On the 17th day of July, 1913, C. A.  Sobral, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, presented a complaint in the Court of First  Instance of said city, charging the defendant with the crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 310 of the Philippine Commission.  The complaint alleged:

"That in, during, and  between the months of January, 1911 and June, 1913, in the city of  Manila,  Philippine Islands, the said Dominador Gomez Jesus having been suspended from the practice  of medicine  on or about August 28, 1909, by the Board of Medical Examiners, in accordance with the provisions of section 8  of said Act No.  310, and while his license as a physician and surgeon was  revoked by the said Board of Medical Examiners, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously treat,  operate upon, prescribe, and  advise for the  physical  ailments  of one Margarita Dolores and other  persons, for a fee, and  presented himself by means  of signs, cards, advertisements, and otherwise  as a physician  and surgeon,  duly admitted, empowered, and allowed  to  practice medicine, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, when in truth and in  fact as the said Dominador Gomez Jesus well knew, he was not allowed to practice medicine in any way in the city of Manila, or anywhere in the Philippine Islands, for a fee, and when, as he well knew, the rendering of medical and surgical services by him  to the said Margarita  Dolores and other persons in the city of Manila was for a fee, and not in a case of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies, or through a call in consultation with other duly admitted physicians or surgeons."

On the 22d day of July, 1913, the defendant appeared and demurred  to  the complaint, upon the following grounds:

"(1) That the complaint was not in the form required  by law; (2) that the facts stated in said complaint did not constitute a crime; (3) that the complaint itself  contains allegations which in truth  would constitute a justification or legal exemption for the accused."

After hearing the arguments for  the  defense  and the prosecution on said demurrer, the Honorable Jose C. Abreu, in a very interesting opinion in which he discusses fully said demurrer, reached the conclusion  that the  complaint was sufficient, and overruled said demurrer.

On the 26th day of August, 1913, the defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded  not guilty.  The cause was brought on for trial before the Honorable George  N. Hurd, on the 9th of September, 1913.

After hearing the evidence, the said judge,  in a very interesting and well-reasoned opinion, found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case  of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the costs.  From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made  the following assignments of error:

"I. The court erred in declaring that the provisions  of section 8 of Act No. 310 are not ,in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill enacted by the Congress of the United States on July 1, 1902.

"II.  The court likewise  erred  in  declaring to be  valid and effective that portion of section 8 of Act No. 310 which empowers the Board  of Medical Examiners to revoke the certificate of  a physician  who  may have  been  convicted of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct or for unprofessional conduct.

"Ill The  court likewise  erred in considering to be final the decision of the Board  of Medical Examiners revoking the certificate of the herein defendant, notwithstanding the appeal carried to the Board of Health and not yet heard and finally decided thereby as section 8 of Act No. 310 provides.

"IV. The court also erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the evidence adduced  by the defense tending to demonstrate that the defendant's certificate as doctor of medicine represents a value greater than P600.

"V. The court likewise erred  in holding that the "Hotel Quirurgico" is Doctor Gomez  himself and  that such institution exists only to cloak the violation  of the law by the defendant.

"VI. The court erred, finally, in sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P200 or, in default thereof, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs of the trial."

The facts disclosed by the record are as  follows:

1. 
   
2. That some time prior to the 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or had been licensed, to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands.
   
   
3. That some time prior to the said  28th  day of August, 1909, the defendant had been accused, arrested, tried, and found guilty of a violation  of the Opium Law.
   
   
4. That in the month of  August, 1909,  the defendant was cited to appear before the "Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands," to show cause why his license to practice medicine should not be revoked, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310.
   
   
5. That on the date set, the  Board proceeded to make an  investigation of the question of the revocation of the license of the defendant to practice medicine,  based upon the fact that he had been theretofore convicted of an "offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct."
   
   
6. That  after the  conclusion of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion  (a)  that the defendant had been guilty of an "offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct;" and (b) adopted a resolution revoking his license to practice medicine.
   
