After the  judgment  appealed from  had been  rendered, the appellant herein moved for a new  trial,  and on  his motion  being overruled he excepted to  the ruling and duly presented the proper bill of exceptions.  He did  not, however, base his motion for a new trial on  the  ground of the judgment being contrary to the weight of the evidence or upon  its  being insufficiently  supported thereby; at least, neither the original  bill  of exceptions nor the printed copy thereof show any evidence of his having done so.  In both documents it is stated that a  new  trial was asked for, but the ground on  which his request was based was not stated. For this reason we  can not review the evidence, according to the definite provisions of the law which expressly prohibit the review of questions of fact on appeal, in cases brought before this court by bill of exceptions, when the appealing party does not ask in first instance for a new  trial on that ground,  which is  the formula adopted by the law for the expression of the appellant's disapproval of the trial judge's findings  of fact.  The appeal not  having been  prepared in the form expressly prescribed by law, it is understood that the right  to a  review of the evidence was waived by the appellant, and that only the questions of law raised by the bill of exceptions are submitted for the decision of this court.  (Sec. 497,  Code of  Civil Procedure,  amended  by Act No. 1596.)

The question involved in the case at bar is the collection of medical fees amounting to P340, to the payment of which the estate represented by the appellant was sentenced in first instance.   In the judgment appealed from it was found to be proven that the  plaintiff was called to render medical attendance to Maria  Pilar Lucero, the predecessor in interest of the said estate, whom he found dangerously ill; that he in fact attended her during several days, visited her two or three times,  prescribed proper treatment and gave special care and  attention to her case;  that  on the night of the patient's death the plaintiff was again called,  as  was also another physician with whom he held a  consultation with regard to the patient's condition; and  that both these  physicians remained in the patient's house  and attended  her continuously until her death  on  the early morning of the following day.  It is also stated in the judgment that several physicians testified at the  trial that the  bill of P340 presented by the plaintiff for his professional services aforementioned, was very reasonable.

Such being the  facts, and  we can  not take account  of others for the reason before indicated, we see no occasion for reversing the  judgment of  the  Court of  First  Instance pronounced in favor  of the plaintiff.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.  So  ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.