The information in this  case charges the defendant and appellant with the  crime  of  hurto (theft)  committed as follows: 

"That one day in the month of July of the present year, 1910, in this municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said defendant, F.  Wickersham, being chief clerk in the office of the Quartermaster of the United States Army in Iloilo, did willfully, maliciously and criminally, and without violence, intimidation or force toward persons  or things,  abstract, take  possession of,  and steal, for the  sake of personal gain  and without the consent of the  owner and by abusing the confidence  of  his chief, various  checks  belonging to the United  States, credited to Captain L. F. Garrard of the  United States Army in Iloilo, to wit:

Check No. 141528 ......................................................	P344.00
Check No. 139856 ......................................................	525.48
Check No. 141471 ......................................................	212.00
Check No. 137651 ......................................................	272.00
Check No. 137691 ......................................................	10.00
Check No. 141489 ......................................................	1,500.00
	2,863.48

and, in coin, the sum of P178.08, making: a total of P3,041.56 Philippine currency; the checks above  mentioned having been  drawn  on  the  Treasury  of the  Philippine Islands, depositary of the Treasury of the United States.  Acts in violation of law."

There is no controversy as to the facts, the defendant and appellant, through his counsel, having admitted the truth of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defendant was the chief  clerk in  the quartermaster's office in Iloilo, to whom was intrusted the combination  and the key to the quartermaster's safe.  He did not, however, have charge of the cash book, which was kept by another clerk in  the office; nor  did he have authority to open the safe or to withdraw funds therefrom except at the direction of his superior officer, the quartermaster, who was in charge of the safe and  its contents, and under whose  immediate control it was.  The only duty of the defendant in regard to the safe and its contents was to keep safely the combination and the key, and to open and  close it at the direction of his superior officer, the quartermaster in charge of the  office;  he  had no  control whatever over the contents of the safe and  was not charged with  the withdrawal or distribution of the funds, checks and other property which were kept in  it.

During the absence of his superior officer and while in a state of intoxication, defendant opened the safe  and  abstracted therefrom the  cash and checks described in  the information.  Before judgment of conviction in the court below, the cash and all of the checks were recovered,  except three which were indorsed by the parties to whom the defendant sold them, and paid by the Treasurer of  the Philippine Islands,  upon whom they were drawn.  The face value of these checks was  refunded to the quarter-master, so that at the time when judgment was entered in the court below all of the stolen  property  or its value had been recovered.

Counsel for appellant, without denying that  the  record discloses highly reprehensible  conduct in the abstraction of the checks and cash from the safe, and the negotiation of some of the checks, contends nevertheless that the judgment of the lower  court  should be reversed on various grounds.

Counsel insists that the trial court  erred in refusing to declare the information fatally  defective because, as counsel contends, it does not set out the value  of the stolen checks. Counsel apparently does not deem the use of the sign T in the information  a sufficient designation  or equivalent of the term "pesos Philippine currency," and he  insists that the tabulated form  in  which  the checks are described in the  information does not affirmatively disclose that  the checks were worth the amount for which it is alleged they were drawn.  Counsel's contention can not be sustained. The sign or character V is generally accepted in these Islands as the equivalent of the words peso or pesos Philippine currency; by Executive Order  No. 44 dated Manila, October 29, 1904, this character was made the official "designation for the new  Philippine  pesos," and since that date its use for that purpose has become uniform and universal. We think that the allegation that the defendant stole  the checks described in  the tabulated statement set out in  the information, and the sum of Pl78.08 in cash "which amount in all to the sum of P3,041.56 pesos Filipinos," is a sufficiently definite allegation of the value of the stolen property; and that it is so clear and explicit as "to leave no room for doubt in the mind of any person of even rudimentary intelligence" that it meant to charge the defendant with the theft of the sum of money therein mentioned and of the checks therein described, the total value of which was the sum therein indicated, the value of each separate check being the amount for which  it was  drawn as set out in the tabulated statement. 

