This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, on the 24th day of December, 1914. Its purpose was to deport the defendant and appellant from the Philippine Islands, by  virtue of the provisions of Act No. 702 of the  United States Philippine Commission.

It appears  from  the  record  that the  defendant  and appellant arrived at  the port of Manila  on  the steamship Loongsang on the 28th day of  February,  1911; that he presented the "section six certificate" and  was admitted without objection.  It is now alleged that he is a  laborer within the Philippine Islands,  without having been registered  as  a  Chinese  laborer  and  should,  therefore, be deported.

The question was finally  submitted to the  Court of First Instance.  After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, reached the  conclusion that the defendant should be deported.  From that decision the  defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments of error.

It is admitted that when  the defendant arrived at the port of Manila in  the  month  of December, 1911, he  was admitted into the Philippine Islands without objection by reason of the fact that he presented the "section six certificate."  The main  question presented  by the appellant  is whether  or not he may be deported from territory of the United States,  having been  admitted by virtue of  said "section six certificate."

Just how long a Ghinese  alien who has been admitted into territory of the United  States without  objection, by virtue of the "section six certificate," may remain therein, has never been directly decided.

In the case of Gan Bun Cho vs. Collector of Customs, (30  Phil. Rep., 614), we said, in discussing that question, that:

"The question of the length of time a Chinese person  may remain in  the territory of the United States, who enters under the 'section six certificate/ seems never to have been brought directly before the Federal courts.  There is  considerable dicta, however, upon the question, most of which indicates that the 'section six  certificate' not only permits Chinese persons of the class entitled to enter, to enter the territory of the United States, but to abide therein during their pleasure.  There are numerous decisions of the Federal courts  to the effect that if a Chinese person is rightly admitted into the territory of the  United States, he  may remain therein, even though subsequently he ceases to belong to the class to which he belonged at the time of entrance. It was not the purpose of the Act  of Congress  to exclude all Chinese persons from the territory of the United States. A certain class of Chinese persons, under the treaty between the United States and China, are permitted to enter without objection.  The 'section six  certificate' was provided, not for the purpose of excluding the class entitled thereto, but simply for the purpose of facilitating their  entrance.  It simply requires the Chinese persons who are permitted to enter  the territory of the United States to provide them selves, in advance, with the proper evidence of their right so to do.  The 'section six certificate' was not intended to be a restriction upon their right to enter.  To hold otherwise would be to impute to Congress the purpose to disregard  the treaty between the United  States  and China. Chinese persons holding the 'section six certificate' are allowed to come and go, to enter  and depart from the territory of the  United States of their own free will and accord.  No case has been called to  our attention, and we believe there is none, which limits their going and their coming to any particular period  of time.  (Lau Ow  Bew vs. U.  S., 144 U.S., 47.)"

In accordance with the foregoing doctrine, the  following rules have been laid down from time to time by the Federal courts:

First. That the minor son of a resident Chinese merchant, having been admitted as such,  can not be deported, if, after he reaches his majority, he becomes a  laborer in territory of the United States.   (U. S. vs. Tan Chuy Ho, 31  Phil. Rep., 383; U. S. vs. Foo Duck, 172 Fed.  Rep., 856; U. S. vs. Yee Quong Yuen, 191 Fed. Rep., 28; U. S. vs. Lim Yuen, 211 Fed. Rep., 1001; Ex parte Lew Lin Shew,  217  Fed. Rep., 317.)

Second. That  a  Chinese person admitted into  territory of the  United States as a student, and who later becomes a laborer, cannot be deported.  Having entered legally he cannot  be deported because he later becomes a laborer. A Chinese person  admitted into territory of  the  United States, as a student may remain after ceasing to be a student, and may earn  his living in any lawful manner, without subjecting himself to deportation.   (U. S. vs. Lee You Wing, 208 Fed. Rep., 166; U. S. vs. Lee You Wing, 211 Fed. Rep., 939; U.  S. vs. Horn Lim, 214  Fed. Rep., 456; In re Tan Chung, 223  Fed.  Rep., 801.)   In said case  (In re Tan Chung) the court said:

"That a Chinese person lawfully entering this country can lawfully change his vocation, and can labor  of right and not of privilege granted by some immigration officer, and that without incurring the penalty of deportation by executive orders or otherwise, is the rule of twenty years9 unbroken current of authority,  (U.  S. vs. Sing Lee, 71 Fed. Rep., 680; Ex parte Lew Lin Shew, 217 Fed. Rep., 317; Ex parte Lam Puy, 217 Fed. Rep., 456.)"

