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[PEOPLE v. PEDRO R. EXCONDE](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ce550?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-9820, Aug 30, 1957 ]

PEOPLE v. PEDRO R. EXCONDE +

101 Phil. 1125

[ G.R. No. L-9820, August 30, 1957 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PEDRO R. EXCONDE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The  accused Pedro R. Exconde was convicted  in the Court  of  First  Instance of  Manila  of violating Central Bank Circular No. 37, approved September 25, 1952, limiting  to P100  the  amount of Philippine currency  that an outgoing passenger  could have on  his person.  The court below meted upon  him  a  sentence  four  (4) months  of imprisonment and fine of P100 and costs.

The facts are not  disputed.  On  May 5, 1954, the appellant Pedro R. Exconde  was  on  board the s.s. President Wilson, as one of its passengers bound for Japan.  Supervising agent Jose A. Fojas,  of the Department of  Finance, found  in Exconde's possession P5,090 in  Philippine  currency,  plus U. S.  $50 in cash; travelers' checks for $100; and a  Bank of America remitter's receipt for  $350,  Admittedly  Exconde's  possession  of  the  P5,000  was  not licensed, and was. in violation of  Central  Bank Circular No, 37  (48 Off. Gaz. 3823) providing" as follows:
"SECTION 1. Pursuant to section  34 of Republic Act No. 265 the Monetary Board  is  hereby promulgating  this circular.  Violation of any  of its  provisions  shall  subject the  offender to the penal provisions of said Act.

SEC. 2. The  import and  export  of Philippine  coins  and notes without the necessary license  issued  by the Central Bank  is prohibited except in  the following cases:

(a) Travelers entering  the  Philippines  may  bring in  Philippine coins and notes  in an amount  not exceeding  P100, provided the coins do not exceed P50.  In case  of travelers arriving on ships, the coins they bring in shall not exceed P50 for first class passengers, P20 for second  class  passengers  and P10 for third class passengers.

(b) Travelers leaving the Philippines  may take with them  Philippine coins and notes in an  amount not exceeding P100, provided the coins do not exceed P5.

SEC. 3. The following shall also be held liable within the meaning of this circular:

(a) Any outgoing: passengers already booked and ready to  leave the country found having in  his person or among his luggage, at the airport or piers, an amount exceeding P100  or Philippine  coins exceeding P5 when no license  has been previously obtained  for the excess amount.

(b) The sender of any mail matter, envelope, or package  already deposited in  the  mails, manifested or  put on board an outgoing international carrier found to  contain  an  amount  exceeding Pl00 when no license has  been previously obtained for the excess amount.

SEC. 4.  All circulars, notifications or regulations previously promulgated  by  the Monetary  Board inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

SEC. 5. This  circular shall take effect immediately."
The  aforesaid circular was promulgated in connection with sec.  34 of Republic Act  265 (Central Bank  Act) providing that:
"SEC.  34. Proceedings  upon violation  of  laws  and regulations.

Whenever any person or entity willfully  violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the Monetary  Board, the person or persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not  more than twenty thousand pesos  and by imprisonment of not more than five years.

"Whenever a banking institution  persists in violating its  charter or by-laws or any law, or orders, instructions, rules or regulations legally issued  by  the Monetary  Board,  or  whenever a  banking institution persist in  carrying on its  business in an unlawful or unsafe manner, the  Board shall,  by  the Solicitor  General,  and without prejudice to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraph of this section, file a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of  the court  to compel the banking institution to discontinue the violations or practices objected to in the petition  of the Board.  The  Monetary Board may,  with the approval of  the  court, take such  action as  the court  may deem necessary to compel the banking institution complained  against to discontinue  the violations  or  practices  set forth in the  Board's petition, and,  if necessary, the Board  may,  under order of the Court, direct the  Superintendent of Banks to liquidate the business of the institution."
Two appeals were taken from  the decision of the trial court  and are  submitted  to us for decision.   One  is  the appeal perfected by Exconde,  who alleges that  Circular No.  37 is invalid, and the other is the appeal taken  by the Government  from  the lower court's refusal to order  the confiscation  of the  P5,000.00 unauthorizedly held  by  Exconde and  found in his  possession by agent  Fojas.

The first argument of appellant Exconde is that sec. 34 of the Central Bank Act can not validate the  issuance of Circular No. 37 because sec. 34 refers solely to regulations under Art, IV, Chapter  B of the Act, concerning activities of the "Department of  Supervision and Examination" of banking institutions.

We see no merit in this  contention.  The  first paragraph of sec. 34, heretofore quoted, is so broad in terms that it was evidently designed to establish penal sanctions for  any and all violations of the  Act  as well as  of  the regulations  legally  issued by  the  Monetary  Board;   and there  being  no other sanctioning  provision elsewhere in the  Act itself,  appellant's  stand,  if upheld,  would lead to the result that, with  the exception of  Art. IV, Chapter B, all other provisions of the Central Bank Act could be violated with impunity.   That  effect the  law  could not have  intended.

