In the judgment rendered in this case, which  concerns the recovery of  possession of a  house and lot, the  Court of  First  Instance found  that  "if  the plaintiff  has not proved that he is the owner  and proprietor  of the property in question, he has,  however,  proved  that he  is entitled to the possession of  the said  property, and it is its possession  that he asks for in his complaint;" and in consonance with this conclusion, he  sentenced the defendant to  deliver  the aforesaid  property to  the plaintiff and to pay the costs of  the case.   An appeal  was taken from this judgment by both the plaintiff and the defendant.

The following facts were proved  at the trial:  The possession of  the property here in question was  recorded by an  anotacion preventiva  in  the  corresponding  property registry, on July 7,  1891,  in  the name of the Chinaman Lao-Ciengcay, and this annotation  was converted  into  a final inscription  on March 29, 1895.  By a public  instrument of August 20, 1896, also  inscribed in the said registry on the 27th of the same month, the Chinaman Lao-Ciengcay mortgaged the property aforementioned to Cipriano Andueza as security for the sum of 1,500 pesos which he had borrowed from the  latter.  Subsequently, in  1897,  at  the instance of the creditor, Andueza, and by the order of  the proper  Court  of  First Instance, the property referred to was attached and sold at public auction, it being adjudicated to Andueza himself in satisfaction of his credit; and, finally, after the said adjudication and during the same year, 1897, Andueza conveyed all his rights in the property to Eugenio Otivar for the consideration of 1,800 pesos which the vendee paid him as the price  thereof, whereupon Otivar immediately took possession of the property in which he was succeeded by his heirs, represented by  the defendant  as  the judicial administratrix of his estate, after his death.

Without directly  impugning  the  preceeding facts,  the plaintiff maintains that the property in  question was never owned by Lao-Ciengcay, but by the Chinaman Valentin Garcia Lao-Juico, the father of them both; that, the said Lao- Juico  having died in 1890, his three sole heirs,  who were the plaintiff,  the  aforementioned  Lao-Ciengcay  and  the latter's  brother, Lao-Joco, by  common accord and extra- judicially, made a partition of the estate left by the said deceased, whereby the plaintiff received as his share, among other  property,  the house and lot  in  question, the  possession  of which he  assumed in June, 1892, and  continued therein  until the year  1897,  when he was obliged to give it up because the Court of First Instance of Albay ordered, on the petition of Cipriano Andueza, the attachment of  the properties of  Lao-Ciengcay,  and  the said  house and  lot were attached by mistake, instead of the property adjoining thereto belonging to Lao-Ciengcay.

The plaintiff, in proof of  his allegations,  presented a private  instrument  containing a  record of the partition made  between himself  and his  brothers, Lao-Ciengcay and Lao-Joco, of the estate left by their father, Valentin Garcia, which instrument appears to have been signed by the said three  brothers and several witnesses and bears the date of June 15,  1892.   No notary, or other public official vested with the  authority to  administer oaths judicially or extra- judicially, intervened  in the execution of the said instrument.  That document contains a clause  as follows:

"For the purpose of avoiding dissensions among the three brothers,  to the eldest of them, Lao-Ciengcay, are awarded the  house where  his  father's  business is established  and which is in front of the church; the store in the building constructed of stone masonry and situated on the main street in front of the house of the Chinaman  Gabriel Gallegos; two  pieces of hemp land and  the  credits in  favor of the said deceased which amount to  7,036 pesos,  1 real and 18 cuartos; and  it shall  be his duty to assume all  liability for the debts which  may be found to have been contracted by the said deceased, Valentin  Garcia, and are yet unpaid, which debts,  it appears, amount to 2,000 more or less."

On the  supposition  that the house adjudicated to  the plaintiff in the  aforesaid partition, and which is certainly not  described therein  in a  manner  sufficient  for its identification,  is  the same one  concerned in this  suit,  there would arise the question, one of law, relative to the probative force of the  aforementioned instrument  of partition with respect  to third persons.

Article  1227 of the Civil Code provides  as follows :

"The date  of a private  instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on which it  may  have  been filed or entered  in a public registry, from the death of any of those who signed it, or from  the date  on which  it may  have been  delivered to  a public official by virtue of his office."

