Narciso Marigsa, as the administrator of the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa,  demands from Ildefonsa Macabuntoc,  the widow  of  the said Esteban Marigsa,  certain property for administration, on the ground that it belonged exclusively to the deceased.

The property specified in  the  complaint  consists of  six carabaos, which, on the death of Esteban  Marigsa, were sold by his widow - two, to Anatalia Isidro,  for P120 each; one, to Agapito Mercado, for P150; one, to Agustin Deliso, also for P150; one, to Sabas  Doro, for the same price; and the other, to Gaspar Umipig, for P120.

The plaintiff endeavored to  prove the  alleged exclusive ownership of Esteban Marigsa, by means of the certificates of transfer issued in the municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, which read:

"Record of transfer of large cattle. - Province of Nueva Ecija. - Municipality  of  Cuyapo. - July  12,  1906. - This record  certifies that Mr. Esteban Marigsa  (deceased), represented by his wife,  Ildefonsa  Macabuntoc, a resident   *   *   *  as owner, transferred by  sale  to  X., a resident   *   *  *  as purchaser, for the sum of one hundred and  twenty pesos  (P120),  one carabao cow, the  description of which,  *   *  *."

The defendants attempted to prove that the carabaos  belonged exclusively to the widow  as paraphernal property brought on her second marriage  to  her husband,  Esteban Marigsa, whom she married  thirty years before, and that the husband  brought  nothing to  the conjugal partnership. These  facts were averred by  the widow and two other witnesses.  The widow  moreover testified that there was no issue by her marriage with Marigsa,  and that she  no longer had any ascendants, nor knew of any  collateral relative of her deceased husband; that the plaintiff himself was named Marigsa only  as a nickname,  his father's family name being Magcauayan, and that the  carabaos had been registered in the name  of Esteban Marigsa because the latter was her husband.

The Court of First Instance  of Nueva Ecija, in accordance with the petition appearing in the complaint, declared that  the six animals specified therein belonged  exclusively to the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa and were subject to the plaintiff's administration, and ordered the defendants to return them to Narciso Marigsa as such administrator. The court also declared rescinded and  invalid the  sales made by the defendant, Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, to her codefendants, with one-sixth of the costs of the trial against each of the defendants.  The latter appealed from the said judgment and alleged the following assignments of error:

First. That the court found that the plaintiff had  fully proved the allegations of his complaint  by means  of the certificates  of ownership issued by  the municipality  of Cuyapo.

Second. That the court found that the carabaos sued for belonged  exclusively  to  the intestate Esteban Marigsa, formed a part of his estate  under administration, and adudged their return to the defendants; and

Third. That the court declared the sales made by the defendant, Ildefonsa llacabuntoc, to her codefendants to be rescinded and invalid.

This court has already decided that the initiation of intestate proceedings must not disturb the  possession, either of the surviving  spouse, or  of the legitimate  heirs, much less that of a third party.

In the registration of animals belonging to husband and wife, the record thereof is often made  out only in the name of the husband, on account  of his being the administrator of the conjugal partnership;  so that the registration herein concerned is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband.   Other kind of proof  is necessary to destroy the presumption implied by  article 1407 of the Civil Code, which  provides;

"All the property of the marriage shall be considered  as partnership property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

Although the property appears as registered  in the name of the  husband, if it was acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage it  has  the inherent character  of partnership property, whether the acquisition  is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only.  (Art. 1401, par. 1, Civil Code.)

The marriage of Marigsa with Macabuntoc having lasted for more than thirty years, according to the testimony, and some of the  carabaos being the offspring of others which were purchased, as stated  by the defendant, during  the marriage, such animals are not paraphernal property of the widow, as she claims, for even such offspring is considered as community  property, according to paragraph  3 of  the said article 1401; nor were they the private property of the deceased husband.

The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a  community, by operation  of law, between the  surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased Espouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow if he or she be  the heir of the deceased spouse.   In the present suit, no proof was adduced to show what right the plaintiff has to call himself coowner with the defendant widow, the only action which could appertain to him  in order that he might interfere with the acts of a person who, in the exercise of her rights with respect to property of which she is a coowner, or perhaps an absolute owner, disposed of such property by transferring  the  same, without the need therefor of  any authorization whatever.  Although it were  upon no other basis than that of coownership, which coownership is irrefutably shown to have existed by the  evidence in this case, the surviving widow  acted perfectly  within  her  rights in transferring the property in question.  Whenever  it shall be shown that there is another coowner as the hem of the deceased husband, then there will  be occasion to prosecute an action for the annulment  of the sale with respect to one-half of  the said property; in  order that it may be inventoried as belonging to the testate or intestate succession of the predecessor in interest.

"ART.  399. Every coowner shall have full  ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another  person  in its  enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.  But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with regard to the coowners, shall be limited to the share which may be awarded him in the division on  the dissolution  of  the community."  (Civil Code.)

"SEC. 685. Community Property. - One-half the  community property,  as determined by the law in force in the Philippine Islands before the thirteenth  day of  August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, belonging to a husband and wife, shall be deemed to belong to the deceased husband or wife, and shall be inventoried  and accounted for, and distributed as a part of the estate, in the same manner as all other property belonging to the estate."   (Code of Civil Procedure.)

From the preceding premises it is concluded:

First. That sufficient grounds  have not been  shown in this  suit to adjudge that the property in question was the private property of the deceased spouse, as against the legal presumption  that it was  the  community property  of both spouses; and, consequently, the first part  of the first finding of the judgment appealed from, declaring it to be  such,  is improper and should be reversed.

Second. That the second finding  of the said judgment  is premature, in so far as it declares the sales made by the defendant, Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, to be  rescinded  and invalid, as this could be done only after it had been proven, in a proper action, that there is another coowner as heir of the deceased husband  of the vendor;  and,  consequently, this finding also should be reversed.

Third. That the second part of the first finding, in so far as it declares all the animals  claimed to be subject to the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa, is likewise improper, inasmuch  as, by virtue of the legal presumption that has until now prevailed,  only a one-half  interest that might have pertained to the deceased husband in the said property, presumptively the  community  property of the dissolved marriage, can, in  principle, be considered as subject thereto, until proof to the contrary be adduced.   Consequently, this finding must also  be disapproved.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, without  special finding as to costs.

Torres, Johnson,  Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.