I.  The case and the issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task  of passing upon the  validity  and constitutionality of a  legislative enactment,  fundamental  and  far-reaching  in  significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police  power and equal protection of the laws.  It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to  remedy really  or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the  alien  retailer.   Through it,  and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national  security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and  welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of  the alien, so  that  the country and the nation may  be  free from  a  supposed economic dependence and bondage.  Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent 'provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180  is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business."  In effect  it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines,  and against associations,  partnerships, or  corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned  by citizens of  the Philippines, from  engaging  directly or  indirectly in  the retail trade;  (2) an exception  from  the  above prohibition in favor  of  aliens actually  engaged in said business on May 15,  1954, who are allowed to continue  to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and  for ten years  after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term  in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom  in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a  provision for the forfeiture of  licenses  (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization,  economic control weights  and measures and labor and other laws  relating to trade, commerce and  industry; (5)  a  prohibition  against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores  or branches of retail business,  (6) a provision requiring aliens  actually engaged  in the retail business  to present  for  registration  with the  proper authorities  a verified  statement concerning their  businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal  offices  of juridical entities;  and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of  aliens now negated in the  retail  business  who  die,  to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation,


Petitioner, for  and in  his own behalf and on behalf  of other alien residents,  corporations and partnerships  adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this  action to obtain  a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to  enjoin  the  Secretary of  Finance  and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.  Petitioner attacks the  constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection  of the laws and deprives them of their liberty  and  property without due process of law;  (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended  in the title thereof;  (3) the Act  violates  international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act  against  the  transmission by aliens  of their retail  business  thru hereditary succession, and those requiring  100%  Filipino  capitalization for  a corporation or entity to  entitle it to engage in  the retail business, violate the spirit  of Sections  1 and 5,  Article XIII and Section  8 of Article XIV  of the Constitution. In answer,  the Solicitor-General  and  the  Fiscal  of the City of Manila  contend  that:  (1)   the Act  was  passed in  the  valid exercise of the  police  power  of the State, which  exercise  is  authorized  in the  Constitution  in the interest of national economic survival;  (2)  the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;  (3)  no  treaty or international  obligations  are  infringed;  (4)  as regards hereditary  succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance  is only of statutory  origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power.

There is no  question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the  police power, but  petitioner claims that its  exercise in this instance is  attended  by a violation of the constitutional requirements of  due process and equal protection of the laws.  But before proceeding to the consideration and  resolution of the ultimate issue- involved, it would be well to bear in mind  certain basic and fundamental, albeit  preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws.  What is the scope of  police power, and how are the  due  process  and equal protection  clauses related to it V  What is the province and  power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty  of the  courts?   These consideration  must  be clearly  and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope,  that  it  has  become  almost impossible to limit its sweep.  As it derives  its  existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to  be expressed  or defined in its scope; it is  said to be  co-extensive with self- protection and  survival, and as such it is  the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.   Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to  almost  unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has  become almost boundles3, just as the fields  of public interest and public  welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human  foresight.  Otherwise stated,   as  we cannot foresee the  needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly  changing and progressive world,  so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by  which  and through which the State seeks to attain  or  achieve  public interest or welfare.   So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power  of the State;  what  they  do is to  set forth the limitations thereof.  The most important of these are the due process clause  and the  equal  protection clause.

b. Limitations on police  power.

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following  provisions of  our Constitution:

"SECTION 1.(1)  No person shall  be deprived of life, liberty or property  without  due process  of law,  nor shall any  person be denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws."  (Article  III,  Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in  democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but  are admittedly  universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.   (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, SO, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The equal  protection  clause.

The equal protection of the law  clause is against undue favor  and individual  or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the  oppression of  inequality.  It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which  it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.  It does not demand absolute equality among residents;  it merely   requires that  all  persons shall  be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as  to  privileges conferred  and  liabilities  enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies  only  to those persons falling within  a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons  within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making" a distinction between those  who fall  within  such class and those who  do  not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process  clause.

The due process clause has to do with  the  reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there  public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved?  Is the  Act reasonably  necessary  for the  accomplishment of the  legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,  arbitrary  or oppressive? Is.  there  sufficient foundation  or reason in connection with  the matter  involved ; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power?  Can the aims  conceived  be achieved by the means used,  or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private  interest?  These  are  the  questions that  we ask when the due process test  is applied.

The conflict,  therefore, between  police  power and the guarantees  of due process  and  equal  protection  of the laws is  more apparent  than real.  Properly  related, the power and the  guarantees are supposed to coexist.  The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for  the attainment  of legitimate  aspirations  of any democratic  society.   There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.  Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and  anarchy.  So the State  can deprive persons of life, liberty  and  property, provided there  is  due  process  of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone  is  given  the  equal  protection  of the law.  The test  or  standard,  as  always,  is  reason.  The police power legislation must  be firmly grounded on public interest  and  welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between  purposes and  means.   And if distinction and classification has been  made, there must be a reasonable  basis for said  distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.

