[ G.R. No. L-1673, October 22, 1948 ]
LAO TANG BUN (ALIAS VICENTE UY), NG BUN HO (ALIAS ONG CHI BEN) LU BON KING (ALIAS LEE), YAP LIM SUN (ALIAS PIA UY), AND GAN PING (ALIAS TANG ENG TIAN), PETITIONERS, VS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JESUS BAUTISTA, AND OSCAR ARANETA, COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION, AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE,
CITY OF MANILA, PHILIPPINES RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Five Chinese citizens detained by our immigration authorities for purposes of deportation have instituted this proceeding to test the legality of their confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines. The use of habeas corpus to accomplish that
objective is now a settled practice.[1]
It appears that, having received information that Tan Eng Tian, Pia Uy, Vicente Uy, Lu Bon King alias Lee and Ong Chi Ben, all Chinese nationals residing in this country, were communists actively engaged in communistic work and were disseminating red propaganda in addition to trafficking in firearms destined for subversive elements, the respondent Commissioner of Immigration issued warrant for their apprehension for investigation according to law with a view to deportation. The orders of arrest clearly expressed the reasons therefor, and were dated August 28, 1947.
The investigation commenced on September 1, 1947. After a thorough hearing, at which the arrested aliens were duly represented by attorneys, who cross-examined the witnesses and inspected all the documentary evidence against them, and were allowed to present testimonial and documentary proofs in their defense, the Board of Commissioners reached the unanimous conclusion that the detainees were really guilty as charged, and ordered that said Chinese (herein petitioners) "be immediately placed under custody in the Immigration Detention Station and that they be deported to Amoy, China, whence they came, on the first available boat bound for that port, in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940".
Basis of the banishment decree are the findings by the Commissioners:
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Mahler v. Eby 264 U. S. 32), it being merely the return to his county of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U. S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler v. Strecker 307 U. S. 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock v. Clark 53 F. (2d) 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U. S. v. Uhl 211 F. 628). It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench v. Pedaris 55 Fed. (2d) 597; Ex party Jew You On 16 F. (2d) 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fundamental and essential, like the right of cross-examination. (U. S. v. Hughes 104 F. (2d) 14; Murdock v. Clark, 53 F. (2d) 155). Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell v. Baker 270 F. 577; Sercerchi v. Ward 27 F. Supp. 437.)
The decision of the immigration authorities is final and may not be disturbed by the courts when the hearing was fair and no error of law was committed and there is evidence to support their conclusion (Kessler v. Strecker 307 U. S. 22-33). The courts will not weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute their judgment for that of the immigration officers on the sufficiency of the proof. These matters are for decision by the immigration authorities and their findings will not be reversed if there is evidence to sustain them,[2] no matter if the courts might find differently from them on the whole evidence submitted. (Jung Sam. et al. v. Haff. 116 F. (2d) 334; U. S. ex rel Karpathiou v. Schlotfeldt, 106 F. (2d) 926).
Time and again this Supreme Court has announced the view that the decisions of the customs or immigration authorities are final, unless there has been an abuse of discretion or power, or where they have acted in open violation of the law. (Bayani v. Insular Collector of Customs, 37 Phil., 468) or there has been no fair hearing.
The record of the proceedings for deportation of herein petitioners had before the immigration officials is presented to us for examination. It is not complete: as pointed out by the Solicitor-Generals memorandum, several exhibits have not been attached. Nevertheless the main papers are here, and they sufficiently show: firstly, that herein petitioners were apprised, in the order for their apprehension, of the charges against them; secondly, that they had time to prepare for the investigation; thirdly, that they were ably represented by about four lawyers in said investigation who had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against their clients; fourthly, that no incident or circumstance is pointed out to indicate prejudice or unfairness on the part of the immigration commissioners; fifthly, that enough evidence was submitted to said commissioners to support their conclusion that herein petitioners were communists, propagated communism in the Philippines, advocated the overthrow of the present Government of the Philippines by revolution, and helped the Hukbalahaps, a rebellious organization.
It is this last point that petitioners vigorously assail, most of the pages of their voluminous printed memorandum having discussed the personal credibility of the witnesses for the Government, the extent and meaning of their assertions as contrasted or compared with those of the defense and the alleged erroneous admission of hearsay evidence to the prejudice of their interests. Yet we have already said hereinbefore that, in these proceedings, hearsay evidence is not necessarily inadmissible. As to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence we should not interfere, substituting our estimate of the situation for that of the Commissioners. Our concern in this instance is merely to see whether some evidence sustains their findings; and if so to keep off the judicial hands. The courts do not administer the immigration laws, they can only raise a staying hand if there has been abuse of power or legal error or the alien has not been given a fair hearing.
