The record in this case discloses that Placida Agraviador, the  grandmother of the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, died  intestate February  14, 1907; that at the time of her death she was a widow; that  she was the mother of nine children, including the defendants Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias Apurado, and  Filomeno Apurado, and  also Hipolita Apurado, who died before her  mother; that  the latter was the mother  of  several children, including Eusebia  Broce, one of the  plaintiffs in  this action,  now married to her co-plaintiff,  Silverio  Vicente; that a tract of land containing some 45 hectares, situated at a place called Tiboco, in the jurisdiction of San Carlos in the Province of Occidental Negros, and fully described in the complaint, constitutes a part of the intestate estate left by Placida Agraviador, deceased; that this intestate estate has never been divided between the heirs, judicially or  extrajudicially, and that up to the time of the trial it had not been made the subject of judicial administration; that on the 24th day of November, 1909, the  defendants, Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias Apurado and Filomena Apurado, sons  of Placida Agraviador,  each  sold his interest in  this land, which was claimed  to be  a one-sixth part thereof,  to the defendant Pedro de la Vina for the  sum of P800.

Plaintiff, Eusebia  Broce,  in this action, which was instituted January 26,  1910, prays that  she be subrogated in place of the defendant Pedro de Li Vina as purchaser  of the interests in  the land in  question  purchased by him  from her coheirs,  and offers to reimburse him the amount paid by him, with interest from the date of  his purchase.   Judgment was  rendered in  her favor  in the  court  below, and the defendant, Pedro de  la Vina, was therein  directed to execute the necessary documents transferring the interests in the land in  question purchased by  him to the plaintiff Eusebia  Broce,  upon the  payment by her of the sum  of P2,400 with  legal interest from the 24th day

In the court  below plaintiffs' right of subrogation was opposed on two  grounds: First, that an extrajudicial partition of the intestate estate of Placida Agraviador, deceased, had been  made  in the year  1908, by  virtue of which the brothers who sold  their interests in the land in question to the defendant De la  Vina had  each become the absolute owner of the one-sixth part thereof sold by him, the plaintiff Eusebia Broce having no right, title or  interest in the  property sold, from  and after the date of the partition; and second, that even if it be admitted that no such partition was in fact made, and that the plaintiff, as one of the heirs of  Placida Agraviador, deceased, has an undivided interest in the land in question, nevertheless her right to be subrogated in the place of the purchaser of the shares of some of her co-owners prescribed by the lapse of time between the sale and the date of her claim to be thus subrogated.

The trial judge completely disposes of the first contention "in a careful review  of the testimony, wherein he shows that  no  lawful extrajudicial partition of the  estate  was made.

Section 596 of Act No. l90 provides as follows: 

"Whenever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age  and legal capacity, and  there  are no debts  due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs,  the heirs may,  by  a family council as known under Spanish law, or by  agreement between  themselves, duly  executed in  writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in the court"

Section 598 of the same code provides that: 

"Such distribution of an estate outside the courts shall not be effective unless all the heirs assent thereto in writing."

There  are indications in the evidence of record that some of the heirs but not all  of them,  undertook to execute a partition  agreement, and it  was  intimated in the  court below that this projected agreement was reduced to writing. But this alleged written partition  agreement, was not produced at the trial, and the failure to produce it, in view of the other evidence of record, leaves no room for doubt that no written agreement signed by all the heirs to the estate was ever executed; and we agree with the trial judge that whatever tentative agreement in  regard to the partition of the estate may have been entered into by some of the heirs, the plaintiff in this action, Eusebia Broce,  was  not a party thereto.

Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides  that: 

If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the coheirs may  subrogate themselves  in the  place  of  a purchaser, reimbursing him  for  the value of the purchase,  provided they  do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof."

Plaintiff's claim of  a right to be subrogated in place of the defendant as the purchaser of the interests of some of her coheirs in the intestate estate of her grandmother is based upon  this  article,  and  the real  contention of  the defendant  in this court is that she failed to exercise  her rights of subrogation  within the  period of a month from the time when she was informed of the sale of the interests of  her coheirs to  the  defendant; indeed, defendants  claim that these sales were made with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs.   There is nothing in  the record, however, which sustains or even tends  to  sustain defendants' contention.  The sales were made on  the  24th day of November, 1909, and an  attempt was made to prove that Silverio Vicente, the co-plaintiff and husband of the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, had knowledge of the sales before  the end of that month or early in  the  month of December.  This is denied by  the husband and we think it is quite clearly established that if he knew anything whatever in  regard to the transaction, his information was based wholly on current rumor, and was so indefinite and uncertain that it could not have imposed upon him any obligation  to exercise or to decline to exercise a right of  subrogation under the provisions of the above  cited article of  the Civil  Code,  even had  he himself been the  directly interested party.  There is  no proof whatever in the  record as to the time when Eusebia Broce, herself, had notice of the sales of the shares of her coheirs to the defendant De la Vina, other than her own testimony that she learned that these sales  had been made, some time about the middle of the month of January, 1910. Her husband admits that during  the month of December, 1909,  he heard rumors as to the sales, and  alleges  that immediately thereafter he made diligent effort to ascertain the truth of these  rumors.  He employed an attorney and with his assistance made inquiry at the office of the registrar  of property  of Occidental Negros,  but found no documentary  evidence or other record  in  regard to the transaction.   He called on the notary who was said to have written the document, but could not at that time secure any accurate  information as to the contents of the  deeds of sale, because the notary's books had been forwarded to the clerk of the court at Bacolod for some purpose. Later, on or about the 14th day of January, 1910, plaintiff's attorney for  the first time learned the date and time of the sales, and the parties  thereto, from a record found in the office of the clerk of the court at Bacolod, and immediately notified the plaintiffs  of the facts thus discovered.   This action was commenced twelve days later, on the 26th day of January, 1910, by the filing of  the complaint in the  Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros.  In our opinion the record clearly discloses that the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, when she received the first  authentic information as to the terms and conditions  of the sale of  the property of her coheirs to the defendant De  la Vina, undertook to assert and did in fact  assert her right  to subrogation  within the period of thirty days prescribed in the above set-out article of the Civil Code.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the trial judge properly recognized her claim to subrogation, and that the judgment of the lower  court should  be affirmed, with the  costs of this instance against the appellants.  So ordered.

Torres, Mapa,  Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.