The defendants  in this action, at the time of the execution of the contract hereinafter presented, were  merchants doing  business in the city of Manila and in other places in the Philippine Islands.  On the 12th  day of June, 1902, the plaintiff and the defendants executed the following contract at Hyderabad Sindh, India:

"I, the undersigned,  Chatamal Tikumal Hindu,  aged 26 years, of Hyderabad Sindh, do hereby  agree  to enter the service  of Messrs.  Pohoomul  Brothers,  namely, Mr. Moolchand, Mr. Lekraj, and Mr.  Sahijram, sons1 of Khiamull, on the following conditions:

"1. That I  shall serve the said firm for the period of three years, commencing on the________day of the month of _______1902, in any place  they may  like  to send me, at the salary of  Rs. 45 per month for  the said period and to be supplied with my daily food by the said firm during the period of my  serving them.

"2. That all  my traveling expenses  to and  from any place shall  be at the charge of the said  firm.

"3. My salary will commence from the date  of departure and will be ceased from the date of leaving the destination.

"4. That I bind myself to serve the said firm honestly and faithfully and be  obedient to my masters,  their managers or persons in  charge of their business in any place or at any time I  shall  be serving and I shall do the works they impose on me.

"5. The accounts to  be settled at Bombay or  Hyderabad Sindh, where the said  masters wish.

"6. The  accounts  to be settled on the rate  of  English months.

"7. That I shall be  responsible for anything and every article which will be trusted to me  and shall  pay all amounts of loss  of  such articles, as well  as all  amounts of goods whenever sold by me on credit, and bind myself to render all amounts or parts of them whenever and wherever called upon.

"8. That if these conditions or any of them is not strictly fulfilled by me, Messrs. Pohoomul Brothers or their agents or anyone in charge of their business at the time will be justified to  diiiniss  me from their  service, retaining all pay or amounts of pay in their hands which may be due to me at  the  time without having I any right to claim from  the firm any amounts or balance of pay and salary.

"9. If  I  after  signing this agreement I do not enter the service of  said company, I  will be liable to pay Rs. 200 as damages to said company and will at once return the amount received, with interest from the date of receipt at the rate of Re. 1  per cent  per annum.

"10. That I bind  myself to leave Hyderabad Sindh as soon as I am ordered  by any of the brothers of the  said company to do so.   If I fail to go I will  be liable as in para.  9th.

"11. The sum of Rs.  25 the  above mentioned masters will give here to my parents for the maintain of family members.

"Dated thus the agreement 12th June, 1902."

As  shown by the contract  itself, it bears date the 12th day of  June,  1902.   Pursuant to  said  contract and by virtue  of the  terms  thereof, the  plaintiff emigrated to the Philippine  Islands, arriving at Manila on the 13th day of October, 1902, and immediately  thereafter began work for the defendants as manager of their store at Tacloban. He continued in their employ until the 21st day of May, 1906.  During all that time he was the manager of various stores belonging to the defendants in Calbayog,  Tacloban, and Jolo and for a short time was  employed in the main house  in Manila.  So far as  appears in the evidence, the only occupation  in which the plaintiff engaged while in the  service of  the  defendants was that  of manager of one or the other of their stores referred  to.  It does not appear except  rarely that he worked as  a clerk or  performed any manual labor whatever, unless the performance of his duties as manager may be held to be such.  As  shown by the evidence,  his work  was  to a very  large  extent management.   We can not assume, for the purpose of bringing the plaintiff within the statute, that he contracted to do  prohibited work or that he worked as a laborer while here.  (U. S. vs. Gay. 80 Fed. Rep., 254.)

During such employment the plaintiff received from the defendants the  sum of Pl,208.76.

After  the term mentioned in the contract had  expired, the plaintiff  discovered,  as he believed, that the contract under  which he came to the Philippine Islands was void under the laws of the United States prohibiting the importation of alien labor, and  thereupon brought this action to recover the value of his services, disregarding entirely the said contract and the  terms thereof and asserting his right to recover on a quantum meruit.