Now,  in this matter of equitable balancing1, what is the proper place and role of the courts?  It must not be  overlooked, in the first  place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative  of  determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of  necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police  power, or of the measures  adopted to  implement the  public policy or to achieve public interest.  On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of  individual liberty  and  right,  have nevertheless evinced  a reluctance to interfere  with the exercise of the  legislative prerogative.   They have  done so early where there  has been  a clear,  patent  or palpable arbitrary and  unreasonable abuse of  the legislative prerogative.  Moreover,  courts are not supposed  to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into  the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic  problems  sought to be  remedied

With the above  considerations in mind,  we  will now proceed to  delve directly into  the  issue involved.  If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as  its title indicates, there would be no question  that  it falls within the legitimate  scope of  legislative power.  But it goes further and prohibits  a group  of residents,  the aliens, from engaging therein.  The  problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or  occupation, as old  as society itself, which  from time immemorial  has always been open to  residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of  retail trade in the  economy  of  the nation.

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown.  But  as group  life develops  and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they  consume  and needing  an  infinite  number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into  existence.

As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have  multiplied and  diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes  as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods  and commodities  needed  for  daily life  are placed within the easy  reach of consumers.  Retail  dealers perform the functions  of capillaries  in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies  are ministered to members of the  communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about  the  importance of the retailer in the life of the  community.   He ministers to the  resident's daily needs,  food in all  its increasing forms,  and the various little  gadgets and  things  needed for home and  daily life.  He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices  needed  for  the  daily cooking.   He  has cloths to sell,  even the needle and  the  thread to sew  them or darn  the clothes that wear out.  The retailer, therefore, from  the lowly peddler,  the owner of a small  sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or a  supermarket  is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's, traits.

The alien retailer  must have started plying  his  trade in this  country in the bigger centers  of population (Time there  was when he was unknown in provincial  towns and villages).  Slowly  but  gradually  he  invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population.  He even pioneers in far  away nooks where the beginnings of community life  appear,  ministering to the daily needs of the residents  and purchasing  their agricultural produce for sale in the towns.  It is an undeniable fact that in many communities  the alien has replaced  the native retailer.  He  has shown in  this  trade,  industry without limit,  and the patience and forbearance  of a slave. Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur;  insults of ill-bred  and insolent neighbors and  customers  are made in  his face,  but he  heeds them not,  and he forgets, and forgives.  The community takes no note of him, as he appears to be  harmless and extremely useful.

c.  Alleged  alien  control  and  dominance.

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to  fact, about  the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy.   Food and  other  essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life  reach the  residents  mostly through him.  In big cities and  centers  of population he  has  acquired not only predominance, but apparent control aver distribution of almost all kinds of  goods, such as  lumber, hardware,  textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour,  garlic, and  scores of other goods and articles.  And  were it  not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the  Facomas  and the Accfa,  his  control  over principal foods and products would easily  become full and complete.

Petitioner  denies that there is alien predominance and control in  the retail trade.   In one breath it  is said that the  fear  is  unfounded  and the threat is  imagined;  in another,  it is charged that the law is merely the result of racialism and pure and unabashed  nationalism.  Alienage, it is said, is not an element of  control; also so  many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible.  The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration.  The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our  prerogative to pass upon and  decide.

The best evidence  are the statistics on the  retail  trade, which put down the figures in black and white.  Between the constitutional  convention year  (1935), when the fear of alien domination and  control of  the retail trade already filled the minds  of our  leaders  with fears and misgivings, and the year of the  enactment of the  nationalization of the retail  trade  act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point  out  to  the  ever-increasing  dominance and  control by the  alien of  the retail trade,  as witness the  following tables:

			Assets		Gross Sales
Year and Retailer's Nationality		No. -Establishments	Pesos	Per cent Distribution	Pesos	Per cent Distribution
1941:
	Filipino ...............	106,671	200,323,138	55.82	174,181,924	5174
	Chinese ..............	15,356	118,348,692	32.98	148,8.13,239	44.21
	Others ................	1,646	40,187,090	11.20	13,630,289	4.05
1947:
	Filipino ..............	111,107	208,658,946	65.05	279,583,888	57.03
	Chinese ................	13,774	106,156,218	33.56	205,701,134	41.96
	Otters ................	354	8,761,260	..49	4,927,168	1.01
1948: (Census)
	Filipino..............	118,681	213,842,264	67.30	467,161,667	60.51
	Chinese..............	12,087	93,155,459	29.38	294,894,227	38.20
	Others..................	422	10,514,675	3.32	9,995,402	1.29
1949:
	Filipino ..............	113,659	213,461,602	60.30	462,532,901	53.47
	Chinese ..............	16,248	125,223,886	35.72	392,414,876	45.36
	Others ................	486	12,066,365	3.39	10,078,364	1.17
1951:
	Filipino ................	119,362	224,053,620	61.09	466,058,052	53.07
	Chinese ..............	17,429	134,325,303	36.60	404,481,384	46.06
	Others ...............	347	8,614,026	2.31	7,645,327	.87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
					Item Gross	Sales
	Year and Retailer's				Assets	(Pesos)
	Nationality				(Pesos)
1941:
	Filipino ..............................................................................				1,878	1,638
	Chinese................................................................................				7,707	9,691
	Others..................................................................................				24,416	8,281
1947:
	Filipino................................................................................				1,878	2,516
	Chinese ................................................................................				7,707	14,934
	Others .................................................................................				24,749	13,919
1948: (Census)
	Filipino................................................................................				1,878	4,111
	Chinese ................................................................................				7,707	24,398
	Others..................................................................................				24,916	23,686
1949:
	Filipino................................................................................				1,878	4,069
	Chinese ................................................................................				7,707	24,152
	Others ................................................................................				24,807	20,737
1951:
	Filipino.................................................................................				1,877	3,905
	Chinese ................................................................................				7,707	33,207
	Others ..............................................................................				24,824	22,033
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics  do not include corporations and partnerships, while  the figures  on  Filipino establishments already  include  mere  market  vendors,  whose capital  is necessarily small.

