On the 12th of August, 1911, the said appellees presented the following motion, asking for the dismissal of  the appeal in the present case. 

"Now  come the  appellees and  respectfully represent to the honorable Supreme  Court that the above-entitled cause is of the original jurisdiction  of the justice  of  the peace court of  Nagcarlang, La Laguna,  in which court  the action was first brought; that subsequently, through appeal, it was forwarded to the Court of First Instance  of La Laguna, where the same was tried and decided  by virtue of that court's appellate jurisdiction;  that in  view of the nature of this cause, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is final  and conclusive  and, consequently, nonappealable. Therefore the appellees respectfully pray this  honorable court  to declare the appeal improperly admitted and  to assess the costs against the appellant."

Said motion was duly set down for hearing, and on the 26th of August, 1911, it was denied in the following terms: 

"The  court,  upon deciding  the  motion  presented by Sr. Diokno in Case No. 7258,  Leonardo Lucido et al. vs. Romualdo Vita, for the recovery of a sum of money, wherein he asked that the appeal be declared to have been improperly admitted for the reason that the judgment of the Court  of First Instance was  final  and  conclusive,  said: 'The petition  is  denied, and the  proceedings in  the  case shall be  continued for the  determination by judgment of the main issues therein.' "

On the 17th of October, 1911, the defendant and appellant presented his printed bill of exceptions,  a copy of which was sent to the plaintiffs and appellees on the same day.

On the 23d  of October, 1911, the plaintiffs and appellees presented another motion, asking for the dismissal of the appeal, which was as follows: 

"Now  come the appellees  in  the above-entitled case and respectfully represent to the  honorable  Supreme Court: That the exception entered by the defendant against the judgment of the Court of First Instance, was made out of season, and the petitioners  therefore pray that  the appellant's bill of exceptions be declared to have been improperly admitted."

By an  examination of the  second motion, it will be noted that the  grounds upon which it is based necessarily existed at the  time of the presentation of the first motion to dismiss said appeal.   It seems to be a  rule well established by courts generally, that a second motion to  dismiss an appeal, based  on the  same grounds as the former  motion, or on grounds existing at the time of such former  motion, will, as a general rule, be denied.  (Nashua & L. R. Corp. vs. Boston & L. R. Corp., 51 Fed. Rep., 929; Hellings vs. Duvall, 131 Cal., 618; Dorn vs. Baker, 92 Cal., 194; Tyrrell vs. Baldwin, 78 Cal., 470; Bingham vs. Brumback, 24 111. App., 332; Ferguson vs. Bruckman,  164 N. Y., 481; Pettit vs. Hamlyn, 42 Wis., 434.)

A second  motion to dismiss an  appeal upon  grounds existing at the time the first motion was presented, should never be granted,  unless at the time of the denying of the first motion, permission was obtained to present a second. Appellants should not be  annoyed nor delayed by subsequent motions based upon  grounds existing at the time of a previous motion, made for the same purpose.  (King vs. Pony Gold Mining Co., 24  Mont., 470.)

Moreover it  will be noted that the  second motion  presented was a motion to dismiss the  appeal for the reason that the exception to the judgment in the court below had not been made within the time  prescribed by  law.   The appellant presented his bill of exceptions in  the court below, after  much  delay, upon the 23d of  June, 1911, for approval and certification.  The  plaintiffs and appellees were duly  notified that  said  bill of exceptions had  been presented to the court below for approval. They made no objection whatever to its  approval  and certification.   On the 7th of July, 1911, the judge  of the lower  court duly approved and certified said bill of exceptions, without any exception whatever from the appellees.  Where the parties in the lower court have received  a copy of a bill of exceptions, with due notice of its presentation  for approval to the lower  court,  and fail to present  to the lower court objections against the approval of the same, the Supreme Court  will be  slow to  dismiss the  appeal upon  grounds which  existed at the time  the bill of exceptions was  presented in the lower court for approval, especially when the parties have waited until after the appellants have incurred the expense  of printing  their bill  of exceptions in the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the said motion of October 23, 1911, is hereby denied.

Arellano, C. J,, Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ. Motion denied.