This is an appeal from a judgment of the  Court of First Instance  of the Province  of  Tarlac dismissing the action before it  on motion of the plaintiff upon the  ground that the court had no  jurisdiction of  the subject matter of the controversy.

The  question for our consideration and  decision is  the power  and authority of a Court of First Instance of one province  to take  cognizance of  an action  by a  railroad company for the condemnation of real  estate located  in another province.

In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the  Province  of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the Province  of  Tarlac.  It is  alleged  in the complaint  that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose of condemning lands for  the  construction of such  line  that this action  is brought.  The land sought  to be condemned is 69,910  square meters  in area.  The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax offices of the municipalities  for the purpose of determining where the lands sought to be condemned  were located and to whom they belonged.  As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of  Tarlac.  The defendants are numerous. Advantage was taken by plaintiff of Act No. 1258 to join as defendants in one action all  of the different owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square meters of land  to be condemned.  After filing and duly serving the complaint the plaintiff,  pursuant to  law and pending final  determination of the  action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in  the complaint,  building its line  and putting the same in operation.  During the progress of the  action  a commission to appraise the  value of the  lands was duly appointed,  which, after taking oral testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed, and after much labor and prolonged consideration made a  report consisting of about  55 typewritten  pages, resolving the question submitted to  it.  On the coming in of this report the court, by  order entered the 27th of September, 1909, set the 11th  day  of  October  following for the hearing thereon.

On the 4th day of October  the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would  be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it  having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that  the  land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.  This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff.  This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal.

The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the proposition,  already referred to, that in condemnation  proceedings, and in all  other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of First Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority where the land is  located in another province, and that no such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.

Sections  55 and  56 of Act  No.  136  of  the  Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of  First Instance  of these Islands with respect to real estate in  the following words: 

"Sec. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.- The jurisdiction  of  Courts of First Instance shall be  of two kinds: 

"1. Original; and 

"2. Appellate. 

"Sec. 56. Its original jurisdiction. - Courts of First  Instance shall have  original jurisdiction: 

*    *    *    *    *    *    *

"2. In  all civil actions which involve the title  to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any  tax, impost, or  assessment,  except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred  upon courts of justice of the peace."

It is  apparent from the wording of these sections that it Was the intention of the Philippine  Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete  jurisdiction  possible over the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith.   Such jurisdiction is not made, to  depend upon locality.  There  is no suggestion of limitation.   The jurisdiction is universal.  Nor do the provisions of  sections 48,  49, 50,  51,  and 52 at  all militate against the universality of that jurisdiction.   Those provisions simply arrange  for the convenient and  effective transaction of business  in the courts and do not relate to their  power, authority,  or jurisdiction  over  the subject matter of the action.  While it is provided in these sections that a particular court shall hold its sessions in the province to which it has been assigned and  in  which it habitually sits and,  inferentially, that it can not hold sessions in any other  province  (except under certain specified conditions), the assertion is nevertheless true that the jurisdiction  of a particular court is in  no wise and in no sense  limited; and  it is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that  a Court of  First Instance  of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions  take cognizance  of an action  arising in another province or  of an  action relating  to  real estate  located outside  of the boundaries  of the  province to which it may at the time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Others provide for the procedure  by which that power or authority is projected into judgment.  The one class deals with the  powers of the court in the real  and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by  which such powers are put into action.   The one is the thing itself; the other is the  vehicle by which the thing  is transferred from the court to  the  parties. The whole purpose and  object of procedure is to make the  powers of the court fully and completely available  for  justice.  The  most perfect procedure that can be devised  is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of  the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into  concrete  acts  of justice  between the parties before it. [The purpose of such a procedure is not  to  restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said  in passing that the most salient objection  which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by  technicalities that that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is  many times  an inconsiderable portion  of the whole.  The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of  contending parties.  It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.   It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always  striving  to secure to litigants. It is  designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.  In other words, it is a means  to an end.  It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.   When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.

The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties  with complete justice between them as a result.   While a fair hearing is as essential as the substantive  power of  the court  to administer justice in  the premises,  and  while  the one  is the natural result of the other, it is different in  its nature and relates to a different thing.  The power or authority  of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed  before procedure in a given cause began.  Procedure does not alter or change that  power or authority; it  simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised.   To be sure,  in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.  This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.  It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction  of the  person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain  it.  There is,  of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter with reference to jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction of the person ancl jurisdiction of the subject matter are both conferred by law.  As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over it. None  of the parties to the litigation  can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed.  That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change.   On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to depend, indirectly at least, on the party's volition.   As we have  said, jurisdiction of the subject matter does not depend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or  any of them.  Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may,  by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.

In  the light of these observations, we proceed  to a consideration  of those provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive of  his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no jurisdiction of the  subject matter of an action by a railroad company to condemn lands located in  another province.   The plaintiff relies for the success of its cause upon section  377 of the Code of Civil Procedure  and upon the special laws relating to the condemnation of lands by railroad corporations.  We take up first the section of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to.

The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of  the court over the subject matter.  It becomes merely a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant.  If their  interests are beat subserved by bringing in the Court of First Instance  of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the. Province of Ilocos Norte, there is  no controlling reason why such a course should not be followed.  The matter is, under the law, entirely within the control of either party.  The plaintiff's interests select the venue.  If such selection, is not  in accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law.  It is  true that this court has more than once held that an agreement to submit a controversy to a court which, under the procedural law, has not been  selected as the appropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such controversy, can not be enforced.  This means simply that either party to such a contract may ignore it  at pleasure.  The law  will  not compel  the fulfillment of an agreement which  deprives  one of the parties to it of the right to present his  cause to that court which  the law designates as the most appropriate.  But the principle asserted in the cases which hold thus is no authority for the proposition that two persons having a  controversy which they desire to have decided by a  competent tribunal may not, by appropriate procudure,  submit it  to  any court having jurisdiction in the premises.   In the one case the relation  is contractual to be enforced over the objection of one of the contracting  parties.   In the other the relation is  not contractual because not between the parties; but, rather, between the parties and the court.   In the one case it is  a contract to be enforced; in the other, a condition to be met.

This being so, we  say again, even though it be repetition, that after jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred so generally and fully  by Ac,t  No. 136, it  is not to be presumed or construed that the legislature intended to modify or restrict  that jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of Civil  Procedure the object  of which is to make that jurisdiction effective.   Such modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of the clearest and most express provisions.