The  defendants set up as  their first defense that even though said contract was void, as in violation of said laws of Congress,  still it is valid and binding upon the parties thereto for the reason that it has been fully executed by them.  As a second defense they allege that some time prior to the  commencement of this action  they and the plaintiff made a full and complete settlement of their respective accounts and claims under said contract, observing strictly the terms thereof, and that it was found upon such settlement that there was due from the plaintiff to the defendants the sum of ^528.38, for which sum the plaintiff then and there gave his  promissory note.   They ask an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff for that amount.

As to the first defense, the plaintiff replied and asserted that the contract was absolutely void, it being clearly within the  prohibition of the laws of Congress  relating to the importation of alien labor and it could not, therefore, be an executed  contract in the sense asserted by the defendants in their first defense.   As to the second defense, the plaintiff admits the execution and  delivery of the note, but alleges that the same was voidable because it  had been  executed by him while under duress caused by threats on the part of the defendants.

The court below in his decision found that the contract was void  as claimed by the plaintiff, that the note given  in pursuance of said settlement was made and executed by the plaintiff through excessive and controlling fear caused by the threats of the defendants to put him in state prison for a series of years, and that,  for that reason, the execution of said note occurred while plaintiff  was  laboring under such fear and intimidation that he did not act of his own free will.   Approving plaintiff's claim of a right to recover upon a quantum meruit, the court below disregarded the said contract wholly and gave the plaintiff a judgment for Pl,208.86, and interest at 6 per cent from June 1, 1906.

This case does not fall within the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1903, but within the Acts hereinafter quoted.  (Fornow vs. Hoffmeister,  6 Phil. Rep., 33.)

The Act of Congress of February 26, 1885, so far as it is material to the issues in this  case, reads as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., That from and after the passage of this  Act it  shall be  unlawful for  any  person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any  manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation  or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the importation or migration  of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or  the  District of Columbia.

"SEC. 2.  That all contracts or agreements, express or implied, parol or special, which may hereafter be made by and between  any person,  company, partnership, or corporation, and any  foreigner or foreigners,  alien or aliens, to perform labor or  service or having reference to the performance of labor or service by any person  in  the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia previous to the migration  or  importation of the person  or persons whose labor or service  is contracted for into the United States, shall be utterly void and  of no effect.

"SEC. 3.  That for every violation of any of the provisions of section one of this  Act the person, partnership, company, or corporation violating the same, by knowingly assisting, encouraging, or soliciting the migration  or importation of any alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its  Territories, or the District of Columbia, to perform labor or service of any kind under contract or agreement, express or implied, parol or special,  with such alien or aliens, foreigner  or  foreigners,  previous to becoming residents or citizens of the United States, shall forfeit and pay for every such offense the sum of one thousand dollars, which may be sued for and recovered by the United States or by any person  who shall first bring his  action therefor, including any such alien or foreigner who may be a party to any such contract or agreement, as debts of like amount are now recovered in the  circuit courts of the United States; the proceeds to be paid into the Treasury of  the  United States; and separate suits may be brought for each alien or foreigner being a party to such contract or  agreement aforesaid.  And it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the proper  district to prosecute every such suit at the expense of the  United States.

*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *

"SEC. 5. That nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to prevent any citizen or subject of any foreign country temporarily residing in the United States, either in private or official capacity, from engaging, under contract or otherwise, persons not residents or citizens of the United States to act as private secretaries, servants, or domestics for such foreigner temporarily  residing  in the United  States  as aforesaid;

"Nor shall  this  Act  be so  construed  as to prevent any person or persons,  partnership, or corporation from engaging, under contract or agreement, skilled workmen in foreign countries to perform labor in the United States in or  upon any new industry not at present established in the United States:

"Provided, That  skilled labor for that purpose can not be otherwise obtained; nor shall the provisions  of this Act apply to professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor  to persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants:

"Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as prohibiting any individual from assisting any member  of his family or any  relative or personal  friend to migrate from any foreign  country to  the  United States,  for the purpose of settlement here."

This  has  been  amended and  supplemented by several subsequent enactments,  but not in a way to affect the questions involved in this action.

It is evident from reading the statute that, so far as the present action is  concerned,  the  main  provisions of the Act are: (1) That the prepayment of transportation or the assistance or encouragement of the immigration of aliens or foreigners under a contract to labor in the United States is unlawful; and (2)  that such contracts made previous to their emigration are utterly void and of no effect.

