The accused was convicted  in the court below of a violation of the provisions of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 1948, which is as follows:

"No person, except a notary public, holding any appointive public office or employment,  or any  public office or employment by appointment, shall, within ninety days  preceding any general election, or  within  sixty days preceding any special election announce his candidacy for or be eligible to hold any elective public  office or employment to be filled at such general or special election.   No person holding an elective public office to which such person has been elected shall  present his  candidacy,  nor  shall he be eligible  while holding such office, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the office  held by him. Resignations tendered for ejectoral reasons shall be accepted without delay by the officer or person called upon to accept them.  The  resignations mentioned  in  this  section shall, in the case  of  Delegates  to the  Philippine Assembly,  be tendered to the  Speaker thereof.   No judge of the Court of First  Instance,  justice of the peace, provincial fiscal,  or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education, or provincial treasurer, shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal,  provincial, or Assembly  election  under penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever  for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified  of the right to vote at any election: And provided further, That the tender  in writing of a resignation within the time herein above  fixed shall be  held to  be  a  compliance with the requirements of this section."

The defendant admitted, at the trial that he had announced his candidacy for the office of municipal  president at the general elections held in the municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, on the 2d of November, 1909,  although, at the time when the elections were held, he had not formally submitted his resignation as a member  of the municipal school board to which he had been appointed on the 26th of April, 1909. The accused  stated that with a view to  his candidacy, he submitted his resignation as auxiliary justice of the peace, in strict accordance with the requirements of the above-set-out section 3  of Act No. 1948, but that he did not submit his resignation as a  member of the school board because he did not deem himself to be,a member,  at the time of the election, he never having taken an  oath of office, and never having attended any  meeting of the  board or acted as  a member thereof from the date of his appointment to the day when he testified.   There is  evidence in  the record which discloses that the accused at the time of his  appointment indicated his intention to accept his appointment, or perhaps expressly stated that he would do so, but it does not appear that he accepted it in such manner as to justify an affirmative finding  that his act amounted to  an acceptance so as to charge him with the responsibilities and to clothe him with the rights of membership oh the board.

Without attempting to lay down any general rule whereby it can be determined when and under what conditions one can be said to "hold" a public office, or to make any nice distinction between the holding of an office  and the right or title thereto, and without determining under what circumstances; if any, the taking of an oath of office may  become a matter of importance in ascertaining whether one can be said to  hold "an appointive office or employment,  or any public office or employment by appointment," we  are  of opinion that the accused in this case should be acquitted, he never having "held" the office in question in the sense contemplated by the penalizing provision  of the above-set- out section of the Election Law; or if, under all the circumstances  of his appointment, he can be said to have "held" it at any time, he having renounced it so as to relieve himself from  criminal liability under the statute in  pursuance of which these proceedings were instituted.  He was not de facto a member of  the  municipal school board of the municipality of Dingras at the time when he announced his candidacy for election as municipal president, so as to come within the purview  of  the  penal provisions of the statute.  The judgment of conviction must therefore  be reversed,  and  the accused  acquitted of the offense  with which he is charged, with the costs  of this instance de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.