68] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 84-223.

^[69] Id. at 211-212.

^[70] Id. at 212-217.

^[71] See id. at 148-155, 167, and 187.

^[72] Erroneously mentioned as "P242,512,500.00." This was modified in the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 (see id. at 212).

^[73] See id.at173-189.

^[74] See id. at 155-173.

^[75] See id. at 224-225.

^[76] See Motion for Reconsideration (Of the Joint Resolution dated 28 January 2014 [sic]) dated April 7, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. II, pp. 707-758.

^[77] Rollo (G.R. No. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 62-63.

^[78] See id. at 12. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 250. Namely: Dennis L. Cunanan, Francisco B. Figura, Gondelina G. Amata, Gregoria G. Buenaventura, Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, and Ofelia E. Ordoñez.

^[79] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 45-60.

^[80] Id. at 57.

^[81] Id. at 42-44.

^[82] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 224-278.

^[83] See id. at 272-275.

^[84] Not attached to the rollos.

^[85] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 251-298.

^[86] Not attached to the rollos.

^[87] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 299-305 and 306-314.

^[88] Id. at 349-352.

^[89] Id. at 353-394.

^[90] Id. at 480-487.

^[91] See Motion for Partial Reconsideration (RE: Resolution promulgated on August 28, 2014) dated September 1, 2014; id. at 488-499.

^[92] Id. at 49-54.

^[93] See id. at 51-53.

^[94] Id. at 52.

^[95] See Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 13 November 2014) dated February 4, 2015; rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. II, pp. 650-668.

^[96] See id. at 655-659.

^[97] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 55-59.

^[98] See id. at 57-59.

^[99] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VIII, pp. 4357-4358.

^[100] Id. at 4495-4543.

^[101] Id. at 4357 and 4489-4491.

^[102] 571 Phil 373 (2008).

^[103] Id. at 381-382; emphases and underscoring supplied, citations omitted.

^[104] 657 Phil 209 (2011).

^[105] Id. at 235.

^[106] Rollo (G.R. No. 212014-15), Vol. I, p. 35.

^[107] Ciron v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015, 756 SCRA 110, 119, citing Tetangco v. Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230, 234-235 (2006).

^[108] Id. at 118-119.

^[109] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24, citing Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 691 Phil. 335, 345 (2012); emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[110] See id.

^[111] Shu v. Dee, 734 Phil. 204, 215 (2014); emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[112] Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, reads in full:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

^[113] Section 1 (d) of RA 7080, as amended, provides:

Section 1. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term ­

x x x x

d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

^[114] Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, 766 SCRA 1, 50-51.

^[115] Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

^[116] Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Navarro-Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015, 773 SCRA 434, 446.

^[117] Id. at 445; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[118] Id. at 446.

^[119] Id., citing Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., 624 Phil. 115, 126-127 (2010).

^[120] Id. at 449.

^[121] Id., citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, 748 SCRA 1, 51.

^[122] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24.

^[123] The following are some of the PDAF documents (bearing the signature of Sen. Revilla) attached to the records of these cases: (1) letters dated April 10, 2007 and November 27, 2007 addressed to Director General Antonio Y. Ortiz (Dir. Gen. Ortiz), Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC or TRC) (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212014-15], Vol. II, pp. 525 and 660); (2) letter dated October 23,2009 addressed to President Gondelina G. Amata (Pres. Amata), National Livelihood Development Corporation (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212014-15], Vol. III, p. 1760); (3) letter dated November 27,2007 addressed to then Secretary Arthur C. Yap, Department of Agriculture (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. III, p. 1114); (4) letter dated December 16, 2008 addressed to Dir. General Ortiz (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. III, p. 1512); (5) letter dated April 28, 2009 addressed to Pres. Amata (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. IV, p. 1916); and (6) letters dated February 27, 2009 and August 17, 2009 addressed to Pres. Amata (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. V, pp. 2502 and 2842).

^[124] Supra note 33.

^[125] Id. at 538.

^[126] Id. at 539.

^[127] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 149-150.

^[128] Id. at 150.

^[129] Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[130] Shu v. Dee, supra note 111, at 526; emphases and underscoring supplied.