The evidence is undisputed that the contract in this action was made at Hyderabad Sindh on the 12th of June, 1902, and  that the  purpose of the contract was  to secure the emigration  of  the  plaintiff to  the  Philippine Islands in order that  he might serve the defendants as manager of one or more of their stores located therein.  The contract contains an express provision for the payment by defendants of the expense of transportation  of  the  plaintiff to these Islands,   It is admitted that the plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the contract in question and at the time of his  emigration to these Islands, was an alien and  a foreigner, being a native of British India and a subject of that empire.

The facts proved in the case bring the contract clearly within  the  prohibition  and condemnation of the statute above quoted provided the plaintiff  may be considered  a laborer within the meaning of that Act.

In the case of Holy Trinity Church vs. United States (143 U. S., 457), the court said at pages 463, 464, and 465:

"Again,  another guide  to the  meaning of a statute is found in the evil  which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks  at  contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed  upon the attention of the legislative body.   (United States vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U.  S., 72, 79.)  The situation which called for this statute was briefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice Brown when, as district judge, he decided the case of United States vs. Craig (28 Fed. Rep., 795, 798): 'The motives and history of the Act  are matters of  common knowledge.   It had become the  practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers, under contracts, by which  the employer agreed, upon the one hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain  time at a low rate of wages.  The effect of this was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in  like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant.  The evil finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to Congress for relief by the passage of the  Act in question, the design  of which was to raise the standard of  foreign immigrants, and to discountenance the migration  of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage.'

"It appears, also, from the petitions, and in the testimony presented before the committees of Congress, that it was this cheap unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and  the influx of which  Congress sought to prevent.  It was never suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition. Those were  matters  to  which the attention of Congress, or of the people, was not  directed.   So far, then, as the evil which was sought to be remedied interprets the statute, it also  guides to  an exclusion of this contract from the penalties of  the Act.

*        *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *

"We find, therefore,  that the title of the Act, the evil which was intended to be  remedied, the circumstances surrounding the  appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee  of each House,  all  concur in affirming  that the intent of  Congress was simply to  stay the influx of this cheap  unskilled labor."

In the case of the United States vs. Laws  (163 U. S., 258), the  court cites and approves  the doctrine laid down in the above case, and in speaking of the  opinion written in that case says, at page 264:

"Upon the basis, therefore, that it could not be imputed as the intention of Congress, notwithstanding the language used in the Act, to prevent the introduction of religious teachers, it was held that the Act did not apply to the case before the court.   Both grounds were covered in the opinion; the one that the  Act was  clearly intended  to  apply only to cheap, unskilled  labor, and  the  other that  in no event could it be construed as applying  to a contract for the services of a rector or a pastor of a religious corporation.   The first ground covers the case in hand.   The construction given to the words 'labor or service' by this court in the above case was neither forced, unnatural, nor unusual. Considering the clear purpose of the Act, the construction adopted was a natural and proper one."

To quote further from the opinion  in this case,  pages 264 and 265:

"In Aikin vs. Wasson (24 N. Y., 482)  the plaintiff contracted with a railroad company to  construct part  of its road.  Defendant was a stockholder in the company, which became insolvent.  It  was indebted  to  plaintiff for the services of himself and his laborers and servants  under his contract.  Section 10 of the Railroad Act enacted that 'all the stockholders of every such company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts due or owing to any of its  laborers and servants for services  performed for such corporation.'   It was held that the plaintiff was neither a laborer nor a servant within the meaning of the Act.

"In Coffin vs. Reynolds  (37 N. Y., 640) the statute reads: 'The stockholders of a company organized under the provisions of this Act shall be jointly  and  severally individually liable for all debts that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants, and apprentices for services performed for such corporation.'  The plaintiff  was the secretary of the company and commenced an action against the defendant as a stockholder to recover the amount  of his salary, the company being insolvent.  It was  held that he could not recover.  He was not a  laborer or a servant within the meaning of the statute.

"In Wakefield vs. Fargo (90 N. Y.,  213), under the same statute, it was held that one who  was employed at a yearly salary  as bookkeeper and general manager was not  a laborer, servant, or apprentice within the meaning of the Act, and hence that he could not recover against the stockholders for a balance of salary due him from the insolvent corporation.