"The bill of rights for the Philippines, giving the accused the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him does not fasten forever upon those Islands the inability of the seventeenth century common law to understand or accept  a pleading that did not exclude every misinterpretation capable of  occurring  to  intelligence  fired with a desire to pervert."   (Paraiso vs. United States, 207 U. S., 368; 11 Phil. Rep., 799.)

Counsel also .contends that whatever be the nature of the offense committed by  the  defendant  in  abstracting money and checks from  the safe of which he carried the key, it is not theft (hurto).  His argument is that one can not steal from one's self, and that one who misappropriates funds or other personal property which are under his control  may perhaps  be  convicted of some offense  of  the nature of estafa (embezzlement), or misappropriation or defalcation of  public funds if  the funds  abstracted  are public funds; but that theft necessarily implies the taking of property from the  possession of another.  We do not question the soundness of the legal proposition thus stated, but as we understand the admitted facts in this case, the defendant did not have the funds and property contained in the safe under his control'.  He had no authority of his own volition to withdraw  funds from the  safe upon any pretext  whatever.  The funds were placed in the safe and could  only be taken from it by his superior officer or by his order.  Defendant's possession of the key and the combination of the safe gave him no control over the contents. His relation to the contents of  the safe  was merely that of a guard whose duty it was to see that no one but his superior officer  had access  to the  funds,  and he had no more right of disposition of the contents of the safe than has a watchman of a warehouse  to  whom the key is intrusted the right to dispose of its contents.   In  the  case of U.  S. vs. Webster  (6 Phil. Rep., 393), the defendant was a  forage  master in  charge  of Government  forage, subject to the orders of the quartermaster, who was directly responsible therefor to the owner, the United  States Government, and without  whose  order no  forage  could be issued.  The forage master had no authority to issue any orders or give out any forage except upon the requisition of the  quartermaster, nor  was he  authorized to  receive money on account of sales of this forage.  Without such authority and without an order from the quartermaster he disposed of hay and oats to the value of some P2,015, for which he failed to account  to the Government.  In that case we said: 

"The qualified charge of this forage, subject to the orders of a superior, who alone was responsible to the Government for it, without the right on the  part  of the accused to sell it or to part  with the  physical custody  of it unless on written orders,  was not such  a  possession as to render the abstraction  of the property by him  malversation  instead of theft."

Counsel's remaining contentions may,  for convenience, be summed up in the proposition that since, as counsel suggests, checks have  no value in themselves, or at  most a mere nominal value, that is, the value  of the piece of paper on which they are written, they are not properly the subject  of larceny; and that whatever offense is committed by one who abstracts a check, the property of another, and thereafter negotiates it,  it  is not theft.   It is contended that the offense of abstracting and negotiating  a check may be estafa  (embezzlement)  or one  of its  kindred  offenses, but that it is not theft.  This was the theory of the common law under which commercial paper was not the subject of larceny,  for the reason, as it was said, that it has no intrinsic value, and is merely an evidence or token of the  existence of money  or  property  elsewhere.   The common law  rule,  however, has been abrogated in  most American  jurisdictions  by  statutes making  commercial papers  the subject of larceny  (18 Am.  &  Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 515)  and it is not in force in these Islands.   The supreme court of Spain has repeatedly  held that checks (cheques) and other commercial papers (valores) are subjects of larceny.   Decisions of March  16,  1899,  and of March 7, 1900.

In those States where commercial paper  has by statute been made the  subject of  larceny,  the  statute  generally provides that  the face value shall "be taken, prima facie, as its  value for  the purpose of the statute, though this last provision is not universal.   In Vermont,  commercial paper was by statute made the subject of larceny without any regulation as to its value.  In the recently decided case of State vs. McClellan  (23 L, R. A. (N. S.) 1063), an unendorsed check was held to be the subject of larceny, and for the purpose of  determining the degree  of  the  crime  its value was  held  to be its face value, or the amount for which  it was  drawn and which could have been realized upon it by its legal owner.

