This is an appeal, by bill of exceptions, from the orders of December 16, 1910, and January 26, 1911, entered by the lower court.

On November 2, 1910, William A.  Grattage filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of this city, against the corporation known as "The Standard Fuel Company," duly  organized and existing  in this city of Manila  and engaged  in the coal business.  The said complaint alleged that on the 14th of October,  1910, and for  a long period prior to  said date, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant corporation as a collector, and for his services was to receive, and had been accustomed to receive, the sum of P100 per month; that on said 14th day of October, the plaintiff  resigned  his  position as collector,  to depart for the United States on the  transport Logan, which sailed on the following day, October 15; that the plaintiff having demanded  of the  defendant  payment of the  balance of salary due, amounting to 79  centavos, the  latter refused to pay him the same, and on the same date  the  defendant, maliciously and without probable cause, filed a complaint charging  the plaintiff with the crime of estafa,  on the ground that on  the 13th of the aforesaid month the accused, Grattage, being under the  obligation, in his said capacity as collector, to  turn over to the company all sums collected by him from the debtors of the said Standard Fuel Company,  collected  and received  the sum of f=22 from the corporation known as  "The  Distilled Water  Company," and, instead  of complying  with his duty, did, voluntarily, illegally,  and fraudulently  appropriate to his own benefit the said sum, to the damage and prejudice of the Standard Fuel  Company, contrary to law; that, by  virtue of this complaint and  of the order of arrest issued by the court, the plaintiff was arrested on the 15th of October on board the transport Logan in sight of all the  passengers  and the crew, taken ashore and  confined in the Luneta police station until the 17th of said month; that, on the hearing of the charge, before the municipal court, as no evidence was presented in support thereof, the  said Grattage  was released;  that by reason  of  the malicious conduct of the defendant, in charging the plaintiff, without probable cause, with the  commission of a crime, the latter was damaged morally and  pecuniarily, for  he had  to pay  attorney's fees and  other  expenses incurred  after his arrest,  and suffered great mental anguish as a result of the humiliation and  mortification caused him  by such arrest;  that  the plaintiff was urgently called  to the United States for matters of great importance and was unable to depart because of the said arrest which  redounded  to the injury of  the good esteem and prestige  in  which he was held; and that such injury and  damage was due to the malicious procedure of the  defendant company,  its  officers, supervisors,  and agents. The plaintiff therefore prayed that judgment be rendered  in his  behalf and against the defendant for  the sum of P7,500.79, the amount in which he estimated such injury arid' damage, together with interest thereon  and the costs,  and that the court further give exemplary damages to the plaintiff in whatsoever amount might be deemed just and equitable.

The defendant company, on December 1, 1910, presented, in writing, a  demurrer to the aforementioned complaint, basing the same  on the grounds  that the complaint did  not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,  and was ambiguous,  unintelligible, and vague;  and asked that the complaint be dismissed, with the  costs  against  the plaintiff.

The  case having come before the court for a hearing on the demurrer, the judge, on the 16th of the  aforesaid month, issued an order sustaining the demurrer, to which ruling an exception was taken by the plaintiff.

The  plaintiff,  by an order of January 7, having been granted a delay for the purpose of amending his complaint, his counsel entered an  exception thereto in writing and stated that his client did not desire to amend his original complaint; therefore the defendant, in turn, requested that the case be dismissed, and the court, by an  order of January 26, 1911, dismissed the action with the costs in favor of the defendant.  An exception to this ruling was taken by the plaintiff, who announced his intention to  appeal to this court, and for such purpose filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was certified and  duly forwarded.

The claim,  made  by the plaintiff  against the defendant company, of an indemnity  for injury and damage, is based on the  allegation that the latter, maliciously and without cause, filed a  complaint in the municipal court of this city,  charging the former, to his detriment,  with having committed the crime  of estafa or embezzlement of P22, which was untrue, for the defendant could not prove the charge, and, because of such lack of proof, the municipal court had to dismiss the action and release the defendant, the herein plaintiff, who alleges that,  as a result of that libelous accusation  filed without just  cause,  he  suffered injury and damage to  the  amount of P7,500.79.

The action  prosecuted by the plaintiff originates  in the fact that he was accused by the defendant company, without probable cause, with having committed the crime of estafa, such  charge being filed before a judicial authority who dismissed the complaint for lack of proof in  its support. The propriety of the said action depends upon whether the judge before whom the charge was heard,  certified that the accusation was  in fact false and libelous, since from this circumstance is  derived the right of the person libeled, or falsely accused, to  prosecute  the false accuser and to demand from  him an indemnity for  injury and damage.

Article 326 of the Penal  Code prescribes that: 

"The crime of false accusation or denunciation is committed by falsely  imputing to any person acts which, if they were true, would constitute a crime that would give rise to proceedings ex  officio if the imputation were  made before an  administrative or judicial official who would be obliged to proceed to its  investigation  or  punishment  by reason of his office. 

"The denouncer or accuser, however,  shall not be proceeded against unless by virtue of a final sentence or writ, equally final, of the court which took  cognizance of the crime imputed, dismissing the complaint. 

