As the evidence taken in this case was not forwarded  to this court, we can not review any question of fact and must accept the  findings of  facts  as set  forth  in  the judgment appealed from.

The facts declared to have been proved are the following: That the plaintiff rendered services to the defendant,  as his employee and clerk, from April 17, 1889,  until December 9, 1905, at a salary, previously  stipulated, of P460 per annum;  that on  the plaintiff's quitting the  defendant's service, a settlement was made between them of the salary owing to and uncollected by the plaintiff,  whereby  it was determined  that there was  a balance due  the latter of Pl,021.97, which the  defendant  bound himself to pay to the plaintiff, in  Cebu,  in the month of January, 1906, and that,  notwithstanding such  obligation  assumed, the  said defendant did not pay the latter anything on account of the aforementioned  debt  until the date of the judgment, November 27, 1906; these facts evidently support the said judgment, that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff the said sum of P1,021.97, together, with the legal interest thereon already  due  or which might be due, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the month of  February, 1906, until the date when  actual and total  payment of the  debt should be made, and also the costs of the suit.   Admitting the facts hereinbefore mentioned, justice would allow the rendering of no other sentence than that contained  in the judgment appealed from, which, therefore, must be  sustained.

The defendant and appellant assigns the following  errors as grounds for his appeal:

"1. The court committed an error of fact and of law by setting  aside, omitting or  not deciding,  by  allowing or denying on the day of the hearings on motions (called Law Day, which  is Monday)  the  defendant's motion,  duly and properly filed in the  office of the  clerk of the court twelve days before  the hearing of the case, for a suspension  of the new trial, notwithstanding the practice of  the court of deciding on  such day analogous motions on other matters pending final hearing.

"2. The court  also committed an error of fact and of law by allowing  the furtive and illegal motion presented by the plaintiff and by  allowing judgment by default against the defendant, who  had  duly appeared,  filed his  answer  and a counterclaim for P5,000, establishing as a foundation for such ruling  three gratuitous and false suppositions against the  defendant, and by disallowing the motion for a revocation of the said judgment by default.

"3. The court committed an error of fact and of law by sentencing the defendant in its judgment of November 27, 1906, to the payment of P1,021.97, with interest, for salary claimed by the plaintiff to which the latter was not entitled, nor  did he present as proof  any document whatever  in support of his pretended credit, or any other proof of his claim.

"4. The court also committed an error of  law  by denying the defendant's motion for the annulment of the judgment and  for a new hearing  of the case  on the grounds  that the sentence was contrary to law and the evidence.

"5. It was  an error of law and a capital one for the court to have executed its judgment without therein having ordered such execution, and not to have annulled the execution of the judgment which had not  become  final when the excepting defendant's motion for a new trial was still pending decision.

"6. The court committed  essential and prejudicial errors and  irregularity in its proceedings by not  having notified the defendant or his attorney in the matter of the formation of the docket of cases for trial,  by not  summoning  him for the  hearing of the  present case or granting his petition that he be furnished  copies of the plaintiff's briefs,  and by not  ordering a  record made of the defendant's  exceptions and of his notice of intention to file a bill of exceptions, thus compelling the defendant to record  them  himself in a petition."

The assignments of error designated under  numbers 3 and  4 must  immediately be  dismissed, since,  as already stated, the sentence has been found to be manifestly proper and just, in view of the  facts declared in the judgment to have  been proved,  and  certainly  this  court  must  accept them as such, as no review  of the  evidence  can  be had for the reasons before  set forth.

The first error alleged by the appellant, even supposing it  really to be such, can  not,in the least affect the judgment appealed from, inasmuch as it relates to a  proceeding commended to the discretion of the court, as is that of the suspension of the hearing of the  case, not subject  to exception, according to the  definite and express provisions of the law.  (Sec. 141, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The facts connected with the third ground of the appeal, are the following: The defendant having been summoned by virtue  of the  complaint which gave rise to the action, appeared at the hearing in due time and filed his answer in which he made a counterclaim for the  sum of P5,000. On the  day set for  the hearing of  the case  the plaintiff appeared,  but not the  defendant nor his attorney, wherefore, and  upon written motion  made  for  the  purpose by the plaintiff, the court declared the said defendant to be in default  and ordered the  trial  to proceed,   hearing the plaintiff's  evidence and rendering afterwards,  grounded thereon, the judgment which is  the subject of the present appeal.

