This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ambos Camarines, Hon.  Grant Trent presiding,  absolving the defendants from the obligation charged in the  complaint, with costs.

This action has proceeded upon two theories:  (1) Upon the theory that  the  defendants, having  entered into the possession of a house and lot, the property of the plaintiff, by gross negligence arid carelessness, caused it to be burned to the damage of  the plaintiff; and  (2)  upon the theory that the defendants entered into possession of a house and lot belonging to the  plaintiff, knowing that they were not entitled  to  the possession  thereof, and  acting, therefore, in bad faith,  they  were responsible to the plaintiff for the destruction of the house by fire.

Upon the whole case we are clearly satisfied that neither of these theories has been sustained by the evidence and that the case was correctly decided by the learned trial court.

It appears that in the year 1906 the defendant Villanueva began an action against the plaintiff to foreclose a mortgage which he held upon various parcels of real estate belonging to the plaintiff, and prosecuted the same to final judgment. After waiting the  proper time for the plaintiff to pay the indebtedness upon  which the mortgage was based, and he not having made such payment, said parcels of land, under the terms of said judgment, were offered for public sale and were sold to said Villanueva at public auction on the 3d day of September, 1906, he being the highest bidder at said sale. Thereafter and on  the 12th day of September of the same year, the said defendant, through the activities of the sheriff, entered into possession of the property, including one of the pieces of land called parcel No. 2.   Upon delivering possession of said parcel No. 2 to the defendant Villanueva, -the sheriff found  that  there  was a house built upon said lot, which house was not specifically mentioned in the description of parcel No.  2, although the land upon which it stood was clearly within the  description of said parcel as presented by the documents.   Fearing that by reason of the failure of such  description  specifically to  mention  the  house  in question  his power did not extend  to the delivery of the possession of said house, the sheriff informed the defendants that, in the event that the court should determine that said house was not property embraced within the mortgage and legally conveyed under the mortgage sale, they, the defendants,  must not only deliver possession but also pay to the plaintiff a proper sum for its occupancy.  The employee of the plaintiff who had  been in charge of the house up to  the time of the delivery of its possession was then notified by the sheriff that he must quit the premises and that the defendant was to occupy them in his stead.  The employee, however, loath to leave uncared for certain articles that were there on the premises, asked permission of the sheriff to be permitted to remain there for the purpose of caring therefor. The sheriff  informed him  that he had  no power to give such permission and referred him to the defendants.   The latter immediately gave permission to the employee to remain upon the premises and look after the property referred to in  his petition.   The defendant placed an  employee of his own in possession of the property to care for and  protect it from injury or  destruction.   On the 12th day of  November of the same year-the court before which the judgment of foreclosure and sale had been obtained, and which ordered the sale of said property under  said  judgment  for reasons which are immaterial  here, annulled the sale and ordered a resale of the same.  During the month of December the property described in the mortgage, including parcel No. 2 in question was again sold at public sale and again purchased by  the defendant Villanueva.  Prior to this time, however, and on the  night of the 3d  of October, 1906,  the  house located on parcel No. 2 was destroyed by fife.   The evidence does not disclose  in what manner the  fire originated  or through whose fault or negligence, if of anyone, it occurred. Upon that question the record is wholly silent.

The first contention presented by the appellant to this court is that the learned trial court erred in holding that the house in question was included in the sale made by the sheriff under the judgment of  foreclosure and sale.

We have carefully examined the record in connection with this allegation of error and are thoroughly satisfied that the evidence  fully supports  the conclusion of the  learned trial court  in this respect.  It appears that the description of the land upon which  the house was located is included  within the description  of parcel No. 2 in  the  mortgage referred to.  The appellant in his complaint and in his argument presents a description of the house and lot referred to  somewhat different in words from  the description of parcel No. 2.  This, however, causes no confusion, inasmuch as it is quite clear that the description of parcel No. 2 fully includes the house and lot described by the appellant.

