This is an action of ejectment.   The plaintiff claims title by purchase from  one Magdalena Cernandi, who claims to have inherited it as the only heir of Buenaventura Cernandi.  The defendants Luis, Leon and  Teodoro Sermonia assert title to the land which they are occupying by purchase from Buenaventura Cernandi before his death, while the  defendant  Andrea  Pajantoy claims the parcel which she  is occupying by gift from her aunt Calixta Pajantoy, wife of Buenaventura Cernandi, with immediate delivery of possession of the lands,  which have remained in her possession continuously since that time.  She also asserts that she is the only surviving heir of Calixta, who died intestate, owning and possessed  of said land as her  separate property.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.   Title to the land was declared in him and possession was ordered delivered in  accordance with such judgment.  From that judgment this appeal was taken.

We are of the opinion that the judgment cannot stand. The plaintiff has plainly failed to prove a cause of action. The  burden  of proof is upon him to show title.   He must recover upon the strength of his own title and cannot rely  for success upon the  weakness  of that of his adversaries.  Having no better title than that  which he acquired from Magdalena Cernandi, he can recover only in case she could.

It is undisputed in the evidence that the defendants Luis, Leon and Teodoro Sermonia  purchased certain lands from Buenaventura Cernandi sometime before his death and that they have  been  openly, notoriously, peaceably  and  continuously occupying the same ever since the purchase.  It is the undisputed evidence that the lands which they now occupy are the  same lands which  they bought of Buenaventura Cernandi and of which they took immediate possession on the purchase.   It is the undisputed evidence that Buenaventura died in the year 1897, with said defendants in possession of the lands to his knowledge under the purchases referred to.  It is the undisputed evidence that said defendants have been in possession of the lands ever since his death to the knowledge of Magdalena Cernandi and the plaintiff, openly, notoriously, peaceably and continuously, claiming title thereto under  the deeds  which they present in evidence.  It is conceded  that at the time of such purchase  and  sale they knew that the said defendants were claiming said lands as  owners by purchase, admitting a superior title in nobody.

The court, bases its judgment in favor of the plaintiff wholly upon the proposition that the technical  descriptions of the lands in  the deeds of said defendants  do  not now agree  with the  descriptions  of the lands which they  are actually occupying; and that said  lands, being, as claims the court, clearly comprehended within the description of the lands mentioned in the complaint,  plaintiff is  entitled to the  possession thereof.  We do not believe that that conclusion necessarily follows.  The description of the lands at the  present time may not be at all like the description of the lands at the time they were sold by Buenaventura to said defendants.  This  for  the very good  reason that  those descriptions refer t,o and are based very largely upon  the names of contiguous owners.  Contiguous owners frequently change.  The description consequently changes.  Moreover, it is  well  known  that  in the sale  of small  parcels  of land in the Philippine Islands the  descriptions have been heretofore  very  inaccurate,  generally  speaking,  and  the identification of the lands from the description alone is in many  cases substantially impossible.   But,  aside from all this, the description of the land in a deed is not necessarily controlling as to the lands  actually sold.  The conveyance itself may,  by mistake, describe one piece  of  land when the intention of the  parties was to convey an  entirely different piece.  Acting on the agreed intention, the purchaser may have taken  possession of the land  which was intended to be sold  instead of the land  actually described. The occupation of the land  by consent of the vendor, with the intention clear between  the parties to sell and buy that particular piece of land, the faulty description in the conveyance cannot later be made the basis for the dispossession of the vendee by an heir who claims the right to dispossess solely by reason of  his inheritance.

In the case at bar, from  the undisputed proofs, the description of the lands in defendants' conveyances has very little signification.   As we  have already said, it  is undisputed that the defendants Luis, Leon and Teodoro Sermonia purchased  certain  lands from  Buenaventura  Cernandi; that they immediately took possession of the lands which they purchased and  which were supposed to have been described in their deeds; that they have continuously occupied these lands from that day until the present j that they were the lands which Buenaventura intended to sell  and which they intended to purchase.

Under such circumstances, the fact, if it be a fact, that the descriptions in  their deeds do not  coincide with  the lands which they actually bought and occupied is of very little importance.  The great and important fact is that these are the lands which they actually bought.  By consent of all  parties they took possession of these lands and have occupied  them ever  since.

Counsel for the appellee lays considerable stress upon what he  alleges to be  certain admissions or  contradictions of the  witnesses  for the defendants. We have carefully read the  evidence and are satisfied that  the  overwhelming preponderance thereof presents the facts as we have stated them.

The  defendant Andrea Pajantoy claims the land which she occupies in two ways: First, by virtue of her relationship  with Calixta Pajantoy, wife  of Buenaventura Cernandi; and,  second, a gift of said land from said Calixta with  delivery of possession which has lasted the prescriptual period.  It appears from the proofs that this defendant was the only heir of said Calixta Pajantoy and that the land which she occupies is land which belonged exclusively to  said Calixta at the time of her death.  Moreover, it appears in the case as undisputed proof that said Calixta, prior to her  death, delivered the parcel of land  in question to the defendant Andrea as a conveyance to her of the same, without, however, executing any instrument incorporating1 such transfer; that said Andrea took possession  of the land at the time of such delivery  and has continuously retained such possession to the present time.  While Magdalena Cernandi was an heir of Buenaventura  Cernandi, being his niece, she was not an heir of Calixta  Pajantoy, his wife, the only heir of  the  latter  being  the defendant Andrea. These facts  certainly furnish the  foundation for a right of possession.  Moreover, from  possession itself ownership is presumed  in  the absence  of  proof  showing title or interest in some other person.   Magdalena claims ownership of the parcel occupied by the defendant Andrea by having inherited it from Buenaventura.  It appears, however, undisputed in the evidence that Buenaventura never had possession of such land but that  possession thereof was always found in Calixta,  his wife.  From this and from the fact that Calixta  disposed of this piece of land during the life-time of her  husband by transferring  it to  the defendant Andrea, it is indicated with fair conclusiveness that it was her separate property and that she had the right to dispose of it as she wished.   This  being true, Magdalena did not receive such property by virtue of her relationship with Buenaventura.   She has  not, therefore,  demonstrated  in the proofs a right  or title superior to that of the defendant Andrea.

It is  asserted by the appellee, and  it is  true, that this court  has many times held that it  will not interfere with the intelligent conclusion  of a trial  court concerning the credibility of  witnesses and the opposing testimony which they present, the court having seen them in the act of testifying and having carefully observed their manner  and demeanor,  unless  the record discloses that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence  has either been overlooked by the court or has been misapprehended or misinterpreted.   (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Palsario, 17 Phil. Rep., 295.)

In the  case  at bar, however, there can  scarcely be said to be conflicting evidence  there cannot be said  to  be  any real dispute between  the  parties as  to the vital facts in the  case.   The case before us  is one in which  the court failed to  draw  the  proper conclusion  from the evidence before it.

For these reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits;  title  to  the lands occupied by the defendants to  be awarded to them, respectively.   So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.