Section  128 of the Code of Civil Procedure  provides as follows:

"In case a defendant fails to appear at the time required in the summons, or to  answer at the time provided by the rules of court, the court shall, upon motion of  the plaintiff, order judgment for the  plaintiff by  default   which shall be entered upon the  docket;  and the court  shall thereupon proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or determine the  other  relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum or to  receive such other relief as the pleadings  and the facts warrant.  *   *   *"

In accordance  with  this provision,  only the defendant who fails to appear at the  hearing within the  time set in the summons or who, having  appeared, does not answer the complaint within the  period fixed by the  rules of the court, may be declared to be in default. The herein appellant isjnot within this  rule since he did appear and did file his  answer  to the  complaint  in  due time, as shown by the bill Of exceptions. The order of the court whereby  he was declared  to  be in  default is, therefore,  erroneous and consequently the second assignment of error made in the appellant's brief is well founded.

Such error, however, turns out to be merely technical in the present case.   In reality it has had no bearing whatever on the course or on the decision of the case, neither has it in the slightest degree prejudiced the defendant's rights. The complaint having been answered, and the assignment of the date for the hearing of the case having been publicly made, as it was, in the docket of the  court for a certain day, the 26th of November, 1906, and the defendant  being duly  informed of the setting  of  such  date, as  shown by his petition of November  14th,  wherein he moved  for a suspension of the hearing  (p. 4 of the bill of exceptions), even though he may have mistakenly believed that the date set was that  of  November 16th  instead of the 26th, on the arrival of this latter date it was entirely optional and discretional on the  part of the  court either to suspend or proceed with the hearing on that day, even in the defendant's  absence and without the need of declaring him  in default  as it seems,  was erroneously done.   Therefore the declaration of default has neither altered nor impaired the defendant's  status upon the trial, for even without  such pronouncement the case would have followed  exactly the same  course which it has in fact, as its hearing on the day set was not suspended  by  the  court.  Practically, nothing was done at the trial after the declaration of default that could  not have been done  with perfect legality though no such  declaration  had been  made.  Hence, the pronouncement  of default has not in  reality prejudiced any  real right of the defendant and can not, therefore, even though erroneous,  serve  as a ground for a reversal of  the  judgment appealed from.  It is a firmly established rule of  this  court and a definite provision of the  law, that no judgment shall b.e, reversed on formal or  technical grounds, or for  such error  as has not prejudiced any real  rights of the appellant party.  (Sec.  503, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The fifth assignment of error refers to the execution of the judgment, that is,  to the proceedings had  subsequent to the latter and can not, for this very reason, affect its execution in any case.   Besides, it is  beyond all doubt that judges  may order  the  execution  of  a positive judgment pronounced by them, even before it becomes final and executory, whenever there are special reasons therefor, the determination of which is of course left to their good judgment and discretion.  (Sec.  144, Code of Civil Procedure.)

With respect to the sixth and last ground of appeal, it is sufficient to say, in order to show that it  lacks real and practical importance, that the defendant was  in fact informed of the date set for the hearing of the case, as proved by his  having asked, before the holding of the trial, for a suspension of  the said hearing until  the next session of the court.   His  acknowledgment at  the trial of  his  cognizance of the setting of the  date for  the hearing produces, in law, the effect of remedying the omission of the summons or notification of the said date,  even  supposing that  there really  was  such an omission, which  certainly  appears  to be denied by the bill of  exceptions in the  records of the court.   And the mistake  into which  the defendant apparently  fell, according to his own  allegation,  can not avail against the statements  made in the  preceding  paragraph, because reference  is made only  to dates and  not to  the setting  in itself of a date.  Once informed  that the  case was set for trial,  it was extremely easy to ascertain  the true date determined for the  hearing,  had he really desired to be  present at the trial. We find nothing in  the record to show that the  defendants' nonappearance at the trial was due to  any  other cause  than that  of his own neglect and carelessness.

The  judgment appealed from is affirmed,  with the  costs of this instance  against the appellant.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.