Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1898.  Two legitimate daughters survived her.  One of these daughters, Petra Padilla, had two legitimate children Rafael and Josefa Aquino.  The other daughter, Pascuala Padilla, had one legitimate child Aurea  Enriquez.   Petra and Pascuala, the daughters of Francisca Reyes, have since died, as has also the  daughter of Pascuala,  Aurea Enriquez.  Hence, the children of Petra Rafael and Josefa Aquino claim to be the sole heirs not only of Francisca Reyes but also of Aurea Enriquez, both of whom died intestate.

The minor Vicente Atanasio Enriquez opposes these pretentions, claiming to be the natural child of Aurea Enriquez and, consequently, entitled  to inherit all of her  separate property, as well as her undivided share of the property of Francisca Reyes.  With respect to the parentage of Vicente Atanasio Enriquez, the parties entered into the following stipulation of facts in open court:

"It is agreed  by and  between the parties in this case, through their respective attorneys, that the child Vicente Atanasio Fnriquez is the son of Aurea Enriquez,  begotten by  a priest, member of the Roman Catholic Church; that at the time of the conception of this child, that priest was a member of the Roman Catholic Church."

The lower court held that this child was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea  Enriquez,  as  well as her undivided one half of the estate of Francisca Reyes, and entered judgment accordingly.   Rafael and Josefa Aquino have appealed from this decision.

The errors assigned  by counsel for the appellants may be condensed into the single question.  Was Vicente Atanasio Enriquez an acknowledged natural child of Aurea Enriquez? If this question be answered in the affirmative,  the decision of the lower court is correct, since article 939  of the Civil Code provides that in the absence of legitimate  descendants and ascendants  (Aurea Enriquez'left none such), the natural children legally acknowledged shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Two conditions are necessary to the status of  an acknowledged natural child: They are (1) that the child is born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child  could  have married (Civil Code,  art. 119); and (2) that the child is legally acknowledged. (Id., arts. 129- 138.)

It is insisted by counsel for the appellants that the fact that the father of Vicente Atanasio Enriquez was a Roman Catholic priest prevents him from fulfilling the first requirement.  In so far as this case is concerned, we accept without discussion his conclusion that under the laws in force in this country prior to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68, the fact that a  man was a priest in sacris was an impediment to his marriage.  Hence, if that law still prevails, Vicente Atanasio Enriquez cannot, under the circumstances as developed by the record, qualify as a natural child of Aurea Enriquez.  This, then,  is the crux  of the whole inquiry.

General Orders No. 68, promulgated December 18, 1899, to take immediate effect, reads as follows:

"The following provisions respecting marriage shall be in force in these Islands from and after this date.

"All laws and provisions, general and particular, and even those customary, which are  in conflict with this order, are hereby revoked.

"SECTION 1. Any unmarried male of the age of fourteen years or upwards, and any unmarried female of the age of twelve years or upwards, and not otherwise disqualified, are capable of consenting to and consummating marriage.

"SEC. 2. Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of  every degree, between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, between uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews, and between stepparents and stepchildren, are incestuous and  void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate."

Section 3 makes illegal and void a subsequent marriage contracted by any person before the  first marriage of such person shall have been annulled or dissolved, and section 10 enumerates six causes for the nullity of marriages.   Each of the latter is set off in a separate, numbered paragraph, so that it cannot be said that the intention of the authors was to include or permit of any  other causes of nullity of marriage.   With equal certainty it may be said that no other qualifications than  those  mentioned in sections  1  and  2, above quoted, were intended by the authors of the law.  The all  inclusive words "Any unmarried male   *  *  *  and any unmarried female," to which are annexed certain  specific, enumerated exceptions, exclude the operation of any other causes of disability than those mentioned in the  law.

"An express exception, exemption,  or saving excludes others."   (Lewis' Southerland Stat.  Const.,  sec. 494.)