The above figures reveal that in  percentage  distribution  of assets and of gross sales,  alien participation has steadily increased during the years.  It  is true, of course, that  Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up  for the  numerical gap through their assets and gross sales  which average between six and seven  times  those  of the  very  many  Filipino  retailers. Numbers in  retailers, here, do  not imply superiority; the alien  invests  more capital,  buys and sells six  to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to  the  known predominance of  foreign elements  in the retail  trade,  remarks that the  Filipino  retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As  observed  by respondents,  the native  investment  is thinly spread,  and the Filipino  retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit,  price" and  supply.

d. Alien control and threat,  subject of apprehension in Constitutional Convention.
It is this domination and control, which  we believe  has been  sufficiently shown to exist,  that  is the legislature's target in the  enactment of  the  disputed  nationalization law.  If they did not exist as a fact the sweeping remedy of nationalization  would  never have   been  adopted.  The framers  of our Constitution  also  believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved  a resolution categorically declaring  among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires  the nationalization of the retail trade; * * *."   (II Aruego,  The Framing of the  Philippine Constitution, 662 663, quoted on page  67 of Petitioner.)  That was twenty- two  years ago; and  the events since  then  have not been either pleasant or comforting.  Dean  Sinco  of the University of the Philippines College of  Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of  the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution  were merely translating the  general preoccupation  of Filipinos "of the dangers  from  alien interests that  had already  brought under their control  the commercial and other  economic activities of the  country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members  of the constitutional convention for the economic  life  of the citizens,  in  connection with  the nationalistic provisions  of  the  Constitution, he says:

"But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such  a situation should remain, political independence alone is no  guarantee to national stability and  strength.   Filipino private  capital is not big enough to  wrest from alien hands the control  of the national economy. Moreover,  it is but of  recent formation and hence, largely  inexperienced, timid  and hesitant.  Under  such  conditions, the  government as the instrumentality of the national  will, has to step in  and assume the initiative, if not the leadership,  in the struggle  for the economic freedom  of the nation in somewhat the  same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom.  Thus  *  * *  it (the Constitution)  envisages  an  organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by  alien  interests in the economic field."   (Phil. Political  Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in  the existence of  alien control  and predominance  is felt  in other  quarters.   Filipino  businessmen, manufacturers  and producers  believe so; they fear the dangers coming from  alien  control, and  they express sentiments  of  economic independence.  Witness thereto is Resolution No.  1,  approved on July  IS,  1958, of the Fifth National  Convention  of Filipino  Businessmen,  and. a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention  of Manufacturers  and Producers.  The man in the street also  believes, and  fears, alien predominance  and control; so our newspapers,  which have editorially pointed out  not only to control but to alien stranglehold.  We, therefore,  find  alien domination and   control to  be  a  fact,  a  reality proved by  official statistics, and  felt  by  all the  sections and groups that compose the Filipino  community.

e.  Dangers of alien control  and dominance in retail.

But the  dangers arising  from  alien  participation  in the retail trade  does not seem to lie in  the  predominance alone; there is  a prevailing  feeling  that  such  predominance may  truly endanger  the national  interest.  With ample capital,  unity of purpose and action  and  thorough organization,  alien  retailers and merchants  can act  in such  complete  unison and concert on such  vital  matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of  the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and  even the choice of the goods or  articles they would or would not patronize  or  distribute, that  fears of dislocation  of  the  national economy and  of  the  complete subservience of  national retailers and of the  consuming public are not entirely unfounded.  Nationals,  producers and consumers alike, can  be placed completely  at  their mercy.   This is  easily illustrated.  Suppose an article of daily use  is  desired to be prescribed  by the aliens, because the  producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction.  All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,  eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation.  Freedom of  trade  is  thus  curtailed and  free enterprise  correspondingly suppressed.

