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[IN MATTER OF APPLICATION OF ERNEST F. DU FRESNE TO BE ADMITTED TO BAR WITHOUT TAKING USUAL EXAMINATION.](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cc4d?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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20 Phil. 488

[ G. R. No. 1045, November 23, 1911 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ERNEST F. DU FRESNE TO BE ADMITTED TO THE BAR WITHOUT TAKING THE USUAL EXAMINATION.

D E C I S I O N

CARSON, J.:

This is a motion for a reconsideration of a former ruling of this court denying an application for a license to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without taking the prescribed examination.

Applicant,  relying  upon the provisions of section 2  of Act No. 1597, seeks admission to the bar  without  taking the usual examination claiming that he has  "held" the office of assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila by virtue of an appointment as acting assistant prosecuting attorney of the city  of Manila, made in his favor under the provisions of section 15 of Act No. 1698.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597 is as follows: 

"Paragraph  one  of section thirteen of  Act Numbered One hundred and  ninety, entitled  'An  Act providing a Code of Procedure  in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby  amended  to read  as follows: 

"'1. Those who have been duly licensed  under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the  United States and are in good and regular standing as members  of the bar of the Philippine Islands  at the time of the  adoption  of this code;  Provided,  That any person  who,  prior  to the passage  of this  Act, or at any time thereafter,  shall have held, under  the authority  of the United States,  the  position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge  or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the  position  of  Attorney-General, Solicitor-General,  Assistant Attorney-General,  Assistant Attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant  prosecuting attorney  for the  city  of Manila,  city  attorney  of  Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts  of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before  the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.'"

That portion of section 15 of Act No. 1698, by authority of which applicant claims that he was appointed an acting assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, is as follows:

"In case of a temporary absence or  disability of any subordinate officer or  employee in any Bureau or Office, the chief of such Bureau or Office may designate any other subordinate officer or  employee in  his Bureau or  Office temporarily to perform the duties of the officer or employee who is  thus absent or disabled, and it shall be the duty of the person so  designated to perform the duties so assigned to him without additional compensation."

Upon the  showing  made  by the  applicant, we do not think that he comes within either the  letter or the spirit of  the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, on which he  bases  his application.

Applicant does not claim that he  was  appointed to the office of assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila. His claim is  that  he  was  appointed an  acting assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila;  but the privilege conferred in  express  terms in  section  2  of  Act No. 1597, upon which he relies, is conferred upon one who has "held"  the position of assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, and makes no express provision touching one who has held the position of an acting assistant prosecuting attorney.

Applicant, however, contends that his appointment as an acting assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, under the provisions of section 15 of Act No.  1698, was a sufficient authorization to him to hold  the office of assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila; and that he  did,  in fact, hold that office and perform the duties thereof  for several months.   We do not  think that this contention is or can be sustained by the terms of the statute upon which applicant relies.

Without considering whether section 15 of Act No. 1698 contemplates or authorizes the making of appointments in the form in which applicant's appointment was made, that is to say, as an acting assistant prosecuting attorney, it is very clear that whatever form be adopted by the prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila in designating subordinate officers and employees in  his office temporarily to perform the duties of  an absent or disabled  assistant prosecuting attorney, his action,  if taken under the authority conferred upon  him by  section 15 of Act No.  1698, can amount to no  more  than a mere designation and authorization  to such person temporarily to perform the duties of the absent or disabled  official, without  additional compensation.   The language  of the statute leaves no room  for doubt that a subordinate officer or employee designated temporarily to perform the duties of another,  continues to "hold" his own office  or employment with  all its rights and  privileges; and there is nothing in the statute  which indicates  that it was the intention  of the legislator that he  is to enjoy, in addition thereto, any of the  rights and privileges of the official whose  duties  he is designated temporarily to  perform, except only, of course, such rights and  privileges as are necessarily incident to the actual performance of  the duties of the absent  or  disabled official.

But not only does the designation of the applicant temporarily to perform  the duties  of an  assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila fail  to bring him within the strict letter of the law  authorizing  the admission  of such officials to the bar without examination; in our opinion it fails also to bring him within the spirit or the intent of the provisions of the above-cited section 2 of Act No. 1597.

Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to the bar in these  Islands  be required  to furnish satisfactory proof of his educational and moral qualifications and of his possession of such a degree  of learning and proficiency in the law as may  be  deemed necessary for the due performance«of the duties of a lawyer.   The learning and proficiency in the law of an applicant for admission to the bar ia usually ascertained by requiring him to submit himself to an examination.  But  section 2 of Act No. 1597 provides, substantially, that officials who have held certain specified judicial and  legal offices in these  Islands will be presumed to have the necessary learning and  proficiency in the law to entitle them to admission to the bar without examination.  Of course, a  mere appointment to one of these offices could not  impart such learning  and  proficiency in the law to one who was without  it at the time of  his appointment, and it is clear that  this presumption must rest on the further presumption  that  before  any person is appointed  to any of the positions mentioned in the Act, due inquiry is made as to his character and qualifications, and that no person will be appointed to such positions who has not at least such a degree of learning and proficiency in the law as would entitle him to admission to practice in the various courts in these Islands.  Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No. 1597 are made either by the President of the United States  by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands  by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, and  the legislator evidently conceived that the fact that such an  appointment is made is a sufficient guaranty that after due  inquiry the appointee has been found to be  possessed of at least the necessary qualifications for  admission to the bar.

But no such presumption arises as to the qualification of one who  is merely designated temporarily to perform the duties of one of the officials mentioned in the Act.  Under the provisions of section 15 of Act No. 1698, the Attorney-General of the Islands, the city attorney and the prosecuting attorney  for  the city of  Manila and the attorney for the Moro Province may each  designate any  subordinate officer or employee in their respective offices  temporarily to perform the duties of an absent or disabled assistant attorney.  In making such designation for temporary duty, there is no such obligation upon the chiefs of these offices to look well to the qualifications as a lawyer of the employee thus designated, as there is upon the Chief Executive to look well to the qualifications of a  regular appointee to such  an office; and  it is  easy to imagine cases where an employee not learned in the  law, or at most with some knowledge and experience in a  single  branch of the law such as  criminal practice and  procedure, might  properly be designated  temporarily to perform  the duties  of an assistant attorney in one or other of those offices, although his permanent appointment to such  an office would not be justified by his general attainments as  a lawyer.  There is no such guaranty that only competent attorneys will be designated  by  the  chiefs  of  these  offices temporarily to perform the duties of absent  assistant attorneys  under the provisions  of section 15  of  Act No. 1698, as  there  is that the President  of the United States by and with the advice  and  consent of the Senate, and the Governor-General  of the  Philippine Islands by and with the consent of the Commission will appoint none but competent attorneys permanently to occupy the important  judicial and  legal positions expressly mentioned  in section 2 of Act No. 1597.

We do not believe that  it was the intention of the legislator to put it in the power of the Attorney-General of the Islands, of the city attorney and the prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila,  and of the attorney for the Moro Province arbitrarily, and in  the exercise of  their unrestrained  discretion to confer upon subordinate officers and employees in their offices the  right to admission to the bar in these Islands without  examination;  and we hold that subordinate officers and employees designated temporarily to perform the duties of absent or disabled assistant attorneys do not hold the positions of such absent or  disabled assistant attorneys in the sense in  which the legislator contemplated the holding of those positions in section 2 of Act No.  1597, in order to give one who has held them the right to  admission to practice law  in these Islands without taking the prescribed examination.

The application should be, and is, denied.

Arellano, C.  J., Torres,  Mapa,  Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.


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