"These  statutes were  passed  for the protection  of  laborers, servants, apprentices, and the like, and the opinions of the courts in relation to the class of individuals that would be included within the meaning of those terms are somewhat relevant, although not entirely analogous, to the case before this court."

It thus  appears that the  Supreme Court  of  the United States has decided clearly and definitely that the only  laborers to which the Act in question refers are those engaged in cheap, unskilled labor.

In the case of the  United States vs. Gay (80 Fed. Rep., 254), it was held that the Acts of February 26, 1885, and March 3, 1891, "are highly penal and must be so construed as to bring within their condemnation only those who are shown by  direct  and positive averments  to  be embraced within their terms;"  and "they are to be construed in the light of the evil to be remedied, and are  limited to cases in which the  assisted immigrant is  brought into this country under a contract to perform manual labor or service."  This case was affirmed in 37 C. C. A., 46.       

From  the doctrine  laid down by the cases referred to it is clear to  our minds that the plaintiff in this action does not come within the prohibited  class.   We are confirmed in this view by an examination  of the  decisions  of  other jurisdictions.  While  not  analogous to the case under consideration,  they are helpful  and instructive.

The court, in the case of  Brockway vs. Innes  (39  Mich., 47), interpreted  the  provision of the constitution of the State of Michigan which  provided that  corporation  stockholders should be liable  "for labor performed for such corporations."  In that case an attempt was made to make the stockholders of the corporation  liable for the services of an assistant chief engineer.  The court in deciding that case said (p. 48):

"But we  feel very sure  that the position of an assistant chief engineer would  never have  been classed as that of a laborer, nor his work as labor, in the popular sense.  It is mostly direction and scientific work, involving much more superintendence than  personal  exertion in manual labor. He is chosen for his knowledge and not for his muscular capacity,  in which latter quality he may or may not be eminent."

In  the case of Trust Company vs. Grand Rapids Democrat  (113 Mich., 615)  the question of the right of preference arose under a statute reading as follows:

"The funds which shall be owed for labor by any person, persons, or corporation at  the  time he, they, or it shall become insolvent, shall be  preferred claims, etc."

The nature of the work performed by the person claiming preference  "was the writing of editorials and the performing of various kinds of editorial work required  to be done  on the daily and weekly issues of the Grand Rapids Democrat,  *  *  *   the  preparation  and correction  of copy  for the printers,  the direction  of the make-up of the paper, including full charge of all branches of the mechanical department of said paper after the close of the business office  each night."  Another claim for preference was presented by  one who was engaged in "proof reading and traveling  around the city gathering news,"  Another claim for preference was presented  by one  who was engaged "in reporting, going around to  the different wholesale houses, collecting  market reports and assisting in  editorial  work and proof reading."  In deciding the case the court said, in regard  to these  two claimants,  "it was the work  of professional men rather than  the work  of laborers, giving the word  its ordinary acceptation, and is not such work as is intended to be covered by the statute."

In the case of Wildner vs. Ferguson  (42  Minn., 112) it was held, interpreting a statute providing for the exemption of wages,  that  the words "a laboring man  or woman" did not include and protect an agent  who sells goods by sample, driving about for that purpose with his own horse and buggy and receiving a weekly salary.

In the case of Wakefield vs. Fargo (90 N. Y., 213), the question before the court was the interpretation of the meaning of the words "laborers, servants, and apprentices" in a statute making stockholders "liable for all debts that may be due and owed to their laborers, servants, and apprentices for services performed for such corporation."   It was held in that case that one employed at a yearly  salary as a bookkeeper and general manager is not a laborer,  servant, or apprentice within the meaning of the provision of law just quoted.  In that case the person  seeking  the favor of the statute "kept account of the receipts and  disbursements of the company, and in the absence of the  superintendent had the charge and control of its business."

In the case of Aiken vs. Wasson (24  N. Y., 482), the person seeking the favor of a  statute similar to the one in the case last cited was "a contractor with the Albany  and Northern  Railroad Company,  of which  the defendant is a stockholder, for the construction of a part of its road."  The court said  (p. 483) :

"It is obvious from the nature and terms of this and other provisions  of the Act, as well as from  the general policy indicated by analogous statutes, that the legislature intended to throw a special protection around that class of persons who should actually perform the manual labor  of  the company."