It is next argued that see. 14 of the Central Bank Law does  not  grant authority  to  the Monetary Board to prohibit  the exportation  of  Philippine currency,  and that if any such authority was in fact granted, the same is void as an invalid delegation of legislative power.   Section 14 is as follows:

SEC. 14. Exercise of authority. In order to exercise the authority  granted to it under this Act, the Monetary Board shall:
(a)  Prepare and  issue  such rules and regulations as it considers necessary for the  effective discharge  of the  responsibilities and exercise of  the powers  assigned to the Monetary Board and  to the Central Bank under this Act;

(b)  Direct the  management, operations and  administration of the Central Bank and  prepare such rules and regulations  as it may deem  necessary or convenient for this purpose;

(c)  On the recommendation of the Governor, appoint, fix the remunerations, and remove all officers and employees of the Central Bank, with tho exception of the Governor; and

(d)   Authorize  such  expenditures  by the  Central Bank as  are in the interest of the effective administration  and operation of the Bank."
It  is well established in  this  jurisdiction that,  while the making of  laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds  exclusively  to Congress,   nevertheless  the  latter may  constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and  effectuate its  policies, for  the reason that the  legislature  often finds  it impracticable  (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the  multifarious and complex situations that may  be met in carrying the law into  effect.   All  that is required  is  that  the  regulation should  be germane to  the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it,  but conform to the standards that  the  law prescribes  (Calalang vs. Williams, 70.Phil. 727;  Pangasinan Transportation  vs. Public Service  Commission, 70 Phil.  22;  Peo. vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.  328; Peo. vs.  Vera, 39 Phil.  660; Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.  660).

Thus, in Calalang vs. Williams, supra, we ruled (p. 732):
"In the  case  of  People  vs.  Itosenthal  and Osmena, G, R.  Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated  June 12, 1939,[1] and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G. R. No. 47065, promulgated  June  26,  1940,[2] this Court had  occasion  to  observe that the principle of  separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the  complexities  of modern  governments,  giving  rise  to the adoption, within certain limits, of  the principle  of subordinate legislation, not  only  in the United States and England  but  in practically all modern governments.  Accordingly, with the Rowing. complexity of modern life, the  multiplication,  of  the subjects  of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity  of the theory of separation of  governmental  powers has, to a large  extent,  been relaxed by  permitting the delegation of greater  powers by tho legislative and  vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, hut also in the  promulgation of  certain  rules  and  regulations  calculated  to  promote  public interest."
Considering that the "responsibilities  and powers" assigned to the Bank and its Monetary  Board, mentioned in sec 14 (a), are those  specified in sec. 2 of the Act:
"SEC- 2. Responsibilities  and  objectives. It shall be the responsibility of the Central Bank  of the Philippines  to  administer the monetary and  banking system of the Republic.

It  shall be the  duty  of the Central  Bank to use the  powers granted to it under  this Act to achieve the following objectives:

(a) To maintain monetary stability  in the Philippines;

(b) To preserve  the  international value of the  peso and the convertibility of the peso into  other freely  convertible currencies; and

(c) To promote a  rising  level  of production, employment  and real income in the Philippines."
as well as those prescribed in sec. 64 of same law, to wit:
"SEC. 64.  Guiding  principle, The Monetary Board shall endeavor to control any  expansion  or  contraction in tho supply, or any rise or fall in prices, which, in  the opinion of the  Board, is prejudicial to the attainment or maintenance of a high level of production,  employment, and real income.  In  adopting policies and measures in accordance with  this, principle  the  Monetary  Board shall have due regard for their effects on the availability and cost of money to particular sectors of the economy as well as to  the economy as a whole,  and their effects on the relationship of domestic prices and costs to  world prices and costs,"
we experience no  difficulty in concluding that Circular No. 37 here in question was  a  valid exercise of the regulatory power delegated by the  Central Bank  Act, and that said Circular is in harmony  with the objectives sought to be achieved by that  law, particularly the control of any prejudicial  "expansion and  contraction of the money supply" (sec. 64) and  "the preservation of the international value of  the  peso"  (sec. 2, par.  b).  It requires  no effort to understand that unless the exportation of currency is curtailed, the value of the peso in terms  of  other  currencies can not be maintained, for the increase of the peso supply in foreign countries would tend to depress its value therein.   How  far  the limitation should  go may  give rise to honest differences of opinion, but the power to restrict the export  of Philippine currency  is undoubtedly there, and courts are only concerned  with the question of authority, not the wisdom of the measure  involved.

Appellants does not dispute that the objectives set  forth in sees.  2  and 64 of the Central Bank Act constitute adequate standards  to guide  the Bank  and  the  Monetary Board; nor may  doubt be entertained  on that score, specially when compared to  those  criteria upon which this Court has  previously affixed the  stamp  of its approval, like "public welfare"  (Cardona vs. Binangonan,  37 Phil. 547); "necessary in the  interest of law and order"  (Rubi vs. Provincial Board,  39 Phil.  660);  "public  interest" (People vs. Rosenthal, 68  Phil. 328);  "justice and equity and the substantial  merits  of the  case"  (Int. Hardwood vs. Pañgil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602).