The second contention of the appellant is that the learned trial court erred in finding that the possession of defendants of parcel No. 2, which includes the house and lot in question, was in good faith.

As to this contention, the record does not leave us in doubt. It having been found that the description contained  in the mortgage includes the house and lot in question, the resolution of the present question is easy.   In the case of Bischoff vs.  Pomar (12 Phil. Eep., 690), this court held, Mr. Justice Torres writing the opinion, that -

"It is a rule, established by the Civil Code and also by the Mortgage Law,  with which the decisions of  the  courts of the United States are in accord, that in  a mortgage of real estate, the improvements on the same are included;  therefore, all objects permanently attached to  a mortgaged building or land, although they may have been placed there after the mortgage was constituted, are also included."

The Civil Code, article 1877, provides that -

"A mortgage includes  the  natural accessions,  improvements, growing fruits, and  rents not collected when the obligation is due.   *  *   *" (Manresa, vol. 12,  pp. 499, 500.)

From this it is evident that the house in  question passed under the mortgage sale.  When, therefore, the defendant entered into possession thereof after he had purchased it at the  foreclosure sale,  he presumably entered into posses- sion honestly and in good faith.   That he did so is nowhere put  in question by  the evidence  in  this case.  No direct evidence is given anywhere attacking his  motives or his intentions.  When the defendant took possession he did so as owner of the  property and,  even if  the mortgage sale had been absolutely void, he would still have been a holder in good faith, being a mortgagee in possession under direction of the court.

"Good faith is always presumed, and any person alleging bad faith on the part of the possessor is obliged to prove it. Possession acquired in  good faith does not lose  this character,  except in the case and  from the moment some act exists  proving that the possessor is aware that he possesses the thing illegally.   It is presumed that the possession is still enjoyed  in the manner in which it was acquired until the contrary is proved."   (Arts. 434, 435, 436,  Civil Code.) "Where a purchaser at a defective foreclosure sale,  or his assigns, goes into possession of the mortgaged premises, with assent  of the mortgagor,  under the right supposed to have been acquired under the  foreclosure sale, he will  be deemed a mortgagee in possession."   (Russell vs. Akeley Lum. Co., 45 Minn., 376; Rogers vs. Benton, 39 Minn., 39.)

"A purchaser at  a mortgage  foreclosure sale which is invalid as against the owner of the equity of redemption becomes assignee of the mortgage, and if he lawfully enters into possession of the premises, he becomes  a mortgagee in possession, and ejectment will  not lie against him by the owner of the equity of redemption."  (Townshend vs. Thomson, 139  N.  Y., 152.)

"An alienee of a mortgage,  who  claimed title under a foreclosure sale, acquires  all the rights  of a mortgagee, even though the foreclosure sale is void for irregularity, so as not to bar the equity  of redemption.  Being  in the position of a mortgagee in possession  after breach of condition  with the debt unpaid, he  has a good defense to an ejectment brought  on the bare  legal title."   (Bryan vs. Brasius,  162 U. S., 415.)

The defendant having entered into possession of the property lawfully, he was obligated to exercise only reasonable diligence and  care  in the management of the  property. (Art. 1903, Civil Codej.Wann vs. Coe, 31 Fed., 369;  Murdock vs.  Clark, 90  Cal., 427.) Article 457 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

"A possessor in good faith is not liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing possessed, with the exception of the cases in which it is proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent.  A possessor in bad faith is liable for the deterioration  or Joss  in  any case,  even in those caused  by force majeure, when he has maliciously  delayed the delivery of the thing to its legitimate possessor."

It  appearing  from  the  nature  of the  relation  of  the defendant to  the property that he was not a holder in bad faith nor a usurper, he is responsible only for those losses which are shown to have been caused by his negligence.  No negligence having been shown in this case, the complaint was properly  dismissed upon the merits.

The judgment is  affirmed,  without special finding as to costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.