We can even  go farther than  theoretical  illustrations to show the pernicious  influences  of  alien  domination. Grave  abuses have characterized the exercise of  the retail trade  by aliens.  It  is a  fact  within judicial notice, which  courts  of  justice may  not  properly  overlook or ignore in  the  interests  of truth and justice,  that there exists a general feeling  on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has  been attended by  a pernicious  and intolerable practices,  the  mention of a few of which would  suffice for our purposes; that at some time  or other they  have cornered  the  market of  essential  commodities,  like  corn and  rice,   creating artificial scarcities to justify  and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions;  that  they have hoarded essential foods to the  inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish  the National Rice  and  Corn  Corporation  to  save the public  from  their continuous hoarding practices  and tendencies; that they have violated  price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities,  such that the legislature had to enact a law  (See.  9, Republic Act No.  1168),  authorizing  their  immediate  and  automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they  have secret combinations among themselves  to control prices, cheating the  operation of the law of supply and  demand; that they  have  connived to  boycott  honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their  demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded  tax laws, smuggled goods  and money  into  and out  of  the land, violated  import and export prohibitions, control  laws  and the like, in derision and contempt of  lawful  authority. It is also believed  that they have  engaged in corrupting public  officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence  of graft and corruption in the  Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both  by the  Government and  by their own lawful diplomatic representatives,  action which  impliedly admits a prevailing feeling  about  the  existence of many of the above  practices.

The  circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things  may come  in  the future.   The present  dominance  of the  alien  retailer,  especially in the big'  centers  of  population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger  on  occasions  of  war  or other calamity.  We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing  goods among nationals ; what we have are well  organized and powerful groups that dominate the  distribution of  goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State,  and  the State cannot rely upon them in times of  crisis  or emergency. While  the  national holds his  life,  his  person  and  his property subject  to the  needs of  his  country,  the alien may even  become  the potential  enemy of the  State.

f. Law enacted in interest  of  national  economic  survival and security.

We are fully satisfied  upon a consideration of all  the facts and  circumstances  that  the disputed law is  not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression  of the legitimate desire and determinetion of the people, thru  their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic  situation that has •unfortunately  been saddled upon it  rightly  or wrongly, to its disadvantage.   The  law is clearly  in  the interest of the public,  nay of  the national  security itself,  and indisputably falls within the scope of police  power, thru which and  by which  the State  insures  its existence and security and  the supreme  welfare  of its  citizens.

VI.  The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien  participation in retail  trade.

The next question that now poses solution  is, Does the law  deny the  equal protection of the laws?  As pointed out  above,  the mere fact  of  alienage is  the  root  and cause  of the  distinction  between the alien and  the national  as a trader.  The alien  resident  owes  allegiance to the country of his birth or  his  adopted country; his stay  here  is  for  personal  convenience;  he  is  attracted by the lure of gain  and profit.   His aim  or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate  nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking  in  that  spirit of loyalty  and enthusiasm for this  country where he temporarily stays and makes his  living,  or of  that spirit' of  regard,  sympathy and  consideration for his  Filipino customers  as would prevent  him from taking  advantage  of their weakness and  exploiting them.  The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can  the alien go  back  to  his beloved  country and his beloved  kin and countrymen.  The  experience of the country is that the alien retailer has  shown such  utter disregard for his  customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that  it  has been  found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the  alien retailer in this country is that he  never  really  makes a genuine contribution to national  income and wealth.  He undoubtedly contributes to general  distribution,  but  the gains  and  profits he makes are not invested  in  industries that  would help the country's economy  and increase  national  wealth.  The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary,  it would indeed be ill-advised to continue  entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices  resorted  to by aliens in the  control of distribution, as  already pointed out  above, their  secret manipulations of stocks of  commodities  and prices, their utter  disregard  of  the welfare  of their customers and of the ultimate  happiness  of  the people  of the  nation of which they are mere guests, which  practices, manipulations and  disregard do not attend the  exercise  of the trade  by the nationals,  show the  existence of real and actual,  positive  and fundamental  differences between  an alien and a national which fully  justify  the  legislative classification adopted in the retail  trade  measure.   These differences  are   certainly a valid  reason  for  the  State to prefer the national over the alien  in  the retail trade.

We would be doing violence to  fact and  reality were  we to hold  that no  reason or ground for a legitimate distinction  can be  found between  one and  the other.

b.  Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.

The above objectionable characteristics of the  exercise of the  retail  trade  by  the  aliens,  which are actual and real,  furnish  sufficient  grounds for legislative classification  of  retail  traders into nationals and  aliens.   Some may disagree with  the  wisdom  of the legislature's classification.  To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making  power.  Since the Court  finds that the classification  is actual, real  and  reasonable,  and  all persons  of  one class are  treated alike, and  as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded,  it is  in  duty bound  to  declare that the legislature acted within  its legitimate prerogative and it cannot  declare  that the act  transcends  the limit of  equal protection  established  by  the  Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature  to make distinctions  and classifications among persons  is not  curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be  violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification  is  without reasonable basis. In  addition  to the  authorities  we  have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.  (1911),  55  L.  ed., 369,  which  clearly  and  succinctly  defined the  application  of equal protection clause to a law sought to  be voided  as contrary thereto:

'* * *1. the equal protection  clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not  take  from  the state the  power  to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide  scope of discretion m  that regard, and avoids  what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely  arbitrary.

