It appears from the record that on the 31st of July, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of  the Province of  Occidental  Negros, for the purpose of  recovering the sum of P6,387.50 as damages resulting from  an attachment secured by the said  defendants against the property of the said plaintiff.

The plaintiff  alleges that the said attachment was illegal.

The said  attachment was issued in the  cause No.  270 of the Court of  First  Instance, in which the defendant herein, Elena Javier,  was the plaintiff, and Ceferino Tan-Suyco was the defendant.  By  virtue of said attachment certain  property,  including a  number of  carabaos,  was attached.  The plaintiff herein, Simeon Tan-Suyco,  made a representation  to the  sheriff that  the said property  and carabaos belonged to him and not to Ceferino Tan-Suyco, whereupon the  attachment was raised.  Later, the  defendant herein  (the plaintiff  in cause No. 270) amended her petition and made the said Simeon Tan-Suyco (the plaintiff herein)  a codefendant with the said Ceferino Tan-Suyco. Upon the amended  complaint (in cause No. 270) a second attachment was issued and the same property and carabaos were  again attached.   The plaintiff herein  (one of the defendants in cause No.  270)  made another representation to the sheriff that  the  property belonged  to him and not to Ceferino Tan-Suyco.  In that cause (No. 270) the  said Simeon Tan-Suyco  filed a separate answer  from that  filed by Ceferino Tan-Suyco, in which, after a relation of the facts, appeared  the  following prayer:

"1. He prays that the court dismiss the complaint against him.

"2. That the  property  attached at the instance of the plaintiff  and  described in the cross-complaint filed in December, 1904, be declared to belong to him.

"3. That the plaintiff be sentenced to restore to the defendant,  Simeon Tan-Suyco, the property attached, to pay for the damage caused, with the costs of the suit,  and that in case of insolvency action be instituted against the property of his bondsmen for the resulting liability."

Said cause No. 270 proceeded to a determination in the Court of First  Instance, was appealed  to the Supreme Court, and in a final  decision rendered  by the Supreme Court on the  3d of  October, 1906, the said Simeon  Tan-Suyco was relieved from  all liability whatever in  said action.  (Javier vs. Tan-Suyco, 6 Phil. Rep,,  484.)

Nearly two years after the termination of said cause No. 270,  the present action was commenced.  After hearing the evidence  adduced during  the trial of  the  cause, the Honorable Albert E. McCabe, judge, found from  the evidence that the questions presented had been litigated and concluded in  said cause No. 270,  and dismissed the action, absolving the defendants from  any liability  thereunder, with costs against the plaintiff.

From  that  judgment the plaintiff appealed  and made the following assignment of errors:

"L The Court of  First Instance erred in holding that the complaint of Simeon  Tan-Suyco, asking for  damages from the defendants Elena Javier and  Ildefonso Monfort, had  already been decided in civil case  No.  270, instituted by Elena Javier against Ceferino Tan-Suyco for  payment of a debt.

"II. The Court of First Instance erred in not holding sufficiently proven the  damages caused  to the plaintiff by his being deprived of the use of his 24 carabaos  and one cow during1 the days when this stock was held under attachment and reattachment at the  instance of the defendant, under the bond of her co-defendants."

With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, the court, in its decision, said :

"On March 2, 1905, the plaintiff in case No. 270 amended her complaint so as  to aver  that the amount  the defendants owe her was P4,882.62, instead of P5,127.21, as in the previous complaint.

"The  defendant   Simeon  Tan-Suyco  replied  to  this amended complaint and again prayed that the plaintiff be sentenced to. make restitution of the property attached and to payment of the damages  caused  thereby; and that in case of insolvency the judgment be extended to her bondsmen.

"The court rendered judgment in this case,  No. 270, on March 10, finding that the defendant Ceferino Tan-Suyco owed the plaintiff, Elena Javier, the sum asked in the complaint, but  it excluded  the defendant Simeon  Tan-Suyco from this judgment, stating  that it was not proven  that he was a debtor along with his father; and in this judgment it was ordered that the attachment be dissolved and that the  24 carabaos and one cow be returned to Simeon Tan-Suyco,  and that the complaint against him be dismissed, with the costs in his favor.

"With reference to that judgment, it  appears that the defendant, Simeon Tan-Suyco, acquiesced therein, but that the plaintiff, Elena  Javier, after her motion for a  new trial had  been  overruled, appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,  where the  case was heard in that court as No. 2675 (6 Phil. Rep. 484), and wherein decision  was handed down on  October 3, 1906, affirming the judgment of the lower court against  Ceferino  Tan-Suyco, as well  as that part of the judgment  in favor of Simeon Tan-Suyco.

"It appears that when this decision of the Supreme Court had been  transmitted to  this Court of First Instance, the sheriff was then directed to return the attached animals to Simeon Tan-Suyco, and that they were returned on December 1, 1906,  with the exception of  8 which had died in the depositary's hands.  It appears beyond doubt that these 8 animals died through  no fault of the person in whose custody they were,  some of them  from old age and some from the epizooty prevailing in this province.

"The present  action was instituted by the plaintiff on account of the damage thus sustained, but the  defendants allege  that it is res judicata, having been  settled  by the decision in case No. 270.

"At the hearing of this case  in this court the plaintiff was rather vague in his testimony with reference to the damage he sustained.  When asked how long he had  been deprived of th,e use of his animals, he did not specify the dates, saying about three years.  He  submitted no evidence to show the value of the  8 animals that died; but it would appear that he suffered loss at the rate of P0.50 for  each day, including Sundays, that these animals  were withheld from him, and for each and all of them, male and female, old  and young, and  even for those  that died;  that is, in his  last amendment to his complaint  he asked for damages in the sum of P12,250.

