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[PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO v. GUILLERMO VIÑA](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ce562?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-11196, Aug 30, 1957 ]

PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO v. GUILLERMO VIÑA +

101 Phil. 1149

[ G.R. No. L-11196, August 30, 1957 ]

PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT,, VS. GUILLERMO VIÑA, IN SUBSTITUTION FOR THE DECEASED CELESTINO V. RAMOS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

ENDENCIA, J.:

In the court below, petitioner  instituted  this action for quo warranto to test the legality and constitutionality of Administrative Order No.  73 issued  by the President of the  Philippines, removing petitioner herein from  office as Assistant  Fiscal  of Manila,  as well as the appointment of the respondent Celestino V. Ramos as Assistant Fiscal of Manila to  replace  him.

There is practically no dispute  as to the facts of the case.

The petitioner was a  duly appointed Assistant Fiscal of Manila who took  his  oath of office  on June 1, 1951.

On  July 19,   1954,  letters  written by him  to  prisoner Domingo Bebania, then serving  sentence for parricide at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal, were found in the latter's hut in a routinary inspection of the prisoners.

The letters were confiscated by the authorities of the prison and at the investigation  of prisoner Bebania, he executed an  affidavit stating therein, among other things, that the petitioner asked  hint  the sum of  P200  and a rooster so that he could work for Bebania's pardon.   Subsequently, the Hon. Secretary of Justice charged the petitioner with dishonest conduct  as  follows:
"In view hereof, you are hereby charged with dishonest conduct highly prejudicial to the  best interest of the service and given five days from receipt hereof within which to submit to this  Department a detailed answer thereto, together with whatever written evidence you may  desire to  present in support of your  side. You are, however, advised that if you  so  elect,  a formal investigation of the  charge may be  conducted, at which formal investigation you will be given the opportunity  to defend yourself personally  or by counsel.  If  you  elect to have a  formal investigation, you may make a request therefor  in  your  answer."
Petitioner chose a  formal investigation,  hence the Department of Justice  appointed a special investigator to conduct  a formal  hearing"  of the charges  against the petitioner. Thereafter   said   hearing  was  held  where evidence was adduced both in  support of the charges and in  defense of  petitioner.  After  the  investigation, the investigator found  the  petitioner  guilty as charged and, on  the basis  of  the findings of the  investigator, the Secretary of Justice,  in  turn, recommended to His Excellency,  the  President of  the  Philippines,  the dismissal of the petitioner.   Upon receipt of said recommendation, the President issued Administrative Order  No. 73 finding the petitioner guilty of dishonest  conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest  of the service and removing  him  from the service effective upon receipt  of said order, the most pertinent portions of  which are as follows:
"It is undisputed  that prisoner  Bebania  solicited  respondent's help to obtain his release from prison;  that the  respondent asked from Bebania the  amount  of P200 and a  "Texas" rooster; and that the rooster  was never delivered  to the respondent.

*             *             *             *             *             *             *

"The sum total of the  efforts exerted by the respondent in  behalf of Bebania consisted, it appears, in writing and filing two petitions for executive clemency, the last of which was denied by the President on June  23, 1954. Whatever  expenses these efforts  entailed could  not  possibly have come up to P200.  As  to his request  for a fighting cock, even on the assumption that is was really intended for his co-employees, the cold  fact remains that he again unconsciously sought to take  advantage of a poverty-stricken prisoner by attempting to take away the latter's poor possessions.

"The  foregoing amply shows that the  respondent is guilty of the charge.  While  respondent's  actuations  in  the  premises  had no connection with the discharge of his official duties and while he may not  have actually  succeeded in  obtaining what he sought to obtain,  yet his acts  clearly show his  moral unfitness for public, service. Observance of the  highest standards   of  personal  integrity and  decorum is required of all public officials if the Government  is to  deserve the trust and  confidence  of  the people, A fiscal, a  vital  part  of the machinery for the  administration of justice, who  deceives a prisoner hungry for freedom and seeks to extract from him what  little he possesses certainly falls far too short of those standards.

"Wherefore,  Mr. Primitivo  P.  Cammayo  is hereby  removed from office as assistant fiscal of  Manila, effective upon receipt of notice hereof."
On November 15,  1954, petitioner received  copy of said order  and shortly thereafter he filed with His Excellency, the  President  of  the Philippines,  a  petition  for its reconsideration,  but it was denied for lack of merit.  As immediately after the issuance of the Administrative Order No.  73,  Celestino V. Ramos was  appointed  Ad interim Assistant Fiscal to   replace the petitioner, the latter  immediately instituted  the present case on  the  ground  that his removal from office was illegal, that the  appointment of respondent Celestino  V. Ramos was likewise illegal, and that Administrative  Order  No. 73  was null and void because   (a)   in  the   investigation  conducted  against  the petitioner the requirement  of due process  of  law had not "been complied with,  and (b) that the act of which he was found  guilty  did  not  constitute  legal  ground  for  his removal.  