A check in  the hands of  its lawful owner is something more than a  mere evidence or token of the existence of money  elsewhere.  It  is an instrument  which,  from  its peculiar qualities as a commercial document, places certain funds  under the special control of its  lawful holder so long as he retains it in his possession.  It confers upon its holder exceptional and peculiar powers as to the disposition of the funds against which it is drawn,  and enables him to realize  those funds without regard to  the mutual relations existing  between himself and the drawer of the check or the depository wherein the funds are actually placed. Furthermore,  as  a  result of the peculiar  qualities  of a check as a commercial instrument,  the  lawful  holder, so long as he retains possession, has not only the right to the funds against which it is drawn, but a claim against the drawer and previous endorsers  in the event of  a failure of these funds in  whole or in  part; provided,  however, there is due diligence on his part in asserting his claim, and in case of endorsers in protesting the  check in  the event of nonpayment.  The loss of possession of  a check deprives the owner of the immediate control of the funds against which it is drawn, and may involve the loss of the fund itself, unless he adopts prompt and efficient measures to protect  himself; indeed if the check be made payable to bearer its  abstraction from his possession exposes him to the  risk of Joss of the fund without redress except only as  against the  guilty person.  Manifestly these peculiar qualities which  the law  confers upon commercial instruments  of this kind, and  the exceptional incidents attaching  to such  instruments  in the hands of a lawful owner, give them  an actual substantial value in his hands which may and should be measured by the amount of cash which may be realized  upon them, that is to say, in the case of a good and valid check, by its face value; and evidence that a check is  a good and valid check is prima facie proof that it is worth its face value in the hands of the lawful owner. We  are of opinion that  a check  is  in a  very real sense personal property, and that  when abstracted with the intention of  converting it to the  use of the person taking it, the abstraction of the check constitutes a taking of persona] property from the possession of another, defined and penalized as the crime of hurto (theft) in the Penal Code.

As to unendorsed checks made payable to order, the contention that  they are of  no  value seems also to be based on the theory that the value of stolen property  is to be determined by its condition when taken; that a check payable to order is an incomplete instrument as long as it remains unendorsed;  that no one can draw  money on a stolen check in  the condition in which it  is found at the time of the theft as long  as it remains unendorsed by the payee; and that consequently stolen checks payable to order have only  a  nominal  value at the time of the theft.  We are  of opinion,  however, that it  is not  necessary that the subject matter of a larceny should be of value to a third person if  valuable  to the owner, and the value of good and  valid checks and  similar commercial  paper to the  owner is, as we have seen, the amount  which he is entitled  to receive therefor,  ordinarily their face value, that is to  say the amount for which they are drawn.   In the case  at bar the defendant took personal property of this character from  the constructive possession of  its owner with the intention  of converting: it  to  his own  use.  The fact, admitting that it was a fact, that he could not make use  of this property in the condition  in  which it was at the  moment when  he  deprived the owner of it  without indorsing it, does not and ought not to determine its value when he is called  to account for his criminal  act.  The checks in the hands of  their lawful owners were completed instruments.  They gave their lawful owner control of the amount of currency corresponding to their face value, with the power  of transferring that  control by an appropriate endorsement; and  indeed  the lawful  owner  might have realized  their substantial value  without indorsement,  for endorsement was not absolutely essential to the value of these checks in the hands of an honest holder.  A formal assignment in an appropriate public instrument and perhaps a parol agreement  with manual  delivery would have been sufficient for that purpose: as between the assignor and assignee, such an assignment would be complete and effectual, and the holder of a check thus assigned could enforce his right therein  by appropriate legal proceedings.  So far,  therefore, as the  lawful holder of a check payable to order  is  concerned, its value is the same whether he has actually endorsed it, or has yet to do so before demanding payment.

We find  no prejudicial error in the proceedings in the court below; the judgment of conviction and the sentence based thereon should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.   So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.