"However,  in view of  the court's  intention in this  suit, it is thought  unnecessary to weigh the evidence regarding the  amount  of  damages the plaintiff might  have  been allowed to collect herein.

"This court holds  that the matter is res judicata, this same  action for  damages having been settled in case  No. 270.  It was  one of the matters  in litigation, brought  thus into question by Simeon  Tan-Suyco; and some  statements were  made by  him based upon the  previous action.   In preparing and rendering the judgment in case No. 270, the trial judge considered the question  of the  damages  that might  have been granted to Simeon  Tan-Suyco.

"In the opinion of this court,  this is a case that plainly comes  under  the principles constituting res judicata in the Philippine Islands, laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in the case of  Tanguinlay vs. Quiros (10 Phil. Rep., 360), where the matter is fully and clearly discussed."

It will be remembered that in the other case (No. 270) the present plaintiff asked for damages resulting from the alleged  unlawful attachment.  The  court did  not allow damages in that case.   The plaintiff did  not appeal from that decision, thereby indicating that he was satisfied with the same.  As  was said above, the plaintiff,  nearly two years after the termination of that action (No. 270), commenced the present action for the purpose of litigating again the very question which he had presented in  the first case, thus incurring additional costs and expenses, which should always be avoided when possible.  And, moreover,  section 439  of the Code  of Procedure in  Civil Actions expressly makes provision for the recovery of damages in connection with  an action  for the  recovery  of  property illegally .attached.  The question then as to damages for the  alleged illegal attachment, which was involved in action No. 270, must have been litigated in that action and  is, therefore, res fudicata of the question presented here.

"The law of res judicata is well settled in the United States and is laid down in a  series  of decisions of the Supreme Court  to the effect that as between the parties  to the first judgment and their privies, it operates as a bar  to a second action upon the same claim, not only as to the issues actually in litigation but also as to all matters which might have been litigated therein, whereas in an action between them upon a different cause it is a bar only as to matters actually litigated.  (Cromwell  vs. County of Sac, 94 U. S., 351; Werlein vs. New Orleans, 177 U. S., 390; U. S, vs. California Co.,  192 U. &, 355; Fayerweather vs. Ritch, 195 U. S., 276, 299; Northern Pacific Railway Co. vs. Slaght, 205 U. S., 122.)°"

It might be argued, however, that under the provisions of section 307 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, that because the lower court in said action No. 270, made no finding whatever with reference to damages that it should he assumed that the question of damages was not litigated in said action (270).

Section 307 provides: "That only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former  judgment  which appears  upon  its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included  therein or necessary thereto."  Said section 307 is an exact reproduction of section 1911 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California, and has been construed many times  by the supreme court of said State.  (Taylor vs. Castle, 42 Cal., 367; Phalen vs. Gardner, 43 Cal., 306,  311;  Woolverton vs. Baker,  98 Cal., 628; Toomy vs. Hale, 100 Cal., 172; Reed vs. Cross, 116 Cal., 473; Bingham vs. Kearney,  136 Cal., 175; Estate of Harrington, 174 Cal., 124, 128.)

In the case of Bingham  vs. Kearney above cited,  the supreme court of the State of California said:

"It is the rule, long  recognized in this country, that a judgment between the same  parties is conclusive, not only as to the subject matter in controversy in the action upon which it is based, but also in all other actions involving the same question, and upon all  matters involved in the issues which might have been litigated and decided in the case,. the presumption being that all such issues were made and decided.  It is the policy of the law to put an end to litigation, and to aid the vigilant  and not those who sleep upon their rights.  It is not the policy of the law to allow a new and different suit between the same parties, concerning the same subject matter, that has already been Htigated; neither will  the law allow the parties to trifle with the courts by piecemeal litigation.

"If the parties to an action fail to assert their claim properly  or to present proper evidence in the first suit, they will not again be permitted in a second action to litigate the same questions.  These principles are elementary."

The principles applicable to res judicata under American jurisprudence  are supported  by many  decisions of  the supreme court of Spain.

There is nothing in the record which shows  why  the plaintiff herein did not insist upon having a finding of the lower court in action No. 270, upon the question of damages. Under his  pleadings he had a perfect  right to present evidence upon the question of the amount  of damages  which he actually suffered.  He  also had a right to insist upon a decision upon whatever evidence he introduced upon  that question.  If the court refused to make a finding upon such evidence or denied his  right to recover  damages  at all, it was his duty to have appealed in that action (270), for the purpose of having the question of damages settled in  that action, instead of waiting  and commencing a separate and distinct action for the same purpose.

This court, speaking  through Mr. Justice Carson, in the case of Lanuza vs. Gonzalez (17 Phil. Rep., 413) said:

"Relief can not be granted in a second action, either by the trial court or by the Supreme Court, when the relief sought might have been secured by an  appeal in the former action; hence, when a court, after due trial, renders a judgment adjudicating the ownership of property and no appeal is taken, under the provisions of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure the judgment becomes final and  the matter must be regarded as res adjudicata, notwithstanding the fact that, if an appeal had  been taken, the judgment of the lower court might have been reversed in the second instance. (Regalado  vs, Luchsinger & Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 625; Macondray &  Co. vs. Quintero, 6 Phil. Rep.,  429; Tanguinlay vs. Quiros,  10 Phil. Rep., 360.)"

After a  full consideration of all the facts and  the  law applicable to  the present case, we are of the opinion  and so declare that the lower court committed no error in deciding that the questions presented here had been litigated in said action 270.

In view of our conclusions with reference to the first assignment of error, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the question presented in said second assignment  of error.

Upon a full consideration of the record, the evidence and the law, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs.  It is so ordered.

Mapa, Carson, Moreland, and Trent,  JJ., concur.