The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads as follows: 

"Sec. 377. Venue of actions. - Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a  partition of real estate,  or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any interest,  right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the province were the land, or some part thereof,  is situated; actions against executors, administrators, and  guardians touching the  performance  of their official duties, and  actions  for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributees, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought  in the province in which the  will was admitted to  probate, or  letters  of  administration  were granted, or the guardian was appointed.   And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any  province where  the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff, except in cases where other  special provision is made in this  Code.   In case neither the plaintiff nor  the defendant  resides within  the Philippine  Islands and  the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of  the defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or is found: Provided, That in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is  not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law,  the action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all cases process  may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending,  to be enforced in any province to bring in  defendants and  to enforce all orders and decrees of the court.   The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is  brought, except in the actions  referred to in the first sixteen lines of this  section relating to real estate, and actions against executors,  administrators, and guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies."

Leaving out of discussion for the moment  actions and proceedings  affecting  estates  of deceased  persons,  they resting upon a different  footing being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that the  section contains no express inhibition against the court.  It provides simply that certain actions  affecting real estate "shall be brought in the  province where the land, or  some part thereof, is situated." The prohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins the  action and lays the venue.  The court, before the  action  is commenced,  has  nothing to  do with  either.   The plaintiff does both.   Only when that is done does the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned.   The prohibition  is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is  not to  take  something from the court but to  grant something to the defendant.  Its wording clearly deprives the court of nothing which  it had, but gives the defendant, as  against the  plaintiff,  certain  rights  which he  did  not have.  It establishes a relation not between  the court and the subject inatter, but between  the plaintiff and  the defendant.  It  relates not  to jurisdiction  but to trial.  It touches  convenience,  not substance.   It  simply  gives  to defendant  the unqualified right,  if he  desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all  of his witnesses live.  Its object is  to secure to him a convenient trial.  If it had  been  the intention of the lawmakers by section 377  to  put a limitation to the jurisdiction  of  the  court, how easy it would have been  to say so  squarely.   "No Court of First Instance shall have  or take jurisdiction of an action touching title to or interest in real property lying wholly in a province other than that in which such court is  authorized to hold  sessions," or a similar provision, would have been sufficient.  This would have been clearly a limitation  on the court rather than the  party.   There would have  been no  room  for doubt. The legislature, however, did not  do so.  It, rather, chose to use language which imposes  a  limitation on the rights of the plaintiff.

In saying this  we do not desire to  force construction. Courts should  give to language  its plain  meaning, leaving the legislature to take care of the consequences.   The Philippine Commission having, in  fullest  phrase,  given the Courts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by Act No.  136, we are of the opinion that that jurisdiction ought not to  be held to be withdrawn except by  virtue of an  Act equally express, or so clearly inconsistent  as to amount to the  same  thing.   The fact that section 377 is not such Act, that it is found in a Code of Procedure rather than in the  substantive law, that it deals with the relative procedural  rights  of parties rather than the power of the  court, that it relates to the place rather than to the thing, that it composes the whole of a chapter  headed simply "Venue," lead us  to hold  that the Court of First Instance of Tarlac had  full  jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action at the time when it was dismissed.

That it had jurisdiction of the persons  of all the parties is indisputable.  That jurisdiction  was obtained not only by the usual course of practice  that is, by the  process of the court - but also by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action.  (Ayers vs. Watson, 113 U.  S., 594; Fisher vs.  Shropshire, 147 U. S., 133.)   The defendants  are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued.   They are not only not objecting to the jurisdiction of  the  court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very  jurisdiction over them.

Nor is the plaintiff in any position  to ask for favors. It is  clearly  guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie  in Tarlac as  it now asserts.  It alleged in its complaint: 

"4.  That,  according  to the information  secured after a minute investigation in the offices of the land registry  and of the land-tax record  of the municipalities within whose jurisdiction lie all the parcels composing the tract of land in question,  the  owners and occupants  of  the  same, with their names as they appear on the plan, are as follows."

At  the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every fact which a  complete knowledge of the location of the lands  sought to be condemned required.  It had the map of its entire line from Paniqui to Tayug, showing the provinces and the various municipalities through which  it runs.  Not only  that:  Before beginning its action  it  had to know the name of every necessary defendant, the land he owned, and the extent of that portion to be condemned. The investigation required  to ascertain these  facts would of necessity  force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge required to bring the  action  in the proper court.   That  the plaintiff at the time it commenced this action did not know in what province its proposed stations and  terminals were is difficult to believe.  That it did not know in what province the land lay which it was  about to  make the subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult to believe. In spite of all this, however, it  deliberately laid the venue in a province where no part of the land lay,  took possession of the land in controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and  after nearly two years of litigation, accompanied with  great trouble  to the  court  and trouble  and expense to the parties, calmly  asks  the  dismissal of  the case for the reason that it did not  know  where its own railroad  was  located.   Under  such  circumstances a  dismissal of the action over the objection of  the defendants ought  not to be permitted except upon absolute necessity and then  only  on payment of  the costs  and expenses of the defendants and of the action.   (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs.. Shropshire, supra.)

There  is  no equitable ground, then,  upon which  the plaintiff may  claim  that it has not yielded  itself  to  the jurisdiction of the court.  Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground.   As we have  already  said,  the  plaintiff, having brought  the  action, of necessity submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.  It took advantage of the situation  it itself created to take possession  of the lands described in the complaint, construct its  lines, switches, stations, yards and terminals, and to carry the cause through two years of expensive litigation.   It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging  its own negligence as a reason for such  attempt.  (Ayers vs. Watson and  Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)

While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance  in the action shall be deemed  a  waiver on his part of all objection  to  the place or tribunal in which the action is brought," except, among other things, in actions affecting real estate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a  defendant can not waive such objection in  such excepted cases.  Nor  do we believe that such provision is controlling in this case.  In the  first place, the application is restricted to "the time of entering his  appearance in the action."  There  is no prohibition against his waiving it later.   It might well have been in the mind of the lawmakers that, at the time of entering his appearance in  the action, the defendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all the facts of the case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being held to a waiver of important rights;  whereas, later in the cause,  as when he files his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he might justly be held to  have waived  his  right to make such objection.   For  this reason it might well be that  the Legislature  purposely refrained from extending the time for  his protection beyond  the  "time of entering his  appearance in the action."   Moreover, there is, in said clause, no prohibition  against an express waiver of his rights by the defendant.   The general rule of law is  that a person may renounce  any right which the law  gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation would be against public policy.  This right of renunciation is so thoroughly established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of Civil  Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in  relation to  the venue  of the action will not be held  to have been abridged by section 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect.   There  is  no  part  of that section clear enough  to  warrant  such a  holding.  Even though the terms of said section were  much clearer than they are in this  respect, we should still hold, if they were much short of express, that the right of renunciation   is not abridged, founding ourselves not only upon the  principles  already laid  down  but  also  upon  that  proposition of  general law embodied in section  294 of the  Code of Civil Procedure which provides that: 

"When a statute or instrument is  equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted."

Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such, against waiver refers exclusively to the defendant. The plaintiff is given no rights respecting it.  Yet  it is the plaintiff who is here calling for the application  of  the provision even against the declared will of the person who is expressly named as the sole beneficiary.  We will not by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene the principles of natural rights.   We will not construe it so as to make the will  to enforce it rest with one who  is neither, included in its terms nor named as its beneficiary.  But even if the plaintiff were entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is estopped  from so doing.   (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7; Babcock vs.. Farewell, 146 Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U. S.), 183; Shutte vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159;  Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45 Mich., 103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 585; Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230; State vs. Mitchell,  31 Ohio State, 592; Counterman vs. Dublin,  38 Ohio  State,  515; McCarthy vs. Lavasche, 89  111., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser  vs. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind., 443).  Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: 

"Conclusive presumptions. - The  following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive: 

"1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally  and deliberately led another to  believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."

(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67, 69; Municipality of Oas vs. Roa, 7 Phil.  Rep., 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil. Rep., 449,  453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)

The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced, expressly or impliedly.  (Christenson vs. Charleton,  37 Atl., 226, 227,  69 Vt., 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt., 374, 382; Ward vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 227, 50 Am. St. Rep., 80; Hoxie vs. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn., 21, 40; Fitzpatrick  vs. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116,134,17 Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44 Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104;  First Nat. Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44; Johnson vs. Schar, 70 N. W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536; Corey vs. Bolton, 63 N. Y. Supp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply Co. vs.  Jones, 68 N.  Y, Supp., 806,  809,  58 App. Div., 231; Monroe  Waterworks  Co.  vs. City of Monroe, 85 N. W., 685, 688, 110 Wis., 11; Fraser  vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N. W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510; Cedar Rapids Water Co. vs. Cedar Rapids, 90 N. W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa, 250; Kennedy vs. Roberts, 75 N. W., 363, 366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer, 100 Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec,  107, 1 Am. Rep., 115;  West vs. Platt, 127 Mass., 367, 372; Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App.,  649,  653; Michigan Savings & Loan Ass'n.  vs. Missouri, K. &  T. Trust Co., 73 Uo. App., 161,165; Perm vs. Parker, 18 N.  E., 747, 748, 126 I11., 201, 2 L. R. A.,  336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E., 1072, 1075, 153 I11., 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N. E., 145,148, 163 I11., 652; United Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U. S.), 82 Fed., 406, 408, 27 C. C. A., 42, 47 L. R. A., 450; Rice vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (U. S.), 103 Fed., 427, 43 C. C. A., 270; Sidway vs. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. (U. S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; Cable vs.  United States Life Ins.  Co. (U. S.),  111 Fed.,  19, 31, 49 C. C. A.,  216;  Peninsular Land Transp., etc., Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666,  676,14 S. E., 237; Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va.,  1, 7;  Liverpool & L.  & G. Ins.  Co. vs. T. M. Richardson  Lumber Co., 69 Pac, 938,  951, 11 Okl., 585; Livesey vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50,  69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7  Nebr., 4,  14,  29  Am.  Rep., 371;  Warren vs. Crane,  50 Mich., 300,  301, 15 N. W.,  465;  Portland & R. R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587,  592, 32 Pac, 688, 689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac, 980, 982, 123 Cal., 360, 69 Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire  Ins. Co.,  38 Atl., 320,  322, 90 Me., 385;  Reed vs.. Union  Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 Pac, 21,  21 Utah, 295;  Dale vs. . Continental Ins. Co., 31 S. W., 266, 269, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K. P.  vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78  Miss.,  525; Bucklen vs. Johson, 49 N. E., 612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.) We have delayed until this moment the citation of authorities relative to the proposition that venue is  not jurisdictional as to subject matter  and that defendant's rights in respect thereto are such that they may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the reason that We desired that the principles which rule  the case  should first be discussed and presented  in  the abstract form.   In  the  case of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U. S., 141), it was held that  the exemption of national banks from suits  in State courts  in counties  other than  the  county or city  in which the association was located was a  personal privilege which could be waived by appearing in such  suit brought in another county, but in a  court of  the same  dignity, and making a defense without claiming  the immunity granted by Congress.  The  court said: 

"This exemption  of national banking  associations from suits in State courts, established elsewhere than in the county or city in which such associations were located, was, we do not doubt, prescribed for the convenience of those institutions, and to prevent interruption  in  their business that might result from their books being sent to distant counties in obedience to process from State courts.   (First  Nat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall., 383, 394; Crocker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass., 240.) But, without indulging in conjecture as to the object of the exemption in question,  it is sufficient that it was granted by Congress, and,  if it had been  claimed by the defendant when appearing in the superior court of Cleveland County, must have been recognized.  The defendant  did not, however, choose to claim immunity  from  suit in  that court. It made defense upon the merits, and,  having been  unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error to the supreme court of the  State, and in  the latter tribunal,  for the first time, claimed the immunity granted to  it by Congress.  This was too late.  Considering the object as well as the words of the  statute authorizing suit against a national  banking association to be brought in the  proper State court of the county where it is located, we are of opinion that its exemption from suits in other courts  of the same State was a personal privilege that it would  waive, and, which, in this  case,  the  defendant  did waive,  by appearing and making defense without  claiming the immunity granted by Congress.  No reason can be  suggested why one court of a State, rather than another, both  being of the same dignity, should take cognizance of a  suit against a national bank, except the convenience of  the bank.  And this consideration  supports the view that  the exemption  of a national bank from suit in any State court except one of the county or city in which it is located  is a personal privilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemed necessary."