The partition  referred to was made;  as  aforesaid, by means of  a private  instrument, and there is no proof of any  kind, nor was even so much as  an attempt made  for its production, that such an  instrument was filed or entered in any  public  registry or delivered  to any  public official by virtue  of his office; neither is it shown, if  any of those who  signed it have died, when their death took place, with the result, therefore, that the date of the said instrument was  not established  by any  of the means prescribed in the legal provision above transcribed, until that instrument was  presented  in the present suit.   Consequently the age of the instrument in question can not be considered, according to the said  article 1227, with respect to Eugenio Otivar and  his  heirs,  as  third persons,  on account of their not having intervened  in  its execution, in any capacity, except from the date of  its  presentation in these proceedings, which was effected  in 1907, almost ten years after the sale of the house in question at public auction, and  its acquisition by the said Otivar at the end of the year 1897.  Whatever, then, be the  intrinsic force which  it may be desired to attribute to  the act recorded  in the instrument in question,  it is evident that it can not affect Otivar's acquisition aforementioned, because such instrument, as  regards its legal  effects  and with relation  to  that act,  must  be considered as having  been executed  only in  1907, on which date  more than nine  years had already elapsed since the said  Otivar  had acquired  the property  and  entered into its possession  by virtue of the  purchase  effected  by him from  Cipriano  Andueza.   The  date  of  a private instrument does not operate to the prejudice of third persons, until after its  certification made in  some of the ways expressed in the article of the Civil Code hereinbefore mentioned.

The plaintiff  alleges that the  fact recorded  in the possessory information title, by reason of which title the disputed property was entered in  the property  registry in the name of  Lao-Ciengcay, to  the  effect  that  the latter acquired  the house  and  lot in question by purchase  from Andres Garcia in ,1864,  is false,  inasmuch as in that year the said  Lao-Ciengcay  was not yet born, as  shown by the possessory  information wherein  it is stated that he was only thirty years old  in  1896.   With regard  to this point, the defendant stated that some clerical error  must have been committed in  recording Lao-Ciengcay's age. Be this as it  may, it does not alter the legal phase of the  question.  Leaving  aside the said possessory  information, it has been established that the property in question was attached and sold  at  public auction in 1897, by order of a competent  public official, as the property of Lao-Ciengcay; that as such it was judicially awarded to Cipriano Andueza, and that the latter sold it in turn in the same year, 1897, to Eugenio Otivar, who held possession thereof from that date as owner, and, after his death, his heirs, represented by  the defendant  in  this suit. Supported by  such titles, Otivar and  his heirs must  be  legally considered as the legitimate owners and possessors  of the property so long as no  other person  proves a better right to the ownership  and possession of  the same.  The plaintiff has  not proved that he has a better right to such ownership and possession,  for the reason  that  the private  instrument on  which he  endeavors to found his claim as the legitimate owner of  the said property at the time it was attached and judicially sold can not be considered as having been executed,  in so far as it tends to oppose the rights of Otivar and his heirs, until  after the date thereof was duly certified, which was effected only in 1907, that is to say, nine years after  the completion of the attachment and sale before mentioned. Having reached this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to decide the other questions set up in the respective briefs of the plaintiff and the  defendant.

It is stated in  the judgment appealed from that "it has been clearly proved  that the plaintiff was in possession of the house and lot in question in good faith from the year 1892 until the year 1897, when he was dispossessed against his will and without being given an opportunity to defend his right."  Considering  the question  from the  point of view of the right of possession, it has already been shown that the plaintiff has not proved  that he has a better  right than the defendant; and, with respect to actual possession, it is  evident  that the plaintiff  lost  it  after one year's adverse possession by Otivar,  pursuant to the provisions of article 460 of the Civil  Code, which provides as follows:

'The possessor may lose his possession

*           *           *           *           *           *

"4.  By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor,  if the new possession has lasted more than one year."

With a reversal of the  judgment appealed from, the defendant is  absolved from the complaint, without  express finding as to the costs of both instances.   So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.