This action was brought by the plaintiff to compel the specific performance of an alleged contract whereby the defendant municipality is  alleged  to have obligated  itself to sell and convey to the plaintiff a certain  tract of  land described in the complaint.

The following agreed statement of facts was submitted to the court below:

"1. That on July 6, 1907, the plaintiff applied to the municipality of Romblon requesting that a parcel of land or building lot owned by the said municipality be  sold to him at the rate of one  peso per square meter; the description of the same is as follows:

"A parcel of land with an area of 469 square meters, the limits and boundaries of which are: On the north  the road that leads to Bagacay or the walk to the pier; on the south the convent walls; on the east the  plaza 'Libertad;' and on the west the mountain called 'Santiago.'

"2. That on the 8th of the said month of July, 1907, the council of said municipality of Romblon agreed to the sale requested by the plaintiff and resolved to sell him said land at the rate of one peso per square meter.

"3.  That when said resolution was submitted to the provincial governor of Romblon, Senor Bonifacio Marron, the sale thereof was authorized on the 12th of the aforesaid month of July, 1907, but at the rate of one peso and twenty centavos  (P1.20) per square meter,  for  the reason that according to the last assessment the latter was the assessed value of the land, not one peso only.

"4.  That said  modification in the price was accepted by the municipal council of Romblon and by the plaintiff, and at the session held by the council on the 15th of July, 1907, the execution of the bill of sale in favor of the plaintiff was agreed to.

"5.  That at the session held by the said municipal council of Romblon on the 31st of July, 1907, it resolved to authorize the municipal  president, Sr.  Juan Mazo,  to execute said bill of sale in favor of the plaintiff for the price of  P1.20 for each square  meter,  in accordance with the authority granted by the ex-provincial governor of Romblon on July 12,1907.

"6. That on  the day after the resolution of the 31st of July, 1907, was taken by the municipal council, the protest of several residents  of Romblon, against the  resolution of the municipal council in  connection with the  sale of said land to Sr. Alfredo Chanco, the plaintiff, was forwarded to the provincial board of Capiz.

"7. That the provincial board of Capiz,  at  its sitting of August 5, 1907, resolved to annul the resolution of the municipal council  of Romblon  of July 8, 1907; with reference to the sale of said lot to Sr. Alfredo Chanco.

"8. That by reason of the consolidation of the two Provinces of Capiz and Romblon, the latter becoming a sub-province from the 15th of July, 1907, the provincial board of Capiz took charge of all matters intrusted to the abolished provincial board of Romblon.

"9. That the said  resolution of the provincial board of Capiz of August 5, 1907, was, on the 9th of said month and year, transmitted  by wire to the municipal council of Romblon through the  lieutenant-governor, and,  in view of said resolution of the  provincial  board of Capiz, the municipal council of Romblon, at its sessions of the  12th, 15th, and 30th of August, 1907, resolved to annul its own resolution of the 8th of July, 1907."

Upon this agreed  statement of facts, the trial court gave judgment in favor of the defendants for costs, from which judgment plaintiff appealed.

In his brief, counsel for appellant makes but one assignment of error, as follows:

"The court below erred in dismissing the complaint, inasmuch as the contract involved  in this case is valid and binding."

The judgment of the trial  court is based upon  the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 676, amending section  41  of the Municipal Code  (in force at the time when the above set-out transactions took place, but  itself amended by the provisions of Act No, 1791), which is as follows:

"Section forty-one of Act  Numbered Eighty-two, known as the Municipal Code, is hereby amended by striking out all of the  section as  it appears in the Act, and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"'SEC.  41. Whenever the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion  upon questions arising in  relation to the constitution or attributes of the municipal  government, it shall frame the questions  in writing and  submit them  to the provincial fiscal for decision.  It shall  be the duty  of the secretary of  the municipal council to forward, immediately after their passage, certified copies of all resolutions, ordinances,  and other acts  of the municipal council to the provincial  governor.  It shall  be the duty of the president  of each municipality whenever he makes a formal executive  order which is published, to direct the  municipal secretary  to  forward a certified copy of the same to the governor of the province.   In case the governor shall think it probable that any act, ordinance,  or resolution of the municipal council, or any executive order of the municipal president is not within its or his legal power, as conferred by the Municipal Code and its amendments, he shall bring the same to the attention  of the provincial board, which shall  request the opinion of the provincial fiscal as to the validity of the act, ordinance, resolution, or order  in question,  and if, after receiving the opinion of the provincial fiscal, the  board shall conclude that such act, ordinance, resolution, or executive order is in violation of the powers conferred by  the  Municipal Code upon  the council or the president making the same, the provincial board shall have the power,  and it shall be its duty, to declare such act, ordinance, resolution, or executive order  to be null and void, and shall immediately  notify the  council or the president, as the case may be, of its action.   Any  attempt to enforce such  act, ordinance, resolution, or executive order, after the provincial board shall have declared it to be null and after  the action of the provincial board  shall be brought to the attention of the municipal authorities, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the officer or officers attempting to enforce the same.  Should the council or the president be dissatisfied  with the decision  of the provincial board, an appeal may be taken by it or by him to the Civil Governor, who shall decide the same  question which was presented to the provincial board and either affirm or reverse the decision of the provincial board.  If  the decision of the provincial board is affirmed, the act, ordinance, resolution, or executive order involved  shall be annulled.  If, however, he shall reverse the decision of the provincial board,  then and in that case notice  of his decision shall be given to the provincial governor, to the  president or  council of the municipality appealing, and upon receipt of notice by the appellant, the act, ordinance, resolution, or executive order ghall  be revived and come into  force again.  Pending the decision on appeal from an order of the provincial board annulling any act, ordinance, resolution,  or executive order the same shall have no force and effect.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive any judicial tribunal of power to hold void for want of statutory authority any act,  ordinance, or resolution of a municipal council or executive order of a municipal president the validity of which shall be involved in  any cause arising before such tribunal, without respect to  the  decision of the  executive  authorities.'"

