On December  10, 1868, Antonio Perez acquired by  purchase a parcel of land for building purposes, situate in the district of  Ermita of  this city, at No. 148 Calle San  Luis. He died on May 15,1881, leaving a widow,  Angela Echarri, and a daughter named Luisa Perez Echarri, who on March 28,1904, sold the said lot to Inocente Echarri, and the latter erected  thereon a house  valued at P8,000. 

On July 22,1908,  or twenty-seven  years after the decease of  Antonio Perez, the original  owner of  the lot,  certain parties named Gregoria Castro and Mercedes Calderon sued Inocente Echarri for five-twelfths of said lot, calling themselves  daughters of one Maria and nieces of  one  Justa whom  they say were daughters  of Antonio Perez in his first marriage with a woman named Eugenia Garcia.  The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila awarded them 8,333.33/17,500 of the  lot.

Defendant appealed, and from this appeal, with the briefs of the litigants, it appears:   

1. That it is  a fact proven by the purchase deed that the original owner of  the lot was Antonio Perez,  without any mention whatsoever in said  deed that he was married.      
   
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3. That in no way, either by documentary or oral evidence,  has it been directly proven by  the plaintiffs that at that time he was married to any woman with whom he must under the law share  the property acquired  during marriage.    
   
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5. That it is an established fact, admitted by both parties, that Antonio  Perez was  married  in 1872  to Maria Meneses, by whom he  had a son, but both said wife and son died  before Antonio Perez did;  so that they  in no way figure  in this suit.     
   
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7. That it is also an  established  fact, admitted by both parties, that Antonio Perez at his death left a widow named Angela Echarri and a daughter by her, Luisa Perez Echarri.
   
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9. That this Luisa Perez Echarri is the only person who appears undoubtedly to be the successor in interest and the heir of Antonio Perez  by  operation of law,  both  in  the testate and the intestate succession.
          
10. That it appears from a  piece of documentary evidence, consisting of an authentic  public  document,  that  before dying Antonio Perez executed a will; but this will could not be produced, and therefore his final  statements and dispositions can not be known.
    
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12. That for the purpose of making a partition of inheritance in the intestate succession of Antonio Perez in which." the plaintiffs may figure, it is  in every way necessary to prove that the original owner married Eugenia Garcia before he  married his  other  two  successive wives,  whose marriages are satisfactorily proven; that he was already married to Eugenia Garcia when he purchased the  lot in question; that in this first marriage he had two daughters, named Maria and Justa; and that from Maria sprang legitimately, that is, as daughters of a legal marriage  under the laws then in force,  Gregoria  de Castro and Mercedes Calderon,  who claim to be the lawful granddaughters of Antonio Perez.
    
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14. That there is not the least evidence in the record  of the fact that Gregoria de Castro  and Mercedes Calderon are the lawful daughters of  this Maria;  that there is only fragmentary evidence of the fact that this Maria was the lawful daughter of Antonio Perez.

These facts are denied in the defendant's reply, and  in the brief accompanying his  assignment of errors,  in arguing upon the second assignment of error, he elucidates with a prolixity of data the legal impossibility of such facts.  But such contention need not be considered  here, especially as there are other arguments  more conclusive, which the court must necessarily consider.

These arguments are  as follows:

The present action does not concern a partition of inheritance but  is an  action for recovery against a third  party who possesses the lot in question by single deed of purchase. This third party is not a  successor  in interest of Antonio Perez, and thus called upon either to defend or impugn the rights of  succession  of  the alleged children  of Antonio Perez, but he is the sole successor of Luisa Perez in ownership and possession of said lot, for the acquisition of which he had before him facts  and documents that have not been denied, not even indirectly, nor in  any way impugned.  He is now disturbed in his possession by this suit, based upon facts which he could  not have conveniently taken into account  when  he made such acquisition in good faith, nor was he under obligation,  in the ordinary course of business, to make any inquiries.

The facts contained in the title deeds to the lot in question, which  that third party had before him in making his purchase, are established facts, adduced by the plaintiffs them- selves.  He saw, first, in the original  deed, that Inocencio and Perfecto Gallego, with a sister  of theirs, were the true and lawful owners of the lot, which was perfectly identified in the deed by location, dimensions and boundaries; second, he saw how Inocencio and Perfecto Gallego, haVing become owners  also of the part belonging to  their sister, had on December 10,1868, sold the lot, described in the same terms as in the deed, to Antonio Perez, the sale having taken place in this city of Manila before a notary public who, for that purpose, witnessed a document, the most formal that could be drawn up for the contract;  and,  finally, he  saw another public document also witnessed by a notary, beating date of January 11,  1888, seven years after the death of Antonio Perez,  wherein it appears that Angela Echarri, widow of Antonio Perez, sold with right of repurchase to a merchant of Manila, Antonio de Marcaida, said lot, identified by boundaries, dimensions and location, according to the foregoing documents of which mention has been made, and  stating "that said lot had been acquired  by her deceased husband, Don Antonio Perez,  according to the bill of sale executed on December 10, 1868, in the  presence of the notary public, Don Baltazar de Ocampo,  the original whereof, with  another original document of ownership, was, exhibited at the time and read by me [says the notary] and after they had been signed by me were attached here-to, to which I certify."  And although the period for the repurchase  was one  year, he saw that on December 17, 1888, the lot had been resold to Angela Echarri by Antonio de Marcaida.