It appears from the testimonies of Lt. Armando Valdez and the Chinamen Lim Yu Ching and Uy Teng Beng that these detainees were the directors and managers of the Chinese Elementary School in Batangas, that communist meetings were held therein, that in its library were seized books and magazines propagating communism; that they further organized a so-called mutual protection association whose real purpose was to foster communism and "make trouble against the government"; that petitioner Tan Eng Tian has actually heard publicly to advocate revolution against the Philippine Government, and its overthrow, to be substituted by the Russian government; that the others were his followers who, like him are 11 communists, friends and supporters of Luis Taruc, avowedly a communist and presently up in arms against the Government.
The Solicitor-General, in his memorandum, calls attention to the fact that whereas the Government presented 39 exhibits, none of them have been submitted here by petitioners. He urges that under the circumstances this Court is not in a position accurately to determine whether respondents have committed abuse of discretion. There is merit to the contention. We note, for instance, that some witnesses, in testifying before in evidence, without objection of the petitioners herein. (Exhibits C, D, E, and F). It is not far fetched to suppose that these affidavits covered points other than those touched upon in the testimony before us for revision, and contained the statements necessary to round out the allegedly inconclusive testimony of the Government witnesses. Could it be then that, knowing the supplementary or curatory effect of such exhibits the petitioners purposely refrained from presenting copies thereof? For instance, the testimony and credibility of Lim Yu Ching vigorously assailed by petitioners (pp. 20-21 of the memorandum) might be bettered with his affidavit which has not been presented.
Again we find petitioners strenuously arguing that there is no evidence to show that the firearms illegally transported for them to Pampanga were delivered to the Hukbalahaps. Yet the witnesses who declared before the Commissioners about such transportation and delivery (Julian Luansing, Vicente Maala and Pablo Manalo) also had made affidavits (Exhibits D, E and F) which were submitted to the Commissioners without objection. These are not now available to us for revision. In the absence of the whole evidence can we validly say that there was no evidence on that particular point. It must be remembered that petitioner has the burden of proof to show, that the immigration authorities have abused their power or discretion (Ong Liengco v. Collector of Customs, 58 Phil., 556; Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 944; Flores Tan v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil., 205), and such showing must be made by the proceedings had before the immigration officials (Ty Buan v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937).
Counsel for petitioners devoted the major portion of their printed memorandum to a close scrutiny of the Government witnesses testimony calling attention to reportedly glaring discrepancies therein; and other features that impugn their credibility. Apparently they accomplished a thorough job. However, the trouble is that the order of deportation does not need to be justified by "preponderance of the evidence" nor by "evidence beyond reasonable doubt". It is not our duty to determine whether the calibration of the evidence made by respondents was accurate or not. It is enough that there is some evidence to support the order of deportation. (Molden v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 497; Chang Ka Hee v. Collector of Customs, supra.)
The credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence or preponderance thereof is not open to inquiry.
Wherefore, under the precedents applicable and in view of the incomplete record, we are not in a position to declare that the respondents did abuse their power in ordering the banishment of herein petitioners, who fall within section 37 (a) (b) of the Immigration Act hereinabove quoted.
The writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, and Pablo, JJ., concur.
[1] Carmona vs. Aldanese, 54 Phil., 896; Uy Tana vs. Collector of Customs, 55 Phil., 942; Tan Ping Co vs. Collector of Customs, 60 Phil., 542; Ong Liengco vs. Collector of Customs, 58 Phil., 554; In re Dick, 38 Phil., 41.
[2] Ty Buan v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937; Chang Ka Hee v. Collector of Customs, 56 Phil., 622.
It appears that, having received information that Tan Eng Tian, Pia Uy, Vicente Uy, Lu Bon King alias Lee and Ong Chi Ben, all Chinese nationals residing in this country, were communists actively engaged in communistic work and were disseminating red propaganda in addition to trafficking in firearms destined for subversive elements, the respondent Commissioner of Immigration issued warrant for their apprehension for investigation according to law with a view to deportation. The orders of arrest clearly expressed the reasons therefor, and were dated August 28, 1947.