   
7. That  the  defendant was  duly notified of the action of said Board.
   
   
8. That  later the defendant  appealed to the Director of Health, which appeal was finally withdrawn by him.
   
   
9. That  later, and  after the license of the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he did practice medicine in the Philippine Islands by treating, operating upon, prescribing for the physical ailments of various persons, for which he charged a fee, and that said treating, operating, and prescribing medicine for said various persons were-not in cases of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies.
   
   
10. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the United States Army,  the United States Navy, the United States Marine  Hospital Service, nor a physician or surgeon from other countries called  in consultation, nor a medical student, practicing  medicine under the  direct supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor  of medicine.

Upon the foregoing facts, the lower court imposed the fine indicated above.

The appellant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that section 8  of said Act  No.  310 is in conflict  with the provisions  of the Philippine  Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), and is,  therefore, void.  Act No. 310, among other things, provides:

1. 
   
2. (a) For the creation  of "A Board  of  Medical  Examiners for the Philippine Islands."  (b) That said Board shall  examine candidates desiring  to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands, and to issue a certificate of registration to  such persons who  are found to  be  qualified,  in accordance with  the  provisions  of said  law, to practice medicine, etc.
   
   
3. That after the 1st of March, 1902, it shall be unlawful for any person to practice medicine, surgery, etc., in any of its  branches in the Philippine Islands, unless he hold such certificate of registration.
   
   
4. That said Board  of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue such certificate  of registration to any individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct.
   
   
5. That said Board might revoke any certificate of registration theretofore granted to any person in case he should be convicted of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct, or for unprofessional conduct.
   
   
6. That any  person shall be regarded as practicing medicine, who shall treat,  operate  upon, prescribe, or advise for any physical ailment of another for a fee, or who shall represent himself, by means of signs, cards, advertisements, or otherwise, as a physician or surgeon.
   
   
7. That said law did not apply to the rendering of services in case of emergency or the administration of family remedies,  or to medical  officers of the  United States Army, of the  United States Navy, or of the United States Marine Hospital  Service,  or to a physician or surgeon of other countries called in consultation, or  to a medical student, practicing under the supervision  of  a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.

It is the power of the Board of  Medical Examiners to revoke a license, once granted,  to which the appellant especially directs his argument, in support of his contention that said Act is in conflict with the  said Act of Congress.

Sections of  Act No.  310 provides: "The Board of  Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of the certificates provided  for therein [in this Act]  to an individual convicted  by a court  of competent  jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct.  In case of such refusal, the reason therefor shall be stated to the applicant in writing.  The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause,  or for  unprofessional conduct,  after due notice to the person holding the certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be final."

That part of the Act of Congress upon which the appellant relies to show that Act No.  310 is  void is paragraph  1 of section 5.  Said paragraph reads as follows: "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."

The appellant gives  three reasons why section 8 of Act No.  310 is  void.  They are:  (a) That the provisions  of section 8 of  Act No. 310 deprive the herein defendant of his rights  or property without due process of law.  (b) That the power to revoke the certificate of a doctor of medicine resides solely in the Courts of First  Instance and the  Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,   (c) That the power granted to the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the certificate of a physician has been  repealed by section 88 of the Philippine Bill. While the assignments of error present various questions, the real questions presented are three:

1. 
   
2. The right of the state to  require of those who desire to practice medicine and surgery, etc., certain standards of morality and general  and  special scholarship, as a  prerequisite to  practice said professions.
   
   
3. The right of the  state to revoke such a license, once granted; and
   
   
4. The right of the state to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, those who attempt to practice the professions of medicine, surgery, etc., without a license, and in violation of the law.

The appellant argues, in support of his first assignment of error:

1. 
   
2. That section  8 of Act No. 310 is null and void because it deprives  him  of  a  right or of property, without due process of law;
   
   
3. That the Board of Medical Examiners has no authority or right to revoke his license; that right, if any exists at all, belongs to the courts; and
   
   
4. That said section 8 has been repealed by section 88 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (The  Philippine Bill).