This transaction of Angela Echarri's shows plainly: That she held the muniments of title to  the lot; that she exclusively possessed  the  lot for  seven years after the death of her husband, Antonio Perez; that during such time, no one had questioned the ownership or possession of the  lot; and, therefore, that  she could freely dispose of it by sale. and  the purchaser,  an intelligent  merchant of this city, had no  hesitation in  buying it.

She held the lot and disposed of it, it may be supposed, in the name and  on behalf of her daughter, Luisa Perez, who was then a minor, and who was apparently the  one who lawfully owned it.   It was hers, as the legal heir of the deceased Antonio Perez, and his only successor in interest after his death; and when she became of age, she, on March 28, 1904, that is, after twenty-three years of undisturbed and peaceful possession, sold it to the defendant in this case.

The Maria who is said to be the mother of the plaintiffs, died in this city, in Calle Mercado, Intramuros, according to the  certificate submitted; and there Mercedes Calderon says she lives.  It does not appear that during her lifetime, and up to 1908, when she appears to have died, Maria made any pretense of being a co-owner of  that lot; nor did  she or Justa, who is also said to have been a daughter of Antonio Perez, institute any action for the partition of what was said to be a legacy of their alleged father.  Only after the de.ath of Maria and of Justa was an attempt made to make a partition  of  Antonio  Perez's  legacy.

The following facts are clearly proven in this case:   

1. That  the defendant acquired  the lot from one who, for twenty-seven years, was in fact  before the world and in law, according to title deeds, the sole  legal owner tfirough inheritance, to wit, Luisa Perez.
      
2. That  it in no way  appears in the case that  she possessed the  lot jointly  and pro indiviso with  any other person having an  equal or a better right than hers to the legacy of her father, Antonio Perez.
   
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4. That  after May 16,  1887, Luisa Perez's  ownership was by  individual title, as the  only heir of Antonio Perez and the sole proprietor of the lot.
   
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6. That at no time has this  sole proprietor been either judicially or extra judicially cited  or  questioned, so that she should understand her ownership  to be in common or shared with other persons. 

The purchaser having bought the  lot under these  circumstances,  he acquired it  by a clear title, in a regular manner, and for a consideration.

So then, even supposing  what  is not  proven  - that is, that the plaintiffs  really are legitimate descendants of the women whom they claims as their mothers, and that these latter  were really  legitimate daughters of Antonio Perez, with better or  equal right over Luisa Perez - they can not, after twenty-seven  years, disturb a third-party, the defendant, a purchaser in good faith, who at present holds the lot by a clear  title, because he is thereby protected; for, even should  the title be in some way  defective, he would still be protected by the prescription for  a period of ten, and even  of twenty years,  by which  possession of real property may  be obtained.   (Civil  Code, arts. 1940 and 1957.)  In the  present case  the defendant would have acquired the lot  by prescription  for a period  of ten years, especially when it is proven  by the testimony of one of the plaintiffs and by documentary evidence that neither they nor their mothers have been abroad  or out of the country, in order to make the required  period twenty years.  (Art. 1958.)

The claim  of prescription having been presented in such form,  it must  not  be understood  to be restricted to  the prescription  of right of action, but must also include prescription of possession.

The "right to commence action" having been prescribed, it applies to negative as well as positive prescription, since the right of action lapses as to the person who acquires the possession  or ownership as well as to the one who is liable to lose the ownership or possession.

It is true that, under article  1965:

"Among coheirs,  co-owners,  or proprietors of  adjacent estates, the right of action to demand the division of the inheritance, of  the  thing held in common,  or the survey of the  adjacent  properties  does  not  prescribe;   *  *   * nevertheless, the imprescriptibility of the action to demand the division  of a succession  known in  Roman Law as famitiss  erciscundas, can not be invoked when one of the co-heirs  has  possessed the inheritance as owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription, because such action necessarily arises from the  possession in common or pro indiviso of the inheritance, as laid down by the Supreme Court in a judgment of April  15, 1904  *   *   *.  Moreover, it  must be remembered that, as was stated  in judgments of the same court of January 15, 1902, and June 22, 1904,  the  action  among  coheirs  or  co-owners  to  demand partition of the inheritance or division of a fund, to which said article applies, is distinct from the action for recovery involving ownership pro solido of the same fund, and if the question is one relating to the  recovery of inherited property or  a  part  of a  common estate,  and not of partition, the prohibition in said article is not applicable."  (12 Manresa, Com. on Civil Code, 858.)

For the  foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed, without special finding as to costs.   So  ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.