Generally speaking, alien Chinese are prohibited from entering territory of the  United States.  This rule is absolute only; first, with reference to laborers; and second, with reference to those who are paupers or liable to become a public charge, or who are suffering from some contagious or obnoxious disease.

To  the foregoing rule,  Congress has made some  exceptions.  These exceptions include students, merchants, tourists, and others who belong to a special class.  Those who are exempt from the class who are prohibited absolutely from  entering may enter, provided they present what  is known as the "section six certificate."  The United States Government has not attempted to prohibit any other nationality  from entering the  territory of the  United States, except paupers and those who have  some obnoxious or contagious  disease.  It is believed that when a Chinaman obtains the "section six certificate,"  he stands on the same footing with any other alien, with  reference to his right to enter and remain in the territory of the United States. Any other alien  who  is  permitted  to enter the territory of the United States may remain therein during  his own pleasure, so  long as he conforms with the laws  thereof. It is believe that when a Chinese alien enters by virtue of the "section six certificate" he stands upon exactly the same footing as any other alien, and has a right to remain in the territory of the United States, exactly as any other alien may remain therein, and  may not be  deported simply because, after his entrance,  he becomes a laborer.

The treaty (article 2, 22 Statutes at Large, 827)  between the United States and China declares that a Chinese merchant may  bring his body and household servants  into the country, and they shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities  and exemptions which are accorded to citizens and subjects of the most favored nations.  (U. S. vs. Yee Quong Yuen, 191 Fed. Rep., 28.)

In the present case, when  the defendant and  appellant arrived at the port of Manila, the customs authorities took possession of his "section six  certificate" and the same was lost.  It was admitted, however, that the defendant brought with him the  "section six certificate;" that the same gave his occupation as that of a  merchant.  That  fact is not denied; it is admitted by the plaintiff and appellee.

It is contended, however, that the "section six certificate" presented by the appellant only permitted him to  enter the Philippine Islands for the purpose of visiting the carnival, and that, therefore,  at  the close of the  carnival he was without right to remain longer.   With reference to that argument, it may  be said that the "section six certificate" always  contains a statement  of the purpose for  which or the condition upon which it is issued.   For example, if the holder is entering the territory of the United  States as a student, the certificate says so.  If the holder is entering the territory of the United States as a tourist,  that fact is stated  upon 'the face  of the certificate.  If the  Chinaman's right to enter the territory of the United States is based upon the fact that he is a merchant, a statement of that fact is found in the certificate.  Whatever the ground upon which the certificate is issued as stated in the certificate it is only an indication that the Chinese alien possesses the requisite qualifications to enter the territory of the United States, and is in no sense a limitation upon his right to remain therein after entrance,  providing we are  right in our contention that the "section six certificate" has the  effect of putting the holder thereof upon  the  same basis,  with  exactly the same rights and  privileges,  as aliens of the  other most favored nations.

Applying the rule which we think is analogous and which the Federal courts of the United States have applied to merchants,  students, wives,   and minor  children, we  are forced to the conclusion that when a Chinese alien enters the territory of the United States lawfully, without objection, and armed with the "section six certificate," he has a right to remain therein exactly as  if he  belonged to the most favored nation.

The Attorney-General asks  that  the judgment  of the lower court be  reversed and  that the defendant and appellant  be  permitted  to remain in the Philippine  Islands. For all of the foregoing  reasons we agree with the Attorney- General in  his request.  It  is therefore ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be reversed, and that the defendant and appellant be given his liberty, and without any  finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

  Torres, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

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CARSON,

I dissent.  I think the weight of the evidence shows that the appellant was permitted to enter the Islands as a tourist, a mere visitor to the Philippine Exposition, and  that he did not and could  not lawfully acquire the right to remain permanently in the Philippine Islands, merely upon the ground that he had succeeded in  securing entry into the Islands as  a tourist.

Whatever may be said or has been  said in favor of the right of a Chinese person who has established a permanent or quasi-permanent domicile in the Philippines to continue in the country  indefinitely despite his loss of  the status by virtue of which he gained  admission the reasoning of those cases is not applicable  where the ground on which admission to the country is gained is inherently and necessarily in conflict with an intent to secure a domicile in the country.