This is a proceeding brought in the Court of Land Registration by Pilar Gil as executrix of the last will and testament of Manuel Murciano, deceased.  The Land  Court ordered the property registered in the name of the plaintiff as such executrix and the corresponding certificate of title issued.   This appeal is taken from the judgment decreeing such registration and the issuance of such title.

We have already  held in  the case  of  Soriano vs. Talens (p. 257, supra)  that the Land Registration  Act does not confer authority  upon an  administrator  to  register title to the land of which his  intestate  died seized.   In the absence of  such  authority  such administrator is  not the proper party to bring such a proceeding.   We see no reason why such a holding should not apply  to. an executrix where the record does not  show, as it does not in this case, that the will  of the deceased  conferred upon the executrix  as such any interest in the land of which he died seized.

This  question,  however,  was not  raised  in  the court below and has not been specifically raised on this appeal. We feel, however, that it is one which the court ought not to pass without notice although it is not expressly raised. If we  permitted  this cause to pass  successfully  through this court, thereby giving it our sanction, we might thereby mislead an innocent purchaser or an innocent incumbrancer of the property in question to part  with  his  money upon the faith of such  sanction only to find later, possibly, that there was a serious question as to whether or  not the registered title upon  which he  had  based  his  faith and paid his money was of doubtful validity.   We are of the opinion,  therefore, that, upon this ground alone, it is the duty of this court to raise this question itself and present it for the consideration of the litigants in this case.  There is another ground also.  Where a cause of action is stated in the  name of one  person and the  proofs show that the real  party in interest  is another person  wholly  distinct, the court should not permit  the judgment to stand  even though  the question is not  specifically raised.  In  such case there is no foundation upon which to base a judgment in favor of the plaintiff as there is  a failure of proof of a cause of action in favor  of the moving party.  Justice will not  permit  us to overlook  a case  of that character and send it on to the future with the implied sanction which such action would give.

We are not unmindful of the force of the principle that courts, generally speaking, should not decide cases upon points not presented and argued, without giving the parties an opportunity to  be heard upon such  questions;  and in reversing this judgment we do so with the knowledge that the  defeated party may make application  for reargument within the time prescribed by the rules of this court.

The judgment is hereby reversed and  the application dismissed.   So ordered.

Mapa,  Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ.,  concur.