Judgment  was rendered in the court below in favor of the plaintiff and against the  defendants, both jointly and severally, for the sum of P1,000, by way of damages arising from the malicious publication set forth in the complaint which is as follows:

"1. That the  plaintiff  and the several defendants above named are all residents of the municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo.

"2. That the  several defendants, at  the time mentioned in the sixth paragraph of this complaint, were all members of the  municipal council of the  said  municipality  of Miagao.

"3. That the plaintiff,  for many years prior to April 30, 1912, has been  a  resident of the municipality of Miagao, above mentioned, and during all the time that he has been a resident of the said  municipality he has  enjoyed a good reputation.

"4. That  the  plaintiff was, on and before the 30th day of April, 1912, and since then to the present date has been a landowner and agriculturist of the said municipality  of Miagao.

"5. That  the plaintiff previously held the office of justice of the peace of and for the said municipality and was,  at the time hereinbelow mentioned, a candidate for justice  of the peace  of the  said municipality; that he successfully passed the examination prescribed by law  for the position of justice of the peace, having obtained the highest average rating among those who took the  said examination; and that, therefore, he was entitled to be appointed to the said position.

"6. That  on or about the 30th day of April, 1912, the said defendants, and each one of them, did, unlawfully,  willfully and maliciously and with the intention of injuring the plaintiff in his reputation  and business, and especially  in his candidacy for the  said office, publish in writing, as a part of a certain resolution passed at a session of the said municipal council and which forms a part of the minutes thereof, the following libelous words relative to the plaintiff:

" 'That it is publicly and well-known in this municipality that the conduct of the said Mr. Florencio Villavicencio  is immoral.

" 'That in many cases the said  Florencio Villavicencio devotes himself in  this municipality to the prosecution  of unjust suits, for the purpose  of exploiting the peaceable inhabitants  of this municipality.' "

"That the libelous words above quoted were incorporated in the said resolution and published as an act of all and each one of the said defendants.   An  excerpt of the minutes  of the said session of the aforementioned municipal council, duly certified by the  secretary of the provincial board  of the Province of Iloilo,  wherein the said resolution appears, is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit A, and forms an integral part of this complaint.

"7. That the words above transcribed were and are completely false and the defendants knew and know that they were and are completely false.

"8. That the said publication did tend and was intended to cast doubt upon the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the plaintiff  and to expose him  to  the hatred, contempt, and ridicule of the public.

"9. That by reason of the said publication and especially by reason of the public and official character of the same, the plaintiff has  experienced great mental anguish  and humiliation, did not obtain the appointment of justice of the peace of the said municipality, and has suffered losses and damages in his business, reputation, and feelings, to the amount of P10,000.

"Therefore the plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendants and each of them, for the sum of P10,000 and the costs of this suit, together with  such punitive (penal) damages as the court may deem a just punishment for each of the defendants and  such  as may serve  as an example for others."

We are all agreed that the evidence of record fully sustains the finding  by  the trial court that  the publication which is the basis of plaintiff's claim of damages was  inspired by express  malice "actuated by personal spleen  towards the plaintiff;" and that defendants failed utterly to sustain the truth of the charges of immorality and official misconduct set forth  therein.   We agree  with the trial judge, furthermore, that the defendants failed not  only to establish the truth of these charges, but also to establish that in making public such charges, they were giving expression to an opinion as to their truth which had been "formed with a reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds." As the trial judge says, it is perfectly evident that in making these charges the defendants acted on  mere  rumor  and hearsay; and we are  satisfied that the defendant Nonato, who was the moving spirit in drawing up and making public these charges of immorality and unfitness for office, seized upon these rumors without making any  genuine effort to verify them,  merely as a cloak for a malicious assault upon the private and official  life of the plaintiff.

In the light of these  findings  of fact, it is not necessary for us to consider  at length the claim of privilege set up by counsel for the defendants, on the ground that the publication was in the nature of fair comment and criticism on the moral fitness of a candidate for public office.

As we said in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 341) : "But while it may be admitted that the public acts of public men may lawfully be made the subject of comment and criticism by the public and by the press, and that such criticism, when made in good faith, should be and is privileged; and while it may, perhaps, also be admitted that a somewhat broad license should be allowed to criticisms of and comment on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office, the very fact  of candidacy putting these matters  in issue, and the public having a right to be informed as  to the qualifications of those who seek election, and  perhaps appointment to public office, nevertheless it is clear upon general principles as  well as under  the express provisions of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) that such comment or criticism, if defamatory in its nature,  constitutes a criminal libel if it appears that it was actuated by actual or express malice; that from the very nature of  the privilege claimed the freedom of such criticism  is necessarily limited to fair comment on the matters under discussion, fair comment being comment which is true, or which, if false, expresses the real opinion  of the author, such opinion having been formed with a reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds (Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, art.  274); and that such criticism cannot be permitted to be used as a cloak for malicious assaults on the  private life and character of the person criticised."

We find no error in  the proceedings prejudicial  to the rights of the defendants and appellants, and the judgment entered  in the court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance in favor of the appellee.   So ordered.

Arellano, C. J,, Torres, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.