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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cc32?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[VICENTE QUIOGUE v. L. P. MCKEEHAN ET AL.](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cc32?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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20 Phil. 334

[ G.R. No. 6774, October 06, 1911 ]

VICENTE QUIOGUE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. L. P. MCKEEHAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance  of the city of Manila, the Hon. A. S.  Crossfield presiding, in favor of the  plaintiff for  the sum of P471.65, with  interest thereon  at the  rate of 6  per cent per annum from the 1st day  of July, 1910, and for the costs  of the action.

The learned  trial court in the opinion upon which his judgment is based says:

"From the evidence presented at the trial I find that the plaintiff  is  engaged in the  undertaking business in the city of Manila, and that the defendant is engaged  in the same business.

"That  the defendant organized a  corporation under the laws of the  Philippine  Islands on the 10th day of February, 1910, and caused articles of incorporation to be recorded,

"That  the plaintiff was aware that such corporation had been  duly created, but it  does not  appear that there  was ever any real organization by election of officers, or otherwise,  though the defendant assumed to act as president and manager of the  corporation, and appointed a secretary, but there appear to  have been  no other officers.

"The plaintiff testified  that he was unaware  that the said corporation had gone into business, and that when he furnished the supplies, while he knew  the defendant  was organizer of the corporation, he did not sell any supplies furnished in his capacity as agent or manager of the corporation, but to him personally, and  it does  not appear except by far drawn inference that the defendant advised the plaintiff when purchasing the goods that he was acting for the corporation, or disclosed in any way his agency.

"The secretary of said corporation testified that he was acting for  the  defendant when  a  part of the goods was received,  and that nothing was said as to whom the goods were being purchased by, or by the plaintiff to  whom they were sold, but that he supposed it was on account of the business known as the 'American Undertaking Company.' 

"I  can but conclude from a  preponderance  of  the evidence, that the plaintiff sold the merchandise in question to the defendant in his personal capacity, and that  the defendant having failed specifically to disclose his agency became personally responsible for the merchandise in question."

There is a strong  conflict of evidence in this case,  the plaintiff asserting and testifying positively that under the contract of sale the articles which are the subject  of this suit were sold and delivered to the  defendant personally and not to the corporation in question, while the defendant asserts and testifies with equal positiveness that the contract of sale was between the plaintiff and the corporation which the defendant claims to have represented at the time.

This court will reverse a judgment  of  the  trial court upon  the facts only when it appears that  it is against a fair preponderance of the evidence.  We do not feel that we can assert from a careful reading  of the  evidence  in the case  that  the  judgment in question  has  that vice. Taking into consideration the conflict of evidence  and also the fact, which  we regard as of considerable importance, that, prior to the sales and services involved in suit, there had never been a meeting of the stockholders of the corporation, that no officers had ever been elected, that no one had ever  been authorized to act  for said corporation and that if the defendant  was acting as agent for the  corporation he was an official de facto and  not de jure, we  are constrained to the conclusion that we would not be warranted in disturbing the conclusion of the trial court.

The judgment  of the court below  is  affirmed, without special finding as  to costs.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.


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