Generally speaking, with reference to  the general and inherent power of the state, we think the  following propositions are so  well established that they  no longer admit of dispute or discussion:

1. 
   
2. The state has  general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants.   (New York City vs..  Miln, 11 Pet. (U. S.), 102, 139; Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.), 283, 423; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall.,  36, 62; Beer Co. vs.. Mass., 97 U. S., 25;  Mugler vs.. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; Dent vs.. W. Virginia, 129 U. S., 114 (25 W. Va., 1); Hawker vs.. N. Y.,  170 U.  S., 189; Case vs.. Board of Health, 24  Phil. Rep., 250.)
   
   
3. To  make reasonable provision for  determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine and surgery, and punishing those  who attempt to engage therein in  defiance of  such  provisions.  (Dent vs.. W. Virginia,  129  U. S., 114  (25 W, Va., 1); Hawker vs.. N. Y., 170 U. S., 189; Reetz vs.. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505; State vs.. Webster, 150 Ind., 607.)
   

This power  of the  state is generally denominated the police  power.  It has  been held that the  state cannot  be deprived of its right  to exercise  this power.   The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation,  or at  least one of the corner stones, of  the  state. For the state to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals,  and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state.  No legislature can bargain away the public health, public safety, or the public morals.  The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants.  Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these  things.  They cannot  deprive themselves of the power to provide for them.  (Stone vs.. Mississippi, 101 U.  S., 814, 816.)

It has even been held that a constitutional prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, public morals, or public safety, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution, of such  contracts.  Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense and to  the same extent as are all contracts and all property, whether  owned by natural persons or corporations.  (New Orleans Gas  Light Co. vs..  Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650, 672.)

In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions, become necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when  the property or the exercise of the right may tend to  destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants.   For example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or  a fertilizing establishment may be located in such proximity to the  residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the  public health  and the welfare of the inhabitants.  In such  a case the discontinuance or the removal of such institutions may be ordered, under the police power of the state, even though it amounts to  depriving persons  of  their  private  property.  (Slaughter  House Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 62; Fertilizing  Co. vs.. Hyde Park, 97 U. S., 659.)

Mr. Chancellor Kent, in  his  valuable commentaries,  in discussing the police power (2 Kent's Commentaries, 340) says: "Unwholesome  trades, slaughterhouses,  operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to the propelling of cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial of the  dead may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational principle that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests must be made subservient to the general interest of the community."

This power is called the police power of the state.  (Commonwealth vs.. Alger, 7 Cush.  (Mass.), 53, 84.)  The police power is so extensive and so comprehensive that the courts have refused to  give it an exact definition;  neither have they attempted to define its limitations.  Upon the police power of the state depends the security of social order, the life  and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property.  It extends to the protection  of the lives, limbs, health, comfort. and quiet of all persons and the  protection of all  property within the state.  Persons and property are subjected to all kinds  of restraints and burdens, in  order to secure  the general  comfort, health,  and  prosperity  of  the  state. (Thorpe vs..  Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149; New York City vs.. Miln, 11  Pet. (U. S.),  102; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall, 36, 62.)

