The defendant in this  case was  convicted  in the  Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union of a violation of the Gambling Law.   He  was sentenced to six months in prison and to pay a fine of P200.   From the judgment of conviction and  the  sentence imposed thereunder the defendant appealed to this court.

The two questions raised by the appellant on this appeal are, first,  that  the  Court of First  Instance had no  jurisdiction over the defendant because  there had been no prelimnary investigation, and, second, that the penalty imposed was excessive.

It appears from  the records that  the  crime for  the commission  of  which  the  defendant  stands  convicted  was committed  in the municipality of San  Juan, Province of La Union; that  the defendant was arrested by and brought before the justice of the peace of that  municipality; that, by reason of the suspension of  that  justice of the  peace from the performance of the duties of his office, the  cause was  transferred to the justice of the  peace of the municipality  of  San Fernando, an  adjoining  municipality; that a preliminary investigation was  had  before the justice of the peace of San Fernando, who  found that the facts warranted  the  conclusion  that the  defendant was  probably guilty  of the  crime charged  and accordingly  certified the case in form of law to the Court of First Instance of the Province  of La Union.

It also  appears from the record  that no  objection was made by  the defendant to the transfer of the cause from the one justice to the other and that he made no objection whatever  before the Court of First Instance as to its jurisdiction to try  him or as to the failure of  a  preliminary investigation prior to the trial.  The question of the failure of a  preliminary  investigation and the consequential lack of jurisdiction of the  Court of First  Instance was raised for the  first time here.  In the case  of the  United States vs. Aquino and others (11 Phil. Rep., 244)  this court said (p. 247):

"No  objection  appears to have been made to this proceeding either  in the court of the justice of the peace or in the trial court, nor did the accused raise any objection at the trial upon the ground now raised for the first time upon  appeal, that they were not given a preliminary trial. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion  that they must be taken to have waived any other preliminary investigation than that which was accorded them in  the court of the justice of the peace  of San Fernando, and to have waived those defects in the preliminary proceedings which are now  indicated by  the counsel upon  appeal.   It has been  uniformly held, not  only  by  this  court  but by  the various courts  of the United States, that when  provision is made for the preliminary trial  of accused persons by a justice of  the peace, this right is one which may be waived by the accused (People vs.  Tarbox, 115 Cal., 57; 47 Pac. Rep. (Idaho), 945; 46  Neb., 631; 83 Wis., 486; People vs. Harris, 103 Mich.,  473; 25 Fla., 675; 45 Hun.,  34; U. S. vs. Cockrill, 8 Phil. Rep., 742; U.  S. vs. Asebuque, 9 Phil. Rep.,  241) ; and this court has frequently held that where the accused fails  to object to proceedings upon the ground that he has had no preliminary investigation,  he must  be taken to have waived his right thereto, and can not raise an objection upon this ground for the first time upon appeal.   (U.  S. vs. Asebuque, 9 Phil. Rep., 241; 54 Kan., 206; 44 Neb., 417.)"

The same proposition was  laid down in the case of the United States vs. Asebuque (9 Phil. Rep., 241).

These considerations  dispose of the  first  assignment of error.

As to the second assignment of error, namely, that the penalty  imposed was excessive, the court  below,  in his opinion sentencing the defendant, said:

"The evidence further shows that all the witnesses who testified against the accused were, with one exception, young men.  One of them was 20 years of age, one 17 years of age, and one 23 years of age.  The evidence shows that these young men were not playing, but they were allowed to be  present at the  game and have  the temptation set before them and they would be apt to play whenever they had  money enough  to enter the game.  The court considers that any man who conducts a gambling house and admits the youth of the country into it for the purpose of seducing them from the path of virtue and teaching  them the vice of gambling deserves a severe punishment."

We can not say, upon the whole case, that the punishment is excessive, particularly in view of the finding of the court above quoted.

The judgment of the court  below is,  therefore,  affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.