This is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes.  Neither as a disqualification  to marry nor as a cause of nullity of marriage does the profession of  priesthood appear in General Orders No. 68 as a restriction upon the all inclusive words, "Any unmarried male  *   *  *  and any unmarried female."  If that impediment be brought  forward from  the former legislation and held to still be a disqualification for marriage, it operates as  such outside the limits of General Orders No. 68, for in no possible way may any of the provisions of the latter be construed or interpreted to include it.  It intrudes upon the operation of General Orders No. 68,  adds to the disabilities of contracting marriages mentioned therein, and further  restricts  the  meaning of the basic  words of  that law, "Any unmarried male   *   *   *  and any unmarried female."  It cannot survive as law  if it  be repugnant  to General  Orders No. 68.  To give it effect General  Orders No. 68 must, as we have said, be modified so as to include it.  Hence, it is repugnant and it is in conflict with the provisions of General Orders No. 68  and must, therefore, be considered as revoked by the repealing clause of that  law.

"The  change of  sovereignty and  the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of  section 5 of the Philippine  Bill caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolishment of all special  privileges  and  of  restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any  particular religious sect.  All became equal in the eyes of the law, and those articles  of the Penal  Code defining  special  crimes against that denomination, which, under the former sovereign, was the state religion, as well as article 225, denning a crime against all others than  that religion, have necessarily  become inoperative."  (U. S. vs. Balcorta,  25  Phil. Rep., 273.)

The birth of the child Vicente Atanasio Enriquez occurring in 1905, several years subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the consequent revocation of the impediment of priesthood to marriage, it results that the child's parents could have' consummated a legal marriage at the time  of  its  conception, and, hence, that the child is a natural child within the terms of article 119 of the Civil Code.

Before leaving this branch of the case, we deem it expedient to discuss the competency  of evidence tending to show the parentage of a natural child (a) in an action by the child to enforce its recognition, and (b) in an action brought by persons who are prejudiced by such acknowledgment to have such  acknowledgment annulled.  The case at bar presents both phases  of the question, for the child Vicente instituted a proceeding in the lower court to establish his  right to inherit the property  of  Aurea  Enriquez as her natural child; and  other relatives of hers Rafael and Josefa Aquino instituted another  proceeding contesting his acknowledgment as such natural child, both of these cases have been consolidated in the court below and thus appealed to this court.

First let us consider the action brought by a  child  to enforce its recognition as a natural child.  Article 129 provides that the father and mother may recognize a natural child jointly or individually.  Article 132 prohibits disclosure of the name of the other parent when the recognition is by one parent alone.   Article 130 provides that in such  a case the child shall  be  presumed to be a natural child if the parent who acknowledged it had legal capacity to contract marriage  at the time  of its conception. Articles  135 and 136  specify the cases in which  the  father  and  mother, respectively,  must recognize a natural child.

Articles 135 and  136 both provide that certain voluntary acts of the father or mother entitle the child to a judgment establishing its status as a natural child of the defendant parent.   These voluntary acts are  of two kinds: Either a writing by the parent expressly acknowledging  the child, or the fact that the parent has permitted it  to  enjoy the status of his or her natural child.  The basic reason for allowing this kind of evidence to be used against the parent is, we presume, one of estoppel.  At least we  think it may now be  so classified  under section 333 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:

"The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be  made  from  particular facts,  are deemed  conclusive:

"1. Whenever a party has,  by his own declaration, act, or omission,  intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."

Upon well-founded principles respecting the conclusiveness of  judgments, article 135 of the Civil Code provides that the father may not deny the status of the offspring in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction, when the judgment against him decrees that he acknowledge the child born of his crime.  In the case of the mother, the Code goes one step further and provides that proof of birth and identity of the child is sufficient to compel her to acknowledge it.  In this instance only  is the parentage of the parent sufficient to compel acknowledgment.  Whichever of  the methods adopted by the child to prove his right to the status of an acknowledged natural child,  it  will be  observed that the presumption  created by article 130 dispenses with the necessity of investigating the identity of the other parent.