The investigation commenced on September 1, 1947. After a thorough hearing, at which the arrested aliens were duly represented by attorneys, who cross-examined the witnesses and inspected all the documentary evidence against them, and were allowed to present testimonial and documentary proofs in their defense, the Board of Commissioners reached the unanimous conclusion that the detainees were really guilty as charged, and ordered that said Chinese (herein petitioners) "be immediately placed under custody in the Immigration Detention Station and that they be deported to Amoy, China, whence they came, on the first available boat bound for that port, in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940".
Basis of the banishment decree are the findings by the Commissioners:
"That the Batangas Chinese Elementary School in Batangas, Batangas, was founded in memory of Chua Kepsi, a Chinaman killed by the Japanese during the occupation; that the said school fell soon after its establishment under the control of Chinese Communists; that its first principal, named Yu Giok, was arrested in San Pablo City, Laguna, as a Communist; that respondent Lu Bon King alias Lee succeeded Yu Giok as principal of said school, while respondents Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian and Yap Lim Son alias Pia Uy with Lao Tang Bun alias Vicente Uy became the president and members, respectively, of the Board of Trustees of said school; that respondent Ng Bun Ho alias Ong Chi Ben has always been an active supporter of said school;The pertinent legal provision is section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended by Republic Act No. 144. It reads in part as follows:
"That as early as 1946, these five respondents were taken to the MPC Headquarters in Batangas. Batangas, where they were investigated by Major Magallanes for communistic activities since they had been observed to be active Communists in Batangas, Batangas; that as the evidence then gathered by Major Magallanes was not complete in the sense that witnesses were not inclined to make affidavits, the five respondents were released; that upon directives received from the Office of the President which was furnished reliable information that these five respondents were actively engaged in communistic activities, the MPC of Batangas arrested them and later on turned them over to the Bureau of Immigration to face tho present deportation proceedings;
"That on March 30, 1946, these five respondents wont to see Uy Teng Beng, a rich and prominent merchant in Batangas. Batangas, from whom they demanded the sum of P10,000 which was to be given to Luis Taruc of Pampanga to help his election to the Philippine Congress; that upon the refusal of said Uy Teng Beng to contribute the sum of P10,000 he was threatened with death by respondent Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian in the presence of the other four respondents;
"That these five respondents, about April or May, 1946, demanded from Lim Yu Ching, a Chinese resident in Batangas. Batangas, the sum of P100 to be given to the Hukbalahap; that Lim Yu Ching who was previously giving contributions to these respondents now refused to give the sum demanded, knowing that it would be used to aid the Communists in the Philippines; that because of this refusal, said Lim Yu Ching was threatened with death;
"That sometime in 1946, after the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines, in one of the classrooms of the Batangas Chinese Elementary School, respondent Lu Bon King alias Lee drew the figure of the Russian flag on the blackboard and then told the audience that the Russian flag should be "up" while the flags of other nations should be "down"; that on July 7, 1946, in celebrating the anniversary of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, respondent Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian delivered a fiery speech before the audience gathered in the Batangas Chinese Elementary School, advocating a revolution to change the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that on the same occasion respondents Lu Bon Ping alias Lee and Yap Lim Sun alias Pia Uy also delivered speeches, while respondents, Lao Tung Bun alias Vicente Uy and Ng Bun Ho alias Ong Chi Ben and Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian were present as part of the audience; that in the Fifth Annual Convention held sometime in the latter part of 1945 in 30 Soler, Manila, by the Philippine Chinese Labor Union, a radical organization affiliated to Communism, respondents Ng Bun Ho alias Ong Chi Ben and Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian were present as shown by the group picture (Exhibit 'L') of all the persons who attended the said convention; that all the five respondents were always preaching the doctrine of Communism in the restaurant of Lim Yu Ching in Batangas, Batangas, urging those present to work for the change of the present Government into that of the Soviet form of government and at the same time severely attacking the present administration of the President of the Philippines;
"That respondent Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian. In February, 1947, hired the jeep of one Julian Luansing for P300 and transported thereon from Batangas, Batangas, to Angeles, Pampanga, nine (9) sacks of carbines which were delivered personally by him to the Huks at 11:30 in the evening; that in April, of the same year, respondent Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian, now with respondents Yap Lim Sun alias Pia Uy and Lao Tang Bun alias Vicente Uy, transported in a jeep hired for that purpose for P200 from Pablo Manalo three (3) sacks of carbines and ammunitions from Batangas, Batangas to Angeles, Pampanga, where they were delivered to some Chinese persons there;