Section 41 of Act  No.  82, thus amended, is as follows:

"Questions  which may arise  relative to the constitution or attributes  of the municipal government  shall be  submitted to the provincial  fiscal for decision."

Counsel for appellant insists that this section does not authorize the  provincial board to declare null and void resolutions or acts  of the  municipal  council whereby the council undertakes  to exercise authority vested in it by subsection (c) of section 40 of the Municipal Code, which empowers the municipal council "to purchase, receive, hold, sell,  lease, convey, and  dispose of property, real and  personal, for the benefit of the municipality,  provided  that the express authorization of the provincial governor shall be necessary  to alienate or constitute any lien upon any real  property of the municipality."  Counsel urges that the "acts, ordinances, and resolutions" of the municipal council which may be declared null and void under the provisions of section 41, as  amended, should be construed so as to include those  only of a  legislative or  administrative character,  and not those of a  contractual nature,  adopted in pursuance of the authority conferred under subsection (c) of section 40 of the  Municipal  Code.  But we find nothing in the  provisions of law above cited which  supports the contention of  appellant's counsel,  and indeed, section 41 of the Municipal Code, as amended, following, as it does, immediately after sections 39 and 40 wherein the duties and powers of the municipal council are enumerated, and containing no provision excepting any particular class of acts, ordinances, or resolutions,, clearly indicates the intention of the legislator to confer authority upon the various provincial boards upon the terms and conditions set out in the amended section, to declare null  and void  all acts, ordinances,  and resolutions of municipal councils,  and executive  orders  of municipal presidents, of every kind and character whatsoever.

Counsel contends, further, that  since there was no  provision of  law requiring the express approbation of acts, ordinances, and resolutions of municipal councils by their respective provincial boards, at the time when those transactions took place, all such acts, ordinances, and resolutions must be taken to  be valid and of binding force and effect, until and  unless  they are expressly and formally  disapproved by the provincial board;  and that the municipality of Romblon having  obligated itself to sell the land in question by a valid resolution, of binding force and effect, is not relieved of its obligation so to do by the fact that thereafter the  resolution was annulled.  But while it is  true that prior to the enactment of Act No. 1791 there was no express provision of law  for the  approbation of such acts, ordinances, and resolutions by the provincial board, it is clear that under the provisions of section 41 of the Act, as amended by Act No. 676, such acts, ordinances, and  resolutions were always adopted  (so long  as the provisions of the latter  Act were in force) subject to  the invalidating action of the provincial board, and that all persons dealing with the municipal  council or in any wise affected  by its acts, ordinances, and resolutions must be taken to  have  had knowledge of that fact.   The agreement of the municipality to sell the land in question, so far as its resolutions  can properly be said to constitute an agreement, must, therefore, be taken to have been subject to the implied  condition that the agreement would be invalidated in the event that before it was actually executed the provincial board should  annul the resolution.  As  disclosed by the  agreed statement of facts, the resolution was in fact annulled before the agreement was  executed, and plaintiff's claim of specific performance can not therefore be maintained.

It may be admitted that in some cases great inconvenience and embarrassment might  have arisen from the exercise by provincial boards of the  authority conferred upon the under section 41 of the code, as amended  by Act No. 676, to annul resolutions of a contractual nature adopted by municipal councils, but such considerations address themselves to the legislature rather than to the courts, except in cases where they may become important  in construing doubtful and uncertain language of a statute.  And it is worthy of observation that the Commission in amending the provisions of this section by the enactment of  Act  No. 1791, appears to have been fully cognizant of its defective character, and to have sought to remedy its defects by the passage of the amendments therein contained.

It  is contended, however,  that the only ground upon which the provincial board was authorized to annul a resolution of the municipal council was that it was in violation of the  powers  conferred by the Municipal  Code upon  the council, and that the  resolution in question  having been clearly within the powers  conferred  upon the municipal council by the provisions of subsection  (c) of section 40,the provincial  board  had no authority to annul it.   It is to be observed, however, that the provisions of section 41 of the code, as  amended by section  1  of Act No. 676, authorize and make it a duty of the provincial board to' declare acts, ordinances, or resolutions of municipal councils  null and void when "the board shall conclude  that such act, ordinance, or resolution, or executive order is in violation  of the  powers  conferred by the Municipal  Code upon  the council or the president making the same."   And it is clear that it was the intention of the lawmaker that except in case of administrative appeal by the council, such action when taken  by the provincial board  should have the  effect  of annulling the act, ordinance, or resolution against which it was directed, whether the board erred or not in the  conclusions upon which it based its action.  It is not suggested, nor does it appear from the agreed statement of facts, that when the annulling resolution of the provincial  board was adopted,  the board neglected or failed to comply  with the provisions of section 41, as amended by Act No.  676, in the proceedings had in this connection, and its action, therefore, must be taken to have been had in conformity with and in pursuance of the provisions of law investing it with authority to annul resolutions of the municipal council.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.   So ordered.

Arellano, C. J.,  Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Elliott, JJ., concur.