The cases heretofore decided by this court upon the point now being discussed may be divided into those wherein the action was against the father, those wherein the action was against both parents, and those  wherein the action was against the mother.  In  all the  cases in which the child sought  acknowledgment by the natural father,  the proof offered was either of express acknowledgment in writing, or of the father's having permitted the child to enjoy the status of a natural child, both voluntary acts  of the father.  We have uniformly held  in  these  cases  that  the fact of the father's parentage is not competent to  prove his acknowledgment:   (Mendoza vs. Ibañez, 4 Phil. Rep., 666; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Id., 738; Benedicto vs.  De la Rama, 4 Id., 746; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Id., 1; Tengco vs. Sanz, 11 Id., 163; Dizon vs. Ullmann, 13 Id., 88.) And, obviously, such evidence is of no purpose  to show either an express acknowledgment in writing or  the fact that the  child has enjoyed the status of a natural child.

Siguiong vs. Siguiong (8 Phil. Rep., 5), Serrano vs. Aragon (22 Id., 10), and Cosio vs. Pili (10 Id., 72), were all actions brought by children to prove their status as natural children legitimized by subsequent marriage of their parents.  In  all  these cases it  was necessary to establish an acknowledgment on the part of the father, which, as stated above,  must be done without reference to his parentage. Hence, the same kind and quantum of proof as to the father's acknowledgment must be produced in such an action as in an action instituted against their father alone to compel acknowledgment.  Only in the last case cited  was this successfully accomplished.

But one case has arisen in which it was  sought to compel the mother to acknowledge a natural child: Capistrano vs. Gabino  (8 Phil. Rep.,  135).  We do not  include Llorente vs. Rodriguez  (3 Phil. Rep., 697), for the  reason, as stated in Benedicto vs. De la Rama (4 Phil. Rep., 746, 749), that that case  was governed by the  laws in force prior  to the promulgation  of the Civil Code.  In the  Capistrano case, evidence of the identity of the mother was introduced and duly considered, but was held insufficient for that purpose.

An examination of all these cases will show that the presumption as to the capacity of the other  parent to marry at the time of conception of the child,  when the action  was against  only  one of the  parents,  was applied  in none of them, unless it might be  said that it was applicable  in the Capistrano case.   The evidence in that case was confined wholly to whether the child was born of its alleged mother, the father being referred to in the decision as "an unknown person."  It may be inferred that had  the evidence of the alleged mother's parenthood been satisfactory, the judgment would have been in favor of the child, regardless  of the fact that its father was "an unknown person."   In Mijares vs. Nery (3 Phil. Rep., 195), it appeared that the plaintiff, a recognized natural daughter  of  her father "was born of a woman  whose name does not appear."   The plaintiff was allowed to participate in the property of her deceased father as an acknowledged natural child, so it is clear that the presumption provided in article 130 was  applied in this case. The reason that the presumption has been so sparingly applied  is that in most of  the cases the  admitted  evidence was of such a description  as  to render its application unnecessary.

The result is that were the case at  bar confined to an attempt on the part of the natural child, Vicente Atanasio Enriquez, to establish  his rights as a natural child of his mother, Aurea Enriquez,  that portion of the stipulation of facts, supra, showing the identity of his father, and which is supposed by  the appellants to militate against his status as such, would be incompetent,  and the child could object to its admission.

But the case involves a protest by third persons, namely, the two children, Rafael and Josefa  Aquino, whose rights will be prejudiced by a judgment holding the child to be an  acknowledged natural  child of Aurea Enriquez.  Their protest is not that the child Vicente is not the child of Aurea Enriquez, for they admit that, but that  its parents could not have contracted a legal and  valid marriage at the time of the child's conception. Hence, it is necessary to determine whether the presumption of article  130 is available to the child in such a case.

