The complaining witness in this case testified that in the year  1899,  about the time when the American troops entered  the town of  Santolan, he  fled with his family to Antipolo; that soon thereafter he  turned  over the key of his storehouse in Santolan to the accused, who stayed behind, asking him  to take care of a considerable quantity of rice which he had  stored there;  that  the accused, who is his cousin, undertook to do so,  but instead of rendering an account  of  his commission,  appropriated  to  his  own  use some 450 cavans of the rice  intrusted to  his care, valued at  P1,350,  falsely  pretending that the American troops had taken possession of the  rice.

The trial  judge was of opinion that the accused did in fact undertake the mission intrusted to  him, as alleged by the complaining  witness, but that  the  evidence  disclosed that the American  troops seized  an unknown part, but not all of the rice of the complaining witness at  the time they  occupied  the  town of  Santolan;  that  the accused carried away, to another place, the rice which the Americans left behind them in the storehouse; that at least 10 cavans of the rice  thus saved and  carried away by the accused had been sold by him for the sum of P25;  and that he had failed to account to the complaining witness for this money.

On this finding the  accused was convicted of the crime of estafa and sentenced to three months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties  prescribed by law.

The evidence of the  prosecution, if it could be  believed, undoubtedly sustains the judgment of  conviction by the trial judge.   But this evidence, especially as to the amount of rice deposited in the storehouse, the amount seized by the American troops, and  the  alleged carrying  away of a part of this rice by the accused is strongly contradicted by the witnesses for the defense; and on a careful review of all the record we are unable to say that the evidence as a whole establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ordinarily, we  would be disposed to accept the findings of fact of the trial judge in a  case  of this kind,  recognizing as we do that in sifting the truth from a mass of conflicting testimony and in determining the relative degree of credibility of interested  witnesses  testifying in  a bitterly contested cause, the trial judge  who sees and hears the witnesses testify is in a better position than are we to make such findings of fact as truth and justice require. But in this  case  we are  satisfied that it was  impossible for the trial  judge to ascertain, beyond a reasonable  doubt, the truth of  the findings on which he based his conclusion as to the guilt of the accused.

The incidents out  of  which this  prosecution  arose  took place,  in  1899, nearly  ten  years before  the complaining witness filed  his complaint.   No satisfactory reason appears for the long delay on the  part of the complaining witness in  seeking redress for  the alleged  injury charged in his complaint.  With  manifest insincerity  he pretends that he only discovered the facts in this regard a short time before the institution of  the action; although if the facts alleged by him were true, it would seem  that either he  must have discovered them soon after they  took place,  or  not at all. His witnesses and his alleged informants were neighbors and dependents among whom he had lived for the greater part of the ten years during which he says he was kept in ignorance  of the occurrences of which  he  now  complains.  These occurrences, if he tells the truth,  must have been generally known in  the community where he  lived, and not only did  he have an active interest in discovering the facts, but some at least of his informants and witnesses had every reason to tell  him all  they  knew  as  to what had occurred, and it is  not suggested that any  of them had any reason for concealing  the  facts  or had any desire to do so.  Under all the circumstances we are  satisfied  that if his  allegations  had  any  foundation in truth, he must have been  fully informed of  the facts  many  years before he filed  his  complaint.  This  unexplained delay  in instituting the  prosecution would under  ordinary  circumstances  be sufficient to cast a  doubt on the truth and sincerity of his claim for redress,  and  raises  a  question  as to his motive in proceeding against the defendant at this time.  Under the exceptional conditions existing at the time when it is alleged the estafa complained of was committed, it  would,  in  any event, have  been extremely difficult  to ascertain and judicially determine,  beyond a  reasonable doubt, the truth of disputed facts  of the nature of  those upon which the  complaint  in this action  is  based.  After the lapse of ten years  these difficulties are multiplied  to such a degree that  in the absence of  evidence of the  most unimpeachable character, a conviction can not  and should not be sustained.

The trial judge was compelled to reject the greater part of the evidence  introduced  by the prosecution as unconvincing  and unsatisfactory  and  rested  his judgment of conviction upon the testimony of  one  of the witnesses that he purchased a  few cavans of rice  from the defendant at about the time when it is alleged the larger amount of rice in question was in his charge.  But aside from the inherent weakness of this evidence, it is to be observed that there is nothing whatever in the  record which justifies the conclusion that the rice thus sold by the  defendant, if in fact it was sold as alleged, was a part of the rice which plaintiff alleges he intrusted to defendant's care.

The judgment convicting the  defendant  and  imposing sentence upon him  should be reversed and  the defendant acquitted  of the crime charged in the  information, with the costs  of both instances de oficio.  If  in  detention, he will be set at liberty forthwith, and  if  at large, his bond will be canceled and his bondsmen exonerated.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.