[ G. R. No. L-2110, July 22, 1948 ]
GODOFREDO DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE RYUKUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
On March 14, 1947, an Agreement was concluded between the Philippines and the United States of America whereby the latter is authorized to occupy and use certain portions of the Philippine territory as military bases and to exercise jurisdiction over certain
offenses committed within and outside said base for an offense allegedly committed at the Main Storage Area, Philrycom Engineer Depot, United States Army, APO 900, located at Quezon City, Philippines, the petitioner was prosecuted in and convicted by a Greneral Court Martial
appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine Ryukus Command of the United States Army and accordingly sentenced, on March 4, 1948, to confinement at hard labor for five years.
In his petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court on March 24, 1948, lastly amended by motion dated April 9, 1948, the petitioner contends that the General Court Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in a place not a base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military bases of March 14, 1947, and that even assuming that the offense was committed in a base, said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the Philippine courts of the jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, Section 1, of the constitution, and violates Section 1 of Article III of the constitution, guaranteeing to every person in the Philippines due process and equal protection of the law.
There is no dispute that the Main Storage Area in which the offense in question is alleged to have been committed is located within a site in Quezon City which has been used as headquarters by the Philippine Ryukus Command of the United States Army since before March 14, 1947, when the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States regarding military bases was concluded. The bases granted to the United States under the Agreement are specified and enumerated in Annex "A" and Annex "B" of said Agreement which, however, in its Article XXI provides that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex 'A' and Annex 'B' (paragraph 1) and that "the terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases." (paragraph 3).
It is not pretended on the part of the respondent that the site in question is included within any of the bases specified in Annex "A" and Annex "B". Hence the same undoubtedly falls under the classification of temporary installations provided for in Article XXI of the Agreement. Even so, as said temporary installation is not located within the limits of the City of Manila, the terms of the Agreement pertaining to bases are applicable thereto by virtue of the provision of paragraph 3 of Article XXI already above quoted. Accordingly, the offense in question falls under the jurisdiction of the United States as a consequence of Article XIII of the Agreement which stipulates that the Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over xxx any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender arid offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines x x x. (paragraph 1). It is not insisted by the petitioner that his case comes under any of the exceptions mentioned in this provision. This brings us to the constitutional point raised by the petitioner.
In at least two recent cases (Raquiza vs. Bradford,[1] 41 Off. Gaz., 626, decided on September 13, 1945, and Tubb vs. Griess,[2] 44 Off. Gaz., 2712, decided on April 7, 1947), we applied the well-settled principles of International law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Counsel for the petitioner, admitting the correctness of our pronouncement, does not contend that such exemption is an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, because by virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would not be an unconstitutional derogation of the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are to recognize the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers.
Although already superfluous, we do not hesitate to hold that even in the absence of an express declaration in the Constitution that the generally accepted principles of international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, we are bound to uphold the immunities above referred to. And this should be true as long as the civilized world or majority of the independent countries composing it still abide by the rules of international law, and as long as the Philippines continues, as it must continue, to have an intercourse with such countries. We would be the last to suppose that the framers of the Constitution would ever intend to impugn or disregard any international practice. "A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world." (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287.)
Under the Agreement of March 14, 1947, the United States was given express permission to establish military bases on certain portions of the Philippine territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less than those conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign". For this reason, if for no other, the constitutional point raised by the petitioner becomes untenable. The jurisdiction granted to the United States under the Agreement may be wider than what is recognized by international law, but the fact remains that the lesser right is fundamentally as much a diminution of the diction of the Philippine courts as the greater right. If the latter right were to be invoked in the absence of the Agreement, there is every reason to state that:
In further support of the Agreement in question, the argument may be advanced that the Philippines Independence Act, approved by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934, reserves to the United States the right to have and acquire naval reservations and fuelling stations in the Philippines. (See section 10, in connection with section 5.) In the Joint Resolution approved by the United States Congress on June 29, 1944, it was provided (Section 2) that after negotiation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Filipino Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. The result is that the right of the United States under the Philippine Independence Act was enlarged by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, so as to include not only naval reservations and fuelling stations but other military bases in the Philippines. Indeed, in the Proclamation of Philippine Independence, it was recited that "Whereas the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934, known as the Philippine Independence Act, directed that on the 4th day of July, immediately following a ten year transitional period leading to the independence of the Philippines the President of the United States of America should by proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty of the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines except certain reservations therein, and thereafter authorized to be made and on behalf of the United States of America should recognize the independence of the Philippines, now therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do proclaim that, in accord with and subject to the reservations provided for in the pertinent provisions of the existing of Congress, the United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty now existing aid exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines and on behalf of the United States of America I do hereby recognize the independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the Government instituted by the people thereof under the constitution now in force. x x x " (Underscoring supplied.) The emphasized portions of this declaration in the Proclamation of Philippine Independence plainly lead to the conclusion, that the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the territory and people of the Philippines is subject to the right of the United States to withhold and acquire such military bases as are authorized, not only by the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, but also by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944. Hence the acquisition of bases by the United States under the Agreement of March 14, 1944, cannot be constitutionally objectionable.
But the point we want to bring out is that, if bases may be validly granted to the United States under the Constitution, there is no plausible reason why the lesser attribute of jurisdiction cannot be waived. From another point of view, waiver of jurisdiction may well be considered as included within the terms "necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, appearing in the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, hereinabove already quoted.
Jurisdiction being validly waived in favor of the United States under the Agreement in question, it follows that petitioner's contention regarding alleged denial of due process and equal protection, of the law becomes unfounded.
