On the 16th  day  of January, 1906,  the  plaintiffs commenced an  action against the defendants  to recover, as owners, certain parcels of land located in  the pueblo of Molo, Province of Iloilo, together with damages, which parcels of land are  more particularly described in paragraph 6 of the complaint.

The defendants, by their answer, allege that they are the owners of the parcels of land in question.  The  question thus presented  by the complaint and answer was simply, Who are the owners  of said parcels of land?

After hearing the evidence adduced  during the trial of the cause, the  lower court found that  the  plaintiffs were the owners and were entitled to the possession of all of the parcels of land  described in said paragraph 6 of the complaint, except that parcel, together with the house located thereon, described in subsection (d) of said paragraph 6. This latter parcel of land the lower court held belonged to the estate of Vito Tiongco.

In  discussing the  evidence  adduced during the trial relating to  the  question of ownership  of said house and parcel of land, the lower court  said:

"The preponderance of evidence  in this case establishes the fact that the house in question, with the tile roof, was originally the property of Catalina Tiongco, sister of Anselma, which was afterwards left to Anselma by virtue of the will made by Catalina before her death,  and that after that time,  probably  in 1887, her  nephew,  Vito Tiongco, was appointed gobernadorcillo of Molo,  whose appointment was contested with much animosity, among other objections adduced against him being the allegation that he  was not the owner of any realty.  In order to  counteract his opposition and avoid his  being  defeated for that  reason, Anselma,  who  then  possessed  many properties, put him into possession of the  said tile-roofed house  as apparently his own property.  He lived in the house from that date up to  the time of his death in 1904, and, as  it appeared to everybody, he considered it as if he was the real  owner thereof.   He made many repairs as well as alterations in the house on his account and to suit his own wishes.  From the weight of the evidence I find that, after being put  into possession of the  house in the manner above mentioned, Anselma agreed that he could have the house as his  own if he would pay to her P3,OO0, which sum is alleged to be the amount paid by her sister Catalina  for the erection of said house; and that  afterwards, and before the death of Anselma,  he had paid this sum to the satisfaction of  Anselma, and, while I can not find any formal conveyance of the property on the part of Anselma, I do find that some time subsequent to that date he claimed it as his property and it was recognized as his  own, therefore, I am inclined to find that the house with tile roof was, at the time of the death of Anselma, really  the property of Vito Tiongco, her nephew."

From this decision of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed and made the following assignments of error in  this court:

"First.  In allowing the defendants to  prove, by means of oral evidence, the ownership of the said realty.

"Second. In  declaring that Anselma  Tiongco sold  the realty in question to Vito Tiongco."

The appellant in his brief said:

"The question now at issue in  this court is limited to the said house."

The appellant contends, in  his first assignment of error, that the lower court  committed an  error by allowing the defendants  to  prove  the sale  of  said  parcel  of  land by Anselma Tiongco  to  Vito  Tiongco,  in  or about the year 1887,  by  oral  proof.  The simple  question  presented is, May the sale of real  property made in  1887 be proven by oral testimony? In support of his contention the appellant cites articles 1278,  1279, and 1280 of the Civil Code.  These articles of the  Civil Code have already been construed by this court  in the cause  of  Couto vs. Cortes  (8 Phil. Rep., 459) as well as in the cause of Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil. Rep.,  561),  where the court held that  "An  oral contract for the sale of real estate, made prior to the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, is binding between the parties thereto, although it may still be necessary for the parties, seeking to enforce  such contract to take some action to secure the execution of proper documents, but this requirement will not render the agreement invalid."

Section 335 of the  Code of Procedure  in Civil Actions, now in force, has established a rule relating to the method of proving contracts of sale of real property, and an oral contract for the sale of real property can not now be proven under said section 335 except "some note or memorandum thereof  be in writing  and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent."  However, said  section (335) makes no attempt to render such contracts  [oral contracts] invalid. It simply provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action, unless the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum.  This provision (sec. 335) of the code simply provides how contracts  for the sale of real property shall be proved.   It does not attempt to make contracts invalid which have not been executed in writing.  This provision does not go to the existence of the contract, except when made by an agent (par. 5 of sec. 335).  It simply requires a  form  of contract.   The contract exists  and  is  valid, though it may not be clothed  with  the necessary form and the  effect of a  noncompliance with the provisions  of the statute is simply that no action can be proved unless the requirement  is complied  with;  but a  failure to except  to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a  waiver of  the provisions of the law.   (Anson on  Contracts, p. 75.)  If the parties to the action, during the trial make no objection to the admissibility of  oral evidence to support a contract of sale of real property, and thus permit the contract to be proved, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been  reduced to  writing.  In the present case  the defendants called thirteen witnesses, who each testified concerning the sale of the parcel of land and the house in question by Anselma Tiongco to Vito Tiongco, in  or about the year 1887, and no  objection was made by the plaintiffs to the admissibility of this testimony.   The plaintiffs did  not invoke  the provisions of  section  335. They permitted  the defendants to prove the oral contract of sale.  The contract of sale, therefore, being fully proven, and under the provisions of the law an oral contract for the sale of real property being binding and valid between the parties,  we see no escape from the conclusion that if the evidence  was sufficient to show the sale, that the contract was binding, even though it had not been reduced to writing.

The second question is, then, Was the evidence adduced during the trial sufficient  to  show  that Anselma Tiongco sold the parcel of land in  question to  Vito Tiongco in or about  the year 1887?  The lower court found  that a  preponderance of the evidence showed that the sale had actually been  made.  Upon a  full consideration  of the evidence adduced during the trial upon this question, we are satisfied and so hold  that  a large  preponderance of the evidence shows, beyond question, that said sale took place and  that Vito Tiongco, at the time  of his  death was the  owner of the said parcel of land.

For the reasons heretofore stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby  affirmed, with costs.  So  ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Moreland, JJ., concur.