It was held that such contractor was not a laborer within the meaning of the Act.   To the same effect are Balch vs. Railroad Co. (46 N. Y., 521); Ericsson vs. Brown (38 Barb. (N. Y.), 390); Stryker vs. Cassidy  (10  Hun.  (N. Y.), 18).

In the case  of the Railroad  Co.  vs. Leuffer (84 Pa.  St., 168), the court said (p. 171):

"When we speak of the laboring or working classes, we certainly do not intend to include therein persons like civil engineers, the  value of whose services rests rather in their scientific than  in their physical ability.   We thereby intend those who  are engaged not in  head but  in hand work and who depend upon such hand work for their  living."

To the  same effect are Heebner vs.  Chave  (5  Pa.  St., 117); Seider's Appeal (46 Pa. St., 57); Sullivan's Appeal (77 Pa. St., 107).

A statute in the State of Texas gave a lien to "mechanics, laborers,, and operators who have performed labor or work with tools, teams, or otherwise in the  construction,  operation, and repair of  any railroad."  In the case of Railway vs.  Mathews  (75 Tex.,  92), the court, interpreting that statute, said (p. 94):

"The word  'laborer,' as used  in the statute,  evidently means one who performs manual services in the construction, repair, or operation contemplated by the statute  and does not embrace one who may work in preparing something of his own to sell to a railway company after it has been rendered suitable through his toil to be used in the construction or repair  of a railway."

In the case of Farinholt vs. Luckhard (90 Va., 936), the court said (p.  938):

"But we think it safe to say that the word 'laborer,' when used in its ordinary and usual acceptation, carries with it the idea of actual physical and manual exertion or toil and is used  to  denote that class  of persons who literally earn their bread by the  sweat of their brows and who perform with their own hands, at the cost of considerable physical labor, the contracts made with their employers."

In the case  of  Ho King (14 Fed. Rep., 724) it was held that "the term 'laborer'  is used  in the treaty with China of November 17, 1880, and the Act in aid thereof of May 6, 1882, in its popular  sense,  and does not  include  any person  but those whose  occupation involves physical toil and who work for wages."  It was there held that a Chinese actor or theatrical performer was not a laborer.

In the  case  of Malcomson vs. Wappoo Mills  (86 Fed. Rep., 192) the question was presented as to who came within the provisions of an Act entitled "An  Act to provide for laborers' liens."  The court said (p. 198):

"The body of the Act  gives to all employe's in factories, mines, etc., a lien, whether they be employed either by the day or month, whether the  contract be in  writing or not, to the extent of the salary or wages that may be due.  The word 'laborer' does not appear in the body of the Act.  To sustain the Act   *  *  *  the word 'laborers'  must be synonymous with  the  word 'employes;' and, as the word 'laborers' is used in the title, the word 'employes,' used in the body of the Act, must be so restricted as to mean such employe's as are laborers.  This being so, neither the superintendent nor the bookkeeper comes within this term."

In the case of Epps vs. Epps  (17 111. App., 196)  it was held that  a bookkeeper was  not a laborer within a statute relating to exemptions.   (Coffin  vs. Reynolds, 37  N. Y., 640.)

In the case of Richardson vs. Dexter (85 Me., 372) it was held in ordinary speech a laborer is one who hires himself out, or who  is hired out, to do  physical toil.   (See also Kansas City vs. McDonald, 80 Mo. App., 448; 18 Ency. of Law, p. 71.)

In the appeal of  Clark (100 Mich., 448) it was held that:

"The general and collecting agent of a corporation engaged  in  the manufacture and sale of flouring mills and milling machinery, who receives an annual salary and his necessary and reasonable traveling expenses, and who occasionally, in the performance of his duties, performs some manual labor in fixing the machines that have been sold, in operating a new mill and securing its satisfactory running, and in giving instructions to others, is not a 'laborer,' within the meaning of Act No. 94, Laws of  1887, which prefers labor debts due from insolvent corporations."