2. A classification having  some reasonable basis does  not  offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in  practice it results in  some inequality.  3. When the classification in  such a law is called in question, if  any  state of facts  reasonably  can be  conceived  that would sustain it, the existence of that state of  facts at  the  time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.  One  who assails  the classification in such  a law  must carry the  burden  of showing that it does not  rest  upon any  reasonable  basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'"

c. Authorities  recognizing   citizenship   as   basis   for classification.

The  question as   to  whether  or  not  citizenship   is  a legal and valid ground  for  classification has already  been affirmatively  decided in  this  jurisdiction  as  well as  in various courts in the United States.  In the case of Smith Bell &  Co.  vs. Natividad, 40 Phil,  136, where  the validity of  Act  No. 2761  of the  Philippine  Legislature  was  in issue, because  of  a  condition therein limiting  the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade  to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States,  thus denying the  right  to  aliens, it was  held  that the  Philippine Legislature did  not  violate the equal  protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.   The Legislature  in  enacting the  law  had  as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these  Islands from foreign interlopers.  We  held that this  was  a  valid exercise  of  the police  power,  and  all presumptions  are in  favor  of  its  constitutionality.   In substance, we  held that the  limitation  of domestic ownership  of vessels engaged  in  coastwise trade  to  citizens of the  Philippines  does not violate  the equal  protection of the law and due process of  law  clauses of the Philippine Bill  of Rights.   In  rendering  said  decision  we quoted with approval the concurring opinion  of  Justice Johnson in the  case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I,  as follows:

" 'Licensing acts, intact, in legislation, are universally  restraining acts;  as, for  example, acts licensing1 gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors,  etc.   The act, in this instance, is  distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage  American shipping, and  place them  on an equal footing with, the shipping of other nations.  Almost  every commercial  'nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade;  and  a  countervailing privilege in favor  of American snipping is contemplated,  in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject.  It  is not  to  give the vessel  an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment.  But it is to confer on her American  privileges, as contradistinguished  from  foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves  into the American commercial marine,, as well as frauds upon the revenue  in the trade coastwise, that  this whole system  is projected.' "

The  rule in general is as follows:

"Aliens are raider no  special  constitutional protection  which forbids n classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the  class  falls  along  the lines of nationality.  That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for  aliens  as  a  class than for similar classes  of American citizens.  Broadly speaking, the difference  in status between citizens and aliens constitutes  a basis for reasonable  classification in  the exercise of police power,"  (2  Am. Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149, (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that  no one can  obtain  a license unless he  is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was  held valid, for the  following reason:   It  may  seem wise to the legislature to  limit the business of those who  are  supposed to have regard for' the  welfare, good order and happiness of  the  community,  and the court cannot question  this judgment and conclusion.   In  Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.E.  309 (Ohio, 1912), a  statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic  of liquors,  was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or  a  deliberate purpose to  discriminate,  but  was  based on  the  belief  that  an  alien cannot  be  sufficiently  acquainted with 'our institutions and  our life as to enable him to  appreciate the relation of  this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In  Ohio ex  rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115  (1926), the U.  S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city  of  Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses  (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens.  It held that  plainly irrational  discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it  does not follow that alien  race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such  a  relation to  a legitimate object of legislation as to  be made the  basis  of  permitted  classification,  and that it could not state  that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that  latitude  must  be allowed for  the  legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil.   The case of State  vs. Carrol,  124 N. E. 129  (Ohio,  1919)  is a parallel case to  the one at bar.   In Asakura, vs. City of Seattle,  210  P.  SO (Washington,  1922),  the  business of pawnbroking was  considered as having tendencies  injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope  of police  power.  A  similar  statute  denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914).   So also in Anton vs.  Van Winkle,  297  V. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said  that aliens are judicially known  to have different  interests, knowledge,  attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall,  is not  an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners,  90 N.W.  1058  (Michigan,  1902),  a law prohibiting the licensing  of  aliens as barbers  was  held void, but  the  reason  for the  decision  was  the  court's finding that the exercise of the business  by the aliens does not in any  way  affect the morals,  the health, or even the convenience  of the community.   In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479  (1947), a  California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing  licenses to  persons ineligible  to  citizenship  was held  void, because the law conflicts with  Federal power over  immigration, and  because there is no public interest in the  mere claim  of  ownership' of the waters and the fish  in  them,  so there  was no  adequate justification for the  discrimination.  It further   added  that the law  was the outgrowth  of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry.   However, two Justices dissented  on the theory that  fishing rights have been  treated  traditionally as natural resources.   In  Fraser  vs.  McConway &  Tarley Co.,  82  Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania,  1897), a state law which imposed a tax on  every employer  of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years  of age, was declared void because the  court found that there was no reason for the  classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the  daily  wage  of an  employee.

d.  Authorities contra explained.

