The appellant in his brief  makes this  statement  concerning these three causes of action: 

"The three cases to which this brief refers were all tried in the Court of  First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial  District;  they  all deal with expropriation;  they were considered by the same commissioners,  whose decision for the second was  based upon that  for the first and for the third upon that for the second;  the proceedings in these cases were identical; with the  exception of three in case No.  6259 represented by William Kincaid, all the defendants are represented by the attorney Legaspi Florendo; the judgment in each was rendered on the same day;  the later proceedings for a  new trial have been identical; and the errors upon which  this appeal is based are the same in all three cases: the appellant therefore prays the  court  to permit submission  of a single brief to point out the  errors incurred by the trial court, and to demonstrate their existence, thus making this work applicable to each of the cases, and  with consideration of this consolidation of proceedings to decide these three cases at the same time as if they were a single  case."

On the 18th day of February, 1907, the plaintiff began these actions for the condemnation of real estate lying in the Province of Pangasinan upon  which to construct  its line from the village of Dagupan, Pangasinan, to the village of  San  Fabian in the same province.   On the  20th  of February of the same year, the plaintiff having made the deposit required by law, the court dictated an order granting possession to the plaintiff of the lands described in  its complaint and involved in this appeal.  Commissioners were duly appointed to  appraise their  value  and to render a report to the court.  On the 31st of August, 1909, the commissioners presented their report.   The parties to the ac- tion appeared by their attorneys, agreed  to the report  of the commissioners, and presented  the same to the court for its approval.   The court being  of the opinion  that the report was correct and the values therein expressed just and equitable, and the parties appearing and consenting thereto, entered judgment in conformity with such report, declaring the lands condemned on behalf of the plaintiff and ordering payments to be made pursuant  thereto.   Some  time after the entry of said  judgment the plaintiff excepted to the same and made a motion for a new trial upon the  grounds expressed in section 497 of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure, which  is the formal motion which lays  the basis for  a consideration of the facts by the Supreme  Court on appeal. Later a motion was made by the plaintiff for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.   Still later the plaintiff made  a motion  for  a new  trial on  the  ground that its consent to the entry of the judgments  in question had been given under a mistake.   These motions  having been denied the plaintiff excepted and  comes to this court on appeal.

We regard this appeal  from the  judgment as  unsustainable.  In our opinion the judgment entered  in the court below was  one  entered by consent  of  parties.   That portion of the judgment of the trial  court affecting this particular point is as follows: 

"By  agreement between the parties, and with the consent of the court, the hearing on the report in this case was held on the 19th day of January, 1910.  Don Antonio Constantino appeared on behalf of the plaintiff,  Mr. James Ostrand on behalf of defendants  (naming them) and Don Mariano Legaspi for the other defendants, with the exception of the Insular Government and Carlos Villamil.  The latter on the 14th day of the month of January presented a motion  in  which  he stated that he was in  entire conformity with  the report  of the  commission presented to the court.  The Insular Government did not appear at all in this case.

*        *    *    *    *    *    *    *

"The report of the commissioners which appears in the record of this case is the only proof presented before me, and there being no opposition to said report, and the court being of the opinion that the same is correct, and  that the valuations therein  set forth and expressed are just and equitable, the same  ought to  be,  and is hereby, approved and affirmed."

In his denial of the motion for a new trial and that to reopen the judgment for the reason that the consent of the plaintiff had been given by mistake, the court said  in part:

"The attorneys for both parties having presented as the only proofs in the case the report of the commissioners, and having  accepted it as correct, and having prayed for  its approval by the court, and having moved the court to enter judgment in  conformity therewith.  *   *   * the motion is dismissed."

These facts stated by the court below in its final judgment and  in  its order denying  the motions referred  to stand uncontradicted in the record.  It is  undisputed that the parties to these cases duly appeared by their counsel and after consideration and deliberation consented to the entry of judgment  upon the report of the commissioners. They not  only consented  to the  entry of  such  judgment, but they  requested the entry  thereof.   This is also  undisputed.  The attorney  for  the plaintiff  attempted  to escape the consequences of  such consent and such request by the assertion in his application for a new trial that he had signed the written stipulation approving the report of the commissioners and requesting that judgment be entered in  conformity therewith under a misapprehension induced by the fact that he had not read the stipulation which he signed with sufficient care to understand what its contents were.  The court  below dismissed such excuse with scant ceremony.  It is entirely without merit and  presents not the slightest reason why the judgment of the court below should be disturbed.

