[ G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982 ]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, MAKATI BRANCH XV, AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
AQUINO, J.:
This case involves the prohibition in Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."* That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution.
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC Record No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of Rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E. Quirino Streets in the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing spouses constructed a house thereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the 1968 cadastral survey made in Tanay by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two streets serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 "and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
It contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoked Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.
In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).
The Public Land Law provides:
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
That ruling is based on the Cariño case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory." That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now Section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "tenian asimismo a su favor la presuncionywra et dejure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos duettos del terreno ni este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos piiblicos del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sale of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but as a derecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court in disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:
Since Section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under Section 48(b). The proceeding under Section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court's judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Fernando CJ., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion.
De Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
* The same issue is involved in the following fourteen pending cases. (1) G.R. No. 51756, Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Director of Lands, et al.; (2) G.R. No. 54045, Director of Lands vs. Dynamarine Corporation, et al.; (3) G.R. No. 54276, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (4) G.R. No. 54952, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Gabriel Valle, Jr., et al.; (5) G.R. No. 55171, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Job B. Madayag, et al.; (6) G.R. No. 55289, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Candido Villanueva, et al.; (7) G.R. No. 56025, Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et al.; (8) G.R. No. 56613, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (9) G.R. No. 57272, Director of Lands vs. Valenzuela Tannery Corportaion, et al.; (10) G.R. No. 57461, Director of Lands vs. Manila Electric Company, et al.; (11) G.R. No. 58077, Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., et al.; (12) G.R. No. 58089, Director of Lands vs. Continental Leaf Tobacco, (Phil.), et al.; (13) G.R. No. 58117, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Emmanuel Cleto, et al. and (14) G.R. No. 58906, Director of Lands vs. United Church of Christ in the Phil., et al.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
FERNANDO, C.J.,
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48 (b). [1] I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, [2] where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction [3] and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48 (b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
[1] Decision, 6.
[2] 120 Phil. 1417 (1964) (per Concepcion, J.)
[3] Cf. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967).
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC Record No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of Rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E. Quirino Streets in the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing spouses constructed a house thereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the 1968 cadastral survey made in Tanay by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two streets serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 "and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
It contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoked Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.
In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).
The Public Land Law provides:
"CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
"SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter."
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
That ruling is based on the Cariño case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory." That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now Section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "tenian asimismo a su favor la presuncionywra et dejure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos duettos del terreno ni este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos piiblicos del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sale of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but as a derecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court in disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:
' 'The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits.Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
"The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do.
"They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified." (75 Phil. 890, 893.)
Since Section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under Section 48(b). The proceeding under Section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court's judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Fernando CJ., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion.
De Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
* The same issue is involved in the following fourteen pending cases. (1) G.R. No. 51756, Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Director of Lands, et al.; (2) G.R. No. 54045, Director of Lands vs. Dynamarine Corporation, et al.; (3) G.R. No. 54276, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (4) G.R. No. 54952, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Gabriel Valle, Jr., et al.; (5) G.R. No. 55171, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Job B. Madayag, et al.; (6) G.R. No. 55289, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Candido Villanueva, et al.; (7) G.R. No. 56025, Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et al.; (8) G.R. No. 56613, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (9) G.R. No. 57272, Director of Lands vs. Valenzuela Tannery Corportaion, et al.; (10) G.R. No. 57461, Director of Lands vs. Manila Electric Company, et al.; (11) G.R. No. 58077, Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., et al.; (12) G.R. No. 58089, Director of Lands vs. Continental Leaf Tobacco, (Phil.), et al.; (13) G.R. No. 58117, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Emmanuel Cleto, et al. and (14) G.R. No. 58906, Director of Lands vs. United Church of Christ in the Phil., et al.
FERNANDO, C.J.,
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48 (b). [1] I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, [2] where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction [3] and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48 (b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
[1] Decision, 6.
[2] 120 Phil. 1417 (1964) (per Concepcion, J.)
[3] Cf. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967).