It  is  true that some  decisions of  the  Federal court and  of  the  State  courts  in the  United States hold that the distinction  between aliens and citizens is  not a valid ground for classification.   But in these decisions the laws declared  invalid  were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,  or were the result or product of racial antagonism and  hostility,  and  there  was  no question  of public interest  involved or pursued.   In  Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme  Court declared  invalid a  Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language  other than  English, Spanish or  any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese  were driven out  of business there would be no other  system of  distribution, and  (2)  that the Chinese1  would fall  prey  to all  kinds of  fraud, because they  would be deprived  of  their  right to be advised of their business and to direct  its conduct.  The real reason for the decision, therefore,  is the court's  belief that no public benefit would  be  derived from  the  operation of the law and  on the  other hand  it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220  (1885)  an ordinance conferring power on officials to  withhold  consent in the operation of  laundries both  as to persons and place, was declared  invalid, but the  court said that the power granted was  arbitrary, that there was no reason for  the discrimination which  attended the administration  and implementation of  the  law, and that  the  motive thereof was mere racial hostility.  In  State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine,  1900),  a  law prohibiting aliens  to engage as hawkers   and peddlers was  declared  void,  because the discrimination bore  no  reasonable and  just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was  proposed. The case at bar  is radically different,  and  the facts make  them so.   As we  already have said, aliens do, not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for  customers with  whom  they come  in  daily contact, nor  the   patriotic  desire to  help bolster  the  nation's economy,  except in  so  far  as  it enhances  their  profit, nor the  loyalty and allegiance  which the  national  owes to  the land.   These limitations  on  the  qualifications of aliens have been shown on  many occasions  and  instances, especially in  times of  crisis and emergency.  We can do no better than  borrow the language  of Anton vs. "Van Winkle,  297 F.  340, 342, to  drive home the reality and significance of  the distinction between the  alien and the national, thus:

"* * *.  It may be judicially  known, however, that aliens  coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs,  and usages that  our own, people have. So it is likewise known that certain, classes  of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen.  Furthermore, it is natural  and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,  whose allegiance  is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not  the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are  they as  well disposed  toward the United States, as those who  by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.  Further enlargement, is unnecessary.  I  have  said enough so that obviously it cannot  be affirmed with absolute confidence that the  Legislature was without plausible reason for  making the classification, and therefore appropriate discrimination  against aliens  as it relates  to  the subject of legislation. * *  *."

VII The Due Process of Law Limitation

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.

We now  come to due process as a  limitation  on the exercise  of  the police  power.   It has been  stated by the highest  authority in the United  States  that:

"* * *.  And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the  law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means  selected shall, have a real and substantial relation to the  subject sought to be attained. *  * *."

*             *             *             *             *             *             *
"So far  as the requirement of  due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction  a  state  is free to adopt whatever  economic  policy  may  reasonably be deemed  to  promote public welfare, and to enforce  that  policy by  legislation adapted to its purposed.  The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purposed, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. * * *." (Nebbia vs New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another  authority  states  the  principle  thus:

"* * *. Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in considering the scope  of the police power in a constitutional sense,  for the test  used to determine  the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature  is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Eights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights.  *  * *."

*             *             *             *             *             *             *
"* * *. A statute to be "within this power must also  be reasonable in its  operation upon the persons  whom it  affects, must not be for the annoyance of  a particular class, and  must not be  unduly oppressive."  (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302, pp.  1074-1075.)

In  the  case of  Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed.  385, 388, it was  also  held:

"*  * *. To justify the state in  thus  interposing1 its authority in behalf of the public, it must  appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished  from those of a particular class, require such  interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the  accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon  individuals.* * *."

Prata Undertaking Co.  vs. State Board of  Embalming, 104  ALR,  389,  395,  fixes this  lest  of constitutionality:

"In  determining" whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of  the police  power to  regulate the operation  of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of  the first questions to be considered by the  court  is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or  is  an arbitrary,  oppressive,  and capricious use of that power, without  substantial relation  to the health,  safety, morals,  comfort, and general  "welfare of the public."

b. Petitioner's argument  considered.

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those  privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and  honest occupation and therefore beyond the  power  of the  legislature  to prohibit and  penalize.   This  argument  overlooks  fact and reality and rests on  an  incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,  that  in this country  where  the occupation is engaged  in  by petitioner, it has been  so  engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm  or injury to the  citizens and without ultimate danger to  their economic peace, tranquility and welfare.   But the  Legislature has  found,  as we have also  found and indicated, that the 'privilege has been so grossly abused by the  alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a  deadly  stranglehold on  the nation's  economy  endangering the national  security in times of crisis and emergency.  

The real question at issue, therefore, is  not that posed by petitioner,  which  overlooks  and  ignores  the  facts and circumstances,  but this,  Is the  exclusion in the future of aliens  from the retail trade  unreasonable,  arbitrary and capricious, taking into account the  illegitimate and  pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore  engaged therein?  As thus  correctly  stated the answer is clear.  The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national  economy from alien  control and dominance.  It is not  necessarily unreasonable  because  it affects private rights and. privileges  (11  Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.)  The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under  all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose  into effect (Id.)   Judged  by this test, disputed legislation, which  is not  merely reasonable but actually necessary,  must be considered not to  have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The  necessity  of the  law  in question  is  explained  in the  explanatory  note  that accompanied  the  bill,  which later was  enacted  into  law:

"This  bill  proposes to  regulate  the  retail business.  Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of  the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life.  If the persons who control this vital artery of our  economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have  no permanent  stake  in our people's welfare,  we are  not  really  the masters  of our own destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.

