Judgment having been rendered by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, the Hon. Charles S. Lobingier presiding1,  dismissing the complaint in this case upon its merits, the plaintiff appealed.

The only question raised by this appeal is purely one of law.

Remedios Grey, wife of the plaintiff, died intestate  in 1905 without ascendants or descendants, leaving a surviving husband and one sister and three brothers.  Under the law, the sisters and brothers are called to inherit all of the estate of the deceased, subject only to the right of the surviving husband, the plaintiff, to a usufructuary interest in one-half thereof.

Administration proceedings in the estate of  the deceased wife were not  taken out until June 15,. 1907, when Jose Grey, one of the defendants, was appointed administrator. In these  administration  proceedings,  the  Court of First Instance of this city issued a decree on December 3, 1910, declaring that each one of the defendants in the case at bar was entitled to one-fourth part of the estate of the deceased Remedios Grey, subject to the plaintiff's (Vicente Reyes') right to the usufruct.

Prior to the  appointment of the administrator for the estate of the deceased Remedios Grey, and  as the result of certain judicial  proceedings had against her surviving husband (the plaintiff in the case at bar), his usufructuary interest in the estate of his deceased wife  was sold under execution  and deeds issued therefor to the purchaser, the defendant Jose Grey.  Such deeds still  subsist  in full force and effect, no  steps ever having been taken either to annul or set them aside or to redeem the interest of the plaintiff thus sold.

The plaintiff, as surviving husband of the  deceased  Remedios Grey, now sues the sister and brothers of his deceased wife, claiming of them  the  payment of  his usufructuary interest in the property of the deceased, basing his claim upon two grounds: first, that the execution sale and the sheriff's deeds executed pursuant thereto did not divest him of his usufructuary interest in the property and that the defendants  still  remain  charged with  its  payment;  and second, the defendants having failed to appeal from the order of the probate court dated December  3, 1910, which order was issued some three years after an attempt  was made to sell under execution the plaintiff's usufructuary interest, and that order having become final, it settled the plaintiff's right to a usufructuary interest, and  the defendants can not now deny this fact.

Counsel for the plaintiff now insists that a usufructuary interest in real property is not such an interest or right as can be sold under execution.  With this contention  we can not agree.   Section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

"Sec. 450. Property liable to execution. - All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both  real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor,  not exempt by Jaw, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and interests in any corporation or  company,  and debts, credits, and all other property, both  real  and personal, or any interest in  either real or personal property, and all other property not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution, in like manner as  upon writs of attachment."

The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends every species of  title, inchoate or complete; legal or equitable.  This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind  of property,  and  every interest in  property which is, or may be,  the subject of private ownership and transfer.  It deals with equitable  rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing or making any distinction  between them.

Article 480 of the Civil  Code reads:

"The usufructuary  may personally enjoy the  thing in usufruct, lease it to another person, or alienate his right to the usufruct, even for a good consideration;   *  *  *."

If the usufructuary right is one which may be leased or sold,  it must logically  and necessarily  follow that such a right is an "interest" in real property within the meaning of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above quoted. It was the plaintiff's usufructuary right in real  property which was sold under execution.  This right was conferred upon him at the death of his wife by  operation of law,  and by virtue of such a right he was entitled to receive all the natural,  industrial, and civil fruits of said real property in usufruct.  He was entitled to hold the actual, material possession of  such property during his lifetime, and was obligated  only to  preserve its  form and  substance.   In  other words, he was  entitled, subject to this  restriction, to use the property as his own.   He was the real owner  of  this interest, and article 480, supra, conferred upon him the right to enjoy the possession of the property or lease it to another or to sell such interest  outright.  We think the real test, as to whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution is does the judgment debtor hold such  a  beneficial interest in such  property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of  it for value?  If he does,  then  the property is subject to  execution and payment of his debts.  The  right of usufruct is  such an interest, and when  the sheriff sold the plaintiff's usufructuary right by virtue of an execution, he had no further interest in said property.

The plaintiff's  second contention  that the  defendants, by failing  to appeal  from  the order  of the court in  the administration  proceedings dated December 3, 1910, wherein the right of plaintiff to  a usufructuary interest in  the property was recognized, have lost their right to refuse such payment to him at this time, is not well founded.   The plaintiff  had no interest  in this property at the time  the probate court  issued  this order.  The order only  set  out the fact that under the law the plaintiff was entitled to a usufructuary interest in one-half of the estate  of his  deceased wife.  It was not a finding that in the meantime  the plaintiff  had not sold, leased,  or otherwise disposed  of or lost such right of participation.   This order,  merely fixed the legal status of the plaintiff and did not have the effect of  canceling or  annuling  the sale  made by the  sheriff. Again, the  plaintiff instituted the action in the case at bar on June 1,  1910,  several months  prior to the  order of December 3,  1910.  The right  to  recover was traversed by the defendants on July 1 of that same year, and the question was pending and undetermined at the time the probate court issued its order.

The validity of the execution  sale  was not an issue in those  administration proceedings, and  the order of  December 3d  cannot, under  any circumstances, be  held to affect the validity of such a sale.

The judgment  appealed from is therefore affirmed,  with costs against the  appellant.

Arellano, C. J.,  Torres,  Mapa, Johnson,  Carson, and Moreland,  JJ., concur.