^[131] See Examination Report dated October 7, 2013; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. II, pp. 370-374.

^[132] See Item (Q) in Report No. 09-10/2013; id. at 397-419.

^[133] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 196.

^[134] 360 Phil. 753 (1998).

^[135] Id. at 763. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 196.

^[136] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 201; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[137] Mira v. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 784 (2013); emphasis supplied.

^[138] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. III, p. 1552. (Dated as March 21, 2012 in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; rollo [G.R. Nos. 212694-95], Vol. I, p. 194.)

^[139] See id; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[140] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 194-195.

^[141] See id. at 43.

^[142] See portions of the following testimonies of the whistleblowers: (1) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Suñas (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. VII, pp. 3930 and 3933-3936); (2) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Luy (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. VII, pp. 3996 and 3998); and (3) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Sula (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212794-95], Vol. VI, p. 3309).

^[143] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 150-151.

^[144] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VII, p. 3998; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[145] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24.

^[146] See id., citations omitted.

^[147] Supra note 121.

^[148] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24, citations omitted.

^[149] Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled" is a general procedural law principle which deals with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the frrst principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue. (See Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 528-530 [2013].)

^[150] People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014, 743 SCRA 215, 240, citing People v. Velasquez, 405 Phil. 74, 99-100 (2001).

^[151] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 117.

^[152] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, supra note 121, at 51.

^[153] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 124-125.

^[154] See id. at 132-133.

^[155] Id. at 134.

^[156] Id. at 135.

^[157] See Estrada v. Ombudsman, supra note 121, at 67; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[158] See May 7, 2014 Joint Order; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 62-62a.

^[159] See Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24, citing Republic v. Transunion Corporation, G.R. No. 191590, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 273, 286.

^[160] Referred to as "COA Report 2007-2009" in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; see rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 113-114.

^[161] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 113-115.

^[162] Id. at 112-113.

^[163] Id. at 186.

^[164] See De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016.

^[165] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 349-352.

^[166] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, pp. 103-104.

^[167] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, pp. 352 and 356-357. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VII, p. 4000.

^[168] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 148.

^[169] See Modus Operandi, id. at 148-152.

^[170] Reyes v. Ombudsman, supra note 24, citing People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).

^[171] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212427-28), Vol. I, p. 209. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212794-95), Vol. VII, p. 4191.

^[172] See id. at 209.

^[173] See rollo (G.R. No. 212794-95), Vol. VI, p. 3292-3294 and 3326.

^[174] Id. at 3294-3295.

^[175] See Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., supra note 119, at 126.

^[176] See Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212694-95], Vol. I, pp. 105-106). See also paragraph 4.1 of Luy and Suñas's Pinagsamang Salaysay dated September 11, 2013 (rollo [G.R. No. 212794-95], Vol. VI, p. 3292), which reads:

4.1.

Kakausapin ni Gng. Napoles ang lawmaker na makakapag-bigay ng pondo, at pagkakasunduan nila ang komisyon o kickback na dapat matanggap ng kausap niya. A/am namin ito dahil sinasama niya kami noon sa ilang meetings niya sa mga lawmakers, at ito rin ang kinagawian na sa mga sumunod niyang mga transaksyon. At nakokompirma namin ito tuwing nag-uutos si Gng. Napoles sa amin na maglianda o magpada/a ng pera para sa mga nakausap niya. Ang kasama namin na /aging naghahanda ng pera ay sina Ronald John Lim x x x.

^[177] Rollo (G.R. No. 213532-33) Vol. I, pp. 19-20.

^[178] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, pp. 49-54.

^[179] Id. at 55-59.

^[180] See id. at 12-15.

^[181] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212694-95), Vol. I, p. 107. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, p. 53.

^[182] See rollo (G.R. Nos. 218744-59), Vol. I, p. 53.

^[183] Ganaden v. Ombudsman, 665 Phil. 224, 232 (2011).

^[184] 600 Phil. 26 (2009).

^[185] Id. at 45.

^[186] 712 Phil. 288 (2013).

^[187] Id. at 309.

^[188] tags