Neither  will it be denied that the owner of a  building, which, by reason  of its decayed condition, becomes a menace to public safety, may be ordered to destroy the same, and thus be deprived of his property.  He may be ordered to repair or destroy it.  Private property, under the police power, may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a conflagration in  order  to save lives and  property.  The existence of  bawdy  houses which tend to greatly affect  the morals of the people of a community may be destroyed or may be  removed.  A manufacturing plant, so located in a thickly settled community as to greatly disturb the peace and  comfort  of the inhabitants, may be ordered closed or removed.   The state, under its police power, may regulate or prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within its borders.   Such a law may destroy the  established business of thousands of  its inhabitants.  (Mugler vs.. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; License Cases, 5 How., 504.)  If any state deems that the retailing or trafficking in ardent spirits is injurious to its citizens and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or  debauchery, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to  prevent it from regulating and restricting such traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it think proper.  The  state may even declare that buildings where intoxicating liquors are distilled or sold shall be a nuisance and ordered destroyed.   (Mugler vs.. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.)   The  state may regulate  its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and act upon all internal matters  which relate to its moral and political welfare.  Over these subjects federal  governments  exercise no  power.  The acknowledged  police power of the state extends even to the destruction of  property.  A nuisance  may be abated. Everything  prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be removed.   (License Cases, 5 How., 504;  Beer Co. vs.. Mass., 97 U.  S., 25, 33; Foster  vs.. Kansas, 112  U.  S., 201, 206; Case  vs..  Board  of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250; Mugler vs.. Kansas,  123 U.  S., 623.)

The police power of the  state extends to the protection of the lives,  limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within its borders.  Under  the  general  police power of the  state, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restrictions and burdens in order to secure the general health,  comfort, and prosperity of all.   This power, or the right to exercise it, as need  may  require, cannot be bargained  away by the state.   (Case vs.. Board of Health,  supra.)  Even liberty itself, the greatest  of all rights, is  not unrestricted license to act according to one's  own will.  It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to  the quiet enjoyment of the same right by others.  (Case  vs.. Board  of Health, supra; Holden vs.. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366, 395.) It is  as much for the interest  of the state that public health should be preserved as  that life should  be  made secure.  With this end in view, quarantine  laws have been enacted in most, if not all, civilized states.  Insane asylums, public hospitals, institutions for the care and education of the blind have been established, and special measures taken for the exclusion of infected cattle, rags, and decayed fruit. States have enacted laws limiting the hours during which women and children shall be employed in factories.  (Case vs.. Board of Health, supra.)

The present is not the first case which has" been presented to the courts relating to the right of the state to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, and to define the conditions under which such practice may be continued and to revoke the  license granted to exercise such  professions. Legislation  or statutory regulations, similar  to the  one which we are now discussing, have been adopted in practically every one  of the States of the Union. The constitutionality of such legislation  has been questioned in practically all of the States where such legislation exists. Such statutes have been uniformly sustained.   (State vs.. Webster, 150 Ind., 607, 616; Dent vs.. W. Virginia, 25 W. Va.,  1  (129 U. S.,  114);  Ex parte Frazer, 54  Cal.,  94; Harding vs.. People, 10 Colo., 387; People vs.. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 111., 370; State vs.. Mosher, 78 Iowa, 321; Iowa Eclectic Medical College vs..  Schrader, 87 Iowa, 659  (20 L. R. A.,  355) ; Driscoll vs.. Commonwealth, 93 Ky., 393; Hewitt vs.. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 353;  Reetz vs.. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505; People vs.. Phippin, 70 Mich., 6; State vs.. State Medical  Examining Board, 32 Minn., 324; State vs.. Fleischer, 41  Minn., 69; State vs.. District Court,  13 Mont., 370; Gee Wo vs.. State, 36  Neb., 241; State vs.. Van Doran, 109 N. C, 864; State vs.. Randolph, 23 Ore., 74.)

The constitutionality of similar legislation, regulating the practice of dentistry,  has  been presented  in many of the States, and has been  sustained.  (Wilkins vs.. State,  113 Ind., 514;  Gosnel  vs..  State, 52 Ark., 228; State vs.. Vandersluis, 42 Minn., 129; State vs.. Creditor, 44 Kansas, 565.)

So also have similar statutory regulations been sustained affecting the practice of pharmacy.  (Hildreth vs.. Crawford, 65 Iowa, 339;, People vs.. Moorman,  86  Mich., 433; State vs.. Forcier,  65 N. H., 42.)