A judgment by consent of the parties is more than a mere contract in pats;  having the sanction of the  court  and entered as its determination  of the controversy,  it  has all the force and effect of any other judgment, being conclusive as an estoppel upon the parties and their privies.

A judgment rendered upon an admission of fact  or by consent is conclusive on the parties to the same  extent as  though  rendered upon  a contest.   (Black on Judgments, sec. 705;  Railway Co. vs. U. S.,  113 U. S., 261; Burgess vs. Seligman, 107 U. S., 20; Thomson vs. Wooster, 114 U. S., 104; Bank vs. Higginbottom, 9 Peters, 48; U. S. vs. Parker, 120 U. S. 89.)

In the case of Harding vs.  Harding  (198 U. S., 317), at page 335, the court quotes with approval the doctrine set down in  the  case of Knobloch vs. Mueller (123  I11., 565) as follows:

"Decrees so entered  by consent can not be reversed, set aside, or impeached by bill of review or bill in the nature of a bill of review, except for fraud, unless it be  shown that the consent was not in fact given, or something was inserted as by consent that was not consented to.  (2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576; Webb vs.  Webb, 3  Swanst, 658; Thompson vs. Maxwell Land-Grant & R. Co., 95 U. S., 391, 24  L. ed., 481; Armstrong vs. Cooper, 11 I11., 540; Cronk vs. Tremble, 66 I11., 432; Haasi Chicago Bldg. Soc, 80 I11., 248; Atkinson vs. Manks, 1  Cow.,  693; Winchester vs.  Winchester, 121 Mass., 127; Allason i Stark, 9 Ad. & El., 225; Alexander vs. Ramsay, 5  Bell,  App., 69.  See also note to Duchess of Kingston's case, 2 Smith Lead. Cas.,  826 et seq.)  It is the general doctrine that such a decree is not reversible upon an appeal or writ of error, or by bill of review for error.   (Armstrong i Cooper, 11 I11., 540.)"

One who appears in court and consents to the entry of a judgment  against  him must be held to have  admitted the existence of every fact necessary to sustain the judgment except that of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action.  Such being the case,  and judgment having been entered upon such facts, an appeal from  such judgment  by way of bill  of exceptions, or otherwise, will not lie on behalf of the party according such consent.  The only remedy in such case  is an application to open the judgment upon the ground of fraud or mistake.  An appeal will lie from an order denying  such application to open, and, upon such appeal, the question will be properly raised and presented  whether or not the court below abused its discretion in its refusal to open the judgment.

In the  case at bar there  is absolutely no merit in the application of the plaintiff to  open the judgment entered by the trial court and such application was properly dismissed.

All of the questions raised on this appeal, except the one last above-mentioned, are  those which relate to facts which antedate the judgment in the court below and are those upon which  such judgment is  founded.  Questions  concerning these facts can not be  raised, as we have before stated, until the judgment itself has been opened and the matter placed before the court for readjudication.   (Casler vs. Chase, 160 Mo., 418.)

The contention of the appellant in the case at bar relative to the  change in the names of the  parties,  the extent of the lands described in the complaint, and the description thereof, are  facts  which antedate  the judgment,  which appeared  in the report of the commissioners, which were approved  as correct by the plaintiff itself, and upon which it itself asked that the court enter the judgment which is now before us  on this appeal.  All of these things were agreed to by the plaintiff and acted upon by the court in pursuance of such agreement.

Our conclusion that the judgment before us was entered upon consent of parties relieves us of the necessity of discussing the other questions presented on this appeal.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C, J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and  Trent, JJ., concur.
 
 

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  DISSENTING:

   
TORRES, J.,

The undersigned is  of the opinion that the  judgment appealed  from  should be set aside  and a new trial had; consequently he does not concur in the majority opinion.