The petition is therefore hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
[1] 75 Phil., 50.
[2] 78 Phil., 249.
In his petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court on March 24, 1948, lastly amended by motion dated April 9, 1948, the petitioner contends that the General Court Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in a place not a base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military bases of March 14, 1947, and that even assuming that the offense was committed in a base, said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the Philippine courts of the jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, Section 1, of the constitution, and violates Section 1 of Article III of the constitution, guaranteeing to every person in the Philippines due process and equal protection of the law.
There is no dispute that the Main Storage Area in which the offense in question is alleged to have been committed is located within a site in Quezon City which has been used as headquarters by the Philippine Ryukus Command of the United States Army since before March 14, 1947, when the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States regarding military bases was concluded. The bases granted to the United States under the Agreement are specified and enumerated in Annex "A" and Annex "B" of said Agreement which, however, in its Article XXI provides that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex 'A' and Annex 'B' (paragraph 1) and that "the terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases." (paragraph 3).
It is not pretended on the part of the respondent that the site in question is included within any of the bases specified in Annex "A" and Annex "B". Hence the same undoubtedly falls under the classification of temporary installations provided for in Article XXI of the Agreement. Even so, as said temporary installation is not located within the limits of the City of Manila, the terms of the Agreement pertaining to bases are applicable thereto by virtue of the provision of paragraph 3 of Article XXI already above quoted. Accordingly, the offense in question falls under the jurisdiction of the United States as a consequence of Article XIII of the Agreement which stipulates that the Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over xxx any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender arid offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines x x x. (paragraph 1). It is not insisted by the petitioner that his case comes under any of the exceptions mentioned in this provision. This brings us to the constitutional point raised by the petitioner.
In at least two recent cases (Raquiza vs. Bradford,[1] 41 Off. Gaz., 626, decided on September 13, 1945, and Tubb vs. Griess,[2] 44 Off. Gaz., 2712, decided on April 7, 1947), we applied the well-settled principles of International law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Counsel for the petitioner, admitting the correctness of our pronouncement, does not contend that such exemption is an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, because by virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would not be an unconstitutional derogation of the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are to recognize the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers.
Although already superfluous, we do not hesitate to hold that even in the absence of an express declaration in the Constitution that the generally accepted principles of international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, we are bound to uphold the immunities above referred to. And this should be true as long as the civilized world or majority of the independent countries composing it still abide by the rules of international law, and as long as the Philippines continues, as it must continue, to have an intercourse with such countries. We would be the last to suppose that the framers of the Constitution would ever intend to impugn or disregard any international practice. "A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world." (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287.)
Under the Agreement of March 14, 1947, the United States was given express permission to establish military bases on certain portions of the Philippine territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less than those conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign". For this reason, if for no other, the constitutional point raised by the petitioner becomes untenable. The jurisdiction granted to the United States under the Agreement may be wider than what is recognized by international law, but the fact remains that the lesser right is fundamentally as much a diminution of the diction of the Philippine courts as the greater right. If the latter right were to be invoked in the absence of the Agreement, there is every reason to state that:
"The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon. it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that, sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction." (The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and Others, 3.L. ed., 287, 293.)Thus in the more recent case of Miquiabas vs. Commanding General, Philippines Ryukus Command, United States Army,[1] G. R. No. L-1988, decided on February 24, 1948, this Court enunciated the principle that as a rule "the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction" over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.
In further support of the Agreement in question, the argument may be advanced that the Philippines Independence Act, approved by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934, reserves to the United States the right to have and acquire naval reservations and fuelling stations in the Philippines. (See section 10, in connection with section 5.) In the Joint Resolution approved by the United States Congress on June 29, 1944, it was provided (Section 2) that after negotiation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Filipino Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. The result is that the right of the United States under the Philippine Independence Act was enlarged by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, so as to include not only naval reservations and fuelling stations but other military bases in the Philippines. Indeed, in the Proclamation of Philippine Independence, it was recited that "Whereas the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934, known as the Philippine Independence Act, directed that on the 4th day of July, immediately following a ten year transitional period leading to the independence of the Philippines the President of the United States of America should by proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty of the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines except certain reservations therein, and thereafter authorized to be made and on behalf of the United States of America should recognize the independence of the Philippines, now therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do proclaim that, in accord with and subject to the reservations provided for in the pertinent provisions of the existing of Congress, the United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty now existing aid exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines and on behalf of the United States of America I do hereby recognize the independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the Government instituted by the people thereof under the constitution now in force. x x x " (Underscoring supplied.) The emphasized portions of this declaration in the Proclamation of Philippine Independence plainly lead to the conclusion, that the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the territory and people of the Philippines is subject to the right of the United States to withhold and acquire such military bases as are authorized, not only by the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, but also by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944. Hence the acquisition of bases by the United States under the Agreement of March 14, 1944, cannot be constitutionally objectionable.
But the point we want to bring out is that, if bases may be validly granted to the United States under the Constitution, there is no plausible reason why the lesser attribute of jurisdiction cannot be waived. From another point of view, waiver of jurisdiction may well be considered as included within the terms "necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, appearing in the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, hereinabove already quoted.
Jurisdiction being validly waived in favor of the United States under the Agreement in question, it follows that petitioner's contention regarding alleged denial of due process and equal protection, of the law becomes unfounded.
The petition is therefore hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
[1] 75 Phil., 50.
[2] 78 Phil., 249.