On August 21,1914, the lieutenant of police of the pueblo of Burauen,  Island of Leyte, filed a  sworn complaint  in writing in the justice of the  peace court of said pueblo, charging  Luis Macalingag, alias Bayao  ni Price  (Price's brother-in-law), with a violation of Act No. 2159 in that on the 14th day of said month, at a time when he  was driving an automobile within the jurisdiction of  the  said pueblo and on the public highway, he did willfully, criminally, and maliciously run into the automobile of the La Union Company which was proceeding along  the  same highway;  that as a consequence of the  collision the automobile of the La Union Company fell with all its passengers over a declivity on the left side of the highway; and that after the accident thus resulting from  the  movement of his automobile the defendant did not stop to render the assistance asked by the passengers of the automobile struck, but,  on the contrary, increased  the speed of the automobile he was driving.

When the complaint was heard on August 21, 1914, the demurrer thereto  was sustained and it was ordered  that the complaint be immediately amended, and,  as the justice had ordered this verbally, he repeated his order in writing on the 29th of the same month, whereupon an amended complaint or information was filed by the chief of police, Ricardo Ortiz; but counsel for the defendant moved the court to dismiss the case, to cancel the bond filed, and to assess the costs de officio, under the provisions of section 23 of General Orders, No. 58, which provides that an order like that of August 21, sustaining the  demurrer and dismissing the case with the costs de officio, without ordering a new complaint or information to be filed, bars a new prosecution for the same offense.  In view of the argument of counsel for the defense and the principle  laid down in the case of Julia vs. Sotto (2 Phil. Rep., 247), and on, the further ground that the verbal order ratified by the written order of August 29 could not in the opinion of the justice of the peace be interpreted as being the prior authorization required  by the law for the filing of a new complaint or for destroying the defendant's right already in existence, the justice  finally dismissed the case by an order  dated September 11, with the costs de officio  and so forth.   From this order counsel for the prosecution appealed.

When the case came up  for the trial in the  Court of First Instance the judge under date of January 6 of this  year set aside the order of the justice of the peace of Burauen dismissing the complaint, and  directed that the case  be returned to the  said justice for further proceedings in accordance with the judgment, without special finding as to costs.  Counsel for the defendant appealed from this ruling.

The record shows the fact to have been duly proven that in sustaining the  demurrer filed by the defendant and in dismissing the complaint,  the justice of the peace verbally directed that the said complaint be amended, a verbal direction which was  ratified by the justice in his order of August 29, 1914; and  therefore  after such  ratification the  same justice could not grant the motion of the defendant to dismiss the  amended complaint, especially when  in view  of said complaint he was obliged by law to render  a decision.

The order of August 21, 1914, could  have been legally amended or supplemented by another of the 29th of the same month by a certain special  provision which the justice of the peace had through negligence or carelessness failed to put down in  writing in said first order, because it had not yet become final nor had it been appealed from by the prosecution, and therefore  the  justice of the peace  still had the power to make it; and it is neither just nor legal that the omission of an important detail that ought to have  been entered in an order  of the court should by reason of negligence, ignorance  or carelessness of a justice of the peace work exemption from the consequences of a criminal act.

Since counsel for the appellant has raised no question as to the validity or constitutionality of Act  No.  2159,  with violation of which the defendant  is charged,  an appeal in third instance does not lie, and so the appeal filed by him from the judgment of January 6 last is improper, said judgment being, moreover, in accordance with  the law and the merits of the case.

The appeal filed from said judgment is dismissed and the case will be  returned  with a copy of this  decision  to the Court of  First Instance, so that in accordance with the provisions of his said judgment he may take proper action in accordance with law.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result on the ground that the appeal in third instance does not lie.