"That on August 13, 1947, the Batangas Chinese Elementary School was raided by the MPC of Batangas and in the course of the raid many books and other papers were taken, some of which, upon being translated, were found to be of communistic leanings such as those referred to in the brief translation or synopsis made by the Consulate General of the Republic of China (Exhibit 'A-5'); and that the principal, respondent Lu Eon King alias Lee, the president of the Board of Trustees, respondent Gam Ping alias Tan Eng Tian, and the Members of said Board, Yap Lim Sun alias Pia Uy and Lao Tang Bun alias Vicente Uy, were fully aware of the character and contents of those books and papers;
"With regard to other material points established by the Government the solicitation of contributions undertaken by the respondents to help Luis Taruc and the Hukbalahaps, the supply of arms and ammunitions made by three of the respondents to the Huks in Angeles, Pampanga, the making of public speeches, urging a revolution to overthrow the present Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to establish the Soviet form of government, the distribution of leaflets printed in red favoring indirectly Communism, and committing other subversive acts the respondents confined themselves to more denials of each. x x x x x x x"
"(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;It is undisputed that every sovereign nation has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory or to deport them upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (cf. Borchard Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915). (48-49). In the exercise of such sovereign power the Philippine Legislature enumerated in above section 37 the reasons for which aliens are to be banished herefrom. At the same time it ordered that "no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation, nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration", Sec. 37(c), these requisites being undoubtedly the minimum requirements for compliance with the "due process clause" of the Constitution. (Japanese Immigrant Case 189 U. S. 86.)
"(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their Office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines."
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Mahler v. Eby 264 U. S. 32), it being merely the return to his county of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U. S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler v. Strecker 307 U. S. 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock v. Clark 53 F. (2d) 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U. S. v. Uhl 211 F. 628). It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench v. Pedaris 55 Fed. (2d) 597; Ex party Jew You On 16 F. (2d) 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fundamental and essential, like the right of cross-examination. (U. S. v. Hughes 104 F. (2d) 14; Murdock v. Clark, 53 F. (2d) 155). Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell v. Baker 270 F. 577; Sercerchi v. Ward 27 F. Supp. 437.)
The decision of the immigration authorities is final and may not be disturbed by the courts when the hearing was fair and no error of law was committed and there is evidence to support their conclusion (Kessler v. Strecker 307 U. S. 22-33). The courts will not weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute their judgment for that of the immigration officers on the sufficiency of the proof. These matters are for decision by the immigration authorities and their findings will not be reversed if there is evidence to sustain them,[2] no matter if the courts might find differently from them on the whole evidence submitted. (Jung Sam. et al. v. Haff. 116 F. (2d) 334; U. S. ex rel Karpathiou v. Schlotfeldt, 106 F. (2d) 926).
Time and again this Supreme Court has announced the view that the decisions of the customs or immigration authorities are final, unless there has been an abuse of discretion or power, or where they have acted in open violation of the law. (Bayani v. Insular Collector of Customs, 37 Phil., 468) or there has been no fair hearing.
The record of the proceedings for deportation of herein petitioners had before the immigration officials is presented to us for examination. It is not complete: as pointed out by the Solicitor-Generals memorandum, several exhibits have not been attached. Nevertheless the main papers are here, and they sufficiently show: firstly, that herein petitioners were apprised, in the order for their apprehension, of the charges against them; secondly, that they had time to prepare for the investigation; thirdly, that they were ably represented by about four lawyers in said investigation who had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against their clients; fourthly, that no incident or circumstance is pointed out to indicate prejudice or unfairness on the part of the immigration commissioners; fifthly, that enough evidence was submitted to said commissioners to support their conclusion that herein petitioners were communists, propagated communism in the Philippines, advocated the overthrow of the present Government of the Philippines by revolution, and helped the Hukbalahaps, a rebellious organization.
It is this last point that petitioners vigorously assail, most of the pages of their voluminous printed memorandum having discussed the personal credibility of the witnesses for the Government, the extent and meaning of their assertions as contrasted or compared with those of the defense and the alleged erroneous admission of hearsay evidence to the prejudice of their interests. Yet we have already said hereinbefore that, in these proceedings, hearsay evidence is not necessarily inadmissible. As to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence we should not interfere, substituting our estimate of the situation for that of the Commissioners. Our concern in this instance is merely to see whether some evidence sustains their findings; and if so to keep off the judicial hands. The courts do not administer the immigration laws, they can only raise a staying hand if there has been abuse of power or legal error or the alien has not been given a fair hearing.
