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[MANILA RAILWAY COMPANY v. MIGUEL FABIE](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cf15?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 5644, Oct 13, 1910 ]

MANILA RAILWAY COMPANY v. MIGUEL FABIE +

DECISION

17 Phil. 206

[ G.R. No. 5644, October 13, 1910 ]

THE MANILA RAILWAY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL FABIE AND BROTHERS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action to exercise the right  of eminent domain. The only question litigated is the value of the land sought to be condemned.   At the proper point in the proceedings the Court of First Instance appointed three commissioners, in accordance with the law,  with instructions to  proceed and ascertain the  value of the land and to make their report to the court.  It appears from the record that the commission proceeded to view the land and to take proofs in relation to its  value.  The  evidence taken was  documentary only and consisted simply of deeds showing conveyances of land between persons living in that community and  containing the prices paid by the vendees  therefor.

The commission  was divided in its report.  Two  members found the  value  of the land to be P56,337.18.  The third, disagreeing with his associates, found the value to be P27,415.92.  Upon the coming in of the report the court took additional  testimony, which consisted   of evidence respecting the benefits which the remaining lands  of the defendants would  enjoy by reason of the building  of the railroad, and also relating to the rental  value of  various pieces of land in that locality.  After taking this additional evidence,  the court found that  the amount stated as the value of the  land in the report of the majority was excessive  and unsupported by the evidence, and, agreeing with the dissident commissioner, found that the real  value of the land was P27,415.92.  The defendant landowners appealed to this court from that judgment.

As we have before said, the only evidence  before  us to support the finding of the commissioners consists of documents which are simply deeds  of transfer of real estate between parties in that community showing the prices paid by the vendees  in  such conveyances.  The only evidence in the record to support the finding of the court below as to the value of the land, as he found it, is that taken before the commissioners,  which consists in the documents aforementioned, and that taken by the court upon  the hearing on the coming in of the report of the commissioners.  It is apparent,  without argument,  that the  evidence  relied upon to support the finding of the commissioners, as  well as that presented to sustain the decision  of the court, is wholly incompetent for the purpose.   Deeds showing transfer of land in the locality in question and the price at which such  land was transferred, standing alone, are wholly incompetent as evidence of value, even  though such deeds contain the price for which the land sold.  The rental value of lands in the locality in which lies the land sought to be condemned, standing alone, is also utterly  incompetent to support a finding of value.  There is, therefore, in all the case  not a particle  of legal evidence which shows value. The value which ought to be shown  is the market value of the land in that locality.  By market value we mean the price fixed by buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article  established or shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property as between one who desires to  purchase and one who desires to sell; the current price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be bought and sold  in  that locality.  Undoubtedly deeds conveying property in the same locality are  of value in determining the market  value of land in that vicinity, provided  they are shown to have been made in the ordinary course of legal business and competition and that the prices stated therein were  real and not affected by unusual conditions.  Standing alone, however, they may be very misleading.   One person may desire a piece of land in a given  locality very much more  than any other  person.  He may, for some special reason, desire it so much that he is willing to pay three or four times its value in order to secure it.  A deed exhibiting such a value would be no criterion of the real value of property in that community.

The Court of First Instance had the  undoubted  right to reject the report of the commissioners,  if that  report  was not founded  upon legal evidence.  The  judge had the  undoubted right also to discharge the commission and appoint a new one.  Conceding, without deciding, that he also  had the right to formulate an opinion  of his own as to the value of the land in question, nevertheless, if he formulate such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence. The difficulty with the ease is that it affirmatively appears from  the record on appeal that there is an entire absence of competent evidence to support the finding either of the commissioners  or of  the  court,  even if the court had a right  to make a finding of his own at all under the circumstances.

We believe that justice requires  the  appointment  of a new commission to ascertain the value of the land, and the granting of a new trial generally.

For the  reasons expressed, the judgment of the court below is reversed  and the  commission  discharged.  The cause  is remanded to the Court of  First Instance,  with instructions to  appoint a new commission for the purpose of ascertaining the  value of the land in  question  in due form  of law; and for such other and further proceedings as law requires.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

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