The plaintiff  company claims to be the registered  owner of a certain sugar plantation known as the "Velez-Malaga," in the barrio of La Castellana, municipality of Pontevedra, Province of Occidental Negros, containing 379  hectares 20 ares, and 32 centares, bounded and described as follows: On the north with the land of the state, of  Gregorio Armonico, and other state lands; on the east with state lands; on the south with state lands and the River Bungahin, and on the west with the River Camandoc.   All the parties agree that  Tomas R.  de Leon was  the original owner of  this hacienda.

The sixty hectares in dispute in this case form a part of this hacienda.   On the 7th of May, 1889, Tomas R. de Leon sold the  said  plantation, including the sixty hectares, to Jose Domingo Frias.   On July 18, 1898, the vendor ratified and affirmed this sale.   Both of these documents were registered on the same day, October 3,  1898,  in the property registry.   On  June 12,  1900, Jose Domingo Frias sold  this hacienda which he had  purchased from Tomas R. de Leon, including the  sixty hectares in question, to Manuel Giner. This  document of sale was duly registered on September 29,1900.   On  May 5, 1908, Manuel Giner sold this property, including the  land  in  question, to the  plaintiff company. This document of purchase and sale was likewise registered in the propertyregiatry on August 11, 1908.

On March 13, 1885, one Marcelp Corteza commenced an action in the  Courtof First Instance of the  Province of Occidental Negros against the said Tomas  R. de  Leon to recover the sum of f&17$i with interest, due upon a promissory note.  By reason  of the commencement of this action an order of attachment was issued on March 20, 1885,  out of the said Court of First  Instance and levied upon  the one hundred hectares of the above-described hacienda.

Final judgment was entered on June 28,1889, against the said Tomas R. de Leon and in favor of the plaintiff in that case for the sum  of P2,175,  with interest and costs.  This judgment has never been completely satisfied.  On May 25, 19P7, Jose Felix Martinez purchased from the said Corteza all of his interest in the said  judgment against the said De Leon.  On petition of the  said Martinez the Court  of First Instance, on the 24th of July, 1908,'issued an execution against the said De  Leon, directing  the sheriff to satisfy the original judgment out of the property of the judgment debtor, De Leon.  The sheriff,  by virtue of the said execution, took possession on August 31, 1908, of the one hundred hectares of land which forms a part of the said hacienda, and which was attached on March 20, 1885, and proceeded to advertise the same for sale to satisfy the said judgment against De Leon.  The  plaintiff company served written notice upon the  sheriff, claiming to  be the  owner of the said one hundred hectares.  The judgment creditor, being the assignee of Marcelo Corteza, having filed an indemnity bond, the sheriff proceeded to sell at public auction sixty  of the one  hundred hectares for  the  sum of P2,632.07,  and Ricardo  Nolan being the highest bidder  became the purchaser.

The plaintiff company thereupon commenced, on the 19th of September,  1908, this  action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros against Jose Felix Martinez, the sheriff of Occidental Negros, and Ricardo Nolan, to recover the said sixty hectares which were sold  at public auction.  Judgment was rendered on July 3, 1909, by the court below,  dismissing this action with  costs.  The plaintiff  appealed.

The last  action which was  taken during the  Spanish regime by the judgment creditor, Corteza, seeking to have the judgment satisfied was in 1897.  The next move which he made was in 1903, when he^presented a petition to the Court  of First Instance asking that the registrar of deeds be ordered to certify  to the Court of First Instance what mortgages, liens, etc., if any, appeared in his books against the one hundred hectares which had  been  attached.  This petition  was granted.  No other action was taken  until 1907, when Martinez,  as assignee of Corteza, asked (on the 12th day of July)  that the  court  direct an execution to issue  against the property of  the judgment debtor.  The said judgment debtor appeared and interposed a demurrer on the ground that the  action had prescribed  (this petition being treated as a motion and not as a new action).   This objection of the  judgment  debtor  was overruled and the execution  issued, but  not  against any  special property. Under this execution it appears that certain properties were levied upon and sold but the sale was later annulled.  Other executions were issued  on the 30th of April  and the  24th of July, 1908; and, as we have said, under this last execution the land sought to be recovered was sold at public auction.

The question to  be determined  is whether or not this judgment could be enforced in the  manner above set forth in view  of the fact that it was rendered  and became  final in  1889.  On this  point  we  think  the provisions of  the Code of Civil  Procedure  are applicable.   This code  took effect on the 1st  day of October, 1901, and the execution, by virtue of which the sixty hectares in question were sold, was issued on the 24th  of July, 1908; that is, a little over six years and nine months  after the  said code went into effect.   Said execution was  issued to carry into  effect  the original  judgment without  a new  action   having  been instituted, tried, and  determined.

Sections 443 and 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure are as follows:

"SEC.  443. When  execution may issue. - The  party  in whose favor judgment  is given may,  at  any time within five years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement, as hereinafter  provided.

"SEC.  447. Enforcement of judgment after lapse of five years. - In all cases, a judgment may be enforced after the lapse of  five years from the date of its entry, and before the same shall have been barred by any  statute of limitation, by an action instituted  in regular form, by  complaint, as other actions are instituted."