In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U. S, 369), the court said: 

"The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be  sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the  courts.  It  is  rather  in the  nature of  a  personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive.  If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, a defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not be  ousted because he has consented.  Here, the defendant companies have provided that they can be found in a district other than that in which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is adopted, and they have been so found.  In our opinion,  therefore, the circuit  court has jurisdiction of  the  causes, and should proceed to hear and decide them."

In the  case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride  (141 U. S., 127), the court used the following language: 

"The  first part of section 1  of the Act  of 1887, as amended  in  1888, gives, generally, to  the circuit courts of the United  States  jurisdiction  of controversies  between citizens  of different States where the  matter in dispute exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs.   Such a controversy was presented in this complaint.  It was  therefore a  controversy of which the circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction.   Assume that it is  true as defendant alleges, that this is not a  case in which jurisdiction is  founded only on the fact that the controversy is between citizens of different States, but that  it comes within the scope of that  other clause, which  provides that 'no civil suit shall  be brought before either  of  said courts, against any person, by any original process or  proceeding,  in  any  other district than  that whereof he is an  inhabitant,' still the right to insist  upon suit only  in the one district is a personal privilege which he may waive, and he does  waive it by pleading to the merits.   In Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.  S., 369,  378), Chief Justice Waite said:  'The Act of Congress prescribing the place  where a person may be sued is not  one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts.   It is rather in the nature of a  personal exemption  in favor of  a defendant, and it is one which he may waive/   The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. .11, Stat., 79), besides giving general jurisdiction  to  circuit courts over  suits  between citizens  of different States, further provided,  generally, that no  civil suit should be brought before either of said courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other  district than that of which he was an inhabitant,  or in  which  he should be found.  In the case  of Toland vs.  Sprague  (12  Pet., 300,  330), it appeared  that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the State in which the suit was  brought, nor found therein.  In that case the court  observed:  'It  appears that the party appeared  and pleaded  to issue.  Now, if the case were one of a want  of jurisdiction in the court,  it would  not, according to well-established  principles, be competent for the parties by any acts of theirs to give  it.  But that is not the case.   The court  had jurisdiction over the  parties and the matter  in dispute; the  objection was that the party defendant, not being  an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, nor  found therein, personal process  could not reach him.   *   *  *  Now,  this was a personal privilege  or exemption, which it was competent for the party to waive.  The cases of Pollard vs. Dwight  (4 Cranch., 421) and Barry vs. Foyles (1 PL, 311) are decisive to show that, after appearance  and plea, the case stands  as if the suit were brought in  the usual manner. And the first of these cases  proves that exemption from liability  to process and that in case of foreign attachment, too,  is a personal privilege,  which may be waived,  and that appearing and pleading will produce that waiver.'   In Lexington vs. Butler  (14 Wai., 282), the jurisdiction of the circuit  court over a  controversy between citizens of different States was sustained  in a case removed from the State court, although  it was conceded that the suit could not have been commenced in the first  instance in  the  circuit  court.  See  also  Claflin  vs. Commonwealth Ins.  Co. (110 U.  S.,  81 [28:76].) 

"Without multiplying authorities  on this  question, it  is obvious that the party who in the  first  instance appears and  pleads  to the merits waives any right to challenge thereafter the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the suit has been  brought in the wrong  district.  (Charlotte Nat. Bank vs. Morgan, 132  U.  S., 141;  Fitzgerald E. M. Const. Co. vs. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S., 98.)" In the case of the Interior Construction and Improvement Co. vs Gibney  (160  U. S., 217), the court held as follows:

"The circuit courts of the United States are thus vested with general jurisdiction of  civil  actions, involving the requisite  pecuniary  value, between citizens  of different States.   Diversity  of citizenship is a condition of jurisdiction, and, when that does not appear upon the record, the court, of its own motion, will order the action to be dismissed. But the provision  as to the particular district  in which the action shall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction  of the court over such a cause between such parties; but affects  only the proceedings  taken to bring the defendant  within  such  jurisdiction, and is a  matter of personal privilege, which  the defendant may insist upon, or  may waive, at  his election; and the defendant's right to object that an action within the general jurisdiction of the court is brought in the wrong district,  is waived by entering  a general  appearance, without taking  the  objection. (Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat., 699; Toland vs.  Sprague, 12 Pet., 300, 330; Ex parte Schollenberger,.96 U. S., 369, 378; St. Louis &  S. F. R. Co. vs. McBride, 141 U. S.,  127; Southern Pacific Co. vs. Denton, 146 U. S.f 202, 206; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U. S., 105; Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge, 151 U. S., 129; Southern Express Co. vs. Todd, 12 U. S. App., 351.)"

In the  case  of Central Trust Co. vs.  McGeorge  (151 U. S., 129), the court disposed of the case as follows: 

"The court below, in holding that it  did not have jurisdiction  of  the  cause,  and in dismissing the bill of complaint for that reason, acted in view of that clause of the Act of March 3, 1887, as amended in August,  1888, which provides that 'no civil suit shall  be brought in the circuit courts of the United States  against any person,  by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant;' and, undoubtedly, if the defendant company,which was sued in another district than that in which  it had its domicile, had, by  a proper  plea or motion, sought to avail itself of the statutory exemption, the action of the court would  have been right.

"But the defendant company did not choose to plead that provision of the statute, but entered a general appearance, and joined  with the  complainant in  its prayer for the appointment  of a  receiver, and thus was brought within the  ruling of  this  court,  so frequently  made,  that the exemption from being sued out of the district of its domicile is a personal privilege which may be waived and which is waived by pleading to the  merits."

(Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup. Ct., 272, 160 U. S., 217, 40 L.  ed., 401; Walker vs. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A.,  421, 56 Fed., 76, 5  U.  S. App., 423;  Von  Auw. vs. Chicago Toy &  Fancy  Goods  Co., 69  Fed.,  448; McBride vs. Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40 Fed., 162; Black vs. Thorne, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 495  (10  Blatchf.,  66, 5  Fish. Pat.  Cas., 550); Norris vs. Atlas Steamship Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover & Allen  Co. vs.  Columbia Straw Paper Co.,  68 Fed., 945; Blackburn vs. Railroad Co., Fed. Cas.  No. 1, 467  (2 Flip., 525); Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs.  Gibson, 50 Fed., 423.)