It appears from the testimonies of Lt. Armando Valdez and the Chinamen Lim Yu Ching and Uy Teng Beng that these detainees were the directors and managers of the Chinese Elementary School in Batangas, that communist meetings were held therein, that in its library were seized books and magazines propagating communism; that they further organized a so-called mutual protection association whose real purpose was to foster communism and "make trouble against the government"; that petitioner Tan Eng Tian has actually heard publicly to advocate revolution against the Philippine Government, and its overthrow, to be substituted by the Russian government; that the others were his followers who, like him are 11 communists, friends and supporters of Luis Taruc, avowedly a communist and presently up in arms against the Government.
The Solicitor-General, in his memorandum, calls attention to the fact that whereas the Government presented 39 exhibits, none of them have been submitted here by petitioners. He urges that under the circumstances this Court is not in a position accurately to determine whether respondents have committed abuse of discretion. There is merit to the contention. We note, for instance, that some witnesses, in testifying before in evidence, without objection of the petitioners herein. (Exhibits C, D, E, and F). It is not far fetched to suppose that these affidavits covered points other than those touched upon in the testimony before us for revision, and contained the statements necessary to round out the allegedly inconclusive testimony of the Government witnesses. Could it be then that, knowing the supplementary or curatory effect of such exhibits the petitioners purposely refrained from presenting copies thereof? For instance, the testimony and credibility of Lim Yu Ching vigorously assailed by petitioners (pp. 20-21 of the memorandum) might be bettered with his affidavit which has not been presented.
Again we find petitioners strenuously arguing that there is no evidence to show that the firearms illegally transported for them to Pampanga were delivered to the Hukbalahaps. Yet the witnesses who declared before the Commissioners about such transportation and delivery (Julian Luansing, Vicente Maala and Pablo Manalo) also had made affidavits (Exhibits D, E and F) which were submitted to the Commissioners without objection. These are not now available to us for revision. In the absence of the whole evidence can we validly say that there was no evidence on that particular point. It must be remembered that petitioner has the burden of proof to show, that the immigration authorities have abused their power or discretion (Ong Liengco v. Collector of Customs, 58 Phil., 556; Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 944; Flores Tan v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil., 205), and such showing must be made by the proceedings had before the immigration officials (Ty Buan v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937).
Counsel for petitioners devoted the major portion of their printed memorandum to a close scrutiny of the Government witnesses testimony calling attention to reportedly glaring discrepancies therein; and other features that impugn their credibility. Apparently they accomplished a thorough job. However, the trouble is that the order of deportation does not need to be justified by "preponderance of the evidence" nor by "evidence beyond reasonable doubt". It is not our duty to determine whether the calibration of the evidence made by respondents was accurate or not. It is enough that there is some evidence to support the order of deportation. (Molden v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 497; Chang Ka Hee v. Collector of Customs, supra.)
The credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence or preponderance thereof is not open to inquiry.
"The record shows that the board of special inquiry, which decreed and recommended the petitioner's deportation had investigated the case and received among other evidence the testimony of Si Kim Tee (alias Chua Ang Shi), justifying the action taken. There is no merit in the appellant's contention that the testimony of this witness should not have been given credence. Courts are not free to review the weight, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence adduced before this board of special inquiry; and the decision of the Bureau of Customs, based upon evidence, is deemed conclusive. (Tan Beko vs. Collector of Customs, 26 Phil., 254; Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil., 123; Guevara vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 394; Molden vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 493) (Cheng Tao Liap vs. Collector of Customs, 55 Phil., 395, 396.)The sworn statements of Lt. Valdez and the other witnesses show the objectionable activities and preachings of these Chinese communists who advocate the overthrow of the present government by force and furnished arms to the rebellious elements. Such statements may not be as strong and as unimpeachable as could be, but they are there to support the order of deportation.
Wherefore, under the precedents applicable and in view of the incomplete record, we are not in a position to declare that the respondents did abuse their power in ordering the banishment of herein petitioners, who fall within section 37 (a) (b) of the Immigration Act hereinabove quoted.
The writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, and Pablo, JJ., concur.
[1] Carmona vs. Aldanese, 54 Phil., 896; Uy Tana vs. Collector of Customs, 55 Phil., 942; Tan Ping Co vs. Collector of Customs, 60 Phil., 542; Ong Liengco vs. Collector of Customs, 58 Phil., 554; In re Dick, 38 Phil., 41.
[2] Ty Buan v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937; Chang Ka Hee v. Collector of Customs, 56 Phil., 622.