The  following cases have held that drummers are not laborers:  Wildner  vs.  Ferguson (42 Minn., 112); People vs.  Remington  (109 N. Y., 631); Briscoe vs. Montgomery (93 Ga., 602); Epps vs. Epps (17 111. App., 196) ; Eppstein vs. Webb  (44 111. App., 341).

In the following  cases a civil engineer was held not to be a laborer: Railroad Co. vs. Leuffer  (84 Pa.  St.,  168); Conant vs. Van Schaick (24 Barb. (N. Y.), 87); Brockway vs. Innes  (39 Mich., 47); State vs. Rusk (55 Wis., 465).

The following cases have held that a superintendent is not a laborer: Railroad Co. vs.  Baker (14 Kans., 428) : Blakey vs. Blakey  (27 Mo., 39); Malcomson vs, Wappoo Mills (86 Fed. Rep,, 192); Blanchard vs. Railroad Co. (87 Me., 241) ; Cole vs. McNeill, (99 Ga.,  250);  Wakefield vs. Fargo (90 N. Y., 213); Hill vs. Spencer  (61 N. Y., 274) ; People vs. Remington (109 N. Y., 631); State vs. Rusk (55 Wis., 465); Isbell vs. Dunlap  (17 S. C, 581) ; Whitaker vs. Smith (81 N. C, 340); Krauser vs. Ruckel (17 Hun. (N. Y.), 463).

In State vs. Rusk (55 Wis., 465) it was said that the word "laborer," as employed in the Act empowering the governor to expend certain moneys in paying the claims of laborers, etc.,  for work on a line of railway,  should be interpreted in the sense in which it is ordinarily used and understood when applied to men engaged in constructing railways.  It was held that engineers were not included.

The court in the case of Bank vs. Shenandoah Iron Co. (35  Fed.  Rep., 436), interpreting  a statute  of Virginia giving the wages of employees of an insolvent corporation preference, held that the president of an  iron manufacturing company, whose official designation was "general manager," was not entitled to the  preference provided by  said statute.  See England vs. Organ Co. (41 N. J. Eq., 470).

In Kyle vs. Montgomery  (73  Ga., 343), the court  held that the "boss" of a department of a factory, having charge of the employment and discharge of the  men who worked under him, who was required to  do no manual labor, but was  simply required  to exercise his experience and knowledge in the direction of the operatives, can not be regarded as a  day  laborer within the  meaning and  intent of the statute exempting the wages of such persons from garnishment.   (18 L. R. A., 309.)

There  are many cases holding,  in  some respects, apparently conflicting doctrines.  For example:

In the case of Heckman vs. Tammen  (184 I11., 144) a bookkeeper was held to be  a laborer within a statute  preferring the laborers of an insolvent employer.

The following cases have held that a clerk is a laborer: Cole vs. McNeill (99 Ga., 250); Railroad Go. vs. Baker  (14 Kans., 428) ; Signor vs.  Webb  (44 111.  App.,  338); Epps vs. Epps (17 111. App., 196).

In the case of Heckman vs. Tammen (184 111., 144), construing an Act entitled "An Act to protect employees and laborers in their claims for wages," in  which it was provided that "in all such cases the debts owed to laborers or servants, which have accrued by reason of their labor or employment, shall be considered and treated as preferred claims,  and such laborers or employees  shall be preferred creditors," it was held that the parties claiming the favor of the  statute  performed "physical labor as typesetters, cylinder feeders, pressmen,  and one  also kept the books, at stipulated wages of so much per week.  That  in their employment they had  acquired  and used skill would  not render the designation 'laborer' inapplicable.  They labored with their hands for their employer for wages and were clearly laborers within the meaning of the statute.   *  *   * While  we are disposed to  hold  that the  statute must be confined to those who perform  manual service, still it  can not be confined to such services only that require  no skill in their performance of them."

In the case of Lawton vs. Richardson (118  Mich., 669), the court, interpreting a statute which  gave a preference to debts for labor,  held that debts due to employees in a dry-goods store, who act as department managers and salesmen, and perform such services as the unpacking of goods, marking them  and placing them  upon shelves, sweeping out the store, and  keeping  the  stock in order,  are debts for labor  within the meaning of  the statute.  The court said (p. 671):

"The circuit  judge found that, as to  the work  done  by Mr. Lawton when in New York,  it was not the work of a laborer within the meaning of the statute; but as to the other work done by him, and the work  done by the other complainants,  it  was labor  within the meaning of  the statute.  It  is apparent from what has already appeared that nearly  all  the  labor done was not  intellectual or  supervisional [professional] in its character, nor  was it  of an especially skillful kind.  It was, in  the main, manual labor and  of such a character as the statute was intended to protect."