"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood.   While this bill seeks to  take  away from the hands of persons who are not  citizens  of the Philippines  a power that can  bo wielded to paralyze all aspects of  our national life and endanger our national  security it respects existing rights.

"The approval of this bill is ¦necessary for our national survival."

If  political  independence is  a  legitimate  aspiration  of a  people,  then  economic independence  is none the less legitimate.   Freedom  and liberty  are not real and positive if the  people  are  subject  to  the  economic control and domination  of  others,  especially if not of their own race or country.  . The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign  economic  control  and  domination,,  is  one  of the noblest motives  that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible  to conceive   that legislation that  seeks to bring it about can infringe the  constitutional limitation of due  process..  The  attainment  of a.  legitimate  aspiration of a people can never  be beyond the limits of  legislative  authority.

c. Law  expressly held  by Constitutional .Convention  to be within the sphere  of  legislative action.

The framers  of  the Constitution could not have intended  to  impose  the constitutional restrictions of due process  on  the attainment of  such  a noble  motive as freedom from economic control  and domination,  thru the exercise of  the police  power.   The fathers  of the . Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to  enact legislation that  would  promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they  expressly made their voice clear;  they adopted a  resolution  expressing their belief that the legislation  in question is  within the scope  of the  legislative  power.  Thus  they  declared' in their Resolution:

" 'That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but  it abstains from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is  authorized to promulgate a  law which  limits to Filipino and  American  citizens  the privilege  to  engage  in the retail trade.' "  (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the  Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do  well  to  refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.  Thus in the preamble, a  principal objective is the  conservation of the patrimony of the  nation and as corollary thereto the provision  limiting  to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,  development and  utilization   of  its  natural resources.   And in  Section  8  of Article XIV, it is provided that  "no franchise, certificate,  or any  other  form of authorization for the operation of a public utility  shall be  granted except  to citizens  of the Philippines."  The. nationalization of  the retail trade is  only  a continuance of  the  nationalistic protective  policy  laid  down  as  a primary objective  of the Constitution.  Can  it be  said that  a  law  imbued  with the  same purpose  and  spirit underlying  many of the  provisions  of the  Constitution is unreasonable, invalid  and unconstitutional?

The seriousness  of the  Legislature's concern for  the plight of  the ' nationals  as manifested in the  approval of the radical measure is,  therefore, fully justified.  It would have been recreant to  its duties towards the country and  its  people  would  it  view the  sorry  plight of  the nationals with complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival.  As the  repository of  the sovereign power of  legislation, the  Legislature  was  in duty bound  to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination  of  retail trade poses to national economy.

d.  Provisions of  law  not unreasonable. .

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been.  The law  is  made prospective  and  recognizes the right and privilege of  those already  engaged in  the  occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar  recognition of the right to  continue  is  accorded  associations  of  alians.  The right  or privilege  is denied to  those only  upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of  the Court on  this  case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been  denied  to children and  heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade.  Such provision would  defeat the law itself, its  aims and purposes.  Besides,  the exercise of legislative discretion  is not  subject  to  judicial  review. It is well settled that  the  Court will  not  inquire  into the motives  of the Legislature,  nor  pass  upon  general matters of legislative  judgment.   The Legislature is  primarily  the judge of  the  necessity of an  enactment or of  any of its provisions,  and every presumption is in favor  of  its  validity,  and  though the  Court may hold views inconsistent with the  wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative  power.   Furthermore,  the test  of the  validity of a  law attacked  as a violation  of due  process, is not its  reasonableness,  but  its,  unreasonableness,  and  we  find the  provisions  are  not  unreasonable.  These  principles also answer  various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are:  that  the  law does not  promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out  of employment; that  prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be  general breakdown; that there  would be  repercussions  from  foreigners;  etc.  Many  of these arguments are  directed against the supposed  wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they  do  not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in  the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof  is misleading or  deceptive, as it  conceals the real purpose of  the bill, which is to  nationalize the retail  business  and  prohibit aliens from engaging therein.   The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1)  of Article VI, which reads:

"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of  the bill."

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators  or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of  the  law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.)   A cursory consideration of  the  title and the  provisions of the bill  fails to  show  the presence of duplicity.  It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main  purposes  and  objectives  of  the law. But "regulate" is a broader term  than  either prohibition  or nationalization.   Both of these  have always been included within the term regulation.

"Under the. title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of  intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page AX of Answer.)

"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall he stated in the title, the title 'To  regulate  the  sale of intoxicating  liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such  liquors to minors  and to persons  in  the habit of  getting intoxicated;  such matters being  properly included within the subject of regulating the sale."   (Williams vs.  State, 48  Ind.  306, 308, quoted in p. 42  of Answer.)