In the case of Security Loan and Trust Co. vs. Kauffmah (108 Cal., 214), the court  said:

"The constitution,  Article  VI, section  5,  declares  that, 'All  actions for the  enforcement of liens shall  be commenced in  the county  in which the real estate or some portion thereof is situated; and at the time this action was 'commenced' the property was  situate within the boundaries of San Diego.   The constitution does not, however, require that the  action shall be 'tried' in  the country in which the property is  situated, and the statutory provision  in  section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that actions 'for the  foreclosure of liens and mortgages  on real property' must be tried in the county in which the subject  of the action,  or some part thereof,  is situated, 'subject  to the power  of  the  court  to  change the  place  of  trial shows that 'the place of trial is not an element going to the jurisdiction  of the court,  but is a  matter of legislative regulation.  The provision for the  transfer of certain actions to the superior court of the county  of Riverside,  which is contained  in section 12 of the act providing for the  organization  of  that county, shows the extent of this regulation which the legislature deemed necessary, and  implies  that only the actions there designated were to be transferred for trial."

In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290), the court held as follows:

"The statutory provision in respect to personal actions is more emphatic, requiring that 'suits instituted  by summons, shall, except as  otherwise provided  by law,  be brought: First, when the defendant is a resident of the  State, either in the county  within which the  defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found,'  and yet  it was held  in reference to this statute in the case of Hembree vs. Campbell (8  Mo., 572), that though the suit was brought in the county in which the  plaintiff resided,  and service had upon the defendant in the county of his  residence, unless a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court  over the person of the defendant, was interposed in the first instance, the objection on  the score of lack of jurisdiction could not  subsequently  be  successfully raised.  And this, upon  the  generally recognized ground that  the  court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and that the defendant's plea to  the merits acknowledged jurisdiction over his  person, and precluded objection on  account of absence of regularity in the instituting of the  action.  So also, in  Ulrici vs.  Papin  (11  Mo.,  42), where the then existing statute required 'suits in equity  concerning real estate, or whereby the same may  be affected, shall be  brought in the county within which such real estate  or a greater part thereof is situate/ and by demurrer  to the bill it was objected that the suit was  not brought in the proper county  in conformity with the statutory provision, Judge Scott remarked: 'That it does not  clearly appear where the greater part of the lands lie.   This objection,  if tenable, should have been raised by a plea to the jurisdiction.'   And the same learned judge remarks, in Hembree vs. Campbell, supra, 'No principle is better established than that a plea in bar is a waiver of all dilatory matter of defense.   That the matter of abatement was apparent upon  the writ can  make no difference. Such matters are and should  be pleaded.'  And pleas  to the jurisdiction are as necessary in  local as in transitory actions.   (1 Tidd. Prac,  630.)

"It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere  failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court would have the effect  to  confer jurisdiction where  none existed  before for it is well settled that even consent of parties can not confer jurisdiction.  (Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.)  But all circuit courts have a general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages."

In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman  (54 Texas, 623), the court disposed of the question involved in the following words:

"In our opinion, however,  these common law rules respecting local and transitory  actions have no  more to do  in determining with us where a suit can be brought and maintained, than the like rules in respect to the form and names of actions; but this is solely regulated by and dependent upon the proper construction of the constitution and statutes of the State,  In the first, it is emphatically declared in the bill of rights  as a fundamental principle of government, 'AH courts shall be open, and every  person for an  injury done him in  his lands, goods,  person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.'  Now a party may not have an action in  rem for or concerning land in a foreign jurisdiction, because redress can not be given or had by such proceeding in due  course of law; but personal damages may be given for such injury and enforced by due process of law within the State.   'And it would seem if the State failed to give  to  one of its citizens a remedy  against  others  for injuries  of this kind, it would fail in  the pledge made in the constitution as plainly as if the injury had  been in a foreign jurisdiction to one's  goods or person.'

"There is, as Judge Marshall himself says, no  difference in principle in giving  redress for injuries to land in  the jurisdiction where the  defendant is found, which may  not be equally applicable in other cases.  He says, speaking of the fiction  upon  which transitory actions are  sustained, where the cause of action occurred out of the jurisdiction where they are brought:  They  have   (i. e.,  the courts), 'without legislative aid, applied this fiction to all personal torts,  wherever the wrong may have been committed, and to all  contracts wherever executed.  To this general rule contracts respecting lands form no exception.  It is admitted that on a contract respecting lands, an action is sustainable wherever the defendant may be  found.  Yet in such case every  difficulty may occur that presents itself in  an action of trespass.  An investigation of title  may become necessary,  a question of boundary may arise, and a survey may be essential to the full  merits of the case.  Yet these difficulties have not prevailed  against the jurisdiction of the court.  They are  countervailed by the opposing consideration,  that  if the  action  be disallowed, the  injured party may have a clear  right without a remedy in a case where a person who has  done  the wrong, and  who ought to make the compensation,  is within the power of the court.  That this consideration  loses its influence where the action pursues anything  not  in the reach of the court is  inevitably necessary, but for the loss of its  influence, where the remedy is against the person, and is  within the power of the court,  I  have not  yet  discovered a  reason, other than a technical one, which can satisfy my judgment.' "

In the case of De La Vega vs. League (64 Texas, 205), the court said:

"Our statutes in force at the time the reconvention was filed  provided that suits  for  the  recovery of land should be brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is situated.  This is one of the exceptions to the  general rule requiring suits to be brought  in  the county of the defendant's residence.  This  requirement is not a matter that affects the jurisdiction of the district courts over the subject matter of controversies about the title or possession of lands.   Every district court in the State has cognizance of such suits;  the requirement as to the  county in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of this character.   (Ryan vs. Jackson, 11 Tex., 391; Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176.)   A judgment rendered by the district court of Galveston County, when the  parties had submitted to the jurisdiction, would settle the title  to land in McLennan County as effectually  as  if  rendered in  its own district court.   Jurisdiction of causes may be obtained by  defendants  in counties other than those in which the statute  requires  them to be brought, in other ways than by  express consent or by failure to claim the personal privilege accorded by law.  A suit upon a monied demand, brought in the county of a defendant's residence by a resident of another county, may be met with a counter demand against the plaintiff, and a recovery  may  be had upon the counter demand, though  if suit had  been  originally commenced upon it, the county of the plaintiff's residence would have had  exclusive jurisdiction.  And so with other  cases that might be supposed.   A 'plaintiff calling a defendant into court  for the purpose of obtaining relief against him invites him to set up all defenses which may defeat the cause of action  sued  on, or  any other appropriate and germane to the  subject matter of  the suit,  which should be settled between the parties before a proper adjudication of the merits of the cause can be obtained. He  grants him the privilege of setting up all such counterclaims and cross actions as he holds against the  plaintiff which may legally be pleaded in such a suit.