The following cases have held foremen to be laborers: Flagstaff Silver Mining  Co. vs. Cullins  (104  U.  S., 176) ; Capron vs. Strout (11 Nev., 304); Kyle vs.  Montgomery (73 Ga., 337).

The following cases have held a  superintendent to be a  laborer: Gold  Mining  Co. vs. Bouscher  (9 Col., 385); Coraker vs.  Mathews (25  Ga., 571);  Moore  vs.  Heaney (14 Md., 559); Pendergast vs. Yandes (124 Ind., 159).

In the  case of  Williams vs. Link (64 Miss.,  641), the court said (p. 643):

"Where  physical toil is the main ingredient of services rendered,  although directed and made  more valuable by skill, the person performing them is a laborer within the meaning of the statute.  The appellant is shown by the record to  have  been a laborer, engaged as a clerk in  a store, and the wages earned by him as such  laborer are exempt from garnishment." 

In the case of the Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. vs. Culling, supra, the  court said (p.  177):

"Statutes giving liens to laborers and mechanics for their work and labor are to be liberally construed.  (Davis vs. Alvord, 94 U. S., 545.)  The  finding of the  district court makes clear the character of the  services  rendered by the defendant in  error.  He was not the general agent of the mining business  of  the plaintiff in error.  That office was  filled  by  Patrick.  He was  not a contractor. His  services were not of a professional character, such as those of a mining engineer.  He was the overseer and foreman of the body of miners who performed  manual labor upon the mine.  He  planned  and  personally  superintended and directed the work, with a view to develop the mine and make it a successful venture.   His duties were similar to  those  of the foreman of  a gang of track hands upon a railroad,  or  of a force of  mechanics engaged in building  a house.   Such  duties  are  very different  from those  which  belong to the general  superintendent  of a railroad  or the  contractor  for  erecting  a house.  Their performance may well be called work and labor;  they  require the personal attention and supervision  of the  foreman, and occasionally in an emergency, or for an example, it becomes necessary for him to assist with his own hands. They can not be performed without much physical exertion, which, while not so severe as that demanded of the workmen under his control, is nevertheless as really work and labor.   Bodily toil, as well as some skill and knowledge in directing the  work,  is required for  their successful performance. We think that the discharge of them may well be called  work and labor, and that the district court rightfully declared the  person who  performed them  entitled to a lien under the law of the Territory."

The reasons for this apparent conflict are  found, not, perhaps, so much in the different ways in which different courts regard  the  general subject, as in the wording  of the  particular statutes under consideration,  and  in the fact that one who is called, for  example, a clerk in one jurisdiction and performs therein a class  of service which entitles him to that designation, will still  be called a  clerk in another jurisdiction, although he performs  different  or additional services.   In other words,  while his services  in the former jurisdiction are purely those of a clerk, in the other they are a mixture of those of clerk and superintendent, or overseer or bookkeeper, or traveling salesman. This is a source  of considerable  confusion to  one  reading the decision hastily.

Moreover, in viewing the apparent  discordance between the holdings of many of the courts above cited and those of Holy Trinity Church vs. United States and United States vs.  Laws,  supra,  we must not overlook the fact that the rules of statutory  construction and  interpretation applicable to the statute under consideration in the case at bar are directly opposite  to  those applicable to the statutes interpreted and construed  in the other cases.   The statute now under consideration, being highly penal, must be construed with extreme strictness; while  the statutes dealt with in the other cases,  having for their object the giving of liens  "to laborers and mechanic's for their work and labor," are to be liberally construed.

The courts are,  however, substantially uniform in holding that, where the nature of the employment is essentially of superintendence or  management, he who  engages  in that employment  is not a laborer  but  a superintendent or manager  and is not  within the letter or the spirit  of the Act.

The judgment of the court  below is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, without special finding as to the costs of this instance.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J.,  Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ.,  concur.