This action was brought against O. K. Freeman, James L. Pierce, and Burton Whitcomb, as owners and operators of the Manila  Steam  Laundry, to recover the sum oa P952 alleged to be the balance due the plaintiff for services performed during the period from January 9, 1907, to December 31,  1908.   Judgment  was  rendered in favor  of the plaintiff and against Freeman and Whitcomb, jointly and severally, for the sum of P752 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum fronrtne 27th day of August, 1909, and the  costs of the  cause.  The  complaint as to Pierce was dismissed, Whitcomb alone appealing.

When  the plaintiff was  first employed  on  the 9th of January, 1907, this steam laundry was owned and operated by Freeman and Pierce.  Pierce, on the 18th of January, 1907, sold all of his right, title,  and interest in the said laundry  to  Whitcomb, who,  together  with Freeman,  then became the owners of this laundry and continued to operate the same as long as the plaintiff was employed.

The trial court found that the  balance due the plaintiff for services performed amounted to the sum of P752.   This finding is fully supported by the evidence  of record.

Counsel for the appellant  Whitcomb now insists -

1. That the court erred in giving, jointly and severally, a  judgment against Freeman and Whitcomb  for  any sum whatever; and
   
   
2. That the court erred in holding the  appellant Whitcomb liable.

It appears from the record that Whitcomb never knew the plaintiff, never had anything  to do with him personally, and that the  plaintiff's contract was with Freeman, the managing partner of the  laundry.  It further appears from the record that Pierce, after he sold his interest in this laundry to Whitcomb, continued to look after Whitcomb's interest by authority of the latter.

Articles 17 and 119 of the  Code of Commerce provide:

"Art.  17. The record in the commercial registry shall be optional  for private merchants  and compulsory for associations established in accordance with this code or with special laws, and for vessels.

"Art.  119. Every commercial association before beginning business shall  be obliged to record its establishment, agreements, and conditions in  a  public instrument, which shall be  presented for record in the commercial  registry, in accordance with the provisions  of article 17.

"Additional instruments which  modify  or  alter in any manner whatsoever the original  contracts of the association are subject to the same formalities, in  accordance with the provisions of article 25.

"Partners can not make private  agreements, but all  must appear in the articles of co-partnership."

In the  organization of this partnership by Freeman and Whitcomb the above provisions of law were  not complied with; that is, no formal partnership was ever entered into by them,  notwithstanding the fact that they were engaged in the operation of this laundry.

The purposes for which this partnership was entered into by Freeman and  Whitcomb show clearly that  such partnership was not a commercial one; hence the  provisions of the Civil  Code and not the Code of Commerce must govern in  determining the liability of the partners.  (Manresa, vol. 1, p. 184; Aramburo, Civil Capacity, 407,  432; Prautch vs. Hernandez, 1  Phil  Rep., 705; and Co Pitco vs.  Yulo, 8 Phil. Hep., 544.)

In support of the second  assignment of error our attention has been called to the cases of Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng- Chiong-Seng (6 Phil. Rep., 498); Ang Quian Cieg vs. Te Chico  (12 Phil. Rep., 533) ; Bourns vs.  Carman  (7 Phil. Rep., 117).   In the first of these cases the partnership was a mercantile one, as it  was engaged in the importation of goods for sale at a profit.  This was also true in the second case.  In neither of these cases were the  provisions of articles 17 and 119 of the Code of Commerce complied with.   Those partnerships, although  commercial, were not  organized in accordance with the provisions of the  Code of  Commerce as expressed in those articles.   In determining1 the liability of the partners in these cases the court, after making the finding of facts, was governed by the provisions of article 120 of the  Commercial  Code.  In the  last case cited the partnership was one of cuentas en participacion.  "A partnership,"  quoting from the  syllabus in  this case, " constituted in such a manner that its existence was only known to those who had  an interest  in the same, there being no mutual agreement between the partners, and without a corporate name indicating to  the  public  in  some way that there were other people besides the one  who ostensibly managed and  conducted the business, is exactly the accidental partnership of cuentas  en participacion defined in article 239 of the Code of Commerce."

In a partnership of cuentas en participacion,  under the provisions of article 242  of the Code of Commerce, those who contract with the person in whose name the business of such  a partnership was conducted shall have only  the right of action against such person and not against other persons interested.  So this case is easily distinguished from the case at bar, in that the one did not have the corporate name  while  the  other was known  as the Manila  Steam Laundry.

The plaintiff was employed by and peformed services  for the Manila Steam Laundry and was not employed by nor did he perform services  for Freeman alone.  The  public did not deal  with Freeman and Whitcomb personally, but with the Manila Steam Laundry.   These two partners were doing  business under this name  and, as we have said, it was not a commercial  partnership.  Therefore, by the  express provisions of articles 1698 and 1137 of the Civil Code the partners are not liable  individually for the entire amount due the plaintiff.   The liability is pro rata and in this case the appellant is responsible to the plaintiff for  only one-half of the debt.

For these  reasons the  judgment of the court below  is reversed and judgment entered in favor of  the plaintiff and against the defendant Whitcomb  for the  sum of P376, with interest as fixed  by the court  below.  No  costs will be allowed either party in this  court.

A motion was filed on the 22d of August, 1910, by O'Brien and De Witt, asking this court to strike from the record certain allegations in the  printed  brief of counsel for the appellee.  These allegations are as follows:  "Does the receipt bear the earmarks of newly discovered evidence?  Or of newly manufactured evidence?"  These questions were directed against O'Brien,  one of the counsel  for appellant in this case,  and were intended to have the  court believe that O'Brien  had manufactured  the receipt  referred  to. There  is nothing in this record which shows that O'Brien did falsify or manufacture that receipt.  These  questions are clearly impertinent. It is our duty to keep our records   clean and  free from such unwarranted statements.   It is, therefore, ordered that the same be stricken from the record. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.