"This is particularly the case  in our State, where a multiplicity of suits is  abhorred, and a leading  object  is to settle  all disputes between the parties pertinent to the cause  of action  in the same suit.  The question of the original right to bring the cross action  in the county where the suit is pending can not be raised; otherwise this design would,  in a  large  number of cases, be defeated, and the various  matters which could well  be settled in the cause might have to seek a number of different counties, and be asserted in a number of different suits, before the controversy between the parties could be settled.  The plaintiff must be considered as waiving  any privilege to  plead to the jurisdiction in such cross actions,  and as consenting that the  defendant may assert  in  the suit  any demands which he could plead were it commenced  in  the county where such demands were properly suable.  The question then is, could La Vega have set  up  the  matters pleaded in his answer in reconvention had the land sought to be partitioned been situated in Galveston County?  This  question must be determined by the solution of another, viz, can a defendant to a partition suit who claims through the title under which the partition  is sought set up a superior title to the whole  land?   It is doubtless true  that, in a partition suit, a  court of equity will not entertain any controversy as to the legal  title, whether it arises between  the part owners as to their respective interests, or by reason of a claim set up  by one or more of them to the entire land by title superior to the one under which the partition is asked to be decreed.  In  our State, where there is no distinction between law  and  equity in the determination of causes, an action to settle disputed titles, whether legal or equitable, may be combined  with one to partition the land  between the plaintiff  and defendant.  Hence there can be no objection  to determining any questions as to title  between the co-owners in a partition suit in our State, and the strict rules of chancery do not prevail."

In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46  Minn.,  535), the court made use of  the following language:

"1. The appellant contends  that  the district  court for the county of Sibley,  and of the eighth judicial  district, was without jurisdiction, and could not properly determine the rights or interests of either litigant to lands located in Sherburne County, which is in the seventh judicial district; but this  question was passed upon many years since, in the case of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn., 15), wherein it was held  that, although the proper  place  for the trial  of an action to recover real property, or for the  determination, in any form,  of a right  or interest  therein,  was, by virtue of an existing statute - now found as Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, par.  47 - in the county  wherein the  lands  were situated, the district court of the county designated in the complaint had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and had power to proceed, unless a demand for a change of venue was made before the time for answering expired, in accordance with the express provisions of another section  now section 51 -  of  the same  chapter,  and the place of trial had actually been changed by order of the court or by consent of parties."

In  the  case of the West Point Iron Co.  vs. Reymert (45 N.  Y., 703), the court said:

"The action was tried in the county of Dutchess, and by the court without a jury, without objection  on the part of the defendants.  If the trial should have been in Putnam, and by a jury, it was for the defendants to  assert their rights at the trial; and by not  then  claiming them,  they waived them, and must be regarded as having assented to the place and  mode of trial."

We transcribe the following from decisions of the supreme court of  Spain:

"Considering, further,  that Pedrosa, instead  of  immediately objecting to the jurisdiction of the court and asking for a change  of venue, sued for recovery of title, thereby submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, which reserved its decision thereon until plaintiff had presented the  petition  in  due form."   (Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)

"Considering that although other proceedings  were had in the said court (Salvador de  Granada) and in the courts of first instance of Sagrario and Guerra of  said city  subsequent to the death of the count, the truth of the matter is that his daughter, the countess, the only  party now claiming relief, not only had  the  proceedings taken in the first of said courts dismissed but asked the court of first instance of Castilla de la  Nueva  to accept, and the court accepted, her  express submission to its jurisdiction:

"Considering that far from objecting, as  she might have objected, to the jurisdiction of the court, the countess acknowledged such jurisdiction as did the other coheirs when they asked the court to proceed with the testamentary proceedings, thus creating a jurisdictional situation perfectly in harmony with the respective claims of the parties and so binding upon  them that they are  now absolutely estopped from denying its importance  or legal force."   (Judgment of May 30,  1860, 5 Civ.  Jur., 465.)

"He who by his  own acts submits himself to the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  shall not thereafter be permitted  to question such jurisdiction."   (Judgment of December 30, 1873, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)

"According to article 305 (of the Ley  de  Enjuiciamiento Civil)  the plaintiff shall be presumed to have tacitly submitted himself to the jurisdiction  of the court by the mere act of filing his complaint therein, and in the case of  the defendant where the latter after  appearing in the action takes any s.tep therein other than to object to such jurisdiction."  (Judgment of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur., 232.)

"Plaintiff and defendant are presumed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, the former by the mere act of filing his complaint therein and the latter by his answering the same and taking any step other than demurring  to  such  jurisdiction as provided in articles 56 to 58 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil."   (Judgment of July 27, 1883, 52 Civ. Jur., 511.)

"In order that a tacit submission based  upon the mere act of filing the complaint  may be valid the court must be one of ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil."   (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)

The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 1, p. 50):

"The old distinction between  'local'  and 'transitory' actions, though of far less importance than it was before the passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in mind in connection with actions relating to  land situate outside the local jurisdiction  of  our courts.   'Transitory' actions were those in which the facts in issue  between the parties had no necessary connection with a particular locality, e. g., actions in  respect of trespass to goods, assault, breach of contract, etc.;  whilst  'local' actions were  those  in which there was such a connection, e. g., disputes as to the  title to,  or trespasses to, land.

"One importance of this distinction  lay  in the fact  that in the case of local  actions the plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i. e., in the county (originally in the actual hundred)  in  which the land in  question lay.  In the case, however of a transitory action, he might  lay it  wherever he  pleased, subject to the power  of the court to  alter it in a proper case.  Local venues have now been abolished, and, therefore,  so far as actions relating to  land in England are concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.