Various States have attempted to regulate by statute the trade of plumbing, of horseshoeing, as well as that of engineering.  Even the  trade  of barbering is  subject  to statutory regulation in  some States, because it has relation to the  health  of the people.  (Singer vs.. State,  72 Md., 464; People vs.. Warden, 144 N. Y., 529; Smith vs.. Alabama, 124 U.  S., 465.)

Legislation analogous to that under discussion has also been adopted in various States relating to the practice of the profession of law.  The constitutionality of such legislation has been uniformly sustained.  (State vs.. Gazlay, 5 Ohio, 14; Goldthwaite vs.. City Council, 50  Ala., 486; Cohen vs.. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; Ex parte  Yale, 24 CaL, 241.)

In every case, where the constitutionality of  similar statutes has been questioned, it has been held that it is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.

The trade of plumbing vitally affects the health of the people.  The lives of thousands of people may depend upon the result of the work  of an  engineer.  The property and life of citizens of the state may depend upon the advice of a lawyer, and no profession  or trade is more directly connected with the health and comfort of the  people than that of a physician and surgeon.  The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation which very nearly concerns the comfort, health, and life of every person in the land.   Physicians and surgeons have committed to  their care most important interests, and it is of almost imperious necessity that only persons  possessing  skill  and knowledge  shall  be permitted to practice medicine and  surgery.  For centuries the law has required physicians  to possess  and  exercise skill and learning.  Courts have  not hesitated  to punish those who have caused damages for lack of such skill and learning.  The requirement  of the Philippine Legislature that those who may engage in such professions shall be possessed of both knowledge and skill before entering the same is no new principle of law.  It is an exercise of the right of the state, under its police power, which has been recognized for centuries.  No one  can doubt the great importance to the community that health, life, and limb should be protected and not be left in the hands of ignorant pretenders, and that the  services of  reputable, skilled,  and learned men should be secured to them.

In the case of Dent vs.. W. Virginia (129 U. S., 114), the late Mr. Justice Field,  speaking for the court, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen [of the United States] to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he  may choose, subject only to such  restrictions as are  imposed upon  all persons of like age,  sex, and  conditions.  This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican  institutions.  Here all vocations  are open to everyone on  like  conditions.   All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and  great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest,  or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution is  often of great  value  to  the possessors, and cannot be  arbitrarily taken from them, any  more than their  real  or  personal  property can be thus  taken.  But there is no arbitrary deprivation  of  such right when' its exercise is  not permitted because of a failure to  comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society.  The  power (police power) of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will  secure, or tend to secure, them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.  As one means to this end, it  has been the practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits (professions or trades)  a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from  a certificate to them in the  form  of a diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal.  *  *  *  Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and  requires not only a knowledge  of the properties of vegetable and  mineral substances, but  of the human body in all its complicated parts and their  relation to each other,  as well as their influence upon the mind.  The physician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate  remedies for its removal.  Everyone may have occasion  to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which  he possesses.  Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by  his license, issued  by authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the state to  exclude from practice those who have not such a license,  or who are found, upon examination, not to be fully qualified.   The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance  with which the physician is  allowed to  practice  in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes  of treating disease are discovered, or a  more thorough acquaintance is  obtained of the remedial properties of vegetables and mineral substances, or a more accurate  knowledge is acquired  of the human system, and of the agencies by which it is affected.  *   *  *  We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates  an intention  of the legislature to  deprive one of any of his rights.  No one has a right  to practice medicine without having  the necessary qualifications  of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering to the community his  services as a physician, that he possesses such learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the state as competent to judge of his qualifications."

