On the 18th day of June, 1910, the prosecuting attorney of the  Province of Cebu presented the following complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province: 

"That on or  about the 30th day of May,  1910,  in  the municipality of Cebu, of this province and  judicial district. the said Valentin Fonseca and Joaquin Magno, having sworn before the court to testify, declare, and certify truly, and having signed  as  true their testimony,  declaration and certification, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, and contrary to their oath, testified and  subscribed to important facts  which they  did  not believe to be true,  as  follows: That the witness, during the trial of the civil case entitled Priscila Ouano et al., vs. Valentin Fonseca, held before this said court on the 27th, 28th and 30th days of May,  1910, declared that Valentin Fonseca was  the owner  of  the land involved in said cause and  that he had in his houses situated in the barrio of Talamban, municipality of Cebu,  deeds of gift, mortgage and purchase, the first two of which  referred to the land in question and the last to that  adjoining the land occupied by Joaquin  Magno; that the said accused do not believe and did not believe this declaration to  be true, a declaration which is absolutely false,  and  voluntarily sworn to contrary to their said oath, which is an infraction of the law."

Upon  said complaint an order of arrest  was  issued, the defendants were duly arrested, and on the 21st day of June presented the following demurrer to said complaint, alleging that: 

"1. The complaint is not drawn up  in accordance  with law. 

"2. The facts alleged therein do not constitute a crime. 

"Therefore, they ask that the complaint be dismissed and that the  accused be discharged."

After  hearing the arguments upon  said demurrer, the Hon. Adolph Wislizenus rendered the following decision:

"The  present complaint is evidently one drawn in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of Act No.  1697 of the Commission; this law is entitled as follows: 'An Act authorizing the appointment of commissioners to make official investigations  and fixing their  powers,  for the  payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations.'  The  most superficial reading of section 3 of said law shows that the said section provides for any false declaration whatsoever, made before the ordinary courts or before  any tribunal or  person  having power to require the presentation of an  oath and in no way limits it  to false testimony given in investigations  held by the said  commissioners, as is indicated by the title of the aforesaid Act.  We have then this condition, that under  a title,  definitely defined and limited, an  attempt has been made to  define crimes  which in no manner can be brought within the title of the Act.   The court  therefore believes that section 3  of Act No.  1697  is invalid, because it is inconsistent with Act  No. 6 of the aforesaid Commission. The present complaint drawn under the provisions  of  the said section 3, can not be held  to be valid by  the court unless it  is amended in a manner to indicate  that the prosecution is  based  on  the provisions of article 321  of  the Penal Code.  Act No.  1697 has  in no way abrogated  the provisions of the  Penal Code as to false testimony, and  the court, before deciding to sustain  or overrule the  demurrer interposed,  required  the prosecuting attorney  to  state whether  or not he desired  to  amend the complaint  in  the manner indicated. 

"The prosecuting attorney stated that he did not believe it either  necessary or  convenient to amend the complaint and preferred that the validity of section 3 of Act No. 1697 should be definitely decided by the Supreme Court. The judge, in  view of this statement of the prosecuting attorney, sustains the demurrer and orders  that the accused be set at liberty from their  present confinement."

From  this decision of the  lower court, sustaining the demurrer, the  prosecuting  attorney of said province appealed to this court.

The lower court found difficulty in sustaining  section 3 of Act No. 1697.  The  question of the validity of section 3 of said Act has already  been passed upon  by this  court. Evidently the attention of the lower court was not  called to the decisions in  the cases of U. S. vs. Concepcion (13 Phil. Rep., 424); U.  S.  vs. De Chaves  (14 Phil. Rep., 565); and U. S. vs.  Estrana (16 Phil Rep., 520).  All the difficulties which the lower court presents in his decision to the validity of said section 3 seem  to be conclusively answered in the decision in the case of U. S. vs. Concepcion, the objection as to the scope of said section, as well as to the contents and to the title of said law.  It is true that section 1 of Act No. 6 of the Laws of the Commission provides that "All laws shall, before the enacting clause, be  prefaced by a title stating  the purpose and  scope  of the Act," but,  as was said in  the case of U. S. vs. Concepcion,  "This provision being found only in an Act of the Commission, it was entirely within the power of the Commission to repeal it entirely or to disregard it in any particular case."  Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission is a general  law and there seems to be no provision of law which the Commission or Legislature are  obliged to follow requiring it to state specifically in the title of each Act the purpose and scope of such Act.  The only  provision  of law  relating  to this question is that found in section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1,1902, and is as follows: 

"That no private or local  bill which  may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

This provision is evidently mandatory and binding upon the legislature of the Philippine Islands, but it  had  no application  to  general laws.  However advisable  it may be for the legislature to follow said provision of section 1 of Act No. 6 for the information of the public, yet said provision (sec. 1, Act No. 6) is a mere rule for the guidance of the legislature and it may or may not follow  it at its pleasure, it being a rule for the guidance of the legislature simply.   In the cases above cited this court held  that the articles  of the Penal Code relating to perjury had been repealed by said Act  No.  1697, and that that  crime (perjury) is now defined and punished by section 3 of said Act

Therefore the judgment of the lower court sustaining the demurrer is hereby reversed and it is  hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the lower court and that the defendants be duly arraigned under said complaint.   Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.