"The latter shall proceed ex officio against the denouncer or accuser, provided that  the principal cause should show sufficient grounds for instituting a new action."

In harmony with  these provisions of the Penal  Code, article 795 of the Compilation reformada  de las  disposiciones sobre el Enjuiciamiento Criminal, provides  that, in the  first case of the article  above quoted,  which is  when the  act which gave rise to the institution  of the cause is not  proved,  it may be certified by  the  court in  ordering the dismissal that the bringing of the action  has not injured the reputation of the parties prosecuted or of any of them.

The court may also, at  the instance of the party prosecuted, reserve to the latter the right to sue the complainant  for false  accusation.

Article 638 of the Ley  de Enjuiciamiento Criminal  of 1882 (Law  of Criminal  Procedure)  contains analogous provisions, which are cited on account of their agreement with the preinserted article of the Penal Code.

It is concluded from the  legal provisions aforementioned, that the false imputation of  crimes of a private character does not constitute the crime of libelous denunciation  or accusation, punished  by the  said article 326 of the Penal Code.

It is true that the. plaintiff was accused before a judicial authority  with having committed  the crime of estafa, an accusation  which afterwards  could not be proved, wherefore the complaint was dismissed and the plaintiff in this cause,  William  A. Grattage, was  released.  The act of which he was accused, wrongfully and without just cause, might be a crime of a public character which could be the subject matter  of an action by the prosecuting officer; and the  decision or order  of dismissal by the  municipal judge, directing his release, is of a definite and final character; but, notwithstanding these circumstances, the fact is  that the judge, in determining  the  matter,  abstained from  making an  explicit statement  that  the accusation presented by the complaining witness was false and libelous; neither did he order  that the latter be  proceeded against through  an information  by the prosecuting officer.  For this reason, to wit, because of the lack of such certification that the accusation made against the herein plaintiff,  Grattage, was false and libelous,  it would be improper, pursuant to the  provisions of the Penal Code,  to hold that the said accuser incurred criminal liability, or that  he  is civilly liable  for the injury  and damage occasioned by that unproved accusation, not certified to be false by the judge before whom the case was  tried; for, in accordance with article 17 of the Penal  Code,  civil  liability is  always a consequence of criminal responsibility in the cases of crimes that give rise to a criminal action and to  the consequent civil liability.

So, then,  according to an  express  provision of the  code, in order  that an action instituted for the recovery of an indemnity for injury and damage, as a result of  a  false denunciation  or  libelous  accusation,  may  be proper  and maintainable  before  the  courts,  it is indispensable  that, in the judgment whereby the accused and libeled  person is absolved, or  in  the order of  final dismissal,  the said denunciation or  accusation  be,  as provided by the penal law, expressly certified to  be false and libelous; otherwise, the action can not prosper.

In the case  of  Gonzalez  Quiros vs. Palanca Tan-Guinlay (5 Phil. Rep.,  675), the following doctrine was established: 

"No  civil action for damages  on  account of malicious prosecution can be maintained unless the court, in acquitting the  defendant of the  criminal charge, orders a  criminal prosecution to be commenced against the complaining witness for false accusation."

In the same decision it is said: 

"Article 326 of the Penal  Code provides,  as we have held in the  case of United States vs.  Agustina  Barrera (4 Phil. Rep., 461), that no prosecution  for a false accusation or complaint in  a criminal  case  can be commenced unless the judge, in dismissing the first complaint, orders a complaint to be filed against the complaining witness for false  accusation.  The judgment dismissing the complaint  against the defendant contained  no such  provision. We hold  that  this article applies  not  only  to a criminal proceeding  against the complaining witness,  but also  to civil proceedings, and that no  action to recover damages in a civil suit can be maintained  by the  person arrested against the person presenting the complaint, unless in the order  acquitting  the  person  arrested  the  judge  certifies that the complaint was malicious, as required by said article 326.  The defendant in this case, therefore,  is not entitled to recover any damages by reason of the criminal prosecution  against him."

Said decision was a confirmation  of  the  legal doctrine constantly followed by the  courts of these Islands; it agrees with that established  in  Spain, and is in  harmony with the provisions of the penal laws in force in that country, which  are analogous to those  that govern in this Archipelago.  We therefore abstain  from citing in this decision laws of Spain and decisions of the  Spanish supreme court. By what has been herein before stated,  and  by the quotation from a former decision of this court, the  impropriety of the action prosecuted by the plaintiff  for injury and damage has been demonstrated.

If the latter had immediately petitioned the court that dismissed  the complaint, to certify, pursuant  to the provisions of the Penal Code, that the accusation  of estafa made  against him was false, perhaps he would  have succeeded in obtaining such  a certification;  but the person accused, now the  plaintiff, William A. Grattage, not having so done, this court can not lawfully authorize a continuance of the said action, nor can it reverse the order of December 16, 1910, sustaining the demurrer.

For the foregoing reasons,  whereby  the errors assigned to the  order appealed from, which is  sustained  as to its dispositive part  upon the grounds herein  set forth, are held  to  have been answered  and refuted, the said order and that of January 26  of the current year are affirmed with the costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., dissents.