The appellant contends, however, that  the Legislature exceeded its authority in conferring upon the Board of Medical Examiners the right to revoke his license.   He contends that the right to revoke it rests in the  judicial department of the Government; that the courts  only are  possessed of the right, if the right  exists, to revoke his license and to deprive him of his right to practice his profession of medicine and surgery.  It will be  remembered that the law conferred upon the Board the right to grant the certificate, as well as the right to revoke  it,  subject to the right of appeal to the Director of Health.  While, in some respects, the power exercised by the  Board is quasi judicial, the action of the Board is not judicial, any more than the action of a board appointed  to  determine the qualifications  of applicants for admission to the bar, nor that of a board appointed to pass upon the qualifications of  applicants to be admitted  to  the profession of teaching.  In  many of the States of the Union, no one can engage in the  trade  of barbering, or horseshoeing, without passing  an examination before a board specially appointed for that purpose.  States have  deemed it  wiser to place such  power and discretion in boards composed of men especially qualified, by reason of their learning and scientific knowledge,  rather than in the courts.

It is contended that the law provides no appeal  from the decision of the Board to the courts, and is, for that reason, null  and  void.  A law  is not  neccessarily invalid,  if it provides a remedy for  those affected thereby, simply because it does not provide for an  appeal to the courts.  Due process  of law is not necessarily judicial process.  (Murray's  Lessee  vs..  Hoboken Land  etc.  Co., 18 How.  (U. S.), 372;  Davidson vs..  New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97; Ex parte Wall,  107 U. S., 265, 289; Dreyer vs..  Illinois, 187 U. S.,< 71, 83;  Reetz vs.. Michigan, 188 U.  S., 505.)  Indeed, it not infrequently happens that a full discharge of the duties conferred upon boards and  commissions or officers of a purely ministerial character requires them to consider and to finally determine questions of a purely legal character. The legislature may confer upon persons,  boards, officers, and commissions the right to finally decide many questions affecting various interests of the people of the  state.  If a remedy is granted, the law will be valid, even though no appeal to the courts is provided.  The right of appeal is a purely statutory  right; it is not an  inherent right.  The right to appeal was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary element of due process of law.  (McKane vs.. Durston, 153 U. S., 684, 687;  Reetz vs.. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505, 508.)

The objection that  the statute confers judicial  power upon the Board of Medical Examiners is not well founded. The law provides for an appeal to the Director of Health. Many executive officers, even those who are  regarded as purely ministerial officers, act judicially in the determination of facts in the performance of their duties, and in so doing "they do not exercise judicial power," as that phrase is commonly used, and as it is used in the Organic Act in conferring  judicial  power  upon  specified  courts.  The powers  conferred upon the Board of Medical Examiners are in no wise different in character,  in this respect, from those exercised by those of examiners of candidates to teach in our  public schools, or by tax assessors, or boards of equalization, in the determination for the purposes of taxation, the value of property.  The ascertainment and determination  of the  qualifications  to practice medicine,  by a board appointed for that purpose, composed of experts, is not the exercise  of a  power which appropriately belongs to the judicial department of the Government.  The same is  true  with reference to the power  conferred upon such a board to  revoke a license, for the  reasons given in the law.  (People  vs.. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah, 291; Reetz vs.. Michigan 188 U. S., 505, 507.)

The appellant further argues and contends that the present law is repealed by section  88 of  the Act  of Congress of July  1, 1902.  We think from the foregoing argument we have shown that there is nothing in said Act of Congress which is inconsistent with the provisions of Act No. 310, under consideration,  and that it is not repealed.

What has been said, we think, also answers the argument of the appellant in support of his second, third, and fourth assignments of error.  It may be well, however, to observe in relation to the third  assignment that the appellant cannot object to the decision of the Board, when he himself, after his appeal, voluntarily withdrew it.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, the record shows, beyond question, that the appellant had personally engaged in the  practice of medicine and surgery, in clear contravention of the law, without being authorized so to do. It is a matter of little importance whether the appellant practiced medicine and  surgery as the "Hotel  Quirurgico" or not.  The record shows that he personally and illegally engaged in the practice of medicine.   The poor sick patients who called him for  medical assistance certainly did not believe or think that they were calling the "Hotel Quirurgico."  They believed that they were being treated by the appellant.  So ordered.

For all of the foregoing reasons the sentence of the lower court is  hereby affirmed, with costs.

Arellano, C. J.. Torres, Carson. Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.