Having reached these conclusions, we must likewise assent to the proposition that the violation of  Circular No. 37 comes within the penal sanctions of the Central Bank Act; because a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a misdemeanor or  a crime  punishable as  provided in the  authorizing statute, and by virtue of the latter.
"*  *, the  regulations adopted lander legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with  the provisions of the  law, and for the sole purpose of carrying  Into  effect its general provisions.   By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended.  So long,  however, as  the  regulations?  relate solely  to carrying  into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.   A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive  officer of the  Government  in  conformity with  and  based upon  a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an. offense and renders the offender liable  to punishment in  accordance with the provisions of .law." ("United  States vs. Bailey, 9 Pet., 238, 252, 254, 256;  Caha vs. United  States,  152  IT. S., 211,  218, United  States vs. Eaton, 144 U.  S.,  677), (U. S, vs. Tupasi, Molina, 29 Phil. 124)

"The legislature  cannot delegate to a board or to an executive officer  the  power to declare  what acts shall constitute a criminal offense.  It is competent for it, however, to authorize a commission to prescribe duties on which the law may  operate  in  imposing  a penalty and in  effectuating the   purpose designed in enacting the law.  There are numerous eases  in which the courts  have sustained statutes authorizing administrative officers to promulgate rules on a  specified  subject  and  providing' that  a  violation  of  such rules or orders should constitute a misdemeanor,  punishable as provided in the  statute."  (11 Am. Jur. pp. 965-966)

"Where  statutes  provide that  violation of a rule or  regulation of an administrative agency shall be a misdemeanor, if  the rule or 'regulation  is reasonable,  the enforcement  of the penalty for its violation is sustained by the courts, for the legislature and not the administrative agency made the action penal."  (Vol. 1, Sutherland Statutory  Construction, p. 92)
Turning now to the State's appeal, it is apparent that the refusal of the court below to order the confiscation of the unlicensed  money  found in  the  possession of the accused Exconde is contrary to the provisions of Art. 10 of the  Revised Penal Code, that read as follows:
"Art. 10. Offenses not  subject to the provisions of the  Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not  subject to the  provisions of this Code.  This  Code shall  be supplementary to such. laws, unless  the latter should specially provide the contrary."
Pursuant  to this rule, Art. 45 of the Penal Code (providing for the confiscation or forfeiture of the instruments or tools  employed  in the  commission  of a crime)  has repeatedly been  applied to  crimes penalized by   special laws, in default of a contrary mandate  therein.  Such a course  was adopted in U. S. vs. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305, involving a violation of the Opium Law; U. S. vs. Filart, 30 Phil. 80 (infraction of the  lottery act, No. 1757); Villaruz vs. Court  of First  Instance, 71  Phil. 72 (usury); Commissioner of Customs vs. Sadia, 95 Phil., 439, 50 Off.  Gaz. 3560  (violation of the Revised Administrative Code).

In the  case  of U.  S.  vs. Bruhez, supra, this  Court affirmed the  confiscation of seven P500-peso bills  delivered to  a customs official in consideration of his allowing: an illegal importation of opium, and considered the money as an instrument for the commission' of the crime.  Similarly, in  Commissioner of Customs  vs.  Encarnacion,  we held that dutiable articles imported  without  having  been declared as required by law  should  be declared forfeited to the Government under Art.  45 of the Eevised Penal Code.

If in People vs. Paet, 58 Off. Gaz. 668, and People vs. Sanchez, supra,  745, this Court  refused  to  entertain  the

Government's  appeal  from  the  refusal of  the1  Court of First Instance to decree such,a forfeiture, it did so, not because Article 45 of the penal Code did not apply, but exclusively on the ground that in a criminal case wherein the accused  had  not  appealed,  no appeal  can be  interposed by the Government with  a view to increasing the penalty imposed by the court below; and confiscation being an additional penalty,  the accused would be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, should the Government's  appeal be entertained.   But in the present case of accused Exconde, his own appeal has removed all bars to the review and correction of the penalty imposed by the court below, even if an increase  thereof should be the result.  (Rule 12C, sec. 11)

Summing up, we hold: (1) that Circular No.  37, issued by the  Monetary  Board of the Central Bank, is a valid exercise of the regulatory power constitutionally delegated to the same  under the terms  of the Central Bank  Act (Rep. Act No. 265);  (2) that violations of said  circular are punishable as criminal offenses under the provisions of the first paragraph of section 34  of said  Act; and  (3) that, pursuant to  Article 10 of the Revised  Penal Code, Art. 45 of the said code applies to criminal proceedings for violations  of the Central Bank Act  or  of the  regulations validly  issued in accordance with the  same.

Wherefore  the  judgment  appealed from  is  therefore modified by ordering that the unlicensed money found in the possession of  the  appellant Exconde be declared  forfeited  to   the  Government.   In  all  other respects,  the appealed judgment is affirmed.  Costs against the accused appellant  Pedro R. Exconde,  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista,  Angelo,  Labrador,  Conception,  Endencia  and Felix, JJ., concur.



[1] 68 Phil. 328.

[2] 70 Phil. 221.

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