"It is, however, important from another point of view, viz, that of jurisdiction as distinct from procedure.   In the case of real actions relating to land in the colonies or foreign countries  the English courts had, even before  the judicature acts,  no jurisdiction; and, therefore,  the removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure  viz, the rule as to local venue - which  might have stood in the way, if they had had and  wished to exercise jurisdiction, did not in  any way confer jurisdiction in such  cases.   The lack of jurisdiction  still  exists,  and  our courts refuse to adjudicate upon claims of title to foreign land in proceedings founded on  an  alleged invasion of the proprietary  rights attached thereto, and  to award damages founded  on that  adjudication; in other words, an action for trespass  to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained in England, at  any rate  if  the  defendant  chooses  to put in issue the ownership of such land"

There is no decision of the  Supreme Court  of the Philippine Islands in conflict with the principles laid down in this opinion.  In the case of Serrano vs.  Chanco  (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter before the court was the jurisdiction of  the Court of First Instance over the actions and proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.  The determination of that question required the consideration of section 602 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure rather than section 377 of that code.  The argument of the court touching the last-named section, is inapplicable to the case at bar and would not affect it if it were.  The reference to the jurisdiction of the court made in that argument based on  section 377 was unnecessary to a decision of the case.

The case of Molina vs. De  la Riva  (6  Phil.  Rep.,  12), presented simply the question whether or not an  agreement between parties to  submit themselves  to  the  jurisdiction of a particular court to the exclusion of the court provided by  law as the appropriate court in  the premises could be enforced.   As we  have before intimated,  it  touched no question involved in the litigation at  bar.

In the case of Molina vs. Be la Riva  (7 Phil. Rep., 302), the action was one to foreclose a mortgage upon real and personal property.   In discussing the matter before it the court said:

"The demurrer was also based upon the ground that this was an action to foreclose a mortgage and by the provisions of sections 254  and  377 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure it should have been brought in the Province of Albay where the property  was situated.  The action  is clearly an action to foreclose a mortgage, lien, or incumbrance  upon property, but it will  be noticed that section  254 relates only to mortgages on real estate.   This contract covered both  real and personal property, and while, perhaps, an action could not be maintained in the Court of First Instance  of Manila for the foreclosure of the alleged mortgage upon the real estate situated in Albay, yet so far as the personal property was concerned,  we know of no law which would deprive that court of jurisdiction."

As will  readily be observed, the court in the remarks above quoted was not discussing or deciding the question whether or not an action  could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real estate located  in Albay; but, rather, whether or not an action could be maintained in  the Court of First Instance of the  city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage  on personal property located in the Province of Albay.  The remark of the court that perhaps the former action could not be maintained was not intended to be decisive and was not thought  at the time  to be an  indication of what the decision of the court might be if that precise case were presented to it with full argument and citation of authorities.

The case of Castano vs.  Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep., 310), involved the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to issue a writ of  prohibition against a justice of the peace holding his court outside the  province in which the Court of First Instance was  sitting at  the time of issuing the writ.  The  determination of  that  question presented different considerations and different provisions of law from those which rule the decision of the case at bar.

We,  therefore, hold that the terms of section  377 providing that actions affecting real property shall  be brought in the  province where the land involved in the suit,  or some part thereof, is located,  do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the place of trial.

We come, now, to a consideration of the special  laws relating to the condemnation of land by railroad companies upon which  also plaintiff relies.   Of those laws only one is of importance in the decision of this case.  That is Act No. 1258.  In ft are found  these provisions:

"SECTION 1. In addition to  the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power of eminent  domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three, inclusive,  of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled  'An  Act  providing a Code  of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings  in  the Philippine Islands/ the procedure in this Act provided may be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land for the construction, extension, or operation of its railroad line.

*       *       *       *       *       *       *

"Sec. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by its charter, or by general law, to exercise the power of eminent domain in the city of Manila or in  any province, and has not obtained by agreement with the owners  thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as authorized by law, it may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of  Manila if the land is situated in the city of Manila, or  in the Court of First Instance of the province where the  land is situated, join as defendants all persons owning  or claiming to own, or occupying, any of the lands sought to be condemned, or any interest therein, within the city or province, respectively, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each  defendant and  stating with  certainty  the right of condemnation, and describing  the  property  sought to be condemned.  Process  requiring the defendants to  appear in answer to the complaint shall be served  upon all occupants of the land sought  to be condemned, and  upon the owners and all persons claiming interest therein,  so far as known.  If the title to any lands sought to be condemned appears to be in the Insular Government, although the lands are occupied by private individuals, or if it is uncertain whether the title is in the Insular Government or in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so obscure or doubtful that the company  can  not with accuracy or  certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may be made by the company in its complaint to that effect. Process shall be served upon residents and nonresidents in the same manner as provided therefor in Act Numbered One hundred and  ninety, and the rights of minors and persons of unsound mind shall be safeguarded in the manner in such cases provided in said Act.  The court may order additional and special notice  in any case where  such additional or special notice is, in its opinion, required.

"Sec. 4. Commissioners appointed  in pursuance of such complaint, in accordance with section two hundred  and forty-three of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, shall have jurisdiction over all the  lands  included in the complaint, situated  within  the  city of Manila  or within the province, as the case may be, and shall  be governed  in the performance of  their duties by the provisions of sections two hundred and forty-four and two hundred and  forty- five, and the action of  the  court upon the report  of the commissioners shall be  governed by  section two hundred and forty-six of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety."

The  provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to in these  sections are, so far as material  here,  the following :

"SEC. 241. How  the  right of eminent domain may be exercised. - The  Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province  or department thereof, or  of any municipality,  and any person, or  public or private corporation having by law the  right to condemn  private  property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner herein-after prescribed.

"SEC. 242. The complaint - The complaint in condemnation  proceedings  shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, and describe  the property sought to be condemned, showing the interest of each  defendant separately.

"SEC. 243. Appointment of Commissioners. -  If the defendant concede that the  right of condemnation exists on the part of the  plaintiff, or  if, upon  trial, the court finds that such  right  exists, the court shall appoint three judicious and disinterested landowners of the province in  which the land to be condemned,  or  some  portion of the  same, is situated,  to be commissioners to hear the parties  and view the premises, and assess damages to be paid for the condemnation, and to  report their proceedings in full to the  court, and shall issue a commission under the seal of the court to the commissioners authorizing the performance of the duties herein prescribed."