After  due hearing, the case was  dismissed  mainly  on the following grounds:
"That the  petitioner has  been  legally  separated  and  removed from office  can not be  disputed.  The  administrative  order  of the President was  based  on  the  result of  an  investigation wherein the petitioner was  given an opportunity to  be heard and to present his  defense.  The  investigation  was  conducted  by  order of  the Secretary of  Justice,  who  has  general  supervision  of  the office of the  City Fiscal (Section 38, Republic Act No. 409,  as amended by Sec. 2, of  Republic Act No. 1201),

"The finding of the  investigator  that the  petitioner is  guilty of dishonest conduct highly prejudicial to the  best interest  of the service,  is  based  on  facts   established  during  the  hearing.  It has  been sufficiently proved  that the  petitioner sought  to  obtain some gifts from Domingo Bebania, Jr., a prisoner in Muntinglupa, who is serving  sentence  for  parricide,  in  consideration  of  petitioner's efforts  to  secure his  pardon.  The  petitioner's letters  to Bebania were  all written on  official  papers bearing the letterhead of  the  City   Fiscal's   Office.  Evidently he  intended  to impress Bebania with his official position.

"That the petitioner's misconduct has no  connection with the  discharge  of  his  duties as  assistant  fiscal is immaterial.  As  was said in  the  President's administrative  order  'observance of  the highest standards  of  personal  integrity and decorum is required of all public officials if the  government is to  deserve  the  trust and  confidence of the public'  The petitioner was  fount) guilty of dishonest  conduct  after  proper  investigation  and  hearing,  and such finding,  which the court has no  authority to  alter, renders him  unfit for the  office of assistant  fiscal  and undeserving  of the trust and confidence  of the public."
Thereupon  the petitioner appealed  and in this instance he  contends that the lower court  erred:
"I.  In  finding that, petitioner  was  legally removed from office and  in  not  declaring administrative order No. 73 by the President of the  Philippines removing  petitioner  from  office  as  assistant fiscal of Manila illegal  and  unconstitutional altho  the dishonest conduct imputed to the petitioner as ground for his  removal was according to the text of said  administrative order,  not related to nor  connected with the  performance of the official duties of  assistant  fiscal of  Manila  and  petitioner  was not  convicted  nor  even prosecuted  in court for  its commission;

"II.   In not finding that  petitioner's removal from office  as assistant  fiscal  of  Manila was  in violation, of  the  constitutional and legal requirement on due  processes of  law  when he was not given a fair and  impartial hearing;

"III. In holding that the  position of assistant fiscal  of Manila which petitioner had been holding became vacant upon petitioner's removal  from office,  and  that there  was no usurpation and  unlawful holding of  the  office by the  respondent altho respondent was appointed to the same office in place of petitioner;

"IV.  In denying the petition  for  quo warranto and in  not rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner ousting  and excluding the  respondent  from  office and reinstating petitioner  to  the office of assistant fiscal of  Manila with  the right  to receive all the emoluments appurtenant to said office from date of his removal to his reinstatement in  office."
Upon careful consideration of appellant's contentions as embodied in the foregoing assignments of error,  we  find that the decisive one  is whether  he was removed from office without  due process of law  and whether the facts proven  against him during" the investigation  do constitute sufficient legal ground for his removal.  Petitioner-appellant does not deny that there has been a formal hearing of the charges filed against him by the Department of Justice; that in that hearing, he was given opportunity to defend himself from said charges; that the investigator found him guilty  of dishonest conduct highly prejudicial to the  best interest of the service  and accordingly the Department of Justice  has recommended his removal to His Excellency, the President  of  the Philippines, and that the  latter approved such recommendation and dismissed him from the service  because of his  moral unfitness for public service. Evidently,  having these  facts in  view,  it cannot be pretended that  the  constitutional provision  of  due  process of law  for the removal  of the  petitioner has not been complied with.

As to whether the cause for  which he was  dismissed constitutes a legal ground sufficient for his removal from office, we concur with the court below that the  acts committed by the  appellant as conclusively established by the evidence adduced  during the investigation so that he could work for the pardon of prisoner Bebania who was at the time serving sentence for parricide, do constitute disgraceful conduct and show his moral unfitness for public service, especially for the position of a fiscal who is an officer entrusted  with the duty  to prosecute  crimes.

It is  vigorously  contended by the petitioner-appellant that under Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by. law", the cause for  which petitioner-appellant was  removed was not one of those "provided by law." It cannot be denied, however, that the cause for which the petitioner was removed, as could be seen  from the Administrative Order No. 73, does not constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service  which, pursuant to Section 6 of Rule XIII of the Civil Service Rules, are sufficient grounds for removal. And since the  President of the Philippines is the  administrative head of our Government  and as  such is empowered  to  dismiss  from the service, after due investigation, any presidential appointee found guilty of the acts mentioned in the  aforesaid Civil Service Rule, we  are constrained to hold that the petitioner having been properly removed  from office, the present action  has  no foundation in fact  and in law and that the lower  court correctly dismissed it.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion,  Reyes, J.  B.  L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

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