This is  an appeal  by the defendant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon. A. S. Crossfield presiding, reversing the  findings of certain commissioners  who  rejected the claim of the plaintiff presented against the estate of Francisco Martinez, deceased,  and finding in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P12,000.

The learned trial  court in the opinion which forms the basis of his judgment said;

"From  the evidence  presented  at the  trial it appears that on the 29th day of January,  1906, a judgment was entered in this court by Hon. John C. Sweeney, one of the judges thereof, in  favor of Mariano Yap-Tuangco against the deceased Francisco  Martinez for the sum  of  twelve thousand  pesos;

"That there was a  contract agreement between the plaintiff in that judgment and the above mentioned Joseph N. Wolfson and one  Basilio Regalado  y Mapa to  the  effect that said  Wolfson  and Mapa should  have as their fees for prosecuting the  case fifty per cent  of whatever amount might be  obtained;

"That subsequently said Mapa assigned his interest in said contract to the said Wolfson; 

"That subsequently and on the 18th day of June, 1907, the plaintiff Mariano Yap-Tuangco, for value received, sold and transferred and  delivered to said Wolfson all his right, title and interest in and to the  aforementioned judgment."

The question  raised  on this appeal is  whether or  not under the provisions of article  1459 of the Civil  Code the plaintiff, Joseph N. Wolfson, was prohibited from purchasing the judgment of  his client in such manner and to such extent that the contract of which  such  purchase  was  a part was  absolutely  null and  void and could be attacked by a person not a  party to  the  transaction.  The  article in question reads as follow:

"Art. 1459. The  following  persons  can not acquire by purchase,  even at  public or  judicial  auction, neither in person nor by an agent:

"1.  The guardian or protutor, the property of the person or persons who may be under their guardianship.

"2. Agents,  the property the administration or sale of which may have been intrusted to them.

"3.  Executors, the property intrusted to their  care.

"4.  Public officials, the property of the State, municipalities, towns, and also of public institutions, the administration of which has been intrusted to them.

"This provision shall  apply to  judges and experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale.

"5. Associate justices, judges,  members of the department of public prosecution, clerks  of superior and inferior courts, and officials of justice,  the property  and  rights in litigation before the court in the jurisdiction or territory over which they exercise their respective duties, this prohibition including the act of acquiring by assignment. "From this  rule  shall be excepted  the cases  in  which hereditary actions among coheirs  are  involved, or assignments in payment of debts, or security for the goods they may possess. 

"The prohibition contained in this number shall include the lawyers and solicitors with regard  to the property and rights, which may be the object of the litigation,  in  which they may take part by virtue of their profession and office."

On this appeal we do  not discuss or decide the question whether or not  the judgment in question actually falls within the prohibition of the article, it being the disposition of a majority of the court to  place the decision wholly upon the proposition that, even if it be conceded that the purchase of the judgment in question was within the prohibition  of the article quoted, nevertheless,  the  contract of purchase and sale is not void but voidable at the election of the vendor.   This being so, its voidability can not be asserted by one not a party to the transaction, or his representatives.

Manresa, commenting on this section, says;

"Considering the question from the point of view of the civil law, the view taken by the code, we must limit ourselves to classifying as void all acts done contrary to the express  prohibition of  the statute.   Now then: As the  code does not recognize such nullity by the mere operation of law, the nullity of the acts herein before referred to must be asserted by the person having the necessary legal capacity to do so and  decreed by a competent court.   Chapter 6, title 2,  book 4 of the code contains the provisions applicable to the matter  under  consideration."  (Manresa, Spanish Civil Code, vol.  10, p. 108.)

Article 1257 of the Civil Code reads ;

"Contracts shall be valid only  between the parties  who execute them and their heirs, except,  with regard to the latter, the  case in which the rights and obligations arising from the contract are  not transmissible,  either by  their nature, or  by agreement, or by provision of law. 

"Should  the contract contain any stipulation in favor of a  third person, he may demand its fulfillment, provided he has given notice of his acceptance to the person bound before it may have been revoked."

Commenting on articles 1457, 1458, and 1459 of the Civil Code, Manresa says:

"From this statement of the rule and its relation to the succeeding articles, these  consequences logically follow: (1)  That there  are no incapacities except  those expressly mentioned  in the law and that such incapacities can not be extended to other cases  by implication for the reason that such construction would  be in conflict with the very nature of the  provision; (2)  That as a general rule those who can bind themselves have  also legal capacity to buy and sell; (3)  That there are certain exceptions  to  this rule;  (4) That the incapacity to buy or sell may be absolute or relative;  (5)  That such incapacity  is absolute in the^Jase of persons who can not bind  themselves;  (6) That relative incapacity may exist with reference to certain persons or a certain class of property."  (Manresa, Spanish Civil Code, vol. 10, p. 87.)

Article 1302 of the Civil Code reads: 

"The action for nullity of contracts may be brought by those who are principally or subsidiarily obligated by virtue thereof.  Persons with  capacity can not,  however, allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; neither those who caused the intimidation or violence, or employed deceit, or caused the error,  can base their  action on these defects of the contract."

Manresa, commenting on  the latter article, says:

"Two  different requisites  are required  to  confer  the necessary capacity for  the  exercise of  such action.  With each of the said requisites the two paragraphs of this  section deal separately.   The first requisite is that the plaintiff must have an interest in the contract.  The second  is that the victim and not the  party responsible for the defect is the person who must assert the same."  (Manresa, Spanish Civil Code,  vol. 8, p. 737.)

"It was declared  in  a judgment of  the 18th  of April, 1901, in accordance with the rule hereinbefore stated, that he who is not a party to a  contract, or an assignee thereunder, or does  not represent  those who took part therein, has,  under  articles 1257 and  1302 of the  Civil  Code, no legal capacity to challenge  the validity of  such  contract." (Manresa, Spanish Civil Code, vol. 8, p.  788.)

In relation to the same  matter  the  supreme court of Spain on the 23d of November, 1903, published  a decision [p. 702]  in  which appears the following: 

"The judgment appealed  from in  so far as  it declares that  the instrument of  dissolution of the partnership between  A and B  was null and void  for the  reason that the plaintiff  was not bound, either principally  or subsidiarily, by the said  instrument, is  contrary to the provisions of article 1302 of the Civil Code."

Even if the sale of the judgment in  question is found comprehended within the  prohibition of article  1459,  a question which we do not now decide, still  the defendant is not entitled to invoke the terms of said article  for the reason,  above stated, that such prohibition  is personal to the parties to the contract,  being available only to them or their representatives.

For these reasons  the judgment of the court below is affirmed without special finding as to costs.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.