We are of the opinion that what we have  said in the discussion of the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over lands is applicable generally to the  sections of law just quoted.  The provisions regarding  the  place and method  of trial are procedural.   They touch not the authority  of the court over the land but, rather, the powers which it may exercise over the  parties.  They relate not to  the jurisdictional power of the court over the subject matter but to the place where that jurisdiction is to  be exercised.   In other words, the jurisdiction is  assured, whatever the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is  the  thing; the  place of exercise  its incident.
 
  These special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an intention of the legislature to alter the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of Courts  of First Instance granted  by Act  No.  136.  As we said  in discussing the provisions of section 377  of the Code of Civil Procedure, we  can not hold that jurisdiction  to be limited unless  by express provision or clear intendment.

We have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the Code  of Civil Procedure and  section 3  of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither the one nor the other was intended to restrict, much  less  deprive, the Courts of First Instance of the jurisdiction over lands  in the Philippine Islands conferred upon  them by Act No.  136.  We  have extended  that analogy to include the proposition that the question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject  matter, it simply granting to the  defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff "relative  to the place  of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by  implication.  We do not, however, extend that analogy further.  On reading and  comparing section  377 of the Code of Civil Procedure with  section 3 of Act No. 1258. both of which are herein set forth,  a difference is at once apparent in the wording of the  provisions  relating to the place of trial.  Section 377 stipulates that all  actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated."  Section 3 of Act No. 1258 provides that in an action brought by a railroad corporation to condemn land for its uses the plaintiff "may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted *  *  *  in the Court of First  Instance of the  province where the land is situated, join as defendants all persons owning, etc.   *   *   *  land within  the  city or  province *  *  *  ."  Section 1 of that Act, as  we have already seen, says that: "In addition to  the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the  power of eminent domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code of Civil Procedure, "the procedure in this Act may be adopted whenever a railroad  corporation seeks to appropriate  land   *   *  *   ."

From these provisions  we note, first, that the procedure expressly made applicable to actions for the condemnation of land  by  railroad corporations  is  not  that contained in section 377 but that found in sections 241  to 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   Section  377 is nowhere expressly mentioned in Act No. 1258 nor is it anywhere touched or referred to by implication.   The procedure embodied in that Act to consummate the purposes of its creation is complete of itself, rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself or by reference to specific  sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which by such reference are  made  a part thereof.

In the second place, we observe that, so far as venue is concerned, Act No. 1258 and section 377 are quite different in their wording.  While the latter provides that the actions of which it treats shall be commenced in the province where the land, or some part thereof, lies, Act No. 1258, section 3, stipulates that the  action  embraced  in its terms  shall be brought only in the province where the land lies.  This does not mean, of course, that if a single parcel of land under  the  same ownership,  lying partly in  one province and partly in another, is the subject of condemnation proceedings begun by a railroad corporation, a separate action must be commenced in each province.  Nor  does it mean that the aid  of section 377  is  required to  obviate  such necessity.  The situation would be met and solved by the general principles of law the application of which to every situation is an inherent or implied power of every court. Such, for example, are the prohibition against multiplicity of actions, the rule against division  of actions Into parts, and the general principle that jurisdiction over a  subject matter  singly owned will not  be divided among different courts,  the one in which the action is first brought having exclusive jurisdiction of the whole.  The provisions of these two laws, section 377 and Act No. 1258, differ in the manner indicated  because  they refer to  subjects  requiring inherently different  treatment, so different,  in fact, as to be in some respects quite opposite.  While it is true that section 377 speaks of actions for the condemnation of real estate, neverthless  it was intended to cover simply  the ordinary  action affecting title to or interest in real estate, where  the  land involved  is comparatively speaking, compact together.   Its provisions  were not  intended to meet a situation presented  by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously from one end of the country to the other.   Act No, 1258 is a special law, enacted for a particular  purpose, and to meet a particular exigency.  The conditions found in an action for the condemnation  of real estate by a railroad company  might and generally would be  so different  that the application of the provisions of section  377 permitting the venue to be laid in any province where any  part of the  land lies would work  a very great hardship to many defendants in  such an action.  To  hold that a railroad company desiring to build a line from Ilocos Norte to Batangas, through substantially the whole of the Island of Luzon, might lay the venue in Batangas, it being a  province  in which a part of the land described in the complaint was located, would be to require all the parties defendant in Ilocos Norte and intervening provinces,  with their witnesses,  to  go to Batangas,  with all  the inconvenience and expense  which  that  journey would entail, and submit the valuation of their  lands not only to the Court of First Instance of Batangas but to a commission appointed in that province.  The hardship to such defendants under  such  a holding is so manifest that we are of the opinion that it was not intended that  section 377 of the Code  of Civil Procedure should apply to actions for condemnation.  Under the provisions of that section, the defendant has no right to ask for a change of venue if the land involved in  the litigation,  or any part  thereof, is located in the province where the court sits before which the action  has been commenced.   When, therefore, an action such as is detailed above is begun by a railroad company in Batangas  against persons whose lands lie in Ilocos Norte, there being also involved lands lying in Batangas,  such defendants  would have no right under section 377,  if it were applicable, to demand that the trial as to their lands take place in the Province  of  Ilocos Norte.  We do not believe  that this was  intended.  We believe, rather,  that under the provisions of the special laws relating to the condemnation of real  estate by railroad companies,  the defendants in the various provinces through which the line runs may compel, if they wish, a separate action to be  commenced in each province in  order that they may have a fair and convenient trial not  only before the  court but also before  commissioners of their province  who are  not  only conveniently at hand, but who are best able to judge of the weight  of testimony relative to the value of land in  that province.

We, therefore, hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad  corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of  such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie.  In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun.  It would be severed as to  the objecting defendants  and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate  province or provinces.   While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof.  They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction  be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.

The principles which we have herein  laid down we do not apply to criminal cases.   They seem to rest on  a different footing.   There the people of the state  is a party. The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime,  it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near  as may be, where he committed  his crime.  As a result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in constitutions, that the  venue of a criminal action must be  laid in the place where the crime was  committed. While the laws here do not specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions  must  be brought and conducted, except in  cases especially provided  by law, in the province where the crime is committed.

For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.   So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.