It is urged by the appellees that the Court of First Instance decided in 1907 that the judgment had not prescribed and that as no appeal was taken from that  decision it must be considered as final.  On examination of this record it appears that the court below, in passing upon the judgment debtor's objection to the issuance of an execution,  did hold that the judgment had not prescribed.  This decision was based upon the motion of the judgment creditor, dated the 12th of July of that year, wherein he asked for an execution, the said judgment being dated the  17th of October of the same year.

If it be held that section  443 of  the Code of Civil Procedure, supra,  is applicable  to  the case  at bar,  for the reason that more than five years had transpired from the date this section became operative  until the 12th  of July, 1907, the date of the presentation of the motion  upon which the judgment was based, then that decision would be null and void, inasmuch  as it sought  to  enforce  a judgment which had prescribed by statute.

If the original judgment had been entered the next day after the Code of Civil Procedure went  into  effect, and if the  statute of limitations had not been interrupted,  then it is clear 'that the said judgment could not have been enforced in this manner after the expiration of five years, but it could: have  been revived under the provisions of section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, supra.  This being true, we see no reason why the  provisions of section 443 should not apply to judgments rendered prior to  the  passage  of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided  the full  five years had  expired after  its  passage before  the  judgment  was made effective, as in the case at bar.  This holding is not in conflict with the provisions of section  38 of the said code, wherein it is stated that -

"Provided, nevertheless, That all rights of action which have already accrued   *  *  *  must be vindicated by the commencement of an action or proceeding to enforce the same within ten years after this Act comes into effect."

This  provision applies  to rights  of  action'  and not  to judgments.  The general rule for the construction  of statutes relating to prescription is that such  statutes apply to all cases  alike.   The legislature having this in mind enacted this section 38 as a saving clause to protect rights of action which  had accrued before the passage  of this law.  No saving clause was made with reference to judgments.   So it is clear that it was the intention of the Commission that section 443 apply to judgments  which had  been entered before the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court below, in passing upon the judgment creditor's motion, dated the 12th of July, 1007, held that the  action taken  by the  said judgment creditor in  1903 operated to interrupt the  five-year statute of limitations.

As we have said, the action taken by the judgment creditor in 1903 consisted only of a petition dated the 24th of January,  1903, directed to the court, asking the court to order the registrar of deeds to certify to the said court what mortgages, or liens, if  any, appeared in his books against the property of the judgment debtor heretofore attached. The court granted this  request on the 23d of March of the same year and  no action  whatever  was taken thereafter in the matter until the 12th of July, 1907.  The presentation of that petition,  asking the court to direct the registrar of deeds to furnish that information, and the  granting of said petition,  can not be  held to have had the effect of interrupting the provisions of said section 443.  This section is  positive  in its terms, and provisions are  made in section  447 for the revival of a judgment which has prescribed.  Five years was considered  a sufficient length of time for  a judgment creditor to enforce his  judgment. There is nothing in section 443 to the effect that any action taken by the judgment creditor shall  operate to extend the five-year period.

In the case  of  Buell vs.  Buell  (92 Cal., 393), judgment was entered in favor of the appellant on  the 28th of February,  1877.   Execution on this  judgment was stayed by various orders of the  court, made at  the  request of the appellee, until January, 1878.  On  the 17th  of January, 1878,  the appellee commenced an action against the appellant to obtain an injunction  restraining the appellant from taking out an execution on or enforcing the collection of his judgment.  An injunction was issued and remained in full force until the 10th of December, 1885, when it was dissolved  by a decree of the court.  On the 30th of September, 1885, the appellant applied to the court for an order directing  the clerk  to issue  an execution on his judgment. This request was granted and an execution issued and placed in the hands  of the proper officer, but was  subsequently returned  wholly unsatisfied.  On the  16th of September 1889, the  appellant made another application for an execution which was granted and  placed in the hands  of the sheriff, with instructions to levy upon the property of the appellee.  This last writ of execution  was recalled  by the court and an  appeal was taken from  this order recalling the said execution.   The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Belcher, said:

"The question, then, is, did  the  court have jurisdiction and authority to make the  order for  the issuance  of the writ?  Section 681  of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 'The party in whose favor judgment is  given may at any time within five years after the entry thereof have  a writ of execution issued  for its enforcement.'  And it has been held that when the  judgment is for the recovery of money, execution  can only be issued  thereon within five years after its entry.

"It is claimed by appellant  that the time during which execution  was stayed should  be excluded from the computation of the five years.  But this claim can not be sustained, the contrary rule having been expressly declared by this court (Solomon vs. Maguire, 29  Cal., 237;  Cortez vs. Superior Court,  86 Cal.,  278).   *   *  *  The order  under review was in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. The court had  no power to enforce same after the lapse of five years."

The California court having held that an order staying proceedings did not operate  to suspend the running  of the statute, a fortiori the mere presenting of a petition, as was done in the  case  at bar, asking the court  to direct the registrar of deeds to furnish it certain information, should not operate to suspend the five-year limitation.

So we conclude that  the execution issued in July,  1908, by virtue of  which the  sixty hectares of land in question were sold  at public auction,  was null for  the reason that the court was without  jurisdiction  to issue the  same, the judgment  upon  which  it was  based having ceased  to be operative.

The judgment appealed from is,  therefore,  reversed and judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff company, directing the immediate return  of the sixty hectares of land in question to the possession of the plaintiff company.   Without special ruling as to costs.   So ordered.

Arellano,  C. J.,  Torres,  Johnson,  and Moreland,  JJ., concur.