No case has  heretofore reached this court involving this question.   Two cases have, however, been decided by the supreme court of Spain covering the point precisely.  The first is that dated June  9,  1893.   In that case a child, admittedly a natural child, brought an action to compel the annulment of the acknowledgment of four other children by their father as his natural children.   These four children had lived constantly with his father, used his name, and had received support from him  as  his own children.  The only forced heirs of the father were  his natural children and in his will the father provided that the two-thirds of his property of which he could freely dispose should be divided equally between the four children.  The child admittedly having the status of a natural child contested this division of the property, whereby he only received one-fifth of the one-third of his father's property of which the latter could not freely dispose, claiming that the four children were not in fact natural children and that he was, therefore, entitled to inherit all the property of his father.  In support  of this contention  he alleged  that the  four children  in question were born of a woman who was  from 1871 to 1885 (during which  time the four children were born) a married woman whom  he named, with whom his father had lived openly and notoriously.  The guardian of the four children opposed the admission of all evidence tending to prove  the identity of their mother, claiming that they must be presumed to  be natural children under the terms of article 130.  This objection was sustained; but on appeal  in  cassation to  the supreme court it was held that article 130 does not specify who are natural children  but is limited to creating a  presumption as to who are natural children.   This  presumption of law, like other presumptions of law, may be rebutted"' under  the provisions of article 1250 of the Civil Code and it was further held  that the right to rebut this presumption was expressly granted in article 138, which gives a right of action to those who may be prejudiced by the recognition of a natural child.  The prohibition against disclosing the identity  of the other  parent where the recognition is by one parent only is limited to the act of acknowledgment, which is  unilateral; but  this prohibition  does not involve the proposition that the name of the other parent shall not be disclosed in the actions  permitted  for the purpose of contesting such acknowledgment.  To extend such a prohibition in these actions would defeat their purpose, which is to inquire into the identity and qualifications of the parents to marry at the time  of the conception of the child and thus to determine whether the child is or is not in fact a natural child.

The other decision is dated April 23,  1904.  In this case it appears that M. V. recognized two children as his natural children. Subsequently, he married the plaintiff, by whom he had a  daughter.  The plaintiff wife thereupon brought an action to avoid the  acknowledgment of the two children in question, in  which  she  alleged that their mother was one C. T., a woman married to one D. J. at the time of the conception of both of the children.  The guardian ad litem of the two children objected to the admission of evidence tending to prove these allegations and the court sustained this objection.  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the ruling of the Court of  First Instance, holding that neither the provisions of article 141 nor those of article 132 upon which the lower court relied were applicable to a case where it was sought to show that a child, acknowledged as a natural child,  did not have the qualifications of a  natural child.

In  an action  to contest the acknowledgment of a supposedly natural child brought under the provisions of article 138 of the Civil Code, it is absolutely essential to investigate the identity of both of its parents and  their qualifications to contract a valid marriage at the time of the child's conception.   The gist of the plaintiff's action in such a case is that the  acknowledged child is not a  natural child that is, that the parents at the time of its conception could not have  entered into a valid marriage.  Obviously, the only way to establish such a contention is to identify the parents and disclose their incapacity to contract a valid marriage at the time of the child's conception.

It follows that that portion of the stipulation of the facts in the case at bar disclosing the identity and status of the child's father may not be rejected as prohibited  by law, for the  reason that the status of the child is contested not by  the  parent  whose  acknowledgment is  claimed, but by persons who will be injured by such acknowledgment.  The case presented  from this angle is not one  for acknowledgment, but one against  acknowledgment.  As such, the protestants have a right,  under the provisions of article 138, to prove that the child is not such a child as is defined in article 119 of the Code, to wit, one whose parents could have married at the time of  the conception of the child.

As we have held above, however, the facts set forth in the stipulation  concerning  the child's father show that the latter was competent to contract marriage at the time of, the  child's  conception.  Hence,  the protest  fails  on its merits.

The second condition of an acknowledged natural child is fulfilled by Vicente  Atanasio Enriquez by the stipulated fact that he is the son  of Aurea Enriquez, a spinster at the time of  his conception. The judgment of  the court below holding  that he is an acknowledged natural child of Aurea Enriquez must, therefore, be affirmed.  As an acknowledged natural  child, he has the right to inherit all the property, of Aurea Enriquez,  she  having died intestate,  with  neither legitimate ascendants  or descendants.  (Article 939, Civil Code.)  Vicente Atanasio  Enriquez  is, therefore,  entitled to his mother's undivided one-half of the property of the intestate  Francisca Reyes, as well as to all  of her separate property.   It is to be observed that this judgment will not affect the interest of  the child's  father,  he not being a party to the present action.  (Sec. 277,  Code of Civil Procedure.)  The judgment of the  court below being strictly in accordance with  the law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.