While it is true that it appears from the allegations of the complaint that the indebtedness for  the  .recovery  of which this action was instituted had its  origin in a claim of the plaintiffs to an interest in  certain estates of deceased persons of  which defendant-appellant  was either executor or administrator, nevertheless it is quite clear that the action was not instituted for the recovery of this interest as such. The prayer  of the complaint is for the  recovery of  the amount which plaintiffs allege this defendant admitted himself to  be indebted to them, as a  result of an extrajudicial partition agreement touching these estates, or perhaps more accurately speaking of a settlement of  account  between the plaintiffs and this defendant.  This action is not, therefore, of the nature of "actions  against executors, administrators and guardians, touching  the  performance of  their official duties" or of "actions for account and settlement by them" or of "actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among heirs and  distributees"  or of "actions for the  payment of legacies"  which, under the  provisions of section 377 of the Code of  Civil Procedure must be brought in the province in which the will was admitted to  probate, or letters of administration were granted or the guardian appointed.  Appellant's first assignment of error, based on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, can not, therefore, be sustained.

We have so frequently construed the provisions of section 141  of the Code of Civil Procedure, which  declare that "Rulings of the court upon minor matters, such as adjournments, postponements of trials, and other matters addressed to the discretion of the court in the performance of its duty, shall not be subject to exception," that  it is not necessary to go into appellants' assignments of alleged error in certain rulings of this  class made by the trial court at the hearing below.   Nothing which even suggests the abuse of the  discretion thus confirmed to the trial court is shown  to have taken  place in  this  case, and  in the  absence of proof of a clear abuse of discretion, this court has  no authority to correct alleged errors in its exercise.   (Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng,  2 Phil. Rep.,  624; Quiros vs. Tan Guinlay,  5 Phil. Rep., 675; Camacho  vs. Liquete,  6 Phil. Rep., 50; Lichauco vs. Lim, 6  Phil. Rep., 271; Cortes vs.  Manila Jockey Club, 6 Phil. Rep., 501; Banco  Espanol-Filipino vs. Amechazurra, 11 Phil. Rep., 166.)

The  evidence  of record  sustains the findings of fact of the trial court,  and upon  these findings there can be no question of the  right of the plaintiffs to recover the  amount allowed in the judgment, which should, therefore, be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.