"The word  'regulate' is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree  of  restraint and prohibition of acts  usually done  in connection with  the  thing to be regulated.  While word regulate' does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is  no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only  efficacious regulation of which involves suppression."  (State  vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887,  quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the  use of general terms, in the title of a bill; it has  also been said  that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of  the  law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345.)   The above rule was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the  more general term  "regulate" instead of  "nationalize" or "prohibit".   Furthermore,  the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade, which may not be included in the terms  "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to  "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been  many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the  Act  invalid.   The use of  the term  "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes,  under which a simple or  general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found  in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to  apprise the legislators of the purposes,  the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of  matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public.  In the case at bar it cannot be claimed  that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature  of the law, especially the nationalization and prohibition  provisions.  The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its approval.   It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons  for declaring the law invalid ever existed.  The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity  of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of  the Declaration of Human Eights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in  the  above  contention.  The  United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their  subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29- 32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more  than a mere  recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id.  p. 39.) That  such is the import of  the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organization, such  as Norway and  Denmark, prohibit  foreigners from engaging in retail  trade,  and in most nations of the world laws  against  foreigners engaged in domestic  trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and  the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed, to be violated by the law in question.  All that the treaty guarantees  is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals  "upon the same  terms as the nationals of any other  country."  But the nationals of China  are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.   But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by  a  subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail  or restrict the scope of the  police  power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed  law was enacted to remedy a real  actual threat and danger to  national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business  and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope  of the police power of the  State, thru which and by  which  it  protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate  the equal protection  clause  of  the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction  between alien and citizen  in the exercise  of  the occupation regulated,  nor the  due  process of law  clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the  privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;  that the  wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial  department of the  Government may not interfere; that  the provisions of the law  are clearly embraced in the title, and  this suffers from no  duplicity and has not misled  the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be  said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been  entered into on the subject  and the police power may not be  curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the  Court  are of  the opinion that the  radical effects  of  the law could  have been made  less harsh in  its impact on the aliens.   Thus it is stated that more time should  have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing  businesses when the time comes for them to dose.  Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority  and  does not transcend  the limitations  of due process and equal  protection  guaranteed  in the Constitution. Remedies  against  the  harshness  of the law  should  be addressed  to the Legislature; they are beyond our  power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angela, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, J.J., concur.

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PADILLA,  J.,

I  agree to the proposition, principle or rule  that  courts may not Inquire  into the wisdom of an Act passed by the Congress  and duly approved  by the  President of the Republic.  But the rule  does not preclude courts  from  inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution.  I  am satisfied  that the Act assailed as  violative of the due process of law and the equal protection of  the laws clauses  of the Constitution does not  infringe  upon them, insofar as  it affects  associations,  partnerships   or corporations,  the capital  of which is not  wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,  and aliens,  who  are not and  have  not been engaged in the retail business.  I am, however,  unable to persuade myself that it does not violate  said clauses insofar as the  Act applies  to  associations  and partnerships referred to in  "the  Act' and to aliens, who are  and have heretofore been engaged in said business;   When they did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to  engage in it.  They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engage  in the business.  The Act  allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their  license; and corporations, associations or partnerships,  the capital  of which is  not  wholly owned  by citizens of  the  Philippines  to  continue  in the business for a period  of ten years from the date  of the approval of  the  Act (19 June 19S4)  or until  the  expiry of the  term of the existence of the association or partnership  or corporation, whichever  event comes first.   The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which  is not wholly  owned by citizens of the  Philippines,  to engage in the  retail business for a  period of more than ten years from the date of the approval of  the  Act or  beyond the term of  their corporate existence,  whichever event comes first, is  valid and lawful, because  the  continuance  of the existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation^[1] But the prohibition to engage  in the retail business by  associations  and partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens  of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval  of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as  agreed upon by the  associates  and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged  in the business, or  by his executor  or administrator,  amounts to  a deprivation of their property without  due process of law.  To  my  mind,  the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and  partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month  period granted  to  alien heirs of a deceased alien, his  executor  or administrator,  to  liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business.  The price obtainable  at  such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to  reimburse and compensate the  associates or partners of the  association or  partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it.  The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute  the business.  The goodwill that  the  association, partnership and the alien had built  up during a long period of effort,  patience and perseverance forms part of such business.  The constitutional  provisions  that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law ^[1] and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of  the laws^[2] would have no meaning as applied to associations  or partnerships and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business  within  ten  years from the  date of the approval of the Act and  before the end of the term of the existence of the  associations and partnerships as agreed upon by the associates and partners and within  six months after  the death of their predecessor-in-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural lands which together with  the lands of the  public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem  it wise  and prudent to deprive  aliens and their  heirs of  such lands.^[3]

For these  reasons, I  am of the  opinion  that section 1 of the  Act, insofar as  it compels  associations  and partnerships referred to therein to wind  ujp their retail business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act even  before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon  by the associates and partners  and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the  alien heirs of a deceased alien engaged in the retail business in his lifetime, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they  violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

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^[1] Section 76, Act No. 1469.

